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SPECULUM
A JOURNAL OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
CONTENTS
ARTICLES
THOMAS AQUINAS’ DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS HISs- ns ek bw ee ee Oe ea R. McKeon THE SPECULUM VIRGINUM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE i Te lie hd aa im ae ate. te ah A. Watson THE PERFECT PRINCE: A STUDY IN THIRTEENTH- AND FOUR- TEENTH-CENTURY IDEALS................ L. K. Born BYRHTPERTIOS PREFACE ....... ccc sccccce G. F. Forsry DIE VORLAUFER DES GOLIAS ................. B. Jarcno
Re BO FE ee ee ee ee J. BaLocu ZU PETRUS’ VON CLUNI PATRISTISCHEN KENNTNISSEN . M. Manrrivus A THIRTEENTH-CENTURY MANUSCRIPT FROM LLANTHONY
EE ee ae ee ae eae ee ea eee ee E. J. Holmyard and D. C. Mandeville, edd., Avicennae de Congelatione et Conglu-
tinatione Lapidum (A. Marx); F. M. Powicke, Stephen Langton (C. H. Haskins); G. C. Boyce, The English-German Nation in the University of Paris during the Mid- dle Ages (C. H. Haskins); C. S. Baldwin, Medteval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) (W. B. Sedgwick); R. B. Burke, transl., The Opus Maius of Roger Bacon, a Trans- lation (L. Thorndike); W. Levison, Das Werden der Ursula-Legende (G. H. Gerould); L. J. Paetow, ed., Morale Scolarium of John of Garland (Johannes de Garlandia) (C. C. Mierow); L. J. Paetow, ed., The Crusades and Other Historical Essays pre- sented to Dana C. Munro (C. W. David); W. P. Shepard, ed., The Oxford Provengal Ch ier (J. R. Reinhard); E. DeMoreau, Saint Amand, Apétre de la Belgique et du Nord de la France (C. H. Taylor); W. W. Lawrence, Beowulf and Epic Tra- dition (K. Malone).
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SPECULUM
A JOURNAL OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
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THOMAS AQUINAS’ DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS HISTORICAL SETTING
By RICHARD McKEON
ISTORIANS of philosophy, until recently, penetrated only
rarely into the fifteen hundred years that preceded the seven- teenth century. But in the last two decades we have been accus- tomed to the judgment that, if there is a properly modern period, it should be made to begin with the thirteenth century and its first great figure should be Thomas Aquinas. Whatever else such opinions may indicate, at least the paradoxes and the fashions of the history of thought are exhibited in them. Scholasticism had been arid form- alism, logic chopping and unsubstantiated apriorism. Informa- tion to that effect could be gathered from the repeated statements of critics and historians since the seventeenth century. But now mediaeval philosophy may be fitted in a continuous flow of thought which will discover in it a homogeneity with the philosophy of the present day: the thirteenth century, it is specified, saw the separation of philosophy from theology in subject-matter as well as in method; reason had therefore vindicated for itself, by this time, a proper content; nature had taken on again a separate reality.
The newer estimation gives rise to questions as important to philosophy and to the history of thought as were the paradoxes involved in the older view. There are, indeed, dangers in the con- ception of scholasticism which traces its progress in the jostling positions of faith and reason; in effect it is but little removed from the injustice of the view that disposed of scholasticism as superstition
425
426 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
and authority-ridden. If philosophy was constituted in the western world for the first time during the thirteenth century, the status of speculative inquiry in the centuries which preceded the thirteenth
remains to be examined. If the statement be taken literally and if I the homogeneous development of earlier philosophy be considered t in conjunction with it, the conclusion may suggest itself that be- I tween Porphyry in the third century and Aquinas in the thirteenth r no philosophy was expounded in the Christian world — and on that S conclusion should follow at least some further speculation concerning th what philosophy must then be. It should be made clear what, for th example, the basis of the speculative independence discovered in the re philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is. What in the relation of thinking an and being, in the status of truth and error, in the systematic and th metaphysical formulation of thought, distinguishes his philosophy sys so sharply from those which preceded it? These are questions, more- sig over, that prepare for a further question, since the attitude which | Aquinas strikes, modern in contrast to an earlier one, is to lead to ing an evolution of thought through four hundred years until in the fort seventeenth century a reaction may take place to result in an attitude doe: of mind, so it is insisted, again characteristically modern. The criti- mer cal canons from which Aquinas turned no less than the critical canons vivi which resulted from the dissolution of the Thomist system demand ophe detailed examination unless these newer estimations are to be taken an e as new aphorisms and half-truths on turns of history. to th The discussion of the nature and the limits of knowledge has imag sometimes been supposed to have undergone but little change or posse alteration in the Middle Ages. The formulae of the discussion are a gre repeated from writer to writer, and read superficially treatises seem perfe to expound the same doctrines in the same words. Aristotle had set from the terms of the discussion before the beginning of the period: we 9 idea. define the truth, he had written, saying that that which is is and that which is not is not.! Augustine repeated the doctrine in his Sites statement of what truth is: the true is that which is,’ and truthis (Pair. 1 ' Aristotle, Meta., T', 7, 1011b. “ : 2 * Ergo illud dico et sic definio, nec uereor ne definitio mea ob hoc improbetur, quod numis dene.
breuis est: nam uerum mihi uidetur esse id quod est.’ — Augustine, Soliloquiorum Libri Duo, i, 5 (Patr. Lat. XXXII, 889).
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Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 427
that by which that which is, is shown.' Anselm quotes Aristotle’s statement, though of course without mention of Aristotle,? and on the basis of it develops his favorite definition of truth: truth is rightness perceptible to the mind alone.’ Finally, Aquinas brings all these together and finds among them one, borrowed from Isaac Israeli, particularly suited to his purpose, and in complete harmony with the rest: truth is the adequation of thing and understanding.‘ Sharply opposed philosophies may repeat these definitions and seem, therefore, in accord, since on crucial questions they can express themselves in identical phrases. But it is important that in the respective systems the definitions undergo a dialectical translation and take changed meanings, though the words are unchanged, from the doctrines among which they are placed. Abstracted from the systems in which they are placed the formulae have no philosophic significance.
For obviously, if truth is an adequation of thing and understand- ing, the question remains still untouched — what evidence will show forth satisfactorily the accord of a judgment with things? in what does the adequation consist? The history of the ontological argu- ment and of proofs a priori of the existence of God may be used as vivid illustration of the divergences which are possible among philos- ophers who hold to a single description of truth. Anselm’s proof was an expression of his conviction that thought penetrates significantly to the ultimate nature of things. Ideas are to be considered, not as images or replicas, but as realities, and they are, like other realities, possessed of degrees of perfection. The idea of a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is itself a reality — the idea of a perfect being is a perfect idea — and consequently the transition from idea to reality has been made in the very being of the perfect idea. If the idea of God or if the nature of knowledge be examined,
' ‘Sed cut saltem illud manifestum est, falsitatem esse, qua id putatur esse quod non est, intellegit eam esse ueritatem, quae ostendit id quod est.’ — Augustine, De Vera Religione, 36 (Paty, Lat. XXIV, 151).
* Anselm, Dialogus de Veritate ii (Patr. Lat., CLVIII, 469, 470).
* *Possumus igitur, nisi fallor, diffinire quia ueritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis,’ Anselm, de Verit. ii (Patr. Lat. CLVIII, 480).
* Aquinas, de Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad Resp.
428 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
they must be seen to involve in themselves the presence and efficacy of God. But there were men to object to this analysis of thinking as soon as Anselm had stated it, and the objection of Gaunilon has come down, to be repeated at each stage of the history of the onto- logical proof. To Albertus Magnus the argument seemed a Pythag- orean sophism; ! Aquinas argued that, even if the word God meant a being than which a greater cannot be conceived (which may be doubted), even then it would not follow that that which is signified by the word, is in the nature of things; it is certain only that it is in the apprehension of the understanding.” Hobbes, Huet, Gassendi, Locke, and others were to repeat that the presence of an idea in the understanding is no warrant for the existence of the thing without the understanding, and Kant had objections which are different chiefly in terminology.’ Yet the ontological argument did not die with the criticisms of Gaunilon or Aquinas. It had been indigenous to the Augustinian philosophy before Anselm; it continued to be developed after him. Bonaventura does not oppose it during the very years in which Aquinas attacked it; * Duns Scotus approved of it with important reservations and modifications; * that it had per- sisted in the tradition to the seventeenth century is indicated by Descartes’s use of it as well as by Spinoza’s predilection for argu- ments a priori; and it has by no means fallen from the philosophic issues of to-day. Between the Augustinian a priori approach and Aquinas’s insistence on the a posteriori is more than an historic de- velopment; there is also a rooted philosophic difference.
Distinctions may be made, then, in what is thought to constitute an adequation of understanding and thing. Anselm was clearly aware of the implications of the interpretation he makes. At the
1 *Haec et huiusmodi sophismata multa induci possunt contra ea quae determinata sunt, si rationes Heracliti et Pythagorae et Anselmi in libro de Veritate’— Albertus Magnus, De Praedicamentis ii, 13 (Paris: Vivés, 1890, I, 192).
2 Th. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. ii, a. 1, ad Zum. Cf. IV Sent., I, d. III, 3% ad 4um; Super Boeth., de Trinit., q. i, a. 3, ad Gum; Quest. disp. de Veritate q. x, a. 12, ad 2um} Cont. Gent., I, c.x, xi.
3 I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft Il, iii, 4. Also Prolegomena gu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik III, iii, 55.
« Bonaventura, IV Sent., I, d. VIII, p. 1, a. 1, q. ii (pub. Quaracchi, 1882, I, 154).
’ Duns Scotus, IV Sent., I, d. II, q. 1, n. 81-32 (Paris: Vivés, 1893, VIII, 478), ¢ n. 14, p. 418 ibid.
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Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 429
beginning of his dialogue De Veritate he raises the question whether the truth of a true statement is to be sought in the thing.’ Obviously it is not; it is to be sought in the proposition itself — not, of course, in the grammatical form of the proposition, but in conside- rations which can be satisfied without leaving the discursive realm. To be sure, the relation of understanding and thing is such that a proposition is true when things are in fact as it states them to be, but it should be considered too that a thing is as it is by reason of the supreme truth.? Most discussions of truth are confused, Anselm feels, because ‘everyone speaks of the truth of meaning, but very few consider the truth which is in the essence of things.’* That a thing is, involves the definite exhibition in being, of what it is: for it to be necessitates that the definition of what is meant for it to be be fulfilled. ‘Truth, therefore,’ Anselm says, ‘is in the essence of all things which are because they are that which in the supreme Truth they are.’ * The very being of things is the truth and the rightness of that which they are in Truth. The problem of knowledge is soluble precisely because the definition of truth takes on an ontologi- cal significance.
To work among things, consequently, is to become involved in meanings; the truth of things is a rightness to a certain Truth; the truth of meaning is a like rightness. Not only the conventional signs and symbols with which we ordinarily communicate, but all our actions, are permeated with meanings. Anselm illustrates this saturation of things with significance: if you were in a place where there were deadly herbs and if you asked a man who knew, which were deadly and which salubrious, and if he indicated some as salu- brious and himself ate of those he said were deadly, it would not be difficult to develop significances from his actions. It is metaphysical dogma that the rightness of meaning is in a statement whenever the statement is formed according to a rightness which never changes. Truth does not begin or end with the thing to which it is applied, for rightness does not begin to be at the moment when the thing which is signified begins to be, nor does it perish when the meaning
* Anselm, de Verit., ii (Patr. Lat. CLVIII, 469). * Ibid. X, 479. 5 Ibid, IX, 478. * Ibid. VII, 475.
430 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
is not as it should be or when there is no meaning; these are examples i of a deficiency from a rightness which is not deficient. ‘The rightness c by which meaning is called right does not have being and non-being c or any movement through meaning howsoever the meaning itself n may be moved.’ ! pi
The philosophy of Anselm is turned to the source from which the tu essence of things and their truth are derived. If the question be of of truth, truth is, of course, the signifying of something which is in th fact, but what that is and, therefore, what truth is, should not lead Ge to a consideration of the thing. ‘Truth is improperly said to be of mi this or that thing, since it does not have its being in things or out of his things or because of things in which it is said to be, but when things tra are according to that which is always present in things which are as | they should be, then the truth of this or that thing is spoken of, as dep the truth of a word, of an action, or truth of will, just as one speaks assi of the time of this or that thing, although time is one and the same enc for all things which are together in the same time. And if there cilia were not this or that thing, the same time would none the less be, port and therefore one speaks of the time of this or that thing, not be- inh cause time is in things, but because things are in time. And just as seen time, considered in itself, is not said to be the time of anything (but mus' we speak of the time of this or that thing when we consider the things dem which are in it) so too the supreme Truth, persistent through itself, is be is the truth of nothing, but one speaks of the truth or rightness ofa § In A thing when that thing is according to the first truth.’ * by re
Anselm’s questioning is engaged wholly in the discovery, from § of Go many beginnings, of an identical truth, for Augustinism moves in §§ alone a Platonic tradition, seeking to find, in truths which are demon- § of the strated, the presence of a truth which is not to be demonstrated but § is nee rather to be contemplated and perceived. For Augustine and Anselm § either this is the activity of faith seeking the understanding of itself. The Augus philosophy of each depends on the demonstration of the existence of J he goe God, but that demonstration is only the rational exploration of an § plicati idea irrationally derived, and therefore, though Anselm is rigorously J things, precise, Augustine seldom takes the trouble even to state his proofs
1 Anselm, De V erit. XIII, 485. 2 Ibid. XIII, 486.
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in detail or to insure their formal cogency. All things are reminis- cences and indications of God. The elements of this confidence con- cerning the nature of things might be stated as the postulates of a naturalistic philosophy or of a theology, but the exclusive preoccu- pation of Augustinians, at least prior to the thirteenth century, turned toward God. Human ingenuity is capable of only a few out of infinite possible truths, and wisdom seemed to counsel that only those be sought which would aid the soul on its itinerary back to God. Truths were to be the object of contemplation so long as the mind might be elevated by them to the Truth, and Bonaventura in his Reductio Artium ad Theologiam is the fitting representative of the tradition against Aquinas.
It is not always easy to be sure how far Thomas Aquinas has departed from the fundamental tenets of this tradition. He can assimilate most of its formulae with little modification; his refer- ences to Augustine are cautious and respectful, and he usually con- ciliates the opinion of Anselm. Yet his philosophy marks an im- portant turning-point, for before him Albertus Magnus gives a place in his philosophy to the ontological proof,! notwithstanding that it seemed to him a sophism, whereas after him Duns Scotus finds he must ‘color’ the proof, although it seems to him a cogent and tenable demonstration. The philosophic significance of the Thomist reform is bound intimately with the suspicion of a priori demonstration. In Aquinas’ philosophy, knowledge is no longer to be accounted for by referring it to divine illumination. For Augustine the presence of God is central in philosophy, and the simple fact of understanding alone need be determined; if the question of error arises the power of the understanding is not placed under suspicion, but a distinction is needed: when one is deceived, one does not understand, and so either the thing is understood as it is or it is not understood. The Augustinian conclusions, therefore, are true enough for Thomas, but he goes further to analyze what the signs and the metaphysical im- plications of the distinction are. God may still be implicated in things, but questions of truth and error are of greater philosophic
* Sum. Theol., Ia, t. III, q. 17 (Paris: Vivés, 1895, XXXI, 116). Cf. ibid. t. IV, q. 19, @. ii, p. 128.
432 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
importance and they suggest primarily logical and metaphysical con- a siderations. The historical interpretation of Thomism can account b for this change; it is without doubt the rediscovery of nature; the " translation of the works of Aristotle doubtless made the reorientation es possible; obviously the reform was prepared by the long discussion kr of the universal in which the twelfth century submitted extreme be realism to criticism. Whatever its origin, however, the philosophic th consequences of the change are sweeping. sec Aquinas’s pursuit of this further inquiry into logic and meta- no physics came as the natural consequence to his doctrine. But the nal contrasts between the statement he gives of the problem and that of of : his predecessors are often striking. Thus, when he takes up the tion problem of the mutability of created truth in the sixth article of the the first question on Truth, the first four contrary opinions are all sen: quoted from Anselm. In these passages it appears, not so much it is that Anselm thought created truth was immutable, but that his pati chief concern was with an immutable truth. In his replies, Aquinas mod agrees with Anselm’s doctrine; all truth is derived from the first the truth, as well the truth in things as the truth in understanding. intel But in any particular judgment the problem is presented in the possi- alter bility that the truth of the understanding may not correspond to the Jf but: truth of things. The problem is stated most clearly in its metaphysi- J reali cal formation: ‘The thing existing without the soul,’ Aquinas says, § tion. ‘imitates by its form the art of the divine understanding, and it is J of re; constituted to make a true apprehension of itself in the human § appr understanding by that same form by which it has its being; where. § conce fore the truth of existing things includes in its reason the entity of JJ prope things, and it super-adds the relation of adequation to the human § quidd or divine understanding.’ ! stand The question of truth does not arise, then, from the the appre § are.’ hension by the mind of a reality distinct from the mind. The de § things terminations of each existent thing by which it has its being are § known intellectual as well as physical. It is the formal determination of the § ature thing which the understanding seizes, and the form of the thing is not limited to the particular exemplification which any one thing Aq
1 Aquinas, Quaest. disp, de Verit., cf. I, a. 8, ad Resp. (Paris: Vivés, 1875, XIV, 334).
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Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 433
affords. Our concepts represent abstract essences, not individuals, but that representation is no falsification of reality, since in the nature of things the unreceived form is unlimited: forma irrecepta est illimitata. Knowledge is possible because the thing which is known is, in a sense, other than itself. According to its immaterial being, in so far as it is not determined by matter, a thing is not only that which it is, but also in a certain manner something else. Con- sequently, although there can be no element in knowledge which has not previously been experienced sensibly, although it is the very nature of the understanding to be conformed to things, still the test of a true judgment is not in its reference to things. Not even sensa- tions are tested by such a reference. ‘It is not necessary, even though the sense were altered by sensible things, that the judgment of the sense be true according to the conditions of the sensible thing. For it is not necessary that the action of the agent be received in the patient according to the mode of the agent, but according to the mode of the patient or the recipient.’ Moreover, far from knowing the thing as it is, there is no intuition of material singulars; our intelligence renders everything it touches abstract. To insist on this alteration in knowing is no criticism of the origin of our knowledge but rather a flat identification of the data of the understanding with reality, for knowledge is not representation. There is no more ques- tion of the truth or falsity of the understanding in the apprehension of reality than there is of the senses, because the question, by this approach, is without meaning. ‘The understanding is always true concerning essence, just as the sense is always true concerning its proper object.... There is no falsity in the understanding of simple quiddities because either they are not attained at all and we under- stand nothing concerning them, or else they are understood as they are.’* Significantly there is no reality to which the knowledge of things is to be referred, because such a reality would have to be a known reality, and essences as they enter the mind are the very nature of things in their intelligible expression.
1 Aquinas, In IV Meta., lect. $ (Paris: Vivés, 1875, XXIV, 495-496). * Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I, q. lviii, a. 5, ad Resp. Cf. Quaest. disp. de Verit. q. I, a. 12, ad Resp. (Paris: Vivés, 1875, XIV, 340-341).
434 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
This difference of interpretation is at the bottom of the changes ns which Aquinas introduced into the Augustinian doctrine. Anselm st. was certain that reason could not exhaust the things of nature, and he ur was little concerned with the surety of the mind’s knowledge of any ad particular things; but he was convinced that thinking penetrates ing the nature of things, and that the nature of things in general must in be determined prior to the analysis of the parts, or of the sciences, not of things. Aquinas denied the possibility of the enterprise. But not beginning with the quiddities of things which are presented to the the mind, he proposed to examine what can be determined of their in- but terrelations and significances. Anselm’s philosophy, consequently, be ¢ although it is by no means incompatible with logical and scientific ing developments, might move satisfactorily to an ideal of contempla- soul tion. But even this beginning of Aquinas requires metaphysical de- with velopment and logical justification. A
The knowledge of essences which is in the simple uncompounded the idea cannot be false, for the uncompounded idea contains no part esse and therefore implies no comparison. Truth is not in the quiddity truth which the understanding apprehends, for that apprehension is the J arise ideal aspect of the thing which exists outside the soul. Of itself such J toa: knowledge cannot be right or wrong, any more than the image of J tion « the sensible thing which is received in sensation can be right or wrong, J neith for in both there is only a single element and there can be no contra- § logica diction of that by itself. This is not to insist that the essential J subje nature of the thing must of necessity present itself to the under- 9 applie standing, but it is a recognition rather that howsoever the thing § not re present itself in knowledge that is one way of apprehending it; there J nor fa is no question of truth until a comparison is made, and comparison J 4s: a s is possible only between different things; therefore, truth is to be J corres) found only in the understanding and in the understanding only after J ina re the understanding has added something proper to itself. Truth is J within not in the apprehension of quiddities for they are formally identical Knc with things, but in the activity of the understanding compounding judgme and dividing. For then the understanding has added something §f by exy proper to itself which is not to be found in things and which never § Matter
theless may be compared to things. It follows, moreover, that the
Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 435
nature of truth and the test of truth, the adequation of that under- standing and the thing, require no reference beyond the mind that understands. ‘Since indeed the truth of the understanding is the adequation of the understanding and thing by which the understand- ing says that that which is is or that that which is not is not, truth in the understanding pertains to that which the understanding says, not to the operation by which it says it. For the understanding does not require for truth that the act of understanding be adequated to the thing, since the thing is material and understanding immaterial, but that what the understanding says and knows in understanding be equated to the thing, that is, that it be in fact as the understand- ing says.’ It is not necessary that there be something beyond the soul to correspond to its truth since the truth of soul is entirely within it.
A term, then, or a simple idea is neither true nor false. But if the uncomplex essence is stated or defined in relation to another essence or if it is asserted to be present in a subject, questions of truth and falsity must be implicated in the judgment. Falsity may arise from the inconsistency which results from attaching a definition toa certain subject or from the inconsistencies involved in the defini- tion or in a group of definitions. Of itself the idea, say, of a circle is neither true nor false; any given definition of it which involves no logical contradition is true; the application of the definition to any subject is true if no contradititon follows from the judgment which applies it. Even simples which seem to involve a contradiction are not really contradictory; the idea of a square circle is neither true nor false since it may be made the subject of a true statement such as: a square circle involves a logical contradiction. Truth, then, the correspondence of understanding and thing, is to be examined, not inarelation between our minds and things, but in a relation wholly within our minds.
Knowledge, nevertheless, is derived from experience, and the judgment of truth bears on relations among the elements furnished by experience. Experience informs the understanding with the matter of knowledge; still, as soon as understanding judges of the
1 Aquinas, Cont. Gent., I, 59.
436 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
matter of experience, it no longer suffers the action of things, but is, in a certain manner, active. This activity of the understanding in. cludes all the processes which begin with sensation and terminate in the abstractions and judgments of the active intellect. To suppose that the truth of the final product of all that activity can be tested by referring to an object which is supposed to underlie and to be mir- rored in sensation, would be to falsify the relation of form and mat- ter; it would be to suppose that the intellect is in a world somehow unintelligible of itself and that the manipulation of the mind begins with elements somehow alien to it. Our ideas are not reflections which mirror things; on the contrary, ideas are things in so far as things enter knowledge; they are things objectified to our under- standing. Truth is this intellectual reality; judgment is the expres- sion of it, and no other metaphysical statement of it is adequate or possible than that its ideas are formally identical with the things which are known. The soul is in a certain sense all things, and knower and known are one more truly than are matter and form. What must be inquired into is not how the idea images the object, but how ideas have been put in relation in judgments, since it is there that truth or error may enter.
If it is true that Thomas Aquinas succeeded in setting up the autonomy of philosophy by insisting on the independent reality of nature, his insistence on the fundamental intelligibility of things is an aspect of his doctrine no less important to the reconstituted philosophy. In an intelligible world the mind is formed to handle concepts, and the concern of philosophy should not be an inquiry into the impossible relation of identical things and ideas; that rela- tion is caught up in the operation of the understanding according to its own principles. If the understanding is to discover itself in con- formity with things, it must be only by reflecting on its own acts. Such reflection, if it yield anything, must reveal the understanding as an active principle whose nature it is to be conformed to things. Its operations, moreover, must be seen to be according to principles proper to itself and discoverable only in those operations, not built on the habit of its experience of a world external to it. The first principle, that of contradiction, is not ‘acquired by demonstration
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Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 437
nor in any similar manner, but it comes as if by the nature of the one possessing it, as if known naturally and not by acquisition. Indeed, first principles are made known by the natural light itself of the active intellect; they are not acquired by ratiocinations, but only by the fact that their terms are known. That occurs because memory is derived from sensibles, and experience from memory, and from experience the knowledge of terms, and when they are known, common propositions are known of such sort as the principles of the arts and sciences.’' This process is the activity of the active prin- ciple, and by knowledge of it or of its logical consequences, the truth of propositions may be tested.
In the problem of knowledge, the question clearly does not con- cern only the substance of our mind, nor, on the other hand, is our understanding the thing understood. But our mind has its proper operations, and by them it forms a kind of interior ‘word’ which is a likeness of the thing understood. Its relation to the knower is as an accident to its subject; but when it is compared to the thing known, it goes beyond the mind and its intention indicates some- thing outside the mind. Intellectual substances, in so far as they know something placed beyond themselves, proceed in a certain manner outside themselves, but in so far as they know themselves knowing, they begin to return to themselves. The understanding has this self-knowledge as a consequence of judgment; by it the comparison is possible by which the distinction of true and false is possible; it is the basis of metaphysics. The senses have no such knowledge of self and, therefore, there is no comparison in them of their representation with the thing perceived. But intellectual sub- stances by reason of their greater perfection return to their essences with a complete return. Thomas Aquinas quotes from the Liber de Causis to enforce the conclusion that a thing returns to its essence when it knows its essence.
God is present to illuminate the mind in this system as he was in the philosophy of Anselm, and all truths are still derived from one truth. But thinking is no longer itself sufficient to indicate the exis- tence and nature of God. The Augustinian tradition had come early
1 Aquinas In IV Meta., lect. 2 (Paris: Vivés, 1875, XXIV, 476).
438 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
to the insistence that the a priori proof, proceeding as it does from te cause to effect, is the surest mode of demonstration; the nature of fr God must be known first; all other truths depend upon it and al] af sciences are trustworthy only as they are ordered to the knowledge In of God; the nature of things in general must be determined before cel the nature of anything may be investigated. Aquinas agrees that eX] the a priori proof is surer, but he insists that it is impossible to pro- ceed from the nature of God to his effects because the nature of exp God is not known. Far from illuminating his effects we know him int only through his effects. With this reorientation, all the formulae Ber of the sapientia christiana may be repeated, but their significance has The changed. Truth is to state that that which is is and that that which doe: is not is not; it is the indivision of being and essence. For Augustine outs these formulae are true because God exists and they are themselves to u compelling aocuments of his existence. For Aquinas they call up of th only the consideration that man is possessed of an intellect in a of tl formally intelligible universe. Although God is in the background, main the adequation of understanding and thing must be explained by the his o' transcendental psychology of the active intellect, and it is to be probi recognized in the manipulation of concepts according to primitive ment principles. of ab But the Thomist reform, even if it be considered the beginning know of modern philosophy, was by no means its final or determining atti- more tude. The Augustinian and Thomist conceptions of truth stand in Metay sharper outline against the position which in varying forms largely shoulc superseded them in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The criti- of knc cisms to which the Averroists, Duns Scotus, Ockham, and the fol- Berna) lowers of Ockham in turn submit the philosophy of their predecessors that sc reduced to mere probabilities, one by one, the most definite certain- JJ at the ties of the schools. Duns Scotus had insisted that the knowledge of @ On tha God, the immortality of the soul, and the whole series of related it is ab theses be relegated as probable knowledge to theology, and theology & there a became for him a source of rules of action and therefore a practical, can be not a speculative, science. Before the end of the fourteenth century a Aristotelian scholasticism had been forced to a dissolution by criti- aa
cisms directly in line with the criticisms it had initiated. The ma-
=< ol Oe wm
iM alli
Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 439
terials of knowledge come from experience, the ordering of knowledge from the mind: but what authenticated information do the senses afford ? what are the principles of understanding and their certainty? In large part the writings of the Ockhamites of the fourteenth century read as if they were dictated by cautions learned from the experimental sciences and from critical philosophy.
Thus, one of the few surviving writings of Nicholas of Autrecourt expresses amazement that Bernard of Arezzo should hold that clear intuitive knowledge may judge a thing to be whether it is or not.’ Bernard seems by Nicholas’ specifications to be a contemporary Thomist, for it is among the Thomist principles that a true idea does not necessitate the existence of something corresponding to it outside the mind. In the view of Nicholas all knowledge is reduced to uncertainty by such a position; one can be sure of nothing, not of the objects of one’s senses, or of one’s own acts, or finally even of the articles of faith. He chooses to avoid such absurdities by maintaining that he is certain of the objects of his five senses and of his own acts. But in a second letter addressed to the same Bernard,’ probably in reply to a lost letter, he expresses even greater amaze- ment that Bernard should imagine that he has evident knowledge of abstract substances. No one, not even Aristotle, had evident knowledge of abstract substance. In fact, for that reason there are not more than one or two conclusions from evident knowledge in the Metaphysics; and for the same reason the third book de Anima should never have been written. In their examination of the bounds of knowledge there is only one principle on which Nicholas and Bernard can agree, the principle of contradiction: it is impossible that something both be present and not be present in the same thing at the same time: contradictories cannot at the same time be true. On that principle Nicholas bases all certitude; certitude founded on it is absolute; all certitude is to be resolved to it and consequently there are no degrees of certiiude, for all certitude except only faith, can be reduced to the first principle.
' Nicholas of Autrecourt, Epistola ad Bernardum (Beitradge sur Geschichte der Philosophie tes Mittelalters V1 [1908], ii, 2*). * Ibid. p. 6*.
440 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
But this analysis may be applied, not only to substance, but to a other common notions of metaphysics, to causality, God, the ex. tr ternal world. The relation of causation presents no necessary or Bi evident consequence, for the principle of contradiction does not to permit us to conclude from one thing which is known to be, that some th other thing is. A causal relation is at most only probable, and past ple experience alone authorizes the affirmation of such a relation. The arg idea of substance, moreover, is a particular case of causality. It is in] not valid to infer from physical properties or psychical operations dec a material or spiritual substance in which those properties or opera- dA tions inhere. Substances so concluded are not even probable conse- ideg quences, for there is no past experience on which to base them. And, thin of course, the conventional proofs of God fall by this criticism. The min existence of a first cause is no more probable than that of a substance, evid and if we are to believe the document in which Nicholas’ errors whic were condemned by the Masters of the University of Paris, he carried tione his criticism to the logical extent of insisting that the proposition, ingu: God exists, and the proposition, God does not exist, are two ways dency of expressing the same truth.! We have only two sources of certain- know ties: direct apprehension and syllogisms reducible to the first prin- deper ciple. Only individuals exist outside the mind, and the criticism exper which establishes their separate existence clears metaphysics of all § must the entities consequent to Aquinas’ analysis: God, the Soul, the J the O active intellect, substantial species and even things cannot be known § philos certainly. What had been the subject-matter of metaphysics is § D*Aill transferred either to faith or to the probable knowledge which falls J of min in the disciplines based on experience. astron
This fundamental attitude is repeated in the works of the numer- § had fo ous followers of Ockham in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. § the In There were still recognizable Augustinians, but the uncritical con- § influen fidences of Augustine and Anselm had been left far behind. Aquinas § French could usually reconcile Anselm’s position with his own, by the device Concorg of pointing out that Anselm was speaking of the truth which is a0 Jf in the y
, , Re eae ee substan
1 Denifle-Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, II, 580 (Paris, 1891). .
evidence
J. Lappe, ‘Nicholaus von Autrecourt’ (Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. des M. A., VI [1908], ii, 37° 1, 14-15).
Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 441
adequation of the thing to the divine understanding and not of the truth which is an adequation of it to the human understanding. But apart from the partial nature of his philosophy Aquinas seems to have objected only to Anselm’s attempt to pass directly from thought to a conclusion of existence. Cardinal Peter d’Ailly com- pletely rejects the argument of the ‘Venerable Anselm, because his arguments are not demonstrable, but are purely sophistic and faulty in logic, and because of that defect in logic this devout man was often deceived, not only in this place but in other passages.’! For Peter @Ailly, as for Nicholas of Autrecourt, individuals alone exist, and ideas of universals are nothing, unless perhaps they can be called things, existing simply in the mind, common to things without the mind, and universal by predication. Certainty is based either on evidence or on faith, and evidence is of two sorts: absolute evidence which is evidence of the first principle or reducible to it, and condi- tioned evidence or evidence secundum quid which is the evidence our inquiry uncovers of whatever is according to the first type of evi- dence. Absolute knowledge is limited, therefore, to purely formal knowledge. All intellectual knowledge of things is derived from and depends on sensitive knowledge of the same things, and since our experimental knowledge begins with an intuitive presentation, it must always be conditioned and probable. But a statement of the Ockhamite currents of this period would be incomplete if the philosophic disputes were not balanced by the scientific interests. D’Ailly’s doctrine of knowledge is not unconnected with the attitude of mind which turned him to the sciences; he was a noted geographer, astronomer, and astrologist; Christopher Columbus wrote that he had found the confirmation of his idea of sailing west to arrive at the Indies in the Imago Mundi of d’Ailly; Amerigo Vespucci was influenced by d’Ailly’s commentary on the Meteors of Aristotle; a French Revolution is predicted in the sixtieth chapter of the Concordia astronomiae cum historica ueritate to occur 375 years later, in the year 1789. D’Ailly had insisted, in line with his criticism of substance, that the division of the soul into faculties was without evidence, since a single power might have many operations; his
1 D’Ailly, Quaest. in Sent., q. iii, a. 1.
442 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
interest in the soul turned, therefore (doubtless in a tradition con-
tinuing from Chartres through Oxford), to the localization of the . functions and the discovery of the organs of the understanding. He i wrote, finally, on the principles of ecclesiastical and political organ- y ization to such effect that Luther acknowledged his authority and It boasted that he knew the works of Cardinal d’Ailly by heart. The gi Aristotelian scrutiny which Aquinas turned on the world had given we away to empirical and positivistic inquiries long before the seven- ba teenth century had formulated its philosophy and program of science. af But even more significant, the Thomist doctrine and criteria of poi knowledge had yielded before further investigation of the exigencies of of rational demonstration, and new criteria had emerged. The mt critical cautions made necessary by the inquiries of the fourteenth ain century make clear the careful Augustinian statements of the De the Causa Dei of Bradwardine and the more elaborate formulation of a ing supra-rational field of intellectual intuition of the De Docta Igno- des rantia of Nicholas of Cusa; and, further removed, even the material- oph: ism and empiricism of Telesio and the modifications of them in ( Campanella are more fully conceived solutions to these post-Thomist seep difficulties. ions Into this historical and intellectual environment the Thomist Thor reform of the doctrine of knowledge must be fitted. If Aquinas is to with be conceived as the beginning of purely philosophical tradition, then But j philosophy begins by a reaction away from the tenets of Platonism and t and Augustinism. It is not difficult to recognize that Aquinas’ 9,1, researches are concerned, more than those of his predecessors, with thoug problems which were to become traditional in later philosophy. § [t wo But there should be some hesitance before it is insisted that a philo- ophies sophical inquiry is more philosophic if it treats of the passions of the velopr soul or the nature of the understanding than if it treats of the attr 9 of p,., butes of God or the relations of angels to each other. If the study J gchola of logistics and the analysis of the continuum contribute to philos 9 are 4, ophy, perhaps the study of angels may be made to take on a like repeat importance. In any case the statement that Aquinas gave reasol @ reach , a content of its own and nature a reality of its own, is not dificult B noming to understand, though it is a little confusing if the history of phil B Qresme
Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge 443
sophical development is considered. It is in part a statement con- cerning subject-matter, and in that respect it is relevant that, for what concerns the philosophy of knowledge, no product of the human spirit, not even theology, is totally unrelated to the nature of things. It is partly a statement concerning method, and surely recent investi- gations concerning postulates and their relations to their systems would place the certainty of the postulates of mathematics on a basis no surer than that of the postulates of theology. The beginning of modern thought is somewhat arbitrary if it is to be dated at the point at which a man chose to take his axioms from Book IV of the Metaphysics and Book III of the De Anima of Aristotle rather than from the Book of Sentences of Peter Lombard. Scepti- cism is no surer a beginning for philosophy than faith, provided only the postulates of the faith are clear; and faith seeking its understand- ing may engage the philosopher with as much propriety as under- standing seeking itself. To see in Thomism the beginnings of philos- ophy is to deny the name philosophy to much of Neo-Platonism.. Or it may be only that the attitude of the Academics to profess scepticism in all questions until persuaded by sufficient reason to forsake it, is better suited to modern predilections. Certainly Thomism was to be followed rapidly by an academic scepticism with its accompaniment of experimental and empirical interests. But these, once more, are the paradoxes of the history of thought, and that they occur is the consequence, partly at least, of the cireum- stances, inconvenient enough to the historian, that systems of thought are seldom refuted by the systems which supersede them. It would require no great ingenuity to demonstrate that the philos- ophies of Augustine and Anselm, however greatly they differ in de- velopment, involve many of the fundamental suppositions of those of Bradwardine, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, nor would much scholarship be needed to show that many of the crucial arguments are to be found, even when they were not clearly carried over, repeated. There is a tendency in modern criticism, however, to teach over the intervening periods to centre admiration on the tominalistic development of late scholasticism. To call Nicholas of Oresme a precursor of Copernicus, to call Peter d’Ailly a mediaeval
444 Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Knowledge
Berkeley and Malebranche, and Nicholas of Autrecourt a Hume and a Bradley ' is, in that tradition, to speak eulogistically; it is not difficult to conceive the tradition in which the reverse might be true.
The philosophic affinities in the flow of history are too strangely mixed to permit over-simple divisions into periods, or to justify discoveries of affinities, if the fundamental metaphysical postulates of systems be considered: ‘Thomas Aquinas turned in the thirteenth century from a Platonist rationalism; the modern revolt of the seven-
teenth century against scholasticism was a reaction from empiricism N to rationalism; and, to tighten the paradox, after Spinoza and Des- cartes had criticized the imagination and had turned from the insuff- Vii ciencies of knowledge based on sensation to the certainties of reason, of t the eighteenth century came with Bayle, Fontenelle, Voltaire, the ing Encyclopaedists to call these metaphysical solutions vain imagina- 8y tions and to turn from them to the certainties of reason. It would be roo! difficult, on any criterion other than that of subject-matter, to know of h if Aquinas is the beginning of modern philosophy since Augustine adue may be made to father much of the seventeenth century, and the fuer fourteenth century initiated critical tendencies much like those T which grew out of the philosophy of Hume. A philosophic study of nam the development of philosophies should be content to seek out the T bases and cogencies of philosophies rather than engage upon a auth nostalgic search for sympathetic doctrines, for the shifts and alter- was ations of the subject of philosophic inquiry suggest, not that we Chris are coming after centuries of inquiry to the truth and that we have Specu at last left the false, but that the philosopher, like the poet and the provi scientist, takes for his subject what he will. natur. 1 P. Duhem, ‘Un Precurseur Frangais de Copernic: Nicole Oresme (1377),’ Revue Générale 1 Cy des Sciences Pures et Appliquées XX (1909), 866-873; H. Rashdall, ‘Nicholas de Ultricuris, astery of a Medieval Hume,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Ser., VIII (1907), 1-27; Il, 192: L. Salembier, Petrus ab Alliaco (Lille: Lefort, 1886), pp. 150, 161, 163, etc. que tibi 2 ‘ 2 Co.umpra University. q oar Possideti amoris in absentia ;
Peregrinu Christi ui
THE SPECULUM VIRGINUM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TREE OF JESSE
By ARTHUR WATSON
HE twelfth-century Latin manuscript Arundel 44 in the
British Museum is entitled Speculum Virginum. The Epistola begins as follows: Vitimus Christi pauperum C uirginibus sacris N et N. Gaudium assequi beate perennitatis.
At the beginning, the virtue of humility is assumed in the word Vitimus; and humility is indeed the root of all the virtues, as pride is of the vices. This the author expounds in Chapter iv, and his teach- ing is exemplified graphically by representations of two trees (fol. %8v and 29r) having respectively Superbia and Humilitas at the root. Poverty was the lot of the follower of Christ, a concomitant of holiness. The writer himself says (fol. 90r): Sancti omnes Christi aduentum precedentes uel subsequentes semper peregrini et pauperes fuerunt.
The letter N occurs in the Middle Ages in place of a relevant name to be supplied on each occasion."
The letter C is probably the initial letter of the real name of the author. The work is in the form of a dialogue, and the writer, who was a Benedictine, goes by the name of Peregrinus while the uirgo Christi with whom he confers is Theodora. If the writer of this Speculum was received into the monastery as a peregrinus under a provision of the Benedictine order,’ it would not have been un- natural for him to assume this name in the dialogue. There is a
1 Cf. e.g. the following in the order for the consecration of virgins from a MS. of the Mon- astery of St Victor, Paris, quoted by E. Marténe, De Antiquis Eccles. Ritibus (Bassano, 1788), Il, 192: Te inuocamus, Domine sancte, Pater omnipotens, aeterne Deus, super hanc famulam N que tibi uowit seruire pura mente... .
* Nec magnopere tamen uel cognatorum uel amicorum presentiam querendam putetis, q Christum sponsum uestrum fratuelem uestrum in corde geritis, in quo et per quem omnia possidetis. .. . Verum quia amor nunquam ociosus est, misi uobis libellum, quoddam mutui amoris insigne; in quo mentem exerceatis, ad sponsi eterni gloriam proficiatis, minusque de absentia nostra doleatis. Intitulatur autem idem opusculum, speculum uirginum, in quo
peregrinus presbyter cum Theodora Christi uirgine tanta contulisse probatur ut studiosis Christi uirginibus sit in eo magnum conservande castitatis incitamentum.
445
446 The Speculum Virginum
further possible alternative or additional reason for assuming this name, viz., that it is expressive of a state. In peregrinatione sumus the writer says (fol. 95v), and Christ himself was likened to a pere- grinus (fol. 47v). There was therefore an odor of sanctity about the word. The Epistola not only summarizes the contents of the book. It has also a personal character. The writer wished those to whom he was sending his Speculum Virginum to take it as a token of affection and to grieve the less for his absence. It appears from this that he did not always remain in the same monastery.’ Internal evidence points to the writer’s having belonged to the Benedictine order. With reference to the formidable ladder which virgins must struggle to climb (the subject of chapter ix) Peregrinus says: Nonne et huiusmodi scale formam a sancto pastore nostro Benedicto habes traditam, cuius obseruare contendis regulam? (fol. 93r). That the monastery was at Hirschau in Germany appears to be generally ac- cepted. The authorship was ascribed by Trithemius (1462-1516) to one of the name of Conrad; but he does not quote any authority, and his statement has met with vehement opposition (see Appendix
B, p. 467, below).
The Speculum Virginum is one of many works of exposition under the title of Speculum. What Peregrinus understood by the term speculum he himself explains. Maidens look into mirrors, he says, to see whether there is any increase or decrease of their adornment, but Scripture is a mirror from which they may learn how they can please the eternal spouse. In this mirror they can find themselves and understand what they ought to do and what to avoid.’ Towards
1 See Johannes de Turre Cremata, Regula S. P. Benedicti (Cologne, 1575), p. 29, Cap. lxi, De monarchis peregrinis, qualiter suscipiantur. Patr. Lat. LXVI, 858.
2 Attention is drawn to this evidence by Robert Geete on p. iii of his Introduction to the fifteenth-century Swedish translation of the Speculum Virginum, cited p. 448, n. 1, below.
3 ‘Specula uirgines oculis suis applicant, ut ornatus sui uel augmentum uel detrimentum intelligant ... Sunt enim specula mulierum, eloquia diuina uisibus obiecta sanctarum animarum in quibus semper considerant quomodo sponso eterno aut placeant decore sancte conscientig aut displiceant peccati feditate’ (fol. 1v). . . . ‘Speculum itaque scripture sacre pagina, uerbi domini efficatia est, cuius pure ueritatis perspicuitas profunde rationis, mentes studiosorum sic illuminat, ut ibi se recognoscant ubi, se in se ipsis uidere non poterant. Scripturam igitur diuinam si quasi speculum attenderis te ipsam repperis et ex ipsa quid agendum sit intelligis’ (fol. 36v). Theodora says (fol. 28r): ‘Speculum enim uirginibus Christi proposuisti unde uel
uitanda uel imitanda possint speculari.’
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The Speculum Virginum 447
the end of the work Peregrinus bursts out with the fervent hope that this Speculum may be broad enough to satisfy Theodora’s need for instruction."
Inasmuch as variety in reading is pleasant and a treatise which is uniform and unbroken weakens and burdens the attention of the reader, Peregrinus has divided his work into twelve chapters so that the uirgo Christi, eager for the divine word, may wander through fields joined one with another, delight in the varied flowers, in a mystic sense, and glory in weaving for herself a crown of many colors.’
The twelve chapters deal with: (1) the mystic flowers of Para- dise, the form of Paradise with its four rivers, typifying the four evangelists and doctors making fertile the whole church by their word and example; (2) the danger of going astray; (3) the mystic signification of the virgin’s dress; (4) pride and humility; (5) (a) the chief of virgins, Mary, with her Son, and John the Baptist and John the Evangelist, the four being likened to a quadriga by which virgins who have merited the reward may be borne to heaven, () the good and bad teachers (magistri) of virgins; (6) the foolish and wise virgins; (7) the three grades of married women, widows, and virgins, with their respective thirty, sixty, and hundredfold fruits; * (8) the fruit of the flesh and of the spirit, the six ages of the world; (9) the ascent by virgins of a ladder guarded by a dragon and an Ethiopian whom the virgins can overcome by courage and win the sought-for crown; (10) the actio gratiarum; (11) exposition of the Gifts of the Spirit (septiformzs spiritus) and the uirtus and potentia of the number seven; and (12) the exposition of the Lord’s Prayer.
! Qutinam tuis studiis sufficeret tandem speculi huius latitudo (fol. 114r).
? Denique quia lectio uaria delectat, tractus uniformis et continuus legentis intentionem emollit et grauat, opusculum idem in partes duodenas distinxi, ut dum uirgo Christi uerbi diuini auida quasi per prata coniuncta discurrens, floribus diuersis, id est sensibus misticis delectatur, coronam multicolorem capiti suo de uerbo dei texere glorietur (fol. 2r).
3 This is a special application of what has general application in the parable of the Sower (Matth., xiii, 8). Cf. Aldhelm, De Laudibus V irginitatis (Prose, cap. xix, ed. R. Ehwald, M.G.H., Auct. Antig, XV, 1919, 249): His igitur tribus graduum ordinibus, quibus creden- tium multitudo in catholica florens ecclesia discernitur, euangelicum paradigma centesimum, seXagesimum et tricesimum fructum juxta meritorum mercimoniam spopondit.
448 The Speculum Virginum
Finally, there is an Epithalamium.' The Epithalamium is missing in the British Museum MS. Arundel 44.
The illustrations in the British Museum MS. are as follows:
1 (fol. 2v). A Tree of Jesse which will be described later (Plate I).
2 (fol. 13r). The mystic form of Paradise (Plate IT). In the centre is the Virgin holding Christ (cross-nimbed) with an open book on which is written, Si quis sitit, ueniat et bibat (John vii, 37). Between the centre and the circumference are represented streams connected with full-length horned figures of the four rivers of Paradise. Each river-figure touches with his hands two medal- lions within which are (a) a symbol of an evangelist and (b) one of the doctores ecclesiastici. Streams connect the medallions with the centre. On the circumference in each case between a doctor and an evangelist are medallions each containing a representation of one of the virtues which are at the summits of trees rising from the centre. The subjects on the circumference are in the following order, John, Tigris, Augustine, Justice, Mark, Geon, Gregory, Fortitude, Mat- thew, Eufrates, Jerome, Temperance, Luke, Phison, Ambrose, Pru- dence. Twelve virgins, likened to doves settling beside abounding streams, are shown, all of whom drink from two fountain sources, the Evangelists and the Father (doctores ecclesiastict). Eight of these virgins represent the Beatitudes, and four represent the Cardinal Virtues. The Beatitudes and Virtues comprise all spiritual know- ledge.’
1 The text of this Epithalamium (an acrostic of 258 lines in praise of the Virgin), from the MS. in the Preussische Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, MS. Phill. 1701, is quoted in a volume entitled Speculum Virginum: Jungfruspegel (a translation into Swedish from the Latin by Mathias Laurentii) edited by Robert Geete and published by the Svenska Fornskrift-Sdllskape, Stockholm, 1897, 1898, Vols. 111, 118, 115, pp. 609-616.
The Epithalamium is also quoted in an article by G. M. Dreves on ‘ Konrads von Hirschau doppelchoriges Epithalamium virginum’ in the Zeitschrift fiir Katholische Theologie XXV (1901), 546-554, and is printed in parallel columns, for two choirs, the form in which he found it in the Wiirzburg MS.
2 Verum licet in omni pictura uel artificio ratio prestet operi, et sit maior qui facit quam quod facit, uolo tamen quendam paradisum speculatorium pre oculis tibi in pictura ponere, ubi fons cum suis fluminibus quadripartito meatu procurrentibus sed intelligibilibus, pocula sumministrent sacris uirginibus, quasi columbis iuxta fluenta plenissima residentibus, sicque siue de fontibus euangelicis seu doctrinis ecclesiasticis bibant, ut octo beatitudines cum 1111” uirtutibus principalibus in quibus omnis spiritualis disciplinae ratio consistit, imitari ualeant (fol. 13r).
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The Speculum Virginum 449
The representation of the Beatitudes, a group of eight, is extra- ordinary in this connection. So also is the association of the Fathers with the Evangelists. Emile Male in L’Art Religieux de la Fin du Moyen Age, 1922, p. 224, assigns the origin of this association to a later date than the twelfth century: ‘Le XV° siécle méme,’ he says, ‘mit en honneur une opposition d’un nouveau genre. I] mit en paralléle les quatre évangélistes, non plus avec les quatre grands prophétes, comme faisait le XIII° siécle, mais avec les quatre Péres de ’Eglise latine: saint Augustin, saint Jéréme, saint Ambroise, saint Grégoire le Grand.’ In a footnote is added: ‘Ce genre d'opposition apparait dés le XIV¢* siécle, 4 l’autel de Notre-Dame d’Avioth.’
$ (fol. 28v). The Vices, represented by a tree with Superbia at the foot holding a chalice, the words written across the page being Aureus calyx Babilon. Branches right and left divide the Vices which spring from Superbia into an elaborate classification and sevenfold grouping, Luxuria, however, having two sub-divisions of six each. Near the top is Luxuria, with folded arms, above whom are the words uetus adam. The leaves on which the names of Vices are written, except those which take their rise from Luxuria, droop. Fructus iste descendit is written across the page. Around the main stem two serpents are twined and venom issues from their mouths. Across the page are the words Sinistra and Babilonia. Near the top are two griffins, above which is written Fructus carnis. There are in all 62 Vices.
4 (fol. 29r). The Virtues, represented by a tree with Humilitas at the foot, from whose breast issue two branches; there are two angeli pacis, one on each side of her. There is here, as in the preced- ing illustration, an elaborate classification. The Virtues have a sevenfold grouping, Caritas exceptionally having two subdivisions of five each. The leaves point upwards, Jste ascendit. Christ is at the top and beneath him the word Caritas. In four syllables around His nimbus are the words Nouus adam. Corresponding with words in the representation of the Vices appear the words Deztera, lerusalem and Fructus spiritus. The color blue, absent in the pre-
450 The Speculum Virginum
ceding illustration, is introduced in the representation of the Virtues, The number of Virtues is 60.1
5 (fol. 34v). The contest between Humilitas and Superbia. In the middle Humilitas with unconcern is driving a sword perpendic- ularly into the body of Superbia. To her right Iahel has Sisara Duz Madianitarum at her feet with a nail through his right temple. To the left of Humilitas is Iudith with Olafernes at her feet.? Both Sisera and Holofernes have crowns like that of David in the Tree of Jesse
(see Plate I).
6 (fol. 46r). The quadriga. In the middle is the Virgin standing full length with her feet on a wheel and holding the infant Christ whose feet also rest on a wheel. To the Virgin’s right is St John the Baptist, bearded, with nimbus, and with shaggy clothing; on her left St John the Evangelist, these two also having wheels beneath their feet. These four figures, as has been noted, are likened in the text to a quadriga.* They are all nimbed. At the top are two angels (nimbed) each holding an open book. The following are the inscrip- tions thereon:
(a) Stella gerit solem, rosa fert tibi credule florem Clarus ut ex sole repareris floris odore.
(b) Tempore iam uerno uiret orbis flore quaterno Flos ut homo uite sit gramen amando pudice.
7 (fol. 57v). The Foolish and Wise Virgins (Plate III). This illustration is divided horizontally into three parts. In the lowest
1 In R. Bruck, Die Malereien in den Handschriften des Kénigreichs Sachsen (Dresden: C. C. Meinhold und Séhne, 1906), pp. 88, 89, are reproductions from a Leipzig MS. of the thirteenth century, entitled Definitions Viciorum, which have a marked similarity in general appearance to the trees of Vices and Virtues in the Speculum Virginum.
2 For reproduction of corresponding subject in the Berlin MS. Phill. 1701 see A. Michel, Histoire de ’ Art (Paris, 1906), II, i, 301, and for reproduction of the same subject in the Zwettl MS. 180, see E. Winkler, Die Buchmalerei in Niederisterreich von 1150-1250 (Vienna, 1923), Fig. 53.
3 Vere felices anime, writes Peregrinus beneath the illustration, gue quadrige huius exemplo a terra subleuantur et tam florido thalamo inter angelos posito collocantur. Felices eque uirgines que horum florum odore trahuntur, et rotas istas quantum possible est imitantur (fol. 46r). And Theodora is made to say appreciatively, Pulchre rotas baptistam et euangetistam wirgini malri et agno precedentibus coniunzisti; quorum omnium castitatis exemplo nihil maius nihil prestantiut inuenisti.
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The Speculum Virginum 451
are 10 virgins, 5 on the left and 5 on the right. Between the two groups of 5 are two nimbed figures holding horns in their hands and above are the words media nocte clamor factus est and across the page Dormitauerunt omnes et dormiuerunt (Matth. xxv, 6, 5).
In the middle division are, on the left, the 5 wise virgins for whom the door is open and on the right the 5 foolish virgins in distress with dishevelled hair, one of whom is in vain trying a door. Above the wise virgins is written Has opus atque fides celestes mittit in edes, above the foolish, Haut patet his aditus quibus excidit et liquor et luz.
The third division contains a design with five semicircular arches, in the second of which is a nimbed figure representing ecclesia, in the third Christ (nimbed) with an open book on which is written Glori- ficantes me glorificabo. Qui autem contemnunt me erunt ignobiles (1 Samuel ii, 30), in the fourth Mary nimbed, and in the first and fifth nimbed figures.’
8 (fol. 70r). This illustration is in three divisions. At the top are the words accipio quodcunque peregrinationis et molestie mee solatium a peregrino. At the foot are Adam et Eua above whom the green tree springs with figures enclosed in the convolutions of the branches as in the first illustration, the Tree of Jesse (see P’ .te I). The lowest division represents the Fructus tricesimus coniugatorum, the second the Fructus sexagesimus uiduarum, and the highest the Fructus centesimus (see Plate I, above). In the lowest are represented on the left Ab (Abraham) and his wife, Za et El (Zacharias and Elizabeth) and on the right Noe and his wife, and Job and his wife. In the second division are on the left Debbora and Judith and on the right uidua g° duo minuta misit in gazophylacium (Mark xii, 41, 42) and Anna. In the highest division are virgins and at the top Christ, cross-nimbed. The fructus is represented by blades of corn. In the highest division those at the top are blue and green in contrast with dull red beneath.
9 (fol. 83v). The flesh and the spirit. A Cross is represented divided into compartments. At the bottom is a monster and above
' For reproduction of corresponding illustration in the Berlin MS. Phill. 1701, see Joachim Kirchner, Beschreibendes V ergeichnis der Miniaturen und des Initialschmuckes in den Phillipps- Handschriften (Leipzig: J. J. Weber, 1926), opposite p. 66.
452 The Speculum Virginum
it the words Deceptor ueteranus. In the second compartment a figure representing lex with a sword in her right hand and in her left a book on which is written non concupisces; above, a figure against which are the words Caro Bonum; still higher, a figure with the words Spiritus melius; and at the top Christ, cross-nimbed, with blue robe and blue nimbus, against whom are the words Gratia and Deus optimum. On the arms of the cross are, left, Ratio, and right, Saprentia; between these two are the words Liberum arbitrium. Ratio and Sapientia each grasp one arm of Caro and one arm of Spiritus. Christ holds the arms of Spiritus. Beginning in the high- est compartment, continuing in a circle around Christ, and ending with rvs illius, in the highest compartment but one is written Infeliz ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius (Rom. vii, 24) and Sub te erit appetitus eius et tu dominaberis illius (Gen. iv, 7).
10 (fol. 93v). The Ascent of the Ladder (Plate IV).! The mean- ing of this illustration is described in the text.? The bottom of the
1 For similar subject see Herrad von Landsperg’s Hortus Deliciarum (Paris, 1877), Tab. ix; this volume contains reproductions from miniatures of the twelfth century in the manuscript which was destroyed in the fire of 1870 at the Strassburg Library. There is no Ethiopian, but there is a dragon at the foot, and towards the top two demons aiming arrows in the direction of the ladder. On the ladder are included a soldier, a layman, and a monk, who are falling of. At the top a persona representing !"irtus id est Caritas is about to receive from the right hand of God the Corona utte.
2 Fol. 98r. [Peregrinus] Denique scala nobis erigenda est cuius ima draco cautus obseruat, ethiops altiora stricto mucrone possidens arcet ascensum, et ad iuuenem in summitate ipsius scale collocatum habentem ramos aureolos, premiorum indices accessum. Sed uirginum Christi robur et constantia fidei instar uermis draconem conculcat tormenta diuersa scale latera ambientia quasi stipulam exsufflat, nigrum ethiopem perterit et perculcat, et immobili nec mutabili desiderio, ad ramos frondentis olee properat. T{[heodora] Memini, pater amande te nonnulla scale huius uestigia, pagine superius impressisse, sed quid ista portendant studeas obsecro enucleare. P{eregrinus] An ignoras artam et angustam esse semitam que ducit ad uitam, et paucos esse qui inueniunt eam? Que semita, quia semper celestia respicit, et ab ea declinare uel ad dexteram uel sinistram non parui periculi est, cui melius potest compari quam scale de terra ad celum erecte, cuius ut altiores gradus apprehenderis respectus ad ima in recu- perandi discriminis est, summa uero attigisse lauream eternitatis promeruisse est? Porro draconis et ethiopis sicut natura diuersa sic diuersa malicie efficatia. Draco hominem ueneno interficit, ethiops facie forma demonis appropriantem non tam mucrone quam horrore cot- fodit. Ex altero spiritualia nequicie cognosce, in altero corpus diaboli quod sanctos in hac uita semper impugnat intellige. Draco uersutus mentem quasi spiris uirulentis suggestione pestifera ab altis auertit, malus homo, sanctis hostis apertius imissus, quod alter sibilo illectrie non ualuit, uicarius eius uel terrore uel aperto congressu efficere gestit.
T. Queso te, unde forma scale huius primum apparuit, cuius misticus ordo tam euidentur eluxit? P. Legitur in gestis martirum de quadam uirgine Christi incarcerata scale huiusmodi
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The Speculum Virginum 453
ladder is watched by a wary dragon while above an Ethiopian guards the ascent and tries to prevent access to the figure of Christ, who holds in His hands golden branches, the signs of reward. But by strength and steadfastness the virgins are able to crush the dragon underfoot like a worm, to blow away like grass the various instru- ments of torment’ placed about the ladder, to pound the Ethiopian to pieces and trample him down and make their way to the leafy olive branches. In response to Theodora’s request that he should give some further enucleation Peregrinus asks her if she has not heard that ‘straight is the gate and narrow the way that leadeth unto life and few there be that find it’ (Maitth. vii, 10), and to what could the path better be compared than to a ladder set up from earth to heaven, to reach the top of which was to merit the reward of eternal life. As the dragon and Ethiopian, he continues, are differ- ent by nature so are the operations of their evil will. The dragon kills a man by his poison, the Ethiopian slays him not only by the sword but also by terror. The former stands for the spirit of wicked- ness, the latter for the body of the devil. The crafty dragon turns the mind away from higher things, the Ethiopian by terror and open attack effects what the dragon cannot effect by fascination.
When Theodora asks what was the origin of the ladder Pere- grinus says that it might be found in the Acts of the Martyrs, in the vision of a certain Virgo Christi, and he refers to a ladder which he assumes she will know, namely, St Benedict’s ladder of Humility, the subject of Chapter vii (De Humilitate) of the Regula.?
The author has thus made clearer the meaning of this picture, but he has, nevertheless, left room for further elucidation. Fortu- fguram in somnis ab angelo didicisse, et uictoria celesti certificatam fuisse, uictis et angelis malis et hominibus sceleratis. Nonne et huiusmodi scale forman a sancto pastore nostro Benedicto habes traditam, cuius observare contendis regulam? Dicit enim latera ipsius scale typum corporis et anime nostre gradibus inserta celistis discipline.
1 In the Leipzig MS. 665 there are two words placed perpendicularly with the points downwards. See R. Bruck, Die Malereien in den Handschriften des Kénigreichs Sachsen (Dres- den: C. C. Meinhold und Séhne, 1906), p. 237.
? S. P. Benedicti Regula, Migne, Patr. Lat. LXVI, 371. Scala illa erigenda est quae in smnio Iacob apparuit . . . Scala vero ipsa erecta, nostra est uita in saeculo: quae humiliato corde a Domino erigitur ad coelum. Latera enim eiusdem scalae, dicimus nostrum esse corpus
¢ animami in qua latera diuersos gradus humilitatis uel disciplinae euocatio diuina ascen- dendos inseruit.
454 The Speculum Virginum
nately he has given a clue in the last few lines of the passage quoted in the footnote. By the wirgo Christi he means without doubt Saint Perpetua and the imagery on folio 93v is drawn in its origin from the vision, or rather visions, of this saint who, at the age of 29, suffered death as a martyr in Africa in 203 a.p. It is recorded that the visions vouchsafed to her are told in her own words. The man- ner in which they are narrated is extraordinarily simple and extra- ordinarily telling. There are two passages on which the subject of the Speculum Virginum is ultimately based. The first has reference to the ladder.’
The second passage occurs in a further vision of Saint Perpetua in which she describes a contest with the Aegyptius, or Ethiopian,
in the arena.*
In Saint Perpetua’s first vision the ascent leads to the white- haired man; in her further vision the reward is bestowed by the lanista. In the Speculum Virginum it is Christ who is at the top of
1 See Bollandus, Acta Sanctorum (Paris, 1863, etc.) under March 7, p. 632; Migne, Pair. Lat. III, 25. The story is told in English in S. Baring-Gould, Lives of the Saints (London: Nimmo, 1897, 98), III, 104.
2 Op. cit., p. 632. Video scalam mirae magnitudinis, pertingentem usque ad coeum et angustam per quam non nisi singuli ascendere possent; et in lateribus scalae omne genus ferramentorum infixum. Erant ibi gladii, lanceae, hami, machaerae: ut si quis negligenter, aut non sursum attendens ascenderet, laniaretur, et carnes eius inhaererent ferramentis. Et erat sub ipsa scala draco cubans mirae magnitudinis qui ascendentibus insidias praestabat et exterrebat ne ascenderent. Ascendit autem Saturus prior, qui postea se propter nos ultro tradiderat, et tunc cum adducti sumus, praesens non fuerat: et peruenit in caput scalae, et conuertit se, et dixit mihi: Perpetua, sustineo te: sed uide ne te mordeat draco ille. Et dixi ego. Non me nocebit in nomine Domini Jesu Christi, et de sub ipsa scala, quasi timens me, lente eiicit caput: et quasi primum gradum calcarem, calcaui illi caput. Et ascendi et uidi spatium horti immensum, et in medio sedentem hominem canum, in habitu pastoris, grandem, oues mulgentem: circumstantes candidati millia multa. Et leuauit caput et aspexit me, et dixit mihi: Beni uenisti tegnon.
3 Op. cit., p. 634. Et exiuit quidam contra me Aegyptius; foedus specie, cum adiutoribus suis, pugnaturus mecum . . . Et exiuit uir quidam mirae magnitudinis ut etiam excederet fas tigium amphitheatri discincatatus purpuram inter duos clauos per medium pectus, habens calliculas multiformes ex auro et argento factas, efferens uirgam quasi lanista, et ramum uiridem, in quo erant mala aurea. Et petiit silentium, et dixit: Hic Aegyptius si hanc uicerit, occidet illam gladio: et si hunc uicerit, accipiet ramum istum et recessit. Et accesimus ad inuicem et coepimus mittere pugnos. Ille mihi pedes apprehendere uolebat: ego autem ili calcibus faciem caedebam: et sublata sum in aere, et coepi eum sic caedere terram concaleats. At ubi uidi moram fieri, iunxi manus, ut digitos in digitos mitterem: et apprehendi illi caput, et cecidit in faciem et calcaui illi caput. Et coepit populus clamare, et fauitores mei psallere. Et accessi ad lanistram, et accepi ramum. Et osculatus est me, et dixit mihi: Filia, pax tecum.
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The Speculum Virginum 455
the ladder and represented as a youth without beard and described in the text as tuwwenis.
But the association of the Ethiopian with the ladder cannot be said to have been the invention of Peregrinus. It occurs before his time in a hymn, De Virginibus, Puella turbata, in a Kolmar MS. of
the eleventh century.’ A comparison of this with the description of Peregrinus shows
a marked verbal similarity.
11 (fol. 108v). Christ represented in a green-bordered vesica, holding an open book on which is written Eunuchis meis dabo locum e nomen melius filiis et filiabus (Isaiah lvi, 5). On each side of Christ are two groups in one of which on the left is Mary and in the other on the right John. At the bottom a tonsured figure is inclining in veneration before Christ and holding his right foot. The color blue makes its appearance in the nimbus of Mary, Christ, and John.
12 (fol. 114v). This representation is placed at the beginning of chapter xi which is an exposition of the Septiformis Spiritus cum suis appendicitis. The picture is in some measure another version of the subject of the frontispiece. There is, for example, in the middle an abbreviated Tree of Jesse including only Jesse, the Virgin, and Christ, and the top is substantially a repetition of that
1 See F. J. Mone, Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1853-55), Ill, 157-8. The following are the first 16 out of 68 lines: 1. Scalam ad coelos subrectam, tormentis cinctam 2. Cuius ima draco seruare cautus inuigilat iugiter, Ne quis eius uel primum gradum possit insaucius scandere; 8. Cuius ascensus extracto Aethiops gladio uetat, Cuius supremis innixus iuuenis splendidus ramum aureolum retinet .. . J. Kehrein in Lateinische Sequenzen des Mittelalters (Mainz, 1873), p. 332, refers to an Finsiedeln MS. of the tenth century containing this hymn.
456 The Speculum Virginum
in Plate I above. This representation, however, draws much of its imagery from architecture. Between the columns are the words: Egredietur uirga de radice esse et flos de radice eius ascendet et requi- escet super eum spiritus domini spiritus sapientie, et intellectus, con- silit et fortitudinis, scientie, pietatis, timororis (Isaiah xi, 1, 2).!
Above is Sapientia edificauit sibi domum excidit columnas septem (Prov. ix, 1).
On the open book which the Virgin holds is written Dominus possedet me in inicio uiarum suarum and Ab eterno ordinata sum et ¢ (Prov. viii, 22, 23). On the closed book held by Christ are the words Spiritus domini super me eo quod unzerit me (Isaiah 1xi, 1).
There are on fol. 17v two small representations of Peregrinus and Theodora, and on fol. 82r are shown by drawings in red the signs of married women, widows, and virgins. Chapter xi has mar- ginal drawings of the heart-shaped leaves which appear at the top of the first illustration.
Peregrinus was a teacher, and the Speculum may perhaps be regarded as the precipitation of his experimentally-acquired views as to what should be taught to his students. He realized the value of graphic exposition, and the appeal to the eye would be, he thinks, of special service if Theodora should chance to find among her companions any who did not understand what they read, since to those who were unlettered the picture was a kind of writing and in any case would render an understanding less tardy.”
There is an approach to humor in Theodora’s request that Pere- grinus should proceed with modica lucubratiuncula (fol. 127r) and an expression of marked irritation on his part a little further on (fol. 127v) when he says, ‘Ignorantia tua ad strophas te excitat ut defendas quod nescis et nescias quod defendis. Multotiens tibi litera repetenda est, que semper in eodem neglegentie luto hesitare uideris.’
And the following passage brings to life again a little banter:
1 Some words are much abbreviated as, e.g. sci for scientig.
2 Quod ergo de hoc capitulo queris sicut a patribus accepimus, pauca ponenda sunt, premissa tamen figura, ut consodales tue si forte quod legunt non intellegunt, uel proficiant
ex forma subposita, quia ignorantibus litteras, ipsa pictura scriptura est (fol. 57r). And again, Attende igitur ut profectum habeas ex mistica pictura si tardior fueris ex scriptura (fol. 13r).
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The Speculum Virginum 457
Pleregrinus]. Contigit te aliquando templum intrasse uitreo decore iluminatum? T[heodora]. Mecum ludis cum adeo usus hic in ecclesiis preualuerit ut sine huiusmodi decore quicquid ornamenti adhibueris nihil (fol 122r).?
The treatise deals largely with the gifts of the spirit and naturally with the Song of Solomon from which there are numerous quotations. It is a handbook of knowledge regarded as specially suitable for virgins, an encouragement to them to persevere in what they have undertaken so that they may obtain the crown which is promised them if they are faithful. The writer does not lay claim to have added to knowledge. Near the end he says that his Speculum is rather a work of demonstration than of creation.? He makes abun- dant use of metaphor. A striking exemplification of this is to be found in the praise of the Virgin beginning on fol. 44r:
Maria itaque lucis eterne porta perfulgida, celestis aule gloria, clauis paradisi reserandi, materies seculi renouandi; singulare sancti spiritus habitaculum, solis eterni tabernaculum; ipsa amor, decus, et forma uirgi- num, totius ecclesie continens in se sacramentum; orta uirga de radice lesse in terris, ante tempora cuncta praesignata Christi mater in celis; Syon et Ierusalem filia regali stirpe progenita, Christi ancilla credentium mater et domina, celestis militie regina; reconciliatrix mundi, sacrarium spiritus sancti; iudicis et sponsi tribunal et secretarium, prolis et domini uirginale puerperium; solium regis regum, flos et fructus uirginum, fructus florens mulierum ; ipsa forma florentis pudicitie, ipsa uernantis sigillum castimonie. Maria stella matutina, sole et luna splendidior, angelis superior, ipso ethere purior, uirtutum operatrix, humani generis amatrix, perditi mundi prouisa reparatrix; ipsa in patriarchis occulta, a prophetis ostensa, in sinagoga radix floris, in ecclesia fructus radicis; ipsa gradu uite speculatiue quasi cedrus exaltata, quasi palma florens et oliua fructifera; ipsa uirgo prudens; in olio uel lampade, lumen indeficiens totius uirginalis uite; facie decora, corpore et mente decentissima; lapsis ueniale patrocinium, iustis ne ruant defen- saculum, celi et terre speculum; et ut breuiter concludam, totius summa salutis humane causa et gloria benedictionis eterne.
This passage is divided into two parts, each of which begins with the word ‘Maria,’ and it might be set out as verse with rhymed
1 This passage is of interest also in its reference to stained glass windows. * Ecce Theodora, tandem per prolixiores sermonum circuitus speculum uirginum pro posse nostro monstrando potius quam fabricando exhibuimus (fol. 114r).
458 The Speculum Virginum
endings. It may be a quotation. In any case it arrests attention as being an outburst in praise of the Virgin, the object of such adoration in the Middle Ages that the attempts to express it created a vast treasury of metaphor.
Peregrinus was a mystic and wrote with verve. There is a record of the effect which his Speculum had in the fourteenth century on one who came under its influence, namely, St Bridget of Sweden. In the Attestationes Domini Petri Olavi (British Museum, MS. Harl. 612, fol. 267v, col. 1063)! it is asserted that, when on a certain day he was reading to Bridget in the monastery of Alvastra from a book which was called Speculum Virginum, she was enraptured. That the book was largely used in monasteries may be judged from the fact that there are no fewer than sixteen manuscripts still existing.
As to the literary value of the Speculum, Trithemius’ appreciation of the author as Tullianam resonans eloquentiam * may be regarded as excessive, yet there is an attraction in his affluentissima exuber- antia. He had some knowledge of classical Latin — a considerable knowledge if, as there is some reason to believe (see Appendix B), he was the author of a Dialogus super Auctores siue Didascalon. In the Speculum he definitely mentions Horace when he says to Theo- dora (fol. 126v), Non iniuria prouerbium illud oratianum tibi potest asscriht que semel arripuit tenet occiditque loquendo (Ars Poetica 475) and his expression guomodo solent magnis minima conferri (fol. 65v) is suggestive of Virgil.
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The first illustration (11 x 7}’’) in the Speculum Virginum is a Tree of Jesse.‘ It is placed at the beginning (fol. 2v) because, as
' Preterea dixit iste loquens testis [Petrus Olavus] quod cum ipse quodam die legeret in monasterio Aluastri predicto coram domina B. in libro qui uocatur Speculum Virginum in quo Peregrinus monachus disputat de omnibus uirtutibus cum Theodora uirgine, tunc domins B ipso teste loquente hoc uidente ut asseruit rapta fuit in spiritu. See Robert Geete, op. cil. supra, p. Xvi.
2 Cathalogus illustrium uirorum . . . (Mentz, 1496 ?), fol. xviii’.
3 Sic paruis componere magna solebam. Fel. i, 24.
4 With regard to colors: red is used for the tree, for the calami, and edges of some of the leaves, green for the headgear of Booz, Obeth, Jesse, and one of the virgins, for the crown of David, for the vases held by Christ, and in the dress of the four corner figures, and in the nimbus of St John the Baptist and St John the Evangelist; blue for the streams flowing from
, is , as et in | quo
. cit,
The Speculum Virginum 459
it appears, it was the most convenient way which the writer could find of expressing figuraliter the main purport of the treatise. So far as the genealogy is concerned it will be noted that it goes back to Booz! who is seated on the margin. He holds with his hands the two branches which proceed from his breast. Above to his left is Obeth, his son, and above to his right Jesse, his grandson. Directly above Booz is David who is crowned, and above him, with the omis- sion of all the intervening generations, is the Virgin holding an open book on which is written Quasi terebintus extendi ramos (Ecclus., xxiv, 22). Against the Virgin who is nimbed is written the word uirga and above is Christ who is cross-nimbed, Flos filius eius.
Above Christ are seven calami leading to heart-shaped leaves representing the seven Gifts of the Spirit named together in each case with the associated qualities. Still higher are seven other leaves. The following is a transcription, in full, of the words which are in some cases much abbreviated:
1. (a) Beati pacifici (e) Baptismus (b) Santificetur nomen (f) Lex scripta (c) Vox domini super aquas (g) Fides
(d) Vincenti dabo stellam matutinam (I) Spiritus Sapientie Mobilis Stabilis
2, (a) Beati mundo corde (e) Sermones (b) Adueniat regnum (f) Spes (c) Vox domini preparantis ceruos (g) Incarnatio (d) Qui uicerit dabo ei calculum (candidum) (II) Spiritus Intellectus Mundus Subtilis
the vases, in the dress of Jesse, David, and Obeth, in the nimbus of the Virgin, Christ, Isaiah, and Zachariah, and in the borders of the heart-shaped leaves, and brown generally for the hair and features. There are instances in the other illustrations where blue appears to have been selected as indicating what was to be regarded of high spiritual import.
1 The writer of this article knows of no pictorial representations of a Tree of Jesse which begin with Booz except those in manuscripts of the Speculum Virginum. Such representations may, however, exist. See Appendix C, pp. 468, 469, below.
The Speculum Virginum
(e) (f) (g)
Beati misericordes Fiat uoluntas tua Vox domini concutientis desertum Qui uicerit uestietur uestimentis albis (III) Spiritus Consilii unicus longe prospiciens
Beati qui esurient et sitiunt iustitiam Panem nostrum cotidianum Vox domini intercidentis (flammam ignis) Vincenti dabo manna absconditum (IV) Spiritus fortitudinis certus Securus
Beati qui lugent Dimitte nobis debita Vox domini confringentis cedros Qui uicerit faciam illum columnam in templo (V) Spiritus scientie Multiplex Disertus
et ne nos inducas
Beati mites
Vox domini in magnificentia
Qui uicerit dabo ei sedere
mecum in throno (VI) Spiritus Pietatis
Suauis Benignus
Beati pauperes spiritu Libera nos a malo Vox domini in uirtute Vincenti dabo edere de ligno uite (VII) Spiritus Timoris Acutus Humanus
Passio domini Expositores Caritas
Descensus ad inferos Epistole canonice Fortitudo
Resurrectio Euangelium Iusticia
Ascensio Prophecie
p : Temperantia
Lex composita Prudentia Aduentus domini
The Speculum Virginum 461
Under (1) to (VII) are set forth the Gifts of the Spirit (Isaiah ix, 1, 2) and beneath them the qualities.!
For (a) the Beatitudes and (b) Petitions, see Matth. v, vi; (c) Voces Domini, Ps. xxviii in the Vulgate; (d) the Triumphal Crowns, A poc.
(f) to sources of divine guidance; and under (g) are the Virtues.*
Above David to his right and left are six virgins to whom the following written words apply, In odore* unguentorum tuorum cur- rimus from the Song of Solomon (i, 3), Trahe me post te currimus in odorem unguentorum tuorum. On the virgins descend the streams from the two vases and also on the two figures to the right and left of the Virgin, who are respectively John the Baptist and John the Evangelist. Some evidence as to the intention with regard to these two figures is to be found in the corresponding illustration from the Vatican MS. Palat. cod. Lat. 565, where the abbreviations Joh bapt and Joh eu appear against the figures. And in the fifteenth-century Dutch manuscript (British Museum Add MS. 38527, see Plate VI) the figure to the right hand of Christ is holding a lamb, and that to the left a chalice. Further, if attention is directed to the subject- matter of Chapter v of the Speculum (see pp. 447, 450 above) there appears to be no doubt that the four figures at the top of the design represent the quadriga — Christ (Angus), the Virgin, John the Baptist, and John the Evangelist.
In the two medallions at the top are represented Isaiah and Zachariah. Isaiah (nimbed) holds a book on which is written his
1 Wisdom of Solomon vii, 22. Est enim in illa (sapientia) spiritus intelligentiae, sanc- tus, unicus, multiplex, subtilis, disertus, mobilis . . . .
Theodora (fol. 124v) points out that Peregrinus has altered the order given in Scripture.
* Towards the end of the treatise Peregrinus attempts to frame paragraphs in which references to each Gift and its associates (a) to (g) are knitted together. As an example (from fol. 125r) may be given the following, the letters within round brackets showing how the var- ious ideas are introduced:
Qui sapit (I) que sunt spiritus domini per pacis (a) custodiam uenire festinat in adoptionem filiorum domini. De qua pace (a) querenda tenenda, uox domini super aquas (c), id est predicatio domini semper ad populos ferebatur quia ipse est pax nostra (a) qui fecit utrumque unum, propter nos baptizatur (e), ubi et dominus maiestatis intonuit, hic est filius nobis delectus et cet. In hac ilaque uoce sapienti¢g (1) legis (f) summa in cordibus fidelium non atramento sed digito domini seribitur (f); ut fides (g) excitetur fide, nomen domini sanctificetur (b), per laborem presentis witg
stella matutina (d) id est eterna corona queratur. * That the syllable ‘do’ appears twice is no doubt due to inadvertence.
462 The Speculum Virginum
prophecy (ix, 1): ‘Egredietur wirga de radice Jesse et flos de radice eius ascendet et requiescet super eum spiritus domini.’ On the right Zachariah (nimbed) also has a book in his hand and on this is written Quid est pulchrum domini nist frumentum electorum et uinum germi- nans uirgines (ix, 17).
The two medallions at the bottom have within them figures rep- resenting Peregrinus and Theodora. On the book which Peregrinus holds are his first few words in the whole dialogue, ‘Collaturo tecum, o Theodora,’ and Theodora’s book similarly has written on it her first words, ‘Quia frater in Christo peregrine.’ The position in which the second finger and thumb of her right hand are shown may possibly be intended to have reference to the centesimus fructus. Mention of this sign as representing virgins does not appear in the Con- stitutiones Hirsaugienses' of the eleventh century, where a totally different signum uirginis uel muliebris is given. Peregrinus, however, in chapter vii of the Speculum gives three signs, two of which are made with the left hand and stand for married women and widows. The third for virgins is made with the right hand by forming a circle with the thumb and first finger.’ In the illustration the circle is made with the thumb and second finger, but this variation may pos- sibly be due to the fact that the index finger is needed for pointing, as in the case of the three other corner figures.
Booz is seated. In all the representations of this subject in the Speculum which the writer has seen, neither Booz nor Jesse is re- cumbent.
The sitting position of Jesse is supposed by Emile Male to have originated in the fifteenth century: *
Donnons un exemple des audaces que se permettent les maitres. Il ya eu vers la fin du XV° siécle un artiste qui a osé modifier l’iconographie de l’arbre de Jessé. Au lieu de nous montrer le patriarche couché et voyant en
1 Migne, Patr. Lat. CL, 948.
2 The verbal description of these signs and of their meaning (fol. 82r) is the same, apart from unimportant differences, as that of St Jerome, Aduersus Iowinianum, Lib. i (Migne, Patr. Lat., XXIII, 213). The signs are for the numbers 30, 60 and 100, and are made to stand for the tricesimus, sexagesimus and centesimus fructus. With regard to the use of signs for numbers, see Migne, Patr. Lat. XXIII, 213, footnote b, and J. E. B. Mayor, Thirteen Satires of Juvenal (London: Macmillan, 1886, 1888), II, 142, note on 1. 249 of the tenth Satire.
3 L’ Art Religieux de la Fin du Moyen Age en France (Paris: Colin, 1922), p. 82.
ve
de
en
art ne, nd for
The Speculum Virginum 463
réve un grand arbre sortir de son ventre, il le represente assis sous un dais en forme de tente . . . L’origine de cette innovation remonte au Speculum Humanae Salvationis: c'est 1a que l'on voit pour la premiére fois Jessé, non plus couché, mais assis.
Male, however, with some apparent inconsistency, mentions in his book dealing with twelfth-century art in France! an instance of the representation, assigned to the end of the eleventh century, of Jesse seated. If, however, this should be judged too timid to be taken into account, the illustration in at least four representations in the Speculum Virginum not later than the thirteenth century of Booz as seated and wide awake deserve some attention.”
This tree of Jesse occurs in eight other MSS, viz., those at Zwettl, Rome, Berlin, Troyes (2), Leipzig, Cologne (W kf 155), and in the British Museum Add MS. 38527. There is also a reproduction in R. Forrer, Unedirte Miniaturen und Initialen des Mittelalters (Strassburg, 1907), Vol. II, Taf. IV, in which the kinship to the illustrations in the MSS of the Speculum Virginum is clear. Plates V and VI are reproductions of the Tree of Jesse from two of these manuscripts.
The illustration from the Berlin MS. Phill. 1701 (Plate V) (15;’ x 11’’) shows a divergence in several details of design from that in Arundel 44. The representation of the gifts of the spirit has disappeared. David is shown full length, in majesty. His attitude, the folds of his robes, his grasp of the branches, showing to the front the palm of his right hand and the back of his left, have a marked similarity to the representation of one of the kings (the fourth above Jesse) in the window of the Cathedral at Chartres.* It may be noted that the four figures representing the quadriga are
1 L’Art Religieuxr du X1I1* Sidcle en France (Paris: Colin, 1922), p. 171, second footnote. The reference is to the Tree of Jesse reproduced in F. J. Lehner, Ceskd Skola Maltriské XI. ku (Die Bihmische Malerschule des XI. Jahrhunderts), Prague, 1902, Plate VIII.
* The artist of the Windmill Psalter in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century was daring enough to represent Jesse as seated in a fine illumination of the initial B of the first Psalm. This is reproduced in the Catalogue of Manuscripts and Early Printed Books in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan (Bennett Collection) (London: Chiswick Press, 1906), opposite p. 41. Jesse is also represented as seated in an initial L at the beginning of St Matthew's Gospel in the British Museum MS. Burney 3, fol. 801r. The MS. is a Bible, 1245, from St
Augustine's, Canterbury. * See J. B. A. Lassus, Monographie de la Cathédrale de Chartres (Paris, 1842), Plate 58.
464 The Speculum Virginum
more closely grouped together and form the summit of the design. Joachin Kirchner! assigns this illumination to French origin and draws attention to the delight which French artists showed in manual skill while with the German it was the subject which was of prime interest.
The fifteenth-century British Museum Add. MS. 38527, Spieg- hel der Maechden (73" x 52’’) (Plate V1), a Dutch translation, has a Tree of Jesse on fol. 4v. The leaves at the top of the MS. Arundel 44 have been replaced by female heads, and scrolls each with the name in Dutch of one of the Gifts of the Spirit. Isaiah, Zachariah, Pere- grinus, and Theodora are full length. The branches have become changed into intersecting thin circle-lines. The branch issues on two sides from the mouth of Booz. The subject has become realistic and lost a good deal of its original simplicity and significance as a reli- gious subject. There is a mass of blue background, and red within the circles. The branches are green, and gold appears on every nimbus, on David’s crown, on the two vases and chalice, and on the robes of Peregrinus.
Representations of the Tree of Jesse in the Middle Ages and in later times are so numerous and so varied in their content that it may well happen that even an important class should escape notice. Neither Corblet in his Etude Iconographique sur Arbre de Jesse (Paris, Arras, [printed 1860]), nor Emile Male in his three great works on ecclesiastical art in France makes any mention of the Tree of Jesse in the illustrations to the Speculum Virginum. These illustrations are of interest, however, as having a significance distinct from that of other representations. In this Tree of Jesse the author has found a means of expressing iconographically his special religious teaching. With it are associated ideas not only of what should be believed and worshipped but also of what should be done, and it may be regarded as an abbreviature for those whom he was addressing.
1 Op. cit., p. 64.
un
nd
The Speculum Virginum 465
APPENDIX A
MANUSCRIPTS OF THE Speculum Virginum
1. Lonpon. XIIth cent. Brit. Mus. Arundel 44, 129 fol. Imperfect. One or two folios at the end and the Epithalamium missing. Illu- minated.
On the outside of fol. 1, is a hymn, ‘ Audite o lucis filie aduerti te coheredes regis et saluatoris nostri,’ with musical notation, neums on a four-lined stave the second of which is red and the fourth yel- low. This appears to be of about the same date as the Speculum; itis not, however, referred to in the Epistola which contains a sum- mary of the contents of the manuscript. The words at the top of this page, hugo mag, indicate that the manuscript was once in the possession of a magister.
2. CoLtoene. XIIth cent. Historisches Archiv, W f 276a from St Maria in Andernach. Imperfect, begins in the third chapter and ends in the ninth. Illuminated.
38. Wuerzpure. XII-XIIIth cent. Universitiits-bibliothek, Mp. th. f. 107. From Ebrach. First book missing. Contains the Epitho- lamium. Without illuminations.
4. Zwetti. XIIIth cent. (1st half). Cistercian Monastery. Cod. 180. Contains the 12 books and the Epithalamium. Illuminated.
5. Rome. XIIIth cent. Vatican, Palat. cod. Lat. 565. Tlluminated.
6. Berurn. XIIIth cent. Preussische Staatsbibliothek, Phill. 1701. 148 folios. Contains the Epithalumium. Illuminated.
The career of this MS. is interesting. It originally belonged to the Cistercian monastery at Igny, afterwards to the Jesuit Collége de Clermont in Paris. In 1763 it passed to Meerman, in 1824 to Sir Thomas Phillipps, and in 1887 to the Berlin Staatsbibliothek.'
1 See Valentine Rose, Die Handschriften-V erzeichnisse der Kéniglichen Bibliothek xu Berlin, vol. XII. Werzeichniss der Lateinischen Handschriften, vol. I (Berlin: Asher, 1893), pp. 138, 187 and Robert Geete: Speculum Virginum: Jungfruspegel (Stockholm: 1897, 1898) PP. X, X, Xi.
The Speculum Virginum
. Troyes. XIIIth cent. Bibliothéque de la Ville, 252. From Clair- vaux. Contains the Epithalamium. Illuminated.
. Troyes. XIIIth cent. Bibliothéque de la Ville, 413. Varies from 252 only in small details. Illuminated.
. Arras. XIIIth cent. Bibliothéque Municipale, 943-282. From the Abbey of St Vaast. Originally 141 folios of which 40 are missing. Nine illuminations.
10. Lerpzic. XJIVth cent. Universitits-bibliothek, Mscr. Nr. 665, Germany (Saxony); 165 folios. Illuminated.
For reproductions of five subjects from this MS. see R. Bruck, Die Malereien in den Handschriften des Kénigreichs Sachsen (Dresden: 1906), pp. 234-238.
11. Rems. XIVth cent. (end). Bibliothéque de la Ville, 611 (F 432). Contains only 20 folios and these belong to the 6th book. Without illuminations.
12. Cotocne. XVth cent. Historisches Archiv. W kf 155. From Kreuzherrnkloster in Cologne. Illuminated.
18. Lonpon. XVth cent. Brit. Mus. Add MS 38527. Dutch transla- tion, Utrecht. At the end is written, ‘Dit boec hoer totten sustenen bi onser vrouwen in den wijngaert t’ Utrecht.’ Contains only the first six chapters. Illuminated.
For reproductions of four subjects from this MS. see A. W. Bij- vanck and Hoogewerff, Noord-Nederlandsche Miniaturen in Hand- schriften der 14°, 15° en 16° Eeuwen (’s Gravenhage, publisher 1921-25), Plates 83 and 84.
14. Municu. XVth cent. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Lat. 3561. Imperfect. Contains at the end a graphic exposition of the Pater Noster.
15. StrockHotm. XVth cent. Kongl. Bibliothek, Antikvitelsarkivets. Translation into Swedish by Mathias Laurentii (Mats Larsson). 164 folios. Without illuminations.
16. Arras. XVIIth cent. Bibliothéque Municipale, 704-916. From the Abbey of St Vaast. Without illuminations.
In the sixth volume of Mabillon’s Annales Ordinis S. Benedicti (Paris, 1739), p. 210, Edmond Marténe, who completed the work after Mabillon’s death, adds, under the year 1131, in reference to
ett
The Speculum Virginum 467
the Speculum Virginum: quod editioni paratum penes nos habemus. The MS. from which it was intended to issue a printed copy may be additional to those enumerated above.
APPENDIX B AUTHORSHIP OF THE SPECULUM VIRGINUM
Trithemius refers to the Speculum Virginum in his books De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis, Cathalogus Illustrium Virorum and Chron- icon Insigne Monasterii Hirsaugiensis. Valentine Rose, and after him Robert Geete, utterly mistrust Trithemius’ assignment of the author- ship of the Speculum to Conrad. They point out that at first Tri- themius was content with stating the assumed name Peregrinus, but that later than 1492 he introduced the name of Conrad. If Trithemius was in a more or less large number of cases inaccurate, it does not follow that he was never accurate, and he may have had some evi- dence of weight in this particular case. Valentine Rose states that in the Berlin MS. and elsewhere in MSS without exception the Speculum Virginum is anonymous.' The Epistola of the Berlin MS. begins Ultimus Christi pauperum N virginibus sacris N et N. Rose refers to one of the Troyes MS. and the Vatican MS. In the former the first initial letter is also N. In the latter it appears from a rotograph that there are spaces with no initials inserted.
The twelfth-century Cologne MS., the British Museum MS. Add. 38257, and some other MSS are not helpful, since they do not contain the Epistola.
On the other hand, in the twelfth-century British Museum MS. Ar. 44 the Epistola begins as has already been noted: Vitimus Christi pauperum C.... The Swedish translation, fifteenth century, edited by Robert Geete, begins: A ptherste aff Christi fatighom C.... and the Zwettl, Leipzig, and Cologne I (W kf 155) MSS also have C.
Valentine Rose apparently was unaware of the existence of these five MSS. Robert Geete knew of one case in which the letter C appeared, viz., that of the Swedish translation which he edited. He is unwilling, however, to admit that the letter could stand for
1 Rose, op. cit. supra, p. 137.
468 The Speculum Virginum
Conrad. He gives reasons for thinking that the MS. was copied by Christina Hansdotter Brask who entered the Vadstena monastery in 1459. His conclusion is that she inserted her own initial as a little piece of vanity.' It is simpler, in the light of the fact that the letter C occurs in other MSS, to suppose that it is a reproduction from a Latin MS.
The appearance of the initial C in the Epzistola of five MSS does not prove that the author’s name was Conrad. But that it occurs in a twelfth-century MS. should warrant at any rate some hesitancy in assuming finally that the assignment of the authorship to one of the name of Conrad was unfounded.
The only contribution here made with regard to the authorship of the Speculum Virginum is this internal evidence in the Epistola. The claim that the author’s name was Conrad is supported by G. Schepps ’ and B. Hauréau.°
With reference to books in the Hirschau library of a monk named Peregrinus, see G. Becker, Catalogi Bibliothecarum Antiqui (Bonn, 1885), pp. 219, 220, and Lessing, Zur Geschichte und Litteratur (Braunschweig, 1773), Zweyter Beytrag, pp. 356 ff.
APPENDIX C
Tue Incuiusion oF Booz IN THE TREE OF JESSE
In representations of the Linea Christi Jesse is ordinarily chosen as the initial figure and the reason for this is of course to be found in the prophecy of Isaiah (ix, 1, 2).
The representations accordingly implicity or explicitly have refer- ence to the Gifts of the Spirit. But the tree-representation does not necessarily begin with Jesse. In the Speculum Virginum it is Boos
1 Geete, Speculum Virginum: Jungfruspegel (Stockholm, 1897-1898), pp. xxiv—xxvi.
2 Conradi Hirsaugiensis Dialogus super Auctores sine Didascalon (Wiirzburg: A. Stuber, 1889). Schepps quotes a number of similarities in expression between the Dialogus and the Speculum, and there appears to be some ground for assuming a common authorship of the two works.
3 Les Oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-V ictor (Paris: Hachette, 1886), pp. 143-148. Hauréau be lieved that Conrad was the author of the Speculum Virginum and of the Libellus de fructibus carnis et spiritus attributed to Hugo de S. Victore (Migne, Patr. Lat. CLXXVI, 997).
~~ SR SS
oo =
1,
id
ot O1
er,
the
bus
The Speculum Virginum 469
who is placed at the base. And it is quite possible that there exist some representations of a different kind in which the creator has had Booz in mind. For though a reason is given above for the selection of Jesse there are other grounds on which Booz might be represented in the position at the foot of the tree assigned to him in the Speculum Virginum. Booz is a more picturesque figure in biblical story than Jesse, the latter being outstanding as the father of David and the ancestor of Christ specially named by Isaiah, whereas Booz is a character in the dramatic story of Ruth. He was the son of a Ca- naanitess (Rahab) and the husband of a Moabitess (Ruth) and there is thus associated with him the idea of the transferred allegiance of Gentiles to the people and God of the Israelites. Again, Booz was by some writers in the Middle Ages regarded as the type of Christ. In the ninth century Rabanus Maurus in a Commentary on the Book of Ruth* asks, ‘Quis est iste uir, qui consanguineus erat Elime- lech? nisi Redemptor noster’, and in the same century Paschasius Radbertus in an exposition of St Matthew’s Gospel says: *
Nurus autem Synagogae non immerito Ecclesia accipitur, quae utique sponsa meruit appelari. Nam et ex ea patres fuerunt ex quibus Christus
nasci dignatus est. Ideo eiusdem Synagogae filius recte nuncupatur: Ergo Booz iste hoc in loco figuram Christi tenuit.
St Isidore in the seventh century in his Allegoriae Quaedam Scrip- turae Sacrae* writes: ‘Ruth alienigena, quae Israelitico uiro nupsit Ecclesiam ex gentibus ad Christum uenientem ostendit. Booz autem Christum uerum Ecclesiae sponsum expressit.’
The fact that Victor Hugo in his poem, Booz Endormi, has also assigned to Booz the place usually given to Jesse is of interest in this connection. The poet represents Booz as recumbent and dreaming :
Et ce songe était tel que Booz vit un chéne
Qui, sorti de son ventre, allait jusqu’au ciel bleu; Une race y montait comme une longue chaine
Un roi chantait en bas, en haut mourait un Dieu.‘
Patr. Lat. CVIII, 1205. 2 Ibid. CXX, 62. 3 Jbid. LXXXIII, 112. ‘ Victor Hugo, Légende des Siécles (Paris: Hachette, 1921), I, 84.
Fincntey, Lonpon.
THE PERFECT PRINCE: A STUDY IN THIRTEENTH- AND FOURTEENTH-CENTURY IDEALS
By LESTER KRUGER BORN
N the political thought of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
the central figure about which the whole revolves is the prince. This emphasises the personal view toward rulership, which is char- acteristic of the period. Furthermore in accordance with the medi- aeval attitude, the writers of these centuries considered the real in terms of the ideal, and were interested in nothing less than the pattern of the perfect prince.
Numerous treatises have been written on that subject from the time of classical antiquity itself. Sometimes the discussions formed incidental parts of larger works; sometimes they were units in them- selves. At all events, from the time of St Augustine and his Ciuitas Dei there has been a long chain of writers and treatises such as those of Cassianus, Liber de Principatibus; St Isidore, De Principis Hones- tate, and De Regnis; Jonas of Orleans, De Institutione Regia; Hinc- mar of Rheims, De Regis Persona et Regio Ministerio; Sedulius Scotus, De Rectoribus Christianis; Peter Damianus, De Principis Officiis; Theophylactus Bulgar, Institutio Regia; Hugo of Fleury, De Potes- tate Regia. . . . These treatises bear the marks of ecclesiastical thought and training, which, on the whole, aided the idea of national mon- archy, in the ascendency from the period with which we start in this paper. The‘twelfth and following centuries were especially produc- tive of this type of literature.
The importance of these numerous treatises on the training of the prince varies greatly. All of them were well known in their own day, and some of them still hold their place. Others are now hardly more than ‘the shadow of a name,’ except to the bibliographer. Some of them were prepared for the use of a particular prince and follow what seemed expedient for him; others have a distinctly pedagogical form and, although dedicated to some one prince, are really intended
470
The Perfect Prince 471
for the use of the children of all nobility; ! and still others theorize on the subject of government in general.’
Many of the works bring in, more or less incidentally, points that are of great importance — or better, were later to become of great importance. Such ideas as the controversy over church and state; the theory of divine right; the idea of unity; the ‘contract’ theory; the distinction between dominium politicum and dominium regale; the problems of internal administration; the matter of coin- age; economic relationships; the idea of ‘law’ are all present in one or more of the writers that we are dealing with. But our interest here is confined to the one central figure — the prince.*
JOHN OF SALISBURY 4
While the date of his treatise puts it before the real limits of this paper, no treatment of mediaeval political ideas could overlook John of Salisbury, whose influence was so predominant in later genera- tions.
The Policraticus of John of Salisbury is the earliest elaborate medieval treatise on politics. . . . It [is] a landmark in the history of political specu-
1 Vincent of Beauvais’ treatise, De Eruditione Filiorum Regalium, seems to come in that class. It was written in 1249-54 at the request of the mother of Louis IX of France, and is largely a reworking of matter contained in his Speculum Doctrinale, VII. It contains such ideas as the body and head of the state; the training of officials; the development of the prince’s character; reverence to God. The work is extremely rare, and I know it only through the article by Daunou in Histoire Littéraire de la France XVIII (1895), 463; 466-7; 496; and the dissertation of R. Friederich, Vincentius von Beauvais als Pddagog . . . (Leipzig, 1883), which gives all the chapter headings.
Due to the limits of this paper, only the most readily accessible standard references have been given in the notes to each section. For the biography, bibliography, studies, and appre- ciations of the writers here discussed, the reader is referred to the various dictionaries of biog- raphy, such sources as Chevalier, Molinier, and Potthast, and the histories of literature. Of general interest is Wm. Miinch, Gedanken iiber Fiirstenerzichung aus Alter und Neuer Zeit, Munich, 1909.
* Dr Lydia Lothrop, of the Department of History and Political Science, University of West Virginia, has generously allowed me to use her notes on Gilbert of Tournai, Aegidius Romanus, and Marsiglio of Padua.
* Born ca. 1110; died 1180; Salisbury wrote the Policraticus in 1159. For the latest treat- ment of this work, see the translation by John Dickinson, The Statesman’s Year Book of John of Salisbury (Knopf: New York, 1927), and introductions, pp. xvii-lxxxii. The best text is that of C. C. I. Webb (Oxford, 1909), 2 vols. Cf. also W. A. Dunning, History of Political Theories (Macmillan: New York, 1916), I, 181-188; and P. Janet, Histoire de la Science Politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale (4th ed., Paris, 1913), I, 341-344.
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lation for two reasons. It is the only important political treatise written before the western thought had once more become familiar with the Politics of Aristotle. . . . In the second place it comes just before the important turning-point in the institutional development at the end of the twelfth, and the beginning of the thirteenth, century, when legal precision began to be stamped on a great number of previously indefinite relationships. . . . It contributed a heritage of ideas whose momentum made them, in spite of the newer influences, the dominant force in political thought down to at least the middle of the sixteenth century.'
Therefore let us see what he has to say about the ‘perfect prince.’
Salisbury is really interested only in monarchy (iv, 1 ff.), and so he begins at once with the place of the prince (i.e., a single leader) in the state, which is likened to the human body. The prince is the head, and is ‘subject only to God and to those who exercise His office and represent Him on earth;’ the senate fills the place of the heart, and the judges and governors of the princes represent the eyes, ears, and tongue; officials and soldiers are the hands; the con- stant attendants of the prince correspond to the sides; officers of the treasury are like the stomache; and the farmers are like the feet, ‘which always cleave to the soil . . . and deserve aid and protection . .. since it is they who raise, sustain, and move forward the entire weight of the body.’ ?
From this it is clear that Salisbury foreshadows the theory of divine right, and in chapter 6 of the same book, he says that the prince is established in his seat by God. However, he does not be- lieve in absolute hereditary succession. The prince may only hope to have his son succeed him if that son is worthy of his father. Succession in the family, then, is both a reward to a good ruler for the proper training of his son, and an incentive for the son to be deserving (iv, 11; cf. also v, 6). The evils that spring from the strife over rights of succession are many (v, 6—7; cf. iv, 11).
The duties of a good prince are manifold.
[He] should be chaste and avoid avarice (iv, 5); he should be learned in
letters (iv, 6); he should be humble (iv, 7); he should banish from his realm actors and mimes, buffoons and harlots (iv, 4); he should seek the welfare
1 Dickinson, op. cit., pp. xvii, xviii. 2 y, 2. This is the first formulation of the ‘organic analogy.’
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of others and not his own (iv, 8); he should wholly forget the affections of flesh and blood and do only that which is demanded by the welfare and safety of his subjects; he should be both father and husband to them (iv, 3); he should correct their errors with the proper remedies (iv, 8); he should be affable of speech and generous in conferring benefits; he should temper justice with mercy (iv, 8); he should punish the wrongs and injuries of all, and all crimes, with even-handed equity (iv, 2); he has duties to the very wise and the very foolish, to little children and to the aged (iv, 3); his shield isa shield for the protection of the weak, and should ward off the darts of the wicked from the innocent (iv, 2); he must act on the counsel of wise men (v, 6); he must protect the widow and the orphan (v, 6); he must curb the malice of officials and provide for them out of the public funds to the end that all occasion for extortion may be removed (v, 10); he must restrain the soldiery from outrage (vi, 1); he should be learned in law and military science (vi, 2); he must in all things provide for the welfare of the lower classes (vi, 20); he must avoid levity (vi, 23); he is charged with the disposal of the means of the public welfare (vi, 24); and is the dispenser of honour (vi, 26); he must not close his ear to the cries of the poor (vi, 27); he must raise aloft the roof-tree of the Church and extend abroad the wor- ship of religion (vi, 2); he must protect the Church against sacrilege and rapine (vi, 13); and finally, he must ever strive so to rule that in the whole community over which he presides none shall be sorrowful (vi, 6).?
The prince who is to perform all these many obligations must have good advisers. They are to be chosen from among the old men (following the successful practice of both the Greeks and Romans), and such as fear God (v, 9). ‘Unjust men are therefore to be ex- cluded, and men who are overbearing and avaricious, and all such manner of human plagues. Nought, indeed, is more deadly than the unrighteous counsellor of a rich man’ (v, 9). The prince must also bear in mind that there is no greater glory than the favor and praise which comes from good men (viii, 14); and that he shall place his friendship only in such honorable men (iii, 12). Obviously flattery and the association of toadies is to be shunned at all times (iii, 4—7). Luxury and the dissipations of lust lead only to undoing (viii, 6). The prince should never forget that he and his money both belong to his people (iv, 5), for the love of wealth for its own sake can lead only to great evil (vii, 16). An evil prince is a nucleus of countless
1 The discussion on military service is based largely on Vegetius, De Re Militari, and occupies chapters 2-19 of Book VI. 2 Dickinson, pp. I-li.
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evils to the state (vi, 20). ‘Then and then only will the health of the commonwealth be sound and flourishing when the higher members shield the lower, and the lower respond faithfully and fully in like manner to the just demands of their superiors, so that each and all are as it were, members of one another by a sort of reciprocity, and each regards his own interest as best served by that which he knows to be most advantageous for the others’ (vi, 20).
The original state of society was good, and in it we may infer there was no need of checks and laws (viii, 17), but now that state no longer exists and there is a prince and there are laws.’ The prince is the ‘envoy of God on earth’ and holds his power from Him (ivy, 1, 10, 12; v, 2, 6, 25-26; vi, 1). If the prince controverts the law of God, his subjects are justified in refusing obedience (vi, 9, 12, 25). But this is not to be a violent disobedience (v, 6; cf. vii, 20). The prince is to serve his fellow-servants of God (iv, 7), and is responsible for his state, not to it (v, 7), and will be judged in Heaven for the dis- charge of his trust (v, 11; vi, 1). Therefore according to divine law, the prince is subject to the law (iv, 4), albeit the will of the prince has the force of law (iv, 1). This is explained by the fact that as soon as the prince acts contrary to the established law, he ceases to be a prince and becomes a tyrant. In enforcing these laws to which he himself is subject, the prince should be regular and consistent (iv, 6-7), although officials are to be punished more severely for their misdeeds than are the commoners (vi, 1). Laws which only catch the lowly, and allow the great to go unpunished, are like spider-webs which catch the flies but do not hold the larger creatures (vii, 20). But the prince should not fail to temper his justice with mercy (iv, 8).
Salisbury believes that liberty and virtue are inseparable (vii, 25), and that real liberty can only be obtained if there is freedom of speech (vii, 25). Hence the good prince in a good state should ‘accept with patience the words of free speaking, whatever they may be. Nor [should] he oppose himself to its words so long as these do not involve the casting away of virtue’ (vii, 25). Consequently,
! Salisbury refers to the well-ordered social state of the bees (vi, 21), which is so much used by later writers. It is taken from Virgil's Georgics, iv, 153-218.
ich nt for aly ike
ith
5);
of uld ney ese tly,
auch
The Perfect Prince 475
in hearing a charge of lése-majesté,' the person of the accused must be looked to, to see if he could have committed the offense and, if so, if he was of sane mind at the time. ‘Nor ought a mere slip of the tongue be drawn into punishment’ (vi, 25).
From a discussion of lése-majesté it is but a step to that of tyran- nicide.?, Salisbury says ‘it is just for a public tyrant to be killed and the people set free for the service of God ’ (viii, 20 passim). The origin of tyranny he gives as springing from pride and ‘ambition, that is, the lust of power and glory’ (vii, 17). Cupidity is the com- panion of folly. If a man possessing these qualities succeeds in gaining the highest position from which he may ‘oppress a whole people by rulership based on force,’ he is a tyrant (vii, 17). With an accumulation of arguments and examples to show that all tyrants come to a bad end, Salisbury brings his Policraticus to a close.
GrrRaLpus CAMBRENSIS 4
In Book i, 19, Giraldus explains the significance of titles both temporal and spiritual. ‘A prince is held to be a sort of head. Just as the head of man or other animal sees and hears not merely for itself, but uses these and other physical senses to the ordering of the whole body, so the head of a state is thought not only not to hear and see, but not even to live, for himself, but rather for his people. What a head is without limbs, this a prince is without subjects’ (i, 19).
1 This was one of the most serious offenses possible, and was severely punished upon conviction.
? Dickinson points out that Salisbury was the first to formulate a real doctrine on this subject.
* For a comparison of a tyrant and a king see viii, 17.
* Born 1146 ?; died 1220 ?. Giraldus wrote the De Principis Instructione about 1217, and it was inspired, as he tells us, by the prevalence of evil practices of both the princes and pre- lates in his own day (pref. to Bk. i). The work is divided into three long books or Distinctiones, as he calls them. The first is general and didactic in nature, while the second and third are historical and consist of reflections about the contemporary rulers. The treatise is dedicated to posterity in general, and in particular to Louis of France, “because he has been imbued with liberal studies since early boyhood and is outstanding in his liberal attitude.”’ Extracts of this treatise were first published in Bouquet’s Recueil des Historiens, xviii, 122-163; and the second and third books (with short extracts from the first) were printed separately in 1846. The best edition of this work is by G. F. Warner, Giraldi Cambrensis Opera, viii (1891), being number 21 of the Rolls Series. It is only with the first book that we are primarily concerned in this study.
476 The Perfect Prince
The need for princely power is not confined to man, but is found also among the animals and even in the Kingdom of Heaven (i, 1), A good prince has many duties and responsibilities. To meet them he should be careful to offend no one by his actions (i, 1); to be mild in his attitude (i, 2) as many of the great princes of antiquity have been; to be modest, which will win the praise of all (i, 13); to be dignified in his public appearances at all times, and to relax as an individual in private (i, 2); to be loved rather than feared, but yet not grow too easy (i, 2); to act with propriety, ‘for in every time of life one must be careful to keep his actions appropriate and his con- duct of life fitting and becoming’ (i, 3); to keep untainted from moral weaknesses which are especially shameful in a prince whose example is aped by so many (i, 4; cf. i, 20); to be patient with the failings of others after the example of Christ and some of the good Roman Emperors (i, 5); to be moderate in manner and studiously avoid quick anger (i, 6); to be careful not to inflict punishments while aroused by wrath (i, 6); to remember that great anger has an injurious effect on the physique (i, 6), whereas clemency is one of the greatest of all good qualities (i, 7); and that it is ‘a glorious thing to hold punishment well within the maximum bounds’ (i, 7); not to forgive too much nor yet to thirst for the blood of even an enemy (i, 7); to be munificent, but not without restraint, for the treasury must not be drained nor his patrimony dissipated, since excessive generosity becomes prodigality (i, 8); to be prudent, since that qual- ity prevents justice turning to cruelty, bravery to temerity, and tem- perance to laxity (i, 11); to remember that the greatest princes have been devoted to letters (introd. to Bk. i), and that learning is of distinct advantage, as the example of Charlemagne showed (i, 11); that although ‘fortune favors the brave’ (i, 14), prudence enables the prince to make the necessary decisions in emergencies (i, 11); and the reading of history furnishes help by examples of strategy and outcomes (i, 11); to realize that it is obviously folly to make war rashly, albeit the magnificence of the prince is bound up with his bravery (i, 9; cf. i, 14), but so is his idealism (magnanimitas), his faith, his safety, his stability, and his patience (i, 9); and, finally, to know that ‘just as the glory of a father lies in the wisdom of his son,
und 1). nem nild ave » be ; an yet e of -on- rom 108e the usly ents 3 an e of hing not my ury sive ual- em- lave s of 11); bles 11); egy jake with , his r, to son,
The Perfect Prince 477
so the glory of a prince is reflected in the peace and tranquility of his subjects’ (i, 15).
From this it is clear that the prince should be the pattern for his subjects — in fact, there is nothing more praiseworthy (i, 20). From his exalted position his virtues and his vices are equally dis- played (i, 20) and
Mobile mutatur semper cum principe uulgus.'
To be good and to have good adherents the prince must be devoted to religion and the general teachings of the Christian faith (i, 20). These principles are often exemplified in the laws of the Empire. The good prince, whose chief aim is to please God (i, 21), merits a great reward because of his efforts to ‘save’ his fellowmen by word and deed (i, 20).?
Giraldus believed that the Kings of France in his day were the best princes. They did not rage among their people as would bears or lions, but were courteous and amiable. They were modest in their successes. Their oaths were not blasphemous. They were just in their relations and beyond question in their moral standards. They did not gain their power through violent turmoil, and they left it to their successors without disorder. An eternal reward will be theirs (iii, 30).
In the actual work of the administration the prince should exer- cise forethought, and encourage agriculture, architecture, commerce, mechanical arts, manufacture of wool and linen, etc., to keep the staples of life well supplied (i, 12). Giraldus also believed in a virile ‘preparedness.’ The encouragement of the arts just mentioned, to- gether with the construction of city defenses, the training of soldiery, the manufacture of munitions, and the employment of field maneu- vers are a peacetime defense against war. This, after all, is only after the example of the ant who gathers its winter store in summer (i, 12).
1 Claudian, De Quarto Consulatu Honorii, 302.
? Giraldus cites many such good rulers beginning with Moses and continuing with other Biblical and Roman Imperial names down to the time of Arthur and his own day. This occu- pies pages 122-133 in Warner’s edition. Cf. i, 18, pp. 76-103, for another list of praiseworthy princes and the ends that were theirs.
478 The Perfect Prince
In legal administration the prince shall take care to be just. Justice breaks incipient attacks against the prince and keeps him and the state in security. It is the binding substance of society, and, by ‘assigning and preserving for each man his own position’ (i, 10), adjusts differences even out of the law courts; e.g., the different social conditions that will arise from success or failure in business. In the enforcement of the law, justice should be tempered with mercy (i, 10), although new laws should be rigorously carried out to make them felt at once (i, 10). A sick limb is not immediately ampu- tated before less heroic measures are employed. Neither should capi- tal punishment be the first resort in the correction of disorder (i, 7 and 10). Giraldus advocates a gradation of punishment. ‘A good prince who is concerned in bringing force upon the wrongdoings of certain men will now imprison them, now inflict bodily pain upon them, and sometimes even cut off a bit of their flesh. Only when he has exhausted all other remedies will the prince have recourse to the supreme penalty’ (i, 10).?
‘It is better . . . to be loved than to be feared by subjects. Yet it is essential to be feared somewhat, provided that the fear is en- gendered in admiration and not coercion; for whatever is loved in tender affection must of consequence also be feared. What is feared, however, is not at once loved. Therefore, let fear be tempered with love, but in such a way that unbounded liberality does not become inextricably involved in carelessness, nor fear which has been aroused through overbearing rigidity be made [an opportunity for] tyranny’ (i, 2).
Giraldus seems not to have committed himself to an opinion on tyrannicide beyond this: ‘Percussori uero tyranni non quidem poena, sed palma promittitur’ (i, 16); but he quotes a great many examples
1 The evil practice of despoiling the property and cargo of ships that were wrecked calls forth a strong protest from Giraldus. He points to the old English laws of shipwreck, in which such property as was recovered went to the survivors of the disaster. But he believes that the laws of the ancients contribute something more. Plundering from the salvaged goods had to be repaid four-fold. The existing conditions he believed to be intolerable (i, 20).
2 Again Giraldus has drawn his ideas from French practice, which he refers to us as ‘laudabilis et digna memoria dispensatio.’ The first offense merits flogging; the second is pun- ished by branding the face or cutting off a lobe of the ear; and the third by blinding or death (i, 10).
The Perfect Prince 479
of tyrants who have all come to a bloody end (i, 17 passim). At all events, the fate of tyrants is hard and they flourish for a while, but for a while only (iii, 31). With this Giraldus closes his final chapter.
GILBERT OF TouRNAI!
Gilbert is quite clear as to the prince’s position and duties. He accepts the idea of monarchy without question, and believes in hereditary succession (i, 2, 11). The prince should be able to raise himself mentally to a point where he can see the evils of his realm in their true perspective, and thus correct them (ii, 1, 3). He should even be acute enough to detect those committed under cover of secrecy (ii, 1, 4), for one of the chief functions of the prince is the abolishment and prevention of evils within the state (ii, 1, 1-3; ii, 2, 1). The prince should be inspired to these duties by a worthy regard for his position (ii, 2, 1).
Humility is one of the most essential qualities in a prince (i, 2, 9), and he should be virtuous (i, 1, 10), for his wicked acts are copied by everyone (i, 2,2). The prince should love his subjects, and gener- ally look out for their welfare (iii, 1; iii, 2), not only because it is right to do so, but also because it makes his own position more secure (iii, 3). Great wealth and avarice are to be shunned, because they obscure the glory of the kingdom (i, 2, 4). The end to be gained is a state in which the subjects may live in peace with their neigh- bors and in harmony with each other (iii, 6). Education and the study of the learned letters must be carefully planned for (i, 2, 5). In the establishment of this good order the prince should be guided by councilors who are upright, not susceptible to bribery, and free from the bonds of greed (i, 2, 6).
Gilbert has quite a bit on laws and legal procedure. Divine law is the foundation of human law (i, 2, 5; ii, 1, 5). Therefore, if a law
! Died 1270. Gilbert of Tournai wrote his Eruditio Regum et Principum, in three epistles, at the request of St Louis (Louis IX of France) in 1259. Among the sources of his treatise is the Speculum Doctrinale of Vincent of Beauvais, with whom Gilbert was a contemporary; the Policraticus of Salisbury; the church fathers, ancient philosophers, and the general list of Roman authors. The text is printed by A. de Poorter, Le Traité Eruditio Regum et Principum de Gilbert de Tournai, in ‘Les Philosophes Belges,’ Vol. IX (1914), with a full introduction. Cf. Felix Lajard in Histoire Littéraire de la France XIX (1838), 138-142.
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is unjust, it is not a true law and should be abolished (ii, 1, 5-6), The prince is not subject to the law. But this is not so that he may do wrong with impunity. It is to be hoped that, free from fear of punishments, he will act from a love of justice and service to the state (ii, 1, 5). Among the chief causes of evil are gambling (i, 2, 1), hypocrisy (ii, 1, 16-17), especially when the clergy are the offenders (ii, 1, 12-15), and bribery of officials not to notice misdeeds at the court. This last is so serious that mere ‘winking at’ court corruption is a grievous matter (ii, 1, 8). Justice is always to be strictly en- forced although punishments are to be meted out humanely (ii, 2, 3; ii, 2, 4, and 7-8). The prince should realize that clemency does not weaken justice (iii, 4). However, officials should be punished more severely than the average man, because they know the law better (ii, 2, 8). The procedure of a trial is as follows: Both plaintiff and defendant shall be sworn. If the former refuses to take oath, the case shall be dismissed; if the latter, he shall be judged guilty. In the trial the judges should take plenty of time, but should also try to prevent cases continuing for more than two or three years (ii, 2, 4). Witnesses should be preferred to evidence, since the judges have an opportunity to examine and question them (ii, 2, 5).'
‘A prince in the exercise of mildness bears the image of God, but the tyrant, relying upon tyranny, prefers him who from the first chose the title of ‘Homicide’ (iii, 6). ‘The difference between a prince and a tyrant is this: the latter rages with worldly pleasure and licentiousness unrestrained; the prince acts only through neces- sity and for a reason’ (iii, 1, 3). The good prince should do all he can by his personal acts to avoid the condition of tyranny, and allow his subjects to dwell in peace and prosperity (iii, 1, 6).
Tuomas AQUINAS 2
Man is a social and political animal (i, 1), and therefore it is necessary to have the organization of society, with someone at the head (i, 1; cf. Sum. Theol. 1*, 2“ quaes. 96, art. 4). This Aquinas
1 Not every case should be accepted in the courts, according to Gilbert’s ideas (ii, 2, 6).
2 Born 1226; died 1274. The De Regimine Principum was written for the King of Cyprus (probably Hugh III, who died in 1267) about 1265-66. The work, which is in four books, is commonly considered to be Aquinas’ only as far as ii, 4. This short treatise does not cover all the political ideas of Aquinas, but nothing of really vital importance is omitted. Although
a
us is ll gh
The Perfect Prince 481
illustrates by the organic analogy, and the commonplace of the social life of the bees (i, 2; cf. 1, 3 and 12; Com. Polit., iii, 12). All other creatures have their necessities of life created for them, but man has to provide his own. Since it is not possible for each individual to do everything for himself, the community developed (i, 1; ef. iv, 3 and 4; Com. Polit., iii, 5). According to Aquinas, the rule of one has been proved best by practice (i, 2; cf. 1, 5-6),! and consequently that form of government which has the least evil in it should be chosen (i, 5). Those states not governed by a single prince have to endure many misfortunes and internal dissensions (i, 2). However, Aquinas does not advocate an absolute and unqualified monarchy (i, 6; cf. Sum. Theol., 1°, 2“, quaes. 90, arts. 3 and 4).2- Dominium politicum in the original state of innocence was best (ii, 8-9). But dominium regale (ii, 9; cf. iii, 11) under present conditions is most advantageous (in natura corrupta regimen regale est fructuosius).*
overshadowed by his greater works, it has had wide popularity, having been translated into French, Spanish, Italian, and German. A new French translation of the authentic portion was published at Paris in 1926. A separate edition (with the De Regimine Iudaeorum) was published at Turin in 1924. I have used the text of the Opera Omnia (Parma, 1852-71), XVI (1864), 224-290. Cf. Janet, op. cit., I, 367-402, espec. 381 ff.; and Dunning, op. cit., I, 191-207. J.J. Baumann, Die Stadtslehre des H. Thomas von Aquino, Leipzig, 1873, has a translation of Bks i, and ii, 14, with a discussion of selections from the De Regimine Iudaeorum; the Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics; the Summa Theologica; and the Summa contra Gentiles. C. A. Bosone, Der Aufsatz ‘De Regimine Principum’ von Thomas von Aquinas, Bonn diss., 1894, is a chapter by chapter summary of the four books with notes and discussion.
1 J, 1-11 are devoted to the general subject of the necessity, preference, and advantage of a monarchy for both the prince and the people. All dominion is based on the example of God, the one ruler of the universe (iii, 1-6). Aquinas thus defines the term prince. ‘Him we call a prince, to whom the summa regiminis in human affairs has been committed’ (i, 14; c.i, 1). Some of the duties of a prince are summed up in i, 12, and the best ways of ruling the state in i, 14-15. The idea of peace, unity, and harmony as requisites of a good state is elaborated by the later writers.
2 Cf. Sum. Theol. 1*, 2**, quaes. 105, art. 2, where Aquinas says a monarchy is best, but since it is hard to get a good prince, a limited monarchy is therefore necessary; and 1%, 2*¢, quaes, 105, art. 1: ‘In the good direction of princes in any state or people, two things must be present; all should have a share in the principate, for this preserves the peace of the people ... Whence the best form of principate is in a state in which one man is the head . . . ; under him are some others of authority, but nevertheless such a principate belongs to everyone, not only because these men can be chosen by all, but because they are so chosen. Such is the organ- ization of every polity that is a combination of monarchy, in so far as that one man rules; an aristocracy, in so far as that many have ruling authority; and a democracy, that is, power of the people, in so far that the prince can be chosen by the common people, and the election of princes is a function of the people.’
* Cf. iv, 8. ‘There are certain provinces of a servile nature. Such ought to be governed
482 The Perfect Prince
Peace is an indispensable requisite for the attainment of good through social organization (i, 2), and this peace can only be attained through the efforts of a good prince (i, 15), following, to the best of his ability, the ways of God (i, 13). ‘A true and perfect polity is like a physical body functioning properly, in which the organs are in perfect condition. If supreme virtue, which is reason (ratio), con- trols the lower powers . . . then there results a calmness and perfect affinity of the forces one to the other. This is called harmony’ (iv, 23). It is clear then, that the members of a community are unlike as individuals, but are one in the common association (i, 1; cf. Sum. Theol. 1°, 2“ quaes. 96, art. 4). The prince looks out for the common good (i, 1; cf. Com. Poltt., iii, 6).
There are three main obstacles to the permanent existence and good order of the state. By nature, man can not endure long in this life. This the prince should offset by care in training the younger generation to replace the previous one (i, 15). A second difficulty is caused by ‘radicals’ or chronic objectors. The corrective for them is found in laws, precepts, and punishments to check the existing trouble and to forestall similar conditions in the future (i, 15). The third is for external causes such as war. The only protection in that case is to guard against all possible enemies. In addition the prince should do his best to keep firm the bonds of peace and mutual good will within the state, and to provide for the essentials of a normal life (i, 15).
It is the work of a prince to rule his subjects well (i, 8), for he is in the state what the soul is in the body, and God is in the universe
by a despotic government, including in despotic, regale. Those men, however, who are of strong character, bold in heart, and reliant upon their own intelligence, cannot be ruled except by a dominium politicum.’ On the importance of this whole distinction, and its later develop- ment, see Dickinson, op. cit., pp. xli, xlii. John Fortescue, in his The Difference between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy (written after 1471), goes one step further and says that there are two forms of government especially to be considered — dominium regale and domi- nium politicum et regale (I-IV). In the former, the people are ruled by laws which are made by the prince alone without their consent (II). In the second (and better) form, the people’s assent is essential (I). But if the prince is a good prince, this form is really advantageous for him, for he ‘may thereby the more sewery do Justice, than by his owne Arbitriment’ (II). But if the prince rules per ius regale, and his people are subjected to dire oppression, it is really a state of tyranny (IV).
The Perfect Prince 483
(i, 12). Nothing is more fitting for a prince than magnanimity (i, 7), and he should consider the friendship of his people the best thing to achieved be (i, 10). The prince should realize that glory is not the only reward he will achieve as a result of his good adminis- tration. In fact it is a thing scorned by the Christian philosophers. The true reward will come from God (i, 7-9).
If the prince has the task — or privilege — of instituting a new state, he should carefully select a region that is fertile, suited for cities, towns, universities, camps, military maneuvers, and business, with places for religious worship and law courts (i, 13). The climate should be temperate (ii, 1), healthful (ii, 2), and favorable to the abundant farming of food-stuffs (ii, 3). The region should also be attractive in natural beauty (ii, 4), with a natural wealth of vines, groves, forests (ii, 5), with large herds of cattle and draft animals (ii, 6). Dependence upon commerce for the staples of life is a great evil (ii, 5). In his administration the prince should have sufficient wealth to carry on the various departments of the government properly (ii, 7; cf. i, 14; ii, 5).2_ In this he should be aided by ministers carefully selected with regard to the kind of state they will serve (ii, 8 and 10). The prince should have his own system of coinage, which should be kept stable. From this much good will come, and not the least will be sound commercial standards (ii, 13). A standard system of weights and measures should also be established (ii, 14). Roads and highways are to be kept open and safe. That will do much to promote internal peace and also to stimulate commerce (ii, 12).
Aquinas devotes some time to a discussion of tyranny (i, 3, 6, 9-11; cf. ii, 9; iii, 9), which he believes is more liable to come from democracy than from monarchy (i, 5).* The opportunity for tyranny
1 The government of the universe (and therefore of the state) is likened to the good navigation of a ship, in which the pilot brings it safely to the right port (i, 14).
? The poor should be provided for from the public treasury (ii, 15).
+ This is in accord with the general ideas of both Plato and Aristotle. Perhaps the best
way to illustrate is by diagram. 1 equals the best form of government; 2 equals the medium; $ equals the poorest.
Good Conditions Bad Conditions 1 Monarchy 3 Tyranny 2 Aristocracy 2 Oligarchy
8 Polity (democracy) 1 Democracy
484 The Perfect Prince
is to be carefully guarded by tempering the prince’s original power (i, 6). A prince voids the mutual agreement of defense and support with his people by his acts of tyranny (i, 6),' and therefore tyran- nicide is justifiable (i, 6; cf. i, 7-11). But no move should be made against the tyrant except by public authority, for all order would be overthrown if private citizens could commit homicide on the grounds of tyranny (i, 6). At all events tyrants seriously err in for- saking the care of justice for mundane powers (i, 10), for they only store up more charges against themselves (i, 11). The reward of a good prince will not only be of this world, but will be in Heaven (i, 9),
WiLuiAM PERRAULT ?
The state is comparable to a mountain which is so great that it is hardly visited by God. Even if He did ‘visit it with the waters of His grace, it would be dried up by the evil winds’ (i, 1). Conse- quently some one must be placed over it, not for his own private good, but for the good of the people (i, 1). This princely power is
If a monarch is ruling well, there is no chance for dissention, and all is peaceful. If a tyranny is set up, only one man gets the good of all things (cf. i, $), and that is obviously the worst possible situation. If an aristocracy rules, they will be inclined to act in accordance with the desires of a few; the same will be true under an oligarchy. In a polity, where everyone is concerned in the outcome of events, if the rule is perverted, the ‘good’ is still distributed to the greatest number of people, because everyone is trying to satisfy selfish ends. Therefore it is the best of poor conditions. In the midst of all this dissension, a tyrant may easily set himself up as the champion and organizer of the confused state of affairs, thereby usurping all the power before the people realize it. Once having gained this position, he holds it through the power of fear (i, 3). In either a monarchy or an aristocracy conditions are too stable and severely organized to readily permit of such usurpation. It must be remembered that Aquinas favors a limited monarchy (i, 14).
1‘... hoe ipse meruit, in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur.’ Again Aquinas has sounded a note which was greatly to be enlarged upon in later centuries.
2 Born ——?; died ca. 1275. Perrault’s De Eruditione Principum in seven books was attributed to Thomas Aquinas, among whose works it is included. His treatise is more me- thodical than that of Aquinas. Bk i deals with the things in general that pertain to the prince; ii, with his relation to God and the church; iii, to himself; iv, to his immediate followers; v, to his children and family; vi, to his subjects; and vii, to his enemies. Bk v, which consti- tutes nearly half the work, is really a treatise on education for the sons and daughters of nobles. Chapters 9-36, 44, 47-48 are devoted to the proper training and marriage responsibilities (or the alternative of celibacy) for boys. The same subjects are treated for girls in chaps. 49-67. The treatise is the usual mine of classical and Biblical citations. The text I have used is that in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia (Parma, 1852-71), XVI (1864), opus c. XX XVII, 390-476. Cf. Petit-Radel in Histoire Littéraire de la France XIX (1838), 307-316.
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The Perfect Prince 485
rather to be feared than sought, because of the perils, trials, brevity, and temptations. ‘Arundinea est haec potestas; exterius habet nitorem; interius uacuitatem’ (i, 1). From all of this the author arrives at the natural conclusion — the prince is not to despise his subjects, for he gets his lofty place from them alone. Here the organic analogy appears again: the head is higher than the rest of the body and the body is ruled by it. But it is the body after all that sustains the head (i, 6).
The prince should often stop to think what he is, who he is, and what sort of creature he is (iii, 6).'_ He should be of good character (vi, 7), mild (vi, 1), truthful (i, 7; i, 13; vi, 1), just in his relations with his subjects, and content with his income (vi, 1). He should always act so as to be a pattern for his subjects (vi, 7). Above all he should not be so concerned with the welfare of others that he neglects the care of himself (iii, 1) — the greatest triumph is self conquest (v, 37) —for evil in the prince is widely diffused by his wicked example (vi, 7). He is culpable who neglects the formation of his character in his youth (v, 7). He should be free from all vices (iii, 2), and especially avoid too great leisure (iii, 7). Youth is the time for study (v, 4). Among the many virtues requisite to a prince are humility (iii, 7-9; v, 31), the avoidance of arrogance (i, 6) as the best means of avoiding vices in general (vi, 8), devotion (pietas) to his people (i, 15), compassion (i, 15), and patience with the weak- nesses of others (vii, 2; v, 34). The prince should guard against wrath as a grave danger, and therefore avoid irascible advisers who will arouse him (vii, 5); he should be especially lenient in punishing injuries directed against himself (i, 14), for clemency makes the difference between a prince and a tyrant (i, 14). On the other hand the prince should be very severe against incendiaries who cause so many evils, not only by their original act, but by its consequences (vii, 10). Yet homicide is to be feared and guarded against (vii, 11), and the life of a sinner is not to be taken except under sanction of divine law (vii, 12). Above all the prince should be wise, so that he may know how to use his power, for the greatness of power is not
1 ii, 18 is devoted to selections from many diverse authors on the prerequisites in the
character of a good prince.
486 The Perfect Prince
in its magnitude, but in its laudable application (i, 2); and the task of the prince is not to burden, but to help his people (i, 2). He should season his bravery with prudence for the same reason (iii, 4), and likewise guard his tongue (v, 18-21).
Only from a good man can good deeds come (i, 3). Fear of God is essential to the good prince (iii, 8-11). Much good will result from early association with the works of God (v, 5). Faith is needed in all men, but especially in the prince (ii, 1-3), and likewise hope (ii, 5~7). Vanity of temporal things should not be valued, but re- garded as the least of the ‘goods’ to which a prince should aspire (i, 8)— including vanity of wealth (i, 9), pleasure (i, 10), glory and praise (i, 12; vii, 4), and favor (i, 11). The dignity of his position should make the prince humble rather than proud (i, 6). The prince ‘must greatly fear prosperity, that is to the unwary what fire is to wax, what the sun is to snow or ice’ (iii, 7). He should not tax too severely (vi, 3). Especially must he guard against plundering habits in himself, his associates, and lower officials (iv, 5-6). This calls down the wrath of God (iv, 7-8). Some princes are so disliked that they do not dare to go about their own cities unarmed — a most deplorable condition (i, 1).
The prince should be loved by his people rather than feared (i, 6; vi, 7), and give of his own goods readily to help them, protecting them from evils and oppressions (vi, 7). The general principle of all this may be summed up in ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself’ (Matth. xxii), and is substantiated by reference to nature, the fraternal nature of man, for ‘nihil tam discordiosum uitio, tam sociale natura, quem genus humanum’ (quoted from St Augustine), and the example of Christ himself (ii, 12). True nobility consists in the absence of ignobility and shameful servitude; in shunning evil; giving freely and liberally, devotion to good men (cf. iii, 3); severity to rebels; scorn for small things; interest in the great; and freedom from all vain terrors (i, 5). The prince should realize that unto the poor was given the Kingdom of Heaven (i, 15). From such a relation as outlined there will be mutual faith and dependence between the prince and his subjects (vi, 4).
When the prince marries, he should choose his wife with great
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The Perfect Prince 487
care, for if he errs in this selection, it is serious to all (v, 27). His wife should be his equal (v, 28), and together they should look after the education of their family (v, 3), for the neglect of parents in this regard is the cause of lack of interest in things worth while (v, 2).!. Equal care is to be exercised in the selection of companions, on the basis of reliability, habits, and congeniality (v, 42-43). All undesirable associates are to be kept away (iv, 40). The three evils to which youth is most prone are arrogant impetuosity, luxurious extravagance, and lasciviousness (v, 45). From earliest youth care should be taken to guard against these by a consistent and progres- sive program beginning with the simplest things such as dress, speech, and manners, and ending with preparation for marriage (v, 12-22). Especial care and restraint are to be devoted to the prince’s daughters who are to receive all the training essential for a ‘perfect lady’ (v, 49). This is partly to be achieved through the use of the learned letters — but at all events these young ladies must be kept busy at something (v, 50).?
The prince should have about him such men as he can trust with his secrets (iv, 2), and if possible a philosopher to help his course through life, as Alexander had Aristotle, and Nero Seneca (i, 2) — but with better results we hope. .
It should be a special care to the prince to see that his ministers are of the right sort, for if they corrupt him by their evil advice, the harm is not to the prince alone (iv, 1). He should guard against the entertaining of false accusations against his subjects by these officers (iv, 4), and against their corruption by bribery and other means iv, 4). In the case of the judges, special care must be exercised (iv, 3). Some of the most frequent (and flagrant) vices of the prince and his ministers are pillaging, arrogance, false simplicity, oppres- sion of the weak to win the great, and cruelty (iv, 9).
The prince should be ready at all times to ask counsel as well as to give it; to be able to choose his advisers well; to evaluate their advice; and, if found to be good, to make use of it (iv, 2). Before
! When the tutor is selected, he should be one who is careful of his manners (v, 11), and who leads an honorable life, with lofty ideals, eloquence and skill in his profession (v, 9). ? This recalls the solicitude of Charlemagne, as told by Einhard, Vita Karoli, chap. 19.
488 The Perfect Prince
any definite act, he should first consider the possibility, the expe- diency, and the suitability of his plan (iii, 5). It is very important for a prince to think before acting: it checks possible excesses, orders the plans, makes his life honorable (iii, 4). Especially is this fore- thought necessary in the matter of making war. War is to be avoided if possible, because of the countless evils that result from it — burn- ing, plundering, theft, reduction of the poor to thievery, and defile- ment of their women (vii, 8). Most of the burdens fall on the poor commoners who have done nothing to deserve such afflictions (vii, 8).
The prince should be good in the fullest significance of the word. The wicked prince is a creature of the forsaken one, and his punish- ment will be poverty, diminution or entire loss of his realm, oppres- sion at the hands of greater princes, and future punishment with the loss of the Kingdom of Heaven (vi, 6).
Arcipius Romanus !
Aegidius is much more definite than some of his predecessors in his ideas of the state and of the ‘perfect prince.’ Hereditary mon- archy, he believes, is the best form of government (iii, 1, 2; iii, 2, 5), just as tyranny is the worst (iii, 2, 7). Aristocracy is placed second (iii, 2, 4), and democracy last.? Very interesting is Aegidius’ belief in the benefits that come from the establishment of cities and towns (iii, 1, 1; iii, 2, $1); namely, convenience in procuring the necessities of life, the enjoyment of a full life, and the use of laws. He also understood the value of a strong middle class (iii, 2, 31). This pre- vents the evils that arise from the great contrast between the very rich and the very poor; and makes possible for all a life according to reason and law.
1 Born 1247; died 1316. Aegidius, a pupil of Thomas Aquinas at Paris, wrote the De Regimine Principum in three books, at the request of Philip the Fair, ca. 1287. Upon his succession, Philip ordered the work translated into French. The treatise is a clear and more complete expression of the ideas of Aquinas, who died before he had completed his own work. There have been numerous editions of Aegidius’ treatise. Of these, the edition of the French text by S. P. Molenaer in 1899, under the title, Les Livres du Gouvernement des Rois; a XIII Century Version of Egidio Colonna’s Treatise, De Regimine Principum, now first published from the Kerr MSS, is the most easily accessible and is here cited. Cf. Janet, op. cit., I, 402-410;
and Dunning, op. cit., I, 207-212. 2 He also disapproves of ‘communism’ (iii, 1, 4).
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The Perfect Prince 489
The perfect prince for this state must have many virtues. In fact he should be endowed with all virtues (i, 2, 27). The prince must be prudent (i, 2, 6-8). As a means of attaining this virtue, the prince should ponder deeply over the affairs of his realm, and abstain as far as possible from ‘tout les jieus et les recreacions et les eshatemenz’ (i, 2, 9). He should be dignified, sympathetic, kindly (i, 2, 28-29), and truthful; and, if he has this last quality, he will not be boastful (i, 2, 30). He should also be energetic, vigorous, and ready to en- courage pleasures among his people (i, 2, 31). He should also be just (i, 2, 10), for without justice the state could not exist (i, 2, 11-12). Yet justice should be tempered with mercy (iii, 2, 13). The prince should be courageous (i, 2, 13-14), but should not become rash (i, 3, 6). Moderation in all things, especially physical, is very im- portant (i, 2, 15-16). Yet generosity is not to be excluded — al- though it must be carefully guarded so as not to become a vice (i, 2, 17-21) — because it wins the love of the people. The prince should be magnanimous and munificent in his undertakings. These virtues inspire the possessor to great things, and prevent discourage- ment and misfortune (i, 2, 22-23). He should love honor (i, 2, 24), but at the same time not forget to be humble (i, 2, 25-26), and be on friendly terms with his subjects (iii, 2, 34). However, he should at all times be so dignified and worthy of respect that his authority be not diminished (iii, 2,9). As a result of this attitude, the people should obey their prince and his laws. From this will come a con- dition of peace (iii, 2, 32-33).
In his home, which should be such as becomes his station, but not too elaborate (ii, 3, 1-8), the prince should be master just as he is in the state (ii, 3, 11-18), but his wife should be his equal and well endowed with ‘temporal, physical, and spiritual goods.’ She should be such an one that she may share the prince’s secrets and help him with advice (ii, 1, 9-21). Toward his children the prince should be affectionate, but should devote his especial attention to their welfare (ii, 2, 1—18).!
All men, and princes in particular, should love the common good and not merely their own advancement (i, 3, 3). They should desire
1 The training of his daughters receives especial attention (ii, 2, 19-21).
490 The Perfect Prince
only the welfare of the state (i, 3, 4-5). Princes should work dili- gently to see that their states are so ordered that their subjects may enjoy the highest benefits — virtue, knowledge, and temporal goods (iii, 2, 8-9). Wise men and enlightened priests should be encouraged to settle in the state, so that education may be widely diffused (iii, 2, 8).
Princes should be powerful enough to keep off enemies from their realms,' but should not enlarge their territory by injuring others (iii, 2, 9). As a means of preventing internal disorder, in addition to these things already named, the prince should not allow small for- tresses to be built within his realm; should respect, however, the position of all his people; should choose the best men for his officials, and move them about frequently; should keep the country well policed; and above all, should learn from experience, and never repeat a mistake once made (iii, 2, 13).
Aegidius devotes some space to the subject of law (iii, 2, 18-19). The laws of a state are to be established in accordance with the cus- toms of the peoples (iii, 2, 24). Natural law differs from the law of men in that the former recognizes the offense, the latter defines the degree of guilt and punishment (iii, 2, 23). To be effective, the laws must be promulgated (iii, 2, 25), and once so published, must be observed (iii, 2, 2). Nor should they be rashly amended (iii, 2, 29). In rendering judgment, the judges should not be swayed by private inclinations (iii, 2, 19), or emotions (iii, 2, 18), but realize that the law is the basis of judgment, for it would not have been created unless there was need for it (iii, 2, 18). But withal, justice should be tempered with leniency and compassion (iii, 2, 20).
We may conclude with one of the most important of Aegidius’ suggestions. The prince should surround himself with wise men and councillors. Their advice should be given in private and after due deliberation. Above all they should speak the truth even though it may not please the prince. It is not enough for these councillors to be wise — they must be practical, and should spend their time
1 Aegidius gives a rather elaborate summary of Vegetius, De Re Militari, in iii, 3, 1-22. From this it is obvious that he expects his prince to be a good general, as well as a good peace- time ruler.
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The Perfect Prince 491
only on the bigger problems of the state, such as the collection of the income and the preservation of wealth; commerce, especially in providing food for cities and towns; trade laws; maintenance of in- ternal order; declaration of war; and the formulating of laws (iii, 2, 14-17). Under such a plan, with a good prince, we may hope for the best.
JAQUES DE CESSOLEs !
De Cessoles believes in an hereditary monarchy. ‘It is better to have princes through the succession of primogeniture than through election or the desire of princes’ (ii, 2). Often there is dissension in the election, or the one so elected won his place through private interests and not through general good. Since the prince is the head and heart of all, everyone has from him whatever they possess and are subject to his royal dignity (iv, 2). If all went about their own interests without any united action at all, the whole kingdom would be lost (iv, 2). ‘Regis sine regno nomen uacuum est et inane’ (iv, 2). Furthermore, violent rule can not persist. Therefore it is necessary that the first-born especially be educated to the ways of goodness, morality, and proper deeds (ii, 2).
This prince should realize that it is unjust to attempt to rule others if he can not first control himself (i, 3; cf. iii, 6), but that the
! Date of birth and death unknown. It has been conjectured that his work (the title varies), De Moribus Hominum et Officiis Nobilium super Ludo Scaccorum, was written about 1800. The author tells us in his introduction that he has the three-fold purpose of ‘regis cor- rectio; otit euitatio; rationum subtilium multiplex inuentio.’ The work is divided into four parts: i is taken up with the origin of the game; ii with five chapters on the various pieces, i.e., King, Queen, etc.; iii with eight chapters on the common pieces; iv with eight chapters on the actual playing movements. On this background de Cessoles gives his own ideas on political theory. Most of the work (like the others of its day) is taken up with quotations from classical antiquity and earlier medieval writers. It seems to have enjoyed a great popularity in Europe until the middle of the sixteenth century. The first edition was in 1473, and was followed shortly by others in 1479, 1497, 1505. The work was translated into German in 1337; French, 1847 and 1350; English by Caxton, 1474 (from the French); Dutch, 1479; Italian, 1493. There were a number of others, the latest of which seems to be that in Italian in 1829. De Cessoles’ work seems to have been adapted (or imitated) by Ingold, a German Dominican, in his Gulden-Spil. Another work (written apparently without knowledge of de Cessoles’ work) is that of Marco Aurelio Severino, La Filosophe degli Scacchi . . . Naples, 1690. I have used the text edited (with critical notes) by Ernst Képke in Mittheilungen aus dem Handschriften der Ritter-Akademie zu Brandenburg A. H. (Brandenburg, 1879). Cf. Felix Lajard in Histoire Littéraire de la France XXV (1869), 9-41.
492 The Perfect Prince
‘glory of a people is in the dignity of the ruler’ (ii, 1). All perfection should exist throughout the whole state, but the summa in those who counsel the prince and the state (iv, 4).
A prince should be just (ii, 5), for the sake of doing right, and also because, if he is too unjust, his subjects will not support him in time of need and he will lose everything (iv, 2). He should be especially careful never to break an oath (ii, 1), realizing that truth with compassion and justice are the mainstays of his throne (ii, 1). The prince should do nothing strenuous or of a doubtful character before consultation (iv, 4). He should be clement (ii, 1), and merci- ful in his victories (ii, 4), remembering, as Seneca tells us, that the ‘king’ bee is without sting (ii, 5). He should be patient (ii, 5), and affable in his manner, for that endears him to the people (ii, 5); and ready and eager to listen to the corrections and suggestions made to him (i, 3). The study of letters is useful and essential to a prince (ii, 2), for ‘omnis sapiens liber est et omnis stultus seruus’ (iii, 1). It is the part of a wise man to do nothing he would repent (iii, 2). Too much leisure is one of the greatest causes of this trouble (ii, 1), for nothing is so strong that it cannot fall a prey even to the weak (i, 3).
Avarice is the worst thing that can beset a prince (iii, 4 passim). Voluntary frugality (paupertas) was at one time highly esteemed (ii, 5). Prodigality, on the other hand, is ultimately a cause of ruin (iii, 8). Furthermore the prince should realize that ‘the more famous he becomes, the more burdened with cares and worries will he be’ (ii, 5), for envy follows on glory (ii, 5). All the acts of his ministers, whether he knows of them or not, are attributed to him alone (ii, 5).
The prince should have only one wife, and should devote all his attentions to her, his children, their education, with preparations for his succession (ii, 1). The queen should be chosen from a good family, of good character, and such a one as will bear successors to the realm (ii, 2), and be capable of directing their training, both moral and educational (ii, 2).
The prince’s counsellors are the judges. It is their task ‘to advise the prince, formulate laws in accordance with his directions, to
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The Perfect Prince 493
sustain the whole state, to interpret the law, to render decisions just and equitable without regard to the parties in the case . . .’ (ii, 3). With them, then, rests the hope of the prince in securing internal peace and harmony (ii, 3). They are to be firm and stead- fast, unmoved by love, hate, anger, or family ties (ii, 3), for from inequality of legal restrictions come civil wars and social disorders in general (ii, 3). Evil doers should be severely dealt with, for ‘in this should justice exist. What are states without justice except companies of brigands?’ (ii, 1).
The other officers, and the duties and responsibilities of the com- moners are treated in chapter ii, 4 and iii, 1-8.2 One general state- ment in regard to them will suffice, since our interest is primarily in the prince. “Let no one scorn the common people, for [some of them] have attained to the highest places, both temporal and spiritual’ (iv, 7).
Anonymous, Liber de Informatione Principum,* and Speculum
Dominarum 4
The Liber de Informatione Principum is divided into four parts, which treat respectively of the excellence of royal dignity, and the virtues most essential in a prince; the obligation of the prince to
' Here de Cessoles brings in the figure of laws as a spider web, which has been quoted in detail under Occleve, pp. 499 ff. below.
2 These sections treat in detail of the knights, the farmers, the smiths, notaries, city officers, merchants, etc., and occupy pages 9-12 and 16-30 (half the treatise) in K6pke’s edition.
3 Written between 1297 and 1314, perhaps for the sons of Philip the Fair. This work seems to have been hardly less famous among its contemporaries than the treatise of Aegidius Romanus, under whose name a French translation was issued in the reign of Francis I. Many manuscript-copies are still extant. The material here given is from the article by Leopold Delisle in Histoire Littéraire de la France XXXI (1893), 35-47.
‘ Delisle assigns this work, otherwise referred to anonymously, to Durand du Cham- pagne, who died in 1340. The Speculum Dominarum is dedicated to ‘Dominae Johannae Dei gratia illustrissimae reginae Franciae et Navarrae,’ who is probably the wife of Philip the Fair. Since she died in 1305, the treatise was probably written ca. 1300. Other possible recipients of this treatise might be Jeanne de Bourgogne, wife of Charles the Long, who died in 1329; and Jeanne d’Evreux, wife of Charles the Fair, who died in 13871. While intended primarily ‘for the use of all women,’ this treatise also has something to say on the training and qualities of the prince. It abounds in the usual commonplaces of Scriptural citation and quotations from the church and pagan writers. Although widely known in its own day, it seems to have lost its vogue in the later fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The account of this work is also known to me only from the article of Delisle in Histoire Littéraire de la France XXX (1888), 302-330, especially 311-329.
494 The Perfect Prince
himself, his wife, his children, his parents, and his subjects; the wisdom of a prince; and the administration of justice. Like most works of its day it lacks originality, and is the usual storehouse of citations to the Scriptures and classical antiquity.
Among the requisites of a prince should be an interest in the church on earth; a desire to erect monasteries and churches (i, 26); and a restraint from plundering and despoiling as the princes of the day were doing. The prince should also assist the poor among the ex-soldiers, and the widows; he should also visit the monasteries; give alms to the needy; provide means of education for the young; and furnish doweries for poor girls (i, 30). He should realize that the summa iustitia is an indispensable quality of the prince (iv, 20), and that this embraces justice to God (iv, 21), himself (iv, 22), and his fatherland (iv, 23). He is to avoid carelessness (iv, 25) and cruelty (iv, 26), realizing that clemency does not lessen the efficacy of justice (iv, 27). This is both distributive and reflex in its effects (iv, 29-30), and should be enforced swiftly and without delays (iv, 28). These last chapters are almost a complete parallel to chap- ters 22-29 in Part iii of the Speculum Dominarum.
This treatise, the Speculum, is divided into three main divisions. Part i has one section in five chapters on the miseries of human conditions; a second, in twenty-three chapters, on the brilliant con- dition of the queen, by way of contrast; and a third dealing with the effect of divine grace, especially in queens. There is one chapter each on Grace, Character, Emotions, and Virtues. Part ii has thirty- two chapters on the advantages of wisdom, and especially that which comes from reading. Charlemagne is the example of the good that results from this practice. Part iii is devoted to the spiritual charac- ter of the queen.
In with this all, we get the relation, expressed or assumed, to the prince. Especially does he need education, for ‘a King without training is like a fool with a sword in his hand; like an inexperienced sailor who holds the helm in the midst of storms; like a judge, ignorant of the laws, who sits in his court rendering wrong judgment.’ Wisdom leads to moderation, which carries with it a long train of virtues.
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While the ideas of du Bois do not come under the strictest inter- pretation of our subject, they are certainly closely allied. Surely his proposals on education and arbitration can only be associated with good princes. He points out at once that experience, prudence, and youth are not a natural combination. Therefore the prudence which comes from experience, possessed by the older men, should guide the young men (with their theoretical training) in the vigorous ac- complishment of action ([iii] 2). But it is only in peace that virtue and the sciences can be fostered and developed. ‘Therefore we ought to seek and ask of God a general state of peace, so that in the time of peace (it cannot be done otherwise) we may acquire perfection in qualities moral and learned. Intellectual faculties which are rational are not protected, but all too often are wiped out through the con- tinuance of wars, discords, and civil suits as bad as wars. It is clear, then, that every good man should dispossess and shun these things, and . . . when this is not feasible, to cut them short to his utmost ability’ ([xiv] 27).
The prince should be magnanimous and magnificent in the giving of donations. He should also be much braver than all others ({Ixxiii] 118). Yet, if there is a war, he should not expose himself in battle. He should let his troops be led by his faithful dukes and members of his house, and not forsake the administration and needs of his whole people just to exercise personal command over a comparatively small number in the army. Besides, some men are by nature intel- lectually the rulers and directors of men. Their wisdom and pru- dence is one of quiet ([lxxiv] 119). Furthermore, the prince should be free to administer justice and judgment in person in the larger cases and problems, and to supervise his officials in the others. He should also be free to give thought to his family and the rearing and training of his children (([lxxiv] 119).
1 Born ca. 1255; died ca. 1821. Du Bois wrote his De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae be- tween the years 1305-07, and dedicated it to Edward I of England. The first printed text is that of Bongars in Gesta Dei per Francos II, 316-361. Cf. Dunning, op. cit., I, 228-229; and R. L. Poole, Illustrations of Medieval Thought (1884), chaps. iv—vii. The best edition is that of E. Langlois in the Collections de Textes pour Servir a I’ Etude et & l’ Enseignement de l Histoire (Paris, 1891), Vol. IX.
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World peace is an essential. This du Bois aimed at attaining through international arbitration.1 This recommendation occurs in his discussion of the great and varied problems in connection with the crusading forces:
But when those states (ciuitates) and many great princes, who render justice to themselves according to the laws and customs of the places, will try to stir up controversy, before whom shall they lay the charges and conduct the litigation? One answer is to let a council order some clerics or others to be chosen as arbiters. They shall be men of wisdom, learn- ing, and trustworthiness, who are under oath. There shall be three prelates and three laymen from each party as judges. They shall be wealthy and of such a sort that they very probably cannot be corrupted through love, hatred, fear, greed, or in any other fashion. They shall assemble at a suitable place, having been strictly bound by oath, and, having received prior to their assembly the briefs of both the plaintiffs and defendants, drawn up concisely and plainly. They shall then receive witnesses and documents and painstakingly examine them. The examination of every witness shall be in the presence of at least two sworn men of faith and prudence. The depositions shall be written and rigorously safeguarded by the judges to prevent any fraud or falsification . . . . If either party is not satisfied with the decision of these judges, the judges themselves shall send the proceedings of the whole suit, together with their opinion, to the apostolic See for change and revision by the incumbent Pope.... If there be no appeal, the opinion shall be sent to be established as per- manent record, and recorded in the records of the Holy Roman Church
([vii] 12).2
Among other reforms advocated by du Bois is the reform of the feudal army ((Ixxvi] 121-[Ixxviii] 127). A primary duty of the king is to defend his kingdom. He may use church property, if necessary, to supply his needs to this end, if his own resources are insufficient
1 Du Bois seems to have been the first to advocate such a measure. Cf. E. Bagdat, La ‘Querela Pacis’ d’Erasme (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1924), p. 104, and note 3. Prof. Gustave Schniirer brought this out in the Historich-politische Blatter CXLI (1908), 279-284, at the first negotiations of the Hague Tribunal. Arbitration was also proposed by Erasmus, the great advocate of peace, in 1514, 1516, 1517. On the general subject of ‘Peace,’ cf. A. H. Fried, Handbuch der Friedensbewegung (2d ed., Leipzig, [1913?]), II, ‘Geschichte, Umfang und Organization der Friedensbewegung.’
2 See also sections [Iviii] 99; [lix] 100, 101. Here du Bois tells us that the Pope should provide a court for the new dwellers in the Holy Land. ‘If it is the right thing to labor for... the establishment of peace in one state . . . how much more so is it to work for the lasting peace, both temporal and spiritual, of all’ (Cf. [xiv] 27; [Ixvii] 108).
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({Ixxvii] 123). Du Bois also brings out the evil consequences of de- basing the coinage of the land ({Ixxxi] 135). As a corrective for social ills he recommends emigration to the new lands. He dwells con- siderably on the care to be exercised in the selection of city sites, etc. ({Ixv] 107—[Ixvi] 108).
The educational ideas of du Bois are important. He deals most with advanced training, but also touches on elementary require- ments ([xlv] 71-[xlvi] 72), so that his program is quite complete. He would emphasise the study of languages, especially those of the Christian peoples, so that there may be a freer interrelation between nations, and in consequence a better understanding. The curriculum should contain the usual liberal arts, and also special courses in surgery and veterinary surgery.' So far the courses were to be fol- lowed by both sexes alike ([xxxviil 61). In addition to these studies, the girls were to be taught those things which make the ‘perfect woman’ ((liii] 85). Most of these ideas are apparently on education in general, yet du Bois really has in mind the upper classes, and at times only the sons and daughters of the rulers.
Du Bois closes his book with the hope that everything may turn out for the best, whether by the use of his suggestions or upon better ones.
MarsiIcuio or Papua?
Marsiglio, like Dante, is most concerned with the perfect prince as a defender of his subjects against the usurpations — so he regards them — of the papacy.* Favoring, as he does (iii, Nos. 32-36), the
1 For a select few, more highly specialized courses in language ([xxxvi] 59), pharmacy [liv] 87), theology ({liv] 88), and law ({lv] 89-[Ivii] 98) should be available. One of Du Bois’ ideas has a distinctly ‘modern’ touch. Those students who, after a fair trial of academic studies, show little aptitude, are to be given a vocational training ((lii] 84).
2 Born ca. 1270; died 1842? The Defensor Pacis, in three books, was written about 1324. We are here concerned with only a small portion of the work. It has been printed separately at various times, and is also to be found in M. Goldast, Monarchia (Hanover, 1612), II, 154—- 308, and most recently C. W. Previté-Orton, The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua, Cambridge: University Press, 1928. Cf. Janet, op. cit., I, 457-461; and Dunning, op. cit., I, 238-244. Most discussions of this little book do not concern the particular phase we are interested in, but see L. Stieglitz, Die Staatstheorie des Marsilius von Padua, etc. (Berlin, 1914), in ‘Beitrige zur Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance,’ No. 19.
* One of Dante’s main interests is to prove that universal temporal empire is the only way to secure world peace and harmony (i, 5-10; ii, 3). It is only indirectly that he gives us
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conciliar plan of government for the church, it is natural that he should limit the powers of the prince, though, after discussing the various forms of government in the manner of Aristotle, he still con- siders monarchy the best practical form (i, 8-9). However, a mon- archy devoting itself to the common welfare and with the consent of the people is the ideal (i, 8). There should be only one prince, or, if more rulers are necessary, all but one should be definitely subordi- nate (i, 17). This prince (or indeed all of them, if there are more than one) should be chosen by election, because in this way there is more chance of getting the right kind of a ruler (i, 16). It would be an incentive to the previous ruler and his heir, who might be elected if he were desirable. Rulers under such conditions would take great pains to know their people (i, 16). The method of election could vary with different countries, but would be democratic in that either the people as a whole,' or by their duly chosen legislator (who might be an individual or a group) should participate (i, 15; cf. i, 12). Marsiglio makes it clear that the primary legislator is the entire community (i, 12). When the community delegates its authority, it should be to the learned few and men of mature years (i, 11-12). Cases will arise, however, which the laws do not cover, and to meet them, the prince will need wisdom and justice (i, 14); and as an example to his people, he must possess the moral virtues (i, 14). The whole idea of checks upon the prince is interesting. Marsiglio maintains the possibility of suspending the prince from his position as a punishment for failure to maintain his high ideals (i, 18). This punishment will be adjudged against him as an individual subject to the laws, and not in his position of prince. The trial will be con-
any idea of what sort of person he thinks the prince who holds this power should be. However, the prince very definitely exists for the good of the state, and not the state for him (i, 13). Among the qualities the prince should possess is self-restraint. Since he has everything, he will be above desire (i, 11). He should be able to secure peace by uniting the wills of his subjects to some one single purpose (i, 15). For this particular ideal the model is the Divine Augustus, ‘under whom a perfect monarchy existed,’ and ‘the world was everywhere at peace’ (i, 16). In the administration of justice throughout the realm, the prince’s share should be limited to the actual making of the laws (i, 11). This is very important, for peoples are best governed when they are left as free as possible (i, 12). 1 Children, servants, women, and foreigners were to be excluded from voting (i, 12).
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ducted according to the law, by the legislator or someone designated by the legislator (i, 18). However, rebellion against the duly elected prince is to be severely punished (i, 19).
Tuomas Occieve !
In order to be successful the king must know his duties and his responsibilities — no archer can hit his target unless he sees it. So it is with a prince; he cannot accomplish his end unless he under- stands it (174).? Let us see then, what Occleve enjoins upon the prince:
First and forwarde the dignitee of a Kyng Impressed be in the botme of your mynde; Consideryng how a changeable a thyng That office is, for so shalle ye it fynde. (78)
The exalted position of a ruler shows the real character of the prince, and the good in him is extolled (103). The king should be chary of his speech, with the result that his people will be eager and heedful when he does address them (87-88). The prince should remember that his burdens are not light, for he is one of the chosen few, and of them God said, ‘Quem deligo, castigo.’ He should always be true to his oath, and his word alone should be worth more than the sworn oath of the common man (85). Above all he is to obey the laws:
Prince excellent, have your lawes in chere, Observe hem and offende hem by no wey;
1 Born 1870?; died 1450? The poem, De Regimine Principis, which contains 5460 lines of English verse, was written in the years 1411-12 and dedicated to Henry V (then Prince of Wales). The first edition is by Thomas Wright in 1860. Occleve himself tells us (Wright’s edit., pp. 74-76) that his work is based on three main sources (in addition to the Bible): the Secreta Secretorum, a work purporting to be a letter from Aristotle to his pupil, Alexander the Great; the De Regimine Principum of Aegidius Romanus; and The Game of Chess Moralized by Jaques de Cessoles. Lines 1-2016 filling pages 1-73, are purely introductory. The poem apparently enjoyed great contemporary popularity, if we may judge by the extant MSS; but its day seems soon to have waned. Cf. H. F. Aster, Verhdltniss des altenglischen Gedichtes ‘De Regimine Principum’ ...2zu seinen Quellen . . . diss., Leipzig, 1888; and A. H. Gilbert, ‘Notes on the Influence of the Secretum Secretorum,’ in Speculum III (1928), 84-98, espec. 98-98.
? The lines are not numbered and the references are therefore given to the pages of Wright’s edition; each page contains four stanzas of seven lines each; «xcept the first page, which contains only three stanzas.
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By othe to kepe it bounden is the powere Of Kyng, and by it is Kynges nobley } Sustened; lawe is bothe lokke and key | Of seurté; while lawe is kept in londe, A prynce in his estate may syker stonde. (100)
: ’ I In dealing with his people the prince should be patient (129), ‘ remembering that . Prudence and temperance, strengthe and ryght, t The foure ben vertues principalle. (171) j He should be of unquestioned morals, and surpass his people in tl virtue (130);! he should be continent, temperate, self-restrained (138), and magnanimous (140); he should be honorable in his admin- “ istration, for m Love without a goode governaile pr A Kyng hathe none . . . (173); be realizing that the avoidance of flatterers and dissuaders is essential - to that end (79; cf. 109-111; 174); merciful in dealing with the less ; powerful (119-124), for power without mercy is tyranny (123). He | should not be avaricious (161), for if he sets his aim at worldly It} 1 wealth, his people will suffer in proportion (144). He should not be . forget, however, that although avarice is worse than prodigality ” ) (165), prodigality is likewise a great evil (158; 167). Largesses : i should be tempered with common sense (147-157): - Largesse mesurable unto you tye, i And foole largesse voidethe from you clene; For free largesse is a vertuous mene. (170) If the prince can accomplish all this, his people will have rest, peace, | wealth, joy, and happiness (174). Occleve also has something to say on justice and the laws. In the s, t first place everyone should make it a point to try to keep his fellow toa } I man from going astray (90). Justice, he says, is of the nature of “sm God, and is something which restrains bloodshed, punishes guilt, Occley defends possessions, and keeps the people safe from oppression (90). og 1 Pages 130-140 are occupied with examples of the ancients, both Biblical and pagan, would.
who have been model characters in this respect.
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We have already shown that the prince should obey the laws (100). As the soul is the motivating power behind the body, so with justice in the state — when it flourishes, all is peace and quiet (98). Those who pass judgment should be careful not to be swayed by anger or hatred or love, and above all, bribery (97-98); for it is a grievous situation that permits the great to break the laws while the weak are apprehended (101).' From this unequal regulation of the law, the common folk are stirred to uprisings (102). In the execution of justice the death penalty should only be used as a means of saving the innocent lives of others (114).
In all his official capacities a prince should not act without counsel, and that from great and low alike (174); bearing always in mind that a man’s advice may be sound, even though it opposes his preconceived opinions (176). Especially should a prince be on guard, because evils done by his ministers, although unknown to him, are laid to his door and there is no excuse which he can make (91-92):
Counceil may wele be likenede to a bridelle, Which that an hors kepethe up from fallyng. (177)
If that be its purpose, then old men with years of experience should be selected as advisers (177). The young men may be just as sincere, but they are too bold; they are the ones to execute the actions (178).
The poem closes with a plea for peace. War, Occleve tells us, springs from ambition and covetousness, as the example of the
1 Smalle tendernesse is hade nowe of our lawes; For yf so be that one of the grete wattes A dede do, which that ageyn the lawe is, Not at alle he pynysshede for that is. Right as lop-webbes flyes smale and gnattes Taken, and suffren grete flyes go, For alle this world lawe is reulede so.
Salisbury (vii, 20) attributes this figure to Anacarsis Cithica; de Cessoles (ii, 3) refers it toa Machanius. Valerius Maximus (vii, 2, 14) reports it as follows: ‘Quam porro subtiliter Anacharsis leges araneorum telis comparabat, nam ut illas infirmiora animalia retinere, ualentiora transmittere, ita his humiles et pauperes constringi, diuttes et praepotentes non alligari.’ In Occleve opposite the stanza quoted is the Latin gloss: Unde Soion unus de vij sapientibus. Erasmus who used the same figure in his Institutio Principis Christiani (Opera Omnia, ed., 1540, V, 464), gives it with the comment: ‘ut quod egregie Graecus ille sapiens dirit.’ This would seem to refer to Solon. At all events the figure is very old, and has become a common- place in the mediaeval writers.
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Roman empire shows (187). The only justification for war is to bring unbelievers into the faith of Christ (195); and terms of victory should not be severe (116-117). The prince ‘is sette in his reame for his peples ese and releef’ (166). Accordingly peace is his goal. This is attained through three general lines: conforming to the will of God; humility of being; tranquility of thought. This last is especially important, because there can be no peace if one is filled with grievous and angry thoughts (180; cf. 180-end). By concorde, smale thynges multiplien; And by discorde, hate, ire, and rancour, Perisshen thynges grete, and waste, and dyen. Pees hathe the fruyte, ese in his favour; To gete pees holsom is the labour. And kepe it wele, whan that a man hath it caught, That ire ne discorde banysshe it nought. (186)
The very last lines of the poem are addressed to the Kings of France and England, the mirrors of the world, from whose peaceful unity so much good could and should come (191).
CONCLUSION
All the treatises analyzed above fall into two main groups — the pre-Aristotelian, and the Aristotelian. ‘The earlier scholastics from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, were obliged, in the absence of fuller sources, to follow in their systems the scanty outlines of Stoic and Platonic doctrine that had been transmitted through the Dark Ages in more or less accurate Compends. Of Aristotle but few works were known, and these, as Symonds says, through “Latin transla- tions made by Jews from Arabic commentaries on Greek texts.”’! By the middle of the thirteenth century the great work of Aristotle was available to all Europe.
In the earlier group is John of Salisbury, who was followed by Gilbert of Tournai, and Jacques de Cessoles. Giraldus Cambrensis also comes in this period. In the later group we find Thomas Aquinas, William Perrault, and Aegidius Romanus. The main impetus, of course, came from Aristotle, but Aquinas contributed much that was
1 Dunning, op. cit., pp. 189-190.
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