CONTRIBUTORS
Oleksandr Pavliuk
Iurii Shapoval
Walter Smyrniw
Olena Duć-Fajfer
Frank E. Sysyn
Olga Andriewsky
John-Paul Himka
Marko Pavlyshyn
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Contributors

OLGA ANDRIEWSKY is an associate professor of history at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. She is completing a book on the Ukrainian national movement in the late Russian Empire.

OLENA DUĆ-FAJFER is a lecturer in folklore studies at the Jagellonian University’s Institute of Polish Philology in Cracow. She recently defended her Ph.D. dissertation (in press) on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Lemko literature.

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA is a professor of east European history at the University of Alberta. A leading North American authority on modern Galician Ukrainian history, he recently finished a book on the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church under Austrian rule.

OLEKSANDR PAVLIUK is a docent at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the director of the Kyiv Center of the Institute for East-West Studies. His book on Ukraine’s struggle for independence and U.S. policy in the years 1917-23 was published in 1996.

MARKO PAVLYSHYN is the Mykola Zerov Senior Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia and a prominent scholar of contemporary Ukrainian literature. A collection of his literary essays was published in Kyiv in 1997.

IURIII SHAPOVAL is the head of the Historical Political Studies Centre at the Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Kyiv. He is a leading specialist on Stalinism in Ukraine and the author of several books on that subject.

WALTER SMYRNIW is a professor of Slavic studies at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. He has a special interest in Ukrainian science fiction.

FRANK E. SYSYN is the director of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. He is completing a book on the Khmelnytsky uprising.
Ukrainian-Polish Relations in Galicia in 1918–1919

Oleksandr Pavliuk

Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia in 1918–1919 can be described by one word: war. Most Ukrainian and Polish historians acknowledge that this war determined the fate of Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR).

The first studies on the Polish-Ukrainian military and diplomatic conflict in Galicia during the existence of the ZUNR appeared in the 1920s and 1930s.¹ Most of them were biased and polemical. Polish authors expounded on Poland’s “historical right” to Western Ukraine and the “artificiality” of the Ukrainian national movement, while the Ukrainian authors defended the righteousness of the Ukrainians’ struggle. Meanwhile Soviet authors treated the adversaries with equal disdain, condemning both the expansionism of “gentry” Poland and the activities of the “bourgeois nationalist” ZUNR government; they continued doing so until the collapse of the USSR.²


2. One of the earliest Soviet treatments is Vladimir [Volodymyr] Gadzinsky’s
It was also during the interwar period, however, that the possibility of reaching a Ukrainian-Polish understanding was first raised. In their attempts to define the causes of the defeat of the independent Western Ukrainian state, certain Ukrainian historians have pointed to the missed opportunities for achieving a compromise with the Poles. The draft for an armistice convention proposed in February 1919 by the Inter-Allied mission headed by the French general Joseph Berthélémy was viewed as a basis for such a compromise. Vasyl Kuchabsky, in particular, wrote that the Ukrainians had no other choice but to agree to Berthélémy’s draft convention, concluding that “Sad were the prospects of that semblance of a state dependent on the will of France and Poland, but, given the situation of Ukraine at that time, it was difficult to attain more [than that], and when a stateless people does attain through struggle an albeit truncated state, that is already a great step forward.”

Until 1939 Polish historians had no need to reflect upon the possibility of a Polish-Ukrainian agreement in the years 1918–19, because Eastern Galicia belonged to Poland. If they did address this issue, they accused the Galician Ukrainians of wasting their military efforts and time by fighting against Poland instead of concentrating on fighting against the Bolsheviks and consolidating the independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in central Ukraine.

Until recently the views of most post-Second World War Polish historians were not all that different. While idealizing Józef Piłsudski’s federalist policy, an American historian of Polish descent accused Ukrainians of “maximalism” and an unwillingness to compromise: “the Eastern Galicians intended to struggle against Poland to the bitter end. Consequently any idea of compromise with Warsaw was out of the question. They wanted everything or nothing.” Meanwhile the fundamental flaw of studies by postwar émigré Ukrainian historians, particularly Matvii Stakhiv (Matthew Stachiw), was their excessively polemical approach and their lack of a broad documentary basis. For obvious

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reasons this sensitive issue was not addressed by scholars in Communist Poland or the USSR. The issue remained unresolved. It was raised again by a prominent Ukrainian historian living in Canada, Ivan L. Rudnytsky. In his analysis of the lessons of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the years 1917–20 and their consequences for both nations and Europe as a whole, he drew an interesting comparison between Polish-Ukrainian relations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and those in the twentieth century. In both instances, the Poles’ refusal to acknowledge Ukraine’s right to an independent existence and the partition of Ukrainian territory between Poland and Russia resulted in Poland itself falling under Russian domination. But Rudnytsky did not absolve the ZUNR government for rejecting Berthélémy’s draft convention; in his opinion, this action was “rash, if not outright suicidal.”

As a result of the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, interest in Polish-Ukrainian relations after the First World War has grown considerably. In 1990 the Polish historian Maciej Kozłowski tried to analyze the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia in an unbiased manner. He concluded that if in February 1919 the Ukrainian Galician Army had defended Kyiv instead of conquering Lviv, “the situation in the world would have looked completely different.” The principal question remains, however: was there a real chance there could have been a Polish-Ukrainian compromise in Galicia in the years 1918–19?

What the future Polish Republic’s eastern policy would be was an issue for Polish political circles even before the restoration of the Polish state. The leader


of the Polish National Democratic Party, Roman Dmowski, and the Polish National Committee (KNP) that he headed elaborated an annexationist conception. As early as in his book Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia Polska (Lviv, 1908), Dmowski argued that Poland’s principal enemy was Germany and that a union between Poland and Russia was necessary if Germany’s expansion was to be stopped. Consequently, during the First World War the National Democrats remained loyal to the Entente and made no proposals regarding the eastern borders of the future Polish state. Only after the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia did Dmowski submit a memorandum on this subject to the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour. Dmowski repeated his proposals in his booklet Problems of Central and Eastern Europe (London, 1917). In his opinion, an independent Poland had to be large and strong enough (with a population of 38 million, 23 million of them Poles) to balance between Germany and Russia. Dmowski proposed that Poland include as much eastern territory as it could absorb, while the rest—practically all the lands Russia took in the First Partition of Poland—should remain in Russian hands. In effect, this meant the annexation of several ethnic Ukrainian regions—the Kholm region, Podlachia, Polissia, Volhynia, and Eastern Galicia—by Poland.11

Such ideas were often repeated, and in more detail, at KNP meetings, where Dmowski’s point of view dominated.12 He viewed Ukraine as an artificial creation that could continue to exist only with Germany’s support; this would mean the growth in German influence, which was not in the best interests of Poland or the Entente. Ukraine’s independence would also result in Poland’s loss of Eastern Galicia. According to Dmowski’s theory of the maturity of nations, Ukrainians were not “mature enough” to exist independently. In his memorandum to President Woodrow Wilson in support of Poland’s the annexation of Eastern Galicia, Dmowski expounded on the Poles’ cultural superiority vis-à-vis the Ukrainians, Berlin’s support of the Ukrainian movement, and that movement’s pro-Bolshevik sympathies.13

The KNP’s representative in the United States, Ignacy Paderewski, had somewhat different views. In a memorandum to President Wilson that he wrote in January 1917, he envisaged the Polish Republic as a multinational federation—a “United States of Poland” comprised of the “kingdoms” of Poland, Lithuania, “Polesie,” “Halicia-Podolia” and “Volhynia,” with the border between

the kingdoms of Galicia-Podilia and Poland running along the Buh River. Paderewski’s name for this federation indicates that he counted principally on Washington’s support.

The other major conception of Poland’s eastern policy was a federal one. The idea of a federation of “free peoples” first appeared in the party programs of Polish Radical Democrats in the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, the advocates of the restoration of a “Jagiellonian” Poland were Józef Piłsudski and his supporters—the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Social Democratic Party. Piłsudski also visualized the future Polish state as a large country, but based his conception on a premise that was different from Dmowski’s. For Piłsudski the principal threat to Polish statehood was Russia. In 1904, the future president of the Polish Republic wrote that he was in favour of “the disintegration of the Russian state into its principal constituent parts and the granting of independence to the countries that were forcibly incorporated as part of the [Russian] empire. We consider this not only the realization of our fatherland’s cultural aspirations to an independent existence, but also a guarantee of this existence, because a Russia deprived of its conquests ... will cease to be a threatening and dangerous neighbour.”

After coming to power, Piłsudski implemented his views in his instructions of 27 November and 18–19 December 1918 to his delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, Michał Sokolnicki and Kazimierz Dluski. One of these instructions (no. 211, 27 November) dealt expressly with Galicia. In his proposal on Poland’s border, which he called the “national minimum,” Piłsudski foresaw the inclusion of Lviv, Kalush, and the Galician oil fields within Poland. In contrast to the KNP, he did not express an interest in the easternmost parts of Galicia. In his December instructions, Piłsudski stressed that the Polish delegation in Paris was to support Ukraine’s independence. But the Polish federalists’ conception was never developed in detail. “Piłsudski’s ‘federalist’ program, vague with regard to future constitutional and structural aspects, was clear insofar as it predicated pushing Russia out of the Lithuanian-Belorussian-Ukrainian borderlands.” No Polish leader officially declared an eastern policy based on federal principles. Moreover, the state counsellor on Ukrainian affairs, Roman Knoll, stressed that

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the idea of federation and the support of Ukraine’s independence should not be officially declared by Warsaw, but should only be referred to in the press.\textsuperscript{19} No matter what his personal views were, Piłsudski had to take into account the views of the National Democrats, the anti-Bolshevik Russian forces, and the Entente, which did not support the break-up of Russia.\textsuperscript{20}

In December 1918, after several conversations with Piłsudski, Stanisław Grabski informed Dmowski that Piłsudski had agreed to the KNP's demand to annex all of Eastern Galicia.\textsuperscript{21} In practice Piłsudski supported the idea of achieving policy goals through military force (a fait-accomplis policy).

The annexationist and federal conceptions did not encompass the entire spectrum of Polish political views at that time. The Polish socialist parties, for example, advocated autonomy for the Galician Ukrainians within the Polish state; the conservatives would only be satisfied if the pre-partition borders of Poland were restored. But these points of view did not have much influence on the elaboration of Poland's eastern policy.

Both the Polish federalists and the annexationists preferred to see a strong Polish state that included Eastern Galicia. They all understood that this plan could only be realized through military force. It was vis-à-vis the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) that their positions varied. Piłsudski hoped that Poland and the UNR could co-operate and that the UNR would be drawn into Poland’s sphere of influence; that is why he was ready to make small concessions in Galicia. Dmowski, the “father of integral Polish nationalism,”\textsuperscript{22} showed no interest in the fate of the UNR and Ukrainian independence, and he even denied that a Ukrainian nation existed. Paderewski sought a merger of Piłsudski’s and Dmowski’s plans. But none of them contemplated the possibility of a compromise with the Galician Ukrainians.

Meanwhile the Galician Ukrainian politicians had “no practical proposals” regarding the Polish question. During the First World War all their actions had been openly anti-Polish and directed at gaining support from Vienna, not at reaching an agreement with the Poles in Galicia.\textsuperscript{23}

As the end of the First World War approached, both the Galician Ukrainians and the Poles, having established their own military formations, waited for the right opportunity to take control of Lviv. The Ukrainians were the first to act,

\textsuperscript{19} Deruga, \textit{Polityka wschodnia Polski}, 24–5.
\textsuperscript{20} Dziewanowski is of the opinion that Piłsudski was ready to reach an accord with the Galician Ukrainians (\textit{Joseph Piłsudski}, 245–6), but he admits that right-wing pressure in support of incorporating all of Eastern Galicia into Poland prevailed (p. 247).
\textsuperscript{21} Leczyk, \textit{Komitet Narodowy Polski}, 311.
\textsuperscript{22} Wandycz, “Poland’s Place,” 454.
\textsuperscript{23} Kozłowski, \textit{Między Sanem i Zbruczem}, 81, 96.
and on 1 November 1918 they proclaimed the creation of the ZUNR. This was a surprising development for the Poles, especially for the Polish Liquidation Commission established at the end of October in Cracow. That same day Polish military units undertook countermeasures, and the initial military skirmishes quickly developed into an all-out war. It must be noted that the new Ukrainian authorities were exceptionally tolerant. There were no arrests or pogroms; Polish newspapers continued appearing until 6 November, even though they published the proclamations of the Polish high command (in their final issues they published a mobilization order). In the meantime negotiations were held. The main differences of opinion between the belligerents concerned the question of Western Ukrainian sovereignty. The Galician Ukrainians insisted that the Galician Poles recognize the ZUNR, but the latter, claiming that there was no one with the authority to do so, refused to discuss the matter. Lonhyn Tsehelsky, the ZUNR’s deputy foreign secretary, later wrote that “we [the ZUNR] did not treat them [the Poles] seriously, and the Poles behaved just as craftily [tak samo lukavyly]. Both sides were concerned with delaying [matters], because both of them felt uncertain. We were too weak to expel the Poles from Lviv, and they were too weak to expel us.”

Not surprisingly, attempts at reaching an understanding were unsuccessful, even though cease-fire agreements had been drafted. Both sides were expecting to receive aid, from Kyiv and Warsaw respectively. The main question was who would receive it first. Polish aid was held up because the armed forces were dispersed among the Regent Council in Warsaw, the Liquidation Commission in Cracow, and the People’s Government in Lublin. The arrival of Ukrainian aid was hampered by the civil war in central Ukraine between the regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and the insurgent forces of the Ukrainian National Union headed by the UNR Directory.

In the end, the Poles proved to be more efficient. On the morning of 19 November, 1,500 Polish troops, led by Lt.Col. Michal Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski, arrived in Lviv from Peremyshl (Przemyśl), and Gen. Tadeusz Rozwadowski, who supported the National Democrats, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish forces in Galicia. As a result, on 22 November the Ukrainian troops retreated from the city.

With the Ukrainians’ loss of Lviv, a war between the ZUNR and Poland as a whole began. The conflict gained momentum with each passing day. During its first stage (December 1918–February 1919), for the most part the ZUNR had the upper hand. It controlled almost all of Eastern Galicia, except Lviv and the Lviv–Peremyshl railway line. The ZUNR government, which was established on

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10 November and headed by Kost Levytsky, organized the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) and local-government administrations quite quickly. Meanwhile the economic, political, and military situation in Poland remained extremely complex, exacerbated by conflicts with the Czechs in Cieszyn (Teschen) and the Germans in the Poznañ (Posen) region. Despite Piłsudski’s consolidation of power in Warsaw, the KNP, which was influential in the West, opposed him. The conflict in Galicia became a convenient issue that the Polish nationalists used to pressure Piłsudski and Jędrzej Moraczewski’s socialist government. The KNP was not just a political organization; it also performed certain state functions, in particular those of a shadow foreign ministry. The KNP had representative offices in the largest European capitals and in the United States, and it controlled Gen. Józef Haller’s army.\(^{25}\) When the war in Galicia broke out, Dmowski and the KNP demanded that Warsaw send troops and aid to Lviv, and stepped up their efforts in the Western capitals to discredit the Ukrainian movement. In the last days of November the KNP protested in Paris against what they called Ukrainian-aided German and Austrian machinations to hinder the unification of newly restored Poland.\(^{26}\) Later the KNP tried to scare the Entente with the prospect of an alliance between “the Ruthenians” and the Bolsheviks, claiming that the Ukrainians were purchasing arms in Vienna and Budapest.\(^{27}\)

In January 1919 the Poles’ situation at the Galician front became even more difficult. Consequently the chief of the Polish General Staff, Gen. Stanislaw Szeptycki, proposed to Piłsudski that he sign an armistice convention with the Ukrainians while “establishing the most advantageous demarcation line [possible].”\(^{28}\) This was reported to London by a British military attaché in Warsaw, Capt. T. F. Johnson. A demarcation line that the Polish General Staff considered to be acceptable ran along the Buh River and farther east from Lviv to the Dniester River, with the oil fields as a neutral zone.\(^{29}\) At that time the front line was much farther to the west, but the position advocated by the General Staff was contrary to the views of the KNP and the Polish Provisional Government Committee in Lviv. When Capt. Johnson arrived with Gen. Szeptycki’s proposal at the Galician Polish headquarters in Horodok Iahelonskyi near Lviv on 13 January, Gen. Rozwadowski firmly rejected the idea of negotiating with the ZUNR. Rozwadowski stated that he would carry out only

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27. British Foreign Office Records [hereafter FO], 371/3897, 1919, Poland, doc. 12316.
29. FO 371/3897, 1919, Poland, doc. 12316.
Pilsudski’s orders; according to Johnson’s telegraph, Rozwadowski executed several Ukrainian prisoners of war in order to make the negotiations impossible.\(^{30}\) The next day, during a meeting in Lviv, Gen. Józef Leśniewski, the commander of the Polish troops in the city, and Count Aleksander Skarbek, the head of the Provisional Government Committee and a KNP representative, also took an unyielding position.\(^{31}\) In the meantime the head of the British Military Mission in Warsaw, Col. H. H. Wade, met with Pilsudski, who agreed to negotiations on the terms for the transfer of Lviv and the Galician oil fields to Poland. According to Pilsudski, the Polish public would not accept the loss of Lviv or making it a neutral city.\(^{32}\) The Galician Poles’ position on Lviv was uncompromising. On 16 January Skarbek assured Wade that the morale of Lviv’s Polish defenders was high and that they did not intend to stop fighting. Skarbek insisted that the Poles would only agree to a demarcation line running along the Strypa, Hnyla Lypa, and Bystrytsia rivers, according to which the oil fields would be transferred to Poland. Wade, whose views were far from being classist, wrote to Balfour that the Poles were so stubborn because their “governing class mostly own estates (or are relatives to estate owners) in Eastern Galicia or Ukraine.... The governing class will be content with nothing else than the reconquest of all Galicia, and regard anything less as a catastrophe.”\(^{33}\)

Unlike the Poles, the ZUNR government and the UHA Command expressed their willingness to compromise. On 20 January Wade informed the Foreign Office about his conversation with the Ukrainian delegates who had arrived from Stanislaw together with Capt. Johnson. In the beginning the representatives tried to negotiate a demarcation line along the Sian (San) River. When Wade declared this was impossible and that Haller’s army would soon be arriving to aid the Poles, the Ukrainians agreed to the proposed Buh River–Stryi demarcation line and making the oil fields a neutral zone.\(^{34}\) Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky supported them.\(^{35}\)

But an agreement was never reached, primarily because of the uncompromising position of the Poles, especially those from Galicia. In its report to Piłsudski regarding the negotiations with Wade’s mission, the Provisional Government Committee’s presidium complained that Johnson’s attitude toward the Poles was biased and stated that his activity was harmful. Skarbek was

30. FO 371/3966, 1919, Russia, doc. 145241.
32. FO 371/3897, 1919, Poland, doc. 14902; PPC, 12: 368–9.
33. FO 371/3897, 1919, Poland, doc. 17227.
34. FO 371/3966, 1919, Russia, doc. 145241.
35. FO 371/3897, 1919, Poland, doc. 17228.
shocked by the very fact that a British representative was negotiating with the Ukrainians. The offer by Hungary’s president, Mihály Károlyi, to mediate between the Poles and the Ukrainians also came to nought.

Polish-Ukrainian rivalry also intensified on the diplomatic front, particularly at the Paris Peace Conference. There Poland was officially represented by Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Paderewski and Dmowski. At the beginning of January, Piłsudski’s delegates, led by Dluski, arrived in Paris and, as had been agreed, joined the delegation, where they were co-opted by the KNP. But the National Democrats did not allow Piłsudski’s representatives to influence the formulation of Polish policy on the banks of the Seine. On 2 March 1919, at the KNP’s plenary session in Paris, Dmowski’s point of view regarding the partition of Ukraine between Poland and Russia prevailed. The federalists (e.g., Dłuski, Sokolnicki, Stanisław Patek, Leon Wasilewski) were defeated. Thereafter they organized separate meetings in Paris, but their voices fell on deaf ears.

Dmowski elucidated his views and corresponding Polish territorial claims during his appearance before the Council of Ten on 29 January and in his memorandum of 3 March. In both instances he addressed the issue of Eastern Galicia. Dmowski admitted that this was a “contested territory,” but maintained that the Galician Ukrainians were “incapable of creating a separate state” owing to their “cultural backwardness.” He insisted that Poland had “historical rights” to Eastern Galicia. Apart from that, he stated that Poland’s annexation of this territory would make it possible to establish a border with Romania. At the KNP’s request, a well-known Polish journalist, Irena Pannenkowa, prepared two booklets in French in which Dmowski’s arguments for annexing all of Galicia were presented. Meanwhile the situation at the front was clearly not benefiting the Poles.

On the whole, the Polish delegation’s possibilities of influencing decisions in Paris were quite limited, owing to (1) the duality of Polish foreign policy, in particular with regard to Poland’s eastern borders, and (2) the organizational structure of the conference itself, which did not grant such possibilities to the

37. Archive of the ZUNR Government, Ukrainian Catholic University (Rome), 292/I/A: Iaroslav Biberovych’s letter to the ZUNR foreign-affairs administration, 21 August 1920.
41. Akty i dokumenty, 3: 129–33.
42. Deruga, Polityka wschodnia Polski, 40–1.
small states. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Dmowski’s program contradicted the plans of the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement. The Ukrainian delegation’s possibilities of exerting influence were even smaller. While Poland was considered an allied nation and its delegation had, at least on paper, the same rights as other delegations at the conference, the Ukrainian representatives arrived there without being invited and had, on the most part, only unofficial contacts with the other delegations.

What transpired in Paris was determined by events at the front. On 17 February the UHA commenced its long-planned offensive aimed at liberating Lviv (the Vovchukhiv Operation), forcing the Poles to form a defensive line across the entire front. At that time one more attempt was made to resolve the conflict.

In mid-February the commanders-in-chief of the Polish and Ukrainian forces, Gen. Rozwadowski and Gen. Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, received telegrams from the Allied Powers demanding an immediate cease-fire. Representatives of the Allied Powers arrived in Lviv—Gen. Berthélemy, Robert H. Lord, Gen. Adrian Carton de Wiart, and Capt. Stabile. On 19 February the possibility of negotiating an armistice was discussed at a meeting of the ZUNR government that President Ievhen Petrushevych attended. The majority of the participants spoke out against an armistice, accusing Gen. Berthélemy, not without reason, of siding with the Poles.43 In light of the UHA’s successes at the front, the ZUNR government expected that Lviv would be regained.

On 24 February, however, under pressure from the Inter-Allied mission, both sides agreed to a cease-fire, and trilateral negotiations commenced.44 As could be expected, the belligerents took bipolar positions. The Ukrainians wanted the basis for further negotiations to be a demarcation line running along the Sian River, while the Poles wanted it along the Zbruch. On 28 February Berthélemy’s mission submitted an ultimatum to both sides with a demarcation line running along the Buh River, the borders between the counties of Zhovkva and Kaminka Strumylova, Lviv and Kaminka Strumylova, and Lviv and Peremyshliany, and along the eastern borders of Drohobych and Turka counties. This left the Poles more than one-third of Eastern Galician territory, including the city of Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil basin, which at that time was fully controlled by the UHA.45

43. Lvivskyi oblasnyi derzhavnyi arkhiw [Lviv Oblast State Archive, hereafter LODA], fond 257, op. 2, spr. 1449, fol. 7.
44. The course of the negotiations is described in detail in Lozynsky, Halychyna, 78–80.
45. On 16 February Piłsudski’s organ, Rząd i Wojsko, had published an article entitled “Niezależna Ukraina” that proposed this very line as a basis for negotiations.
“Berthélémy’s line” was much more advantageous for the Poles than Wade’s and Johnson’s earlier proposals. Yet the front line had not significantly changed. The Polish negotiation team, led by Skarbek, agreed to the Inter-Allied mission’s terms. The ZUNR State Secretariat considered the proposed line unacceptable, given the UHA’s favourable position at the front. The morale of its soldiers was high: “No one even wanted to think about giving up any, even the smallest, scrap of land east of the Sian…. Had the [UHA’s] Supreme Command agreed at that time to the proposed demarcation line, this would have already then led to a total catastrophe at the front. There was [already] a threat that [the soldiers along] the entire front would discard their rifles and go home.”46 In addition, the more favourable proposals of the earlier Johnson-Wade Allied mission gave the Ukrainians hope that a better solution would arise. The Galician leadership thought that Berthélémy’s terms could be accepted at any time. It appears that the Ukrainians considered their right to Eastern Galicia to be so undeniable that they rejected even the possibility of accepting the Entente’s unfavourable terms. They associated them exclusively with Berthélémy’s pro-Polish sympathies. As a result, during the night of 1 March the UHA resumed its military operations. In its response to the mission, the ZUNR government stated that the demarcation line “suits the Poles’ political desires”; it expressed a readiness to sign an armistice convention, but only one “based on a fair decision.”47

Berthélémy’s proposals converged with the ideas of Piłsudski and the Polish General Staff. But the Polish National Democrats considered even such advantageous terms to be fatal. On 20 March, during the debate in the Sejm on what policy to adopt regarding Galicia, the Right, which demanded the annexation of all of Eastern Galicia, had the upper hand.48 The Polish politicians and military leaders were unanimous only in their desire to retain control of Lviv. It appears certain that even if the Ukrainians had agreed to an armistice, it would only have been temporary. The National Democrats demanded much more. Because they had played for time to build up their forces in Galicia, it seems certain that the Poles would have gone on the offensive and not stopped until they had achieved their territorial goals. The turn of events substantiates this hypothesis. Piłsudski had to take into account the demands of the Polish Right because it comprised the majority in the Sejm.

On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Ukrainians would have agreed to relinquish Lviv and the oil fields. In the event that the UNR had consolidated its

47. Lozynsky, Halychyna, 82–3.
power, the Western Ukrainian lands would have become the object of permanent conflict between Ukraine and Poland. In that instance, however, Warsaw would have had more grounds for receiving international legal recognition of its territorial acquisitions in the east. Besides, the prospect that the two Ukrainian republics could defeat the Red Army, even through a joint effort, seemed highly unlikely. While it is true that the UHA was a force to be reckoned with, its power hinged first and foremost on the support of the Galician Ukrainian population. The loss of a large part of Eastern Galicia automatically undermined the UHA’s combat capability. As Rudnytsky points out, “the apparently secondary western front was not in fact secondary. Due to the relatively high level of national consciousness and civic discipline of its population, little Galicia represented at that time the ‘hard core’ of the entire Ukrainian nation.”

Understanding the significance of the situation at the front, the UHA’s Supreme Command did everything in its power to regain Lviv. On 4 March Kurier Polski wrote: “Lviv finds itself in mortal danger.” But by 18 March Polish troops, reinforced by units from Poznań, had managed to begin a decisive counter-offensive. On this occasion the intervention of the Great Powers, responding to numerous requests from the Polish government, was not to Warsaw’s advantage. The telegram of 19 March from the Paris Peace Conference ordering a cease-fire and the commencement of negotiations meant, in fact, that the Polish offensive had to be suspended.

In light of this situation, the ZUNR government decided to accept the terms outlined by the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference and informed the council of its decision. Soon after, it sent a delegation to Paris consisting of Mykhailo Lozynsky, Dmytro Vitovsky, and Oleksander Kulchytsky. The delegation was emphatically instructed to insist on a demarcation line running along the Sian River or, at worst, along the current front line, in which case the Ukrainian side should have access to Lviv and the territory up to the Sian, which would entail the creation of a neutral zone between the Sian and the front line.

The Supreme Council’s telegrams of 19 March and 2 April (the latter sent directly to the Polish government) created confusion in Warsaw and highlighted the divergence of opinion among the Polish leaders. Pilsudski vacillated. On the one hand, he understood that Anglo–American displeasure with Poland’s policy was growing and that, for its own good, Poland could no longer ignore the Allies’ warnings. On the other hand, he was convinced that the question of Eastern Galicia could only be resolved through the use of force. In his

50. Kurier Polski, 4 March, 1919.
51. PPC, 4: 404–12, 419–22.
52. LODA, fond 257, op. 2, spr. 1449, fols. 19–21.
instructions to Leon Wasilewski, who was leaving for Paris, Piłsudski stressed that all the former German territory Poland would obtain in the west would be a gift from the Allies, but any gains in the east could only be acquired through the use of force.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore it seemed worthwhile to Piłsudski to delay negotiations while reinforcing the front and convincing the United States and Britain to assume a more favorable position vis-à-vis Poland. Piłsudski explained to Paderewski that it was necessary to pretend that the Polish government was yielding to Allied pressure.\textsuperscript{54}

The positions of the National Democrats and the senior military remained inflexible. The military command demanded that the offensive be continued to take advantage of the time at hand, even if a cease-fire would later be necessary.\textsuperscript{55} A similar view was advanced by Stanislaw Haller, the new chief of the Polish General Staff (who, as a sign of protest, handed Piłsudski his resignation), by Grabski, the chairman of the Sejm’s Foreign Affairs Commission, and by Skarbek. They believed that suspending the offensive would be detrimental, and persuaded Paderewski to think so too. Paderewski protested to the Entente for treating the Poles and Ukrainians as equals.\textsuperscript{56} As a result the negotiations held on 27 March in Khyriv, mediated by the American general Francis J. Kernan, did not yield any result. The Poles agreed to the armistice only on the terms outlined by Berthélemy’s mission, while the Ukrainians insisted on the terms stipulated in the Supreme Council’s telegram of 19 March.\textsuperscript{57} Another American attempt to stop the fighting—by Capt. U. M. Bachman and Capt. S. Reisler during their visit to Eastern Galicia—was also unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{58} Then, on 4 April, the Sejm passed a resolution declaring that all of Eastern Galicia should belong to Poland. Dmowski’s line had triumphed in Warsaw. The next day, the Polish Foreign Ministry dispatched an official reply to the Council of Ten rebuffing the Allies’ demands and repeating the earlier accusations against the Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{59} The reply was not sent directly to the Conference, but to Paderewski, who delivered it only at the end of April.

\textsuperscript{55} Hupert, Walki o Lwów, 228.
\textsuperscript{56} Dokumenty i materiały, 218–19; Sprawy polskie, 2: 281–3, 286–7.
\textsuperscript{57} Republika, 30 March 1919: Lozynsky, Halychyna, 86–7.
\textsuperscript{58} Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhyv vyshchyhk orhaniv vlady Ukrainy [Central State Archive of Ukraine’s Higher Organs of Power, hereafter TsDAVO], fond 3696, op. 1, spr. 20, fols. 49–52; Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 109–10.
\textsuperscript{59} Sprawy polskie, 2: 284–5.
For the time being the epicentre of the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation shifted to Paris, where the Allies’ indignation with Warsaw for ignoring their demands grew, especially within the British and American delegations. Poland was accused of imperialistic pursuits in the east. In their reports Pilsudski’s agitated representatives in Paris emphasized to Warsaw the importance of maintaining good relations with Britain and the United States, and the catastrophic consequences of Dmowski’s political line. Pilsudski’s close aide Władysław Baranowski strongly recommended that Poland’s eastern expansion be justified ideologically, namely, through a federalist program.\(^{60}\) Disagreements also proliferated within the KNP. In particular, the head of its Political-Legal Department, Erazm Piltz, indicated in a report to Dmowski that with the change of the Entente’s policy toward Russia, the KNP’s eastern program was losing its feasibility, and he proposed a reduction in Polish demands.\(^{61}\)

Thus even when Poland’s leaders (in both camps) examined the consequences of their policy in Eastern Galicia, they considered only the views of the Great Powers and ignored the Ukrainians’ claims. The Polish Foreign Ministry even prepared a map that showed Poland’s border in Galicia as passing through Zolochiv and Berezhany, and Stanisław and Kolomyia as belonging to Romania.\(^{62}\) The existence of the Western Ukrainian state was not even acknowledged.

Paderewski, who stayed in Paris throughout April, strove, on the one hand, to appease the KNP and, on the other, to show the Entente that Poland’s eastern policy was not indistinguishable from Dmowski’s annexationism. On 12 April, during his speech at a meeting of the Polish Commission of the peace conference, he tried to persuade those present that “the democratic Sejm, with its largely peasant influence, was not imperialist” and that the Galician Ukrainians would have the right to decide whether or not they wished to enter into a union with Poland. He claimed that Polish troops had occupied territories in the east for the sole purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks.\(^{63}\) The prime minister tried to distance himself from Dmowski’s presentation of Warsaw’s eastern policy by referring to his 1917 memorandum to President Wilson, but he was unable to explain what the federation plan really entailed.\(^{64}\) On 18 April Paderewski read

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a declaration to Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, a member of the American delegation, that expressed Poland’s agreement in principle to the proposed armistice and stated that a Polish general would be arriving to take part in negotiations. Bliss correctly surmised that Poland was trying to buy time in order to resolve the problem through military means, for a military mission sent by Piłsudski and led by Gen. Jan Romer had been in Paris since the end of March.65

The Ukrainians responded to Paderewski’s declaration very seriously (Bliss had informed the ZUNR’s foreign secretary and one of the leaders of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris, Vasyl Paneiko, of its contents). Then again, the situation at the front did not leave them much choice. On 19 April, Paneiko informed the ZUNR government about Paderewski’s declaration and proposed a cease-fire and new negotiations with the Poles. This issue was discussed by the State Secretariat on 29 and 30 April, and it decided to dispatch delegates to the Polish command to negotiate a three-day cease-fire.66 The delegates—the Galician parliamentarians Col. Fidler and Rev. Dolezhal and State Secretary Stepan Vytvytsky—did not receive a reply.

Gen. Józef Haller’s arrival in Lviv at the end of April led to another intensification of the power struggle within Warsaw’s political elite regarding Poland’s policy in Eastern Galicia. The weekly Rząd i Wojsko (4 May 1919) continued its attack on the KNP for its close association with France, and advised the government to support the independence of Ukraine as long as Lviv and the oil fields remained Polish. Notwithstanding the seemingly sharp disagreements among the Polish leaders, however, the new French ambassador in Warsaw, Eugène Pralon, viewed Piłsudski as a cunning annexationist who only differed in his methods from Dmowski and Paderewski.67 Paderewski successfully delayed the resolution of the Eastern Galician question in Paris, postponing negotiations until the arrival of Gen. Rozwadowski,68 who was not, and had not earlier been, inclined toward a compromise. The instructions Rozwadowski received clearly reflected the position of the Polish command. They addressed the need for the UHA’s full capitulation and the occupation of all of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia as far east as Rivne, and emphasized the need for strengthening contact with the Allies by establishing a common Polish-Romanian border. The “Bolshevik threat” was used to justify such actions.69

On 27 April the Inter-Allied Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice between Poland and the Ukraine, headed by the South African general Louis

65. Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem, 281.
66. LODA, fond 257, op. 2, spr. 1449, fols. 22–3.
67. Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem, 298.
69. Dokumenty i materiały, 244–6; Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 116–18.
Botha, began its work. (Rozwadowski had not yet arrived.) Paderewski informed his personal secretary that the situation regarding Eastern Galicia was practically hopeless, and suggested that the region be occupied as soon as possible, as had been Vilnius, and a common border between Poland and Romania be established. The prime minister emphasized that “the Conference especially takes into account faits accomplis,” but insisted that Haller’s army not be openly used for this purpose. The next day, Paderewski and Dmowski went before the Botha Commission. The former tried to justify the delay in responding to the conference’s telegram of 2 April. (The reply had been handed to Wilson only on 23 April.) Dmowski, as always, accused the Ukrainians of Bolshevism and Germanophilia and demanded a common border with Romania and control of the oil fields. The Ukrainian representatives (Hryhorii Sydorenko, Lozynsky, Vitovsky), who were invited to the commission’s meetings on 30 April and 8 May, were willing to agree to a truce on the basis of the front line of 20 March—the day the Allies’ telegram was received—as long as Lviv was a neutral city under the control of the powerful Great Powers.

On 12 May the commission handed both delegations its draft convention, in which the demarcation line left the oil fields with the ZUNR. This draft virtually repeated the Wade mission’s January proposals. While expressing its reservations in writing, the Ukrainian delegation agreed to the commission’s terms. Dmowski was supposed to deliver a reply on behalf of Poland, because Paderewski had returned to Warsaw. Dmowski was best suited to say “no.” (Perhaps that is why Paderewski hastened to leave the conference, so that he could maintain his image in the West as a moderate politician.) Dmowski tried once again to postpone making a decision, stating that he was waiting for new instructions from Warsaw even though he had never hesitated before to take the initiative. Nevertheless, on 13 May the Poles were forced to give their final answer, which they had managed to delay since 19 March. The KNP leader did not accept the Botha Commission’s draft convention and presented a list of counter-demands, including Poland’s occupation, together with Romania, of Eastern Galicia up to the Stryi–Dniester River–Zolota Lypa River line and of the Lviv–Chernivtsi railway line. This time Dmowski did not mention Poland’s “historical rights,” but based his position on general military considerations.

Another attempt at reaching an agreement had failed. The belligerents’ positions were too divergent. Nonetheless, around that time attempts at direct Polish–Ukrainian negotiations were made in Paris by “Piłsudski’s men”—Dluski,

70. APIP, 2: 118; Sprawy polskie, 2: 296.
72. PPC, 5: 789–99; Lozynsky, Halychyna, 126–32.
Wasilewski, and others—on the Polish side and Sydorenko, Paneiko, and Oleksander Shulhyn on the Ukrainian side. Almost nothing is known about the course of these negotiations or their results. According to Pilsudski’s archival documents in New York, the Ukrainian representatives expressed support for an Eastern Galician state in federation with Ukraine, promised the Poles a corridor linking Poland with Romania, and proposed making Lviv a free city tied to Poland.\(^3\) One thing is certain: even if the Polish federalists had agreed to these terms, they would never have been accepted by the National Democrats or the military, especially after the situation at the front had changed in the Poles’ favour.

In general Paderewski achieved what he had wanted: while he delayed Poland’s reply, the Poles considerably strengthened their position on the Galician front. At the beginning of May the Polish forces there numbered nearly 65,000 men, more than double the number of troops (30,500) in the UHA.\(^4\) The stage had been set for a general Polish offensive, the urgency of which Gen. Haller and the Sejm inopportune emphasized. The leader of the British military attaché in Warsaw, Gen. Carton de Wiart, reported to London that Pilsudski was yielding to pressure from the Sejm and the military and that a Polish offensive was imminent.\(^5\) Even Pilsudski’s representatives in Paris, under the influence of the French, insisted on hastening this offensive with the aim of occupying the oil basin and establishing a common border with Romania.\(^6\)

In Poland, meanwhile, Paderewski continued his efforts. On the one hand, he began negotiations with various political parties in order to subdue their desire for a quick resolution in Galicia. On the other hand, in his conversations with representatives of the Great Powers he tried to renege on his promises regarding the use of Haller’s army.\(^7\) As a result of his activity, on 13 May the Sejm passed a resolution instructing the government to prepare forthwith a draft plan for the autonomy of Eastern Galicia within Poland. The intention was obvious: to make the annexation of Eastern Galicia more palatable to the Entente and the United States. The Polish Right had compromised on the autonomy issue, but in return they insisted on a military offensive. In Pralon’s opinion, Paderewski had implemented the plans of the National Democrats, but in such a way as to allay the objections of Britain, the United States, and the Polish Left.\(^8\)

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76. AGND, box. 56, doc. 829: Winiawa to Pilsudski, 12 May 1919.


Faced with this critical situation, the ZUNR government convened on the night of 10 May and decided on a unilateral cease-fire, to inform the Poles thereof, and to wait until 13 May for a response. The Polish army responded with its offensive. Within five days it had captured the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields, thereby depriving the ZUNR government of its sole source of income for purchasing arms. The ZUNR’s Council of State Secretaries dispatched a protest to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference. Sad news from the front and the virtual idleness of the conference caused despair and confusion among the members of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris. In its memorandum of 21 May the Ukrainian mission openly questioned “whether the states of the Entente possess the will and ability to halt the Polish offensive” and opined that it is “futile to remain in Paris any longer,” a sentiment about which Paneiko forewarned Lloyd George’s secretary, Philip Kerr. But the delegation did not leave Paris. On 21 May the Ukrainian representatives were invited to their first Supreme Council meeting. There they stressed the ZUNR government’s desire to implement the conference’s decisions regarding an armistice and spoke out in favour of the unification of Eastern Galicia with Ukraine.

Meanwhile the Polish offensive continued. Warsaw ignored the Ukrainians’ memoranda and proposals, only taking notice of the West’s attitude toward it. During his meeting with the American and British ambassadors in Poland, Hugh Gibson and Percy Wyndham, Paderewski talked about possibly tendering his resignation, outlined the positions of the Polish political parties, and justified the offensive because of the “Bolshevization” of the Ukrainian army. Both ambassadors warned their superiors that the failure to excuse Paderewski from fulfilling his promises concerning Haller’s army posed a threat of anarchy in Poland and a chauvinist take-over of power there. In his conversation with Wyndham, Piłsudski upheld his earlier position that Lviv and the oil fields should belong to Poland, but left all other Polish claims in Galicia to the conference to decide. Wyndham indicated that Paderewski had gone even further than Piłsudski in his demands.

On 22 and 23 May the Ukrainian question was discussed in the Sejm. During his long speech, Paderewski declared that Polish troops were establishing law and order in Galicia through their actions against Ukrainian “bands” and rejected accusations that Poland was engaging in “eastern imperialism.”

79. LODA, fond 257, op. 2, spr. 1449, fol. 27.
80. Republika, 20 May 1919.
82. PPC, 5: 775–8.
83. Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem, 318.
Sejm adopted his proposed resolution to proclaim autonomy for Eastern Galicia and Poland’s desire for a Polish-Ukrainian accord.\(^4\) The resolution was aimed only at appeasing Great Britain and the United States, for when the ZUNR’s delegates arrived in Lublin, the Poles demanded the UHA’s full capitulation and disarmament as preconditions for negotiations.\(^5\) In response to telegrams sent on 24 and 27 May in which the Supreme Council threatened to suspend aid to Poland because Warsaw had violated the ban on utilizing Haller’s army in Galicia, Piłsudski and Paderewski stated that they were not aware that such commitments had been made.\(^6\)

The ZUNR government, meanwhile, explored the possibility of entering into an alliance with Czechoslovakia. At meetings of the ZUNR’s State Secretariat held on 19 and 25 May 1919, a draft document for federation with the Czechoslovak Republic and the transfer of part of the UHA there was discussed.\(^7\) On 30 May a letter signed by Sydir Holubovych, the new chairman of the Council of State Secretaries, was dispatched to Paris. In it the ZUNR government suggested to the Council of Four that a contingent of Allied troops be deployed in Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna. If this was not possible, the State Secretariat urgently requested that the Allies grant a mandate to the Czechoslovak Republic to occupy the disputed territories until the Peace Conference reached a final decision on the matter of the border between Poland and Western Ukraine.”\(^8\) Ukrainian delegations repeatedly visited Prague. A representative of President Petrushevych, Teofil Okunevsky, was sent to Paris to negotiate with the Czechoslovak delegation the possibility of “establishing close state and political relations between Ukraine and Czechoslovakia, [including] even a Ukrainian-Czech state union (confederation)” and subsequent “formation of a confederation of Slavic states.”\(^9\) Other Galician politicians (Paneiko, Stepan Tomashivsky) saw a federation with a future non-Communist Russia as Ukraine’s only salvation, and they therefore established contact with representatives of various Russian émigré political circles.

At the end of May Piłsudski could afford to halt the Polish offensive in Galicia. His main objective had been realized: the oil fields were in Polish hands, and a Polish-Romanian border had been established. Piłsudski explained his

85. Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 133.
87. LODA, fond 25, op. 2, spr. 1449, fols. 31–2, 33–4.
88. Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 137.
89. Aital Vitoshynsky Archive, Shevchenko Scientific Society (New York), spr. 12, fols. 11–16; Ibid., spr. 15, fols. 18–25, 31–2, 43–7; LODA, fond 257, op. 2, spr. 1455, fol. 2; Archive of the ZUNR Government, 256/II/V: Osyp Burachynsky’s report to Petrushevych, 6 July 1919.
position to Paderewski: because the determination of Poland’s western border depended on nine-tenths on the Entente, it was necessary to avoid any kind of conflict with the Allies and to postpone the resolution of other matters until this issue was settled; afterwards Poland would become a “leading power in Eastern Europe” and be able to act more decisively, and the Great Powers would have to accept its decisions.\footnote{Dokumenty i materiały, 262–7; Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 140–5.} At this time the difference between Piłsudski’s and Dmowski’s views on Eastern Galicia was mostly a matter of timing and tactics. The leader of the Polish state, unlike the National Democrats, paid more attention to the international consequences of his policies, and his restraint was only temporary. Once the offensive had proven to be successful, even the National Democrats adopted a more moderate position. Gen. Rozwadowski suggested to Piłsudski that he placate the Americans by issuing the “Wilno declaration” on Eastern Galicia. Even Dmowski expressed his readiness to accept a temporarily halt of the offensive, including postponing the capture of Rivne and Ternopil.\footnote{Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem, 330–1.} Consequently, at the end of May military hostilities in Galicia ceased, and Haller’s army was transferred to Poland’s western front.

But neither the Galician Ukrainians nor the Poles were prepared to abandon their plans. In spite of the UHA’s seemingly catastrophic situation, the ZUNR government did not abandon hope that it would regain the territory occupied by the Poles. Petrushevych proclaimed himself a dictator and concentrated all power in his hands. The reorganized UHA (Gen. Omelianovych-Pavlenko had been replaced as commander-in-chief by Gen. Oleksander Hrekov) began the desperate Chortkiv Offensive (7–28 June), which temporarily liberated Ternopil and advanced to within fifty km. of Lviv before retreating eastward across the Zbruch River into UNR territory.\footnote{Mykola R. Lytvyn and Kim Ie. Naumenko, Istoriia halytskoho striletstva (Lviv: Kameniar, 1990), 127–32.} Meanwhile Warsaw waited for the right conditions to occupy all of Eastern Galicia once and for all. The breakdown of negotiations in Lviv became the pretext. On 16 June a UNR military delegation headed by Gen. Serhii Delvig signed a temporary armistice convention with Poland that specified the so-called Delvig Line of demarcation. This line left a small territory bounded by the Zolota Lypa, Dniester, and Zbruch rivers to the UHA.\footnote{Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 167–93.} Petrushevych, however, encouraged by the UHA’s successes, refused to ratify the convention. Blaming the ZUNR government for the breakdown of negotiations, the Poles undertook actions aimed at receiving Allied agreement to using Haller’s army where necessity dictated. Although Pralon informed Paris that “the Poles
had not conducted the negotiations with particular seriousness ... the will to continue them was weak on both sides.”

In his federalist plan, Pilsudski foresaw the need for an accord and alliance with Petliura and the UNR against Russia, but no truce whatsoever with the ZUNR. Moreover, the loss of Eastern Galicia was supposed to become, and in fact became, the price the UNR had to pay to reach an accord with Warsaw. The Polish establishment had been greatly distressed by the first contacts between the ZUNR and the UNR in November 1918 and particularly by the unification of the two republics in January 1919. The newspaper Kurier Polski, which supported the line of the Polish Foreign Ministry, wrote at the time about the dangerous military and international consequences of the unification. During the first half of 1919 the Poles repeatedly urged the UNR to relinquish Eastern Galicia to Poland, and in May they managed to extract a promise to do so from the UNR’s peace mission headed by Borys Kurdynovsky. The agreement that Kurdynovsky signed, which declared the UNR Directory’s “disinterest” in Galicia, and other contacts between Pilsudski and Petliura made without the ZUNR leadership’s knowledge heightened Petrushevych’s suspicions, strained his relations with the Directory, and negated the possibility of reaching a Polish-Ukrainian compromise in Galicia. An accord between the UNR and Poland could have been established only if Petliura had had enough trump cards to force Petrushevych to accept it. Up until the end of 1919 this was not a real possibility, for although the Directory was nominally the supreme instrument of Ukrainian state power (Petrushevych was one of its members), the Western Ukrainian government had a better army and was not about to implement decisions with which it disagreed. Petliura greatly needed the military support of the UHA, and he therefore had to take Petrushevych’s position into consideration.

The mentality of Galician Ukrainian society, moulded by decades of bitter Polish-Ukrainian conflict, also played a role here. It seems that in 1919 the Galicians were willing to endure any foreign occupation except Polish rule. For example, in a letter Petrushevych sent to the Supreme Command of the Romanian army, which occupied Galician Pokuttia at the end of May, he wrote: “Because Polish armies have been perpetrating brutal violations against the Ukrainian civilian population during their occupation of Eastern Galicia, whereas

94. Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem, 386.
95. Nova rada (Lviv), 30 November 1918.
96. The head of this ministry’s Eastern Department, Juljusz Łukaszewicz, later admitted that one of the objectives of Polish foreign policy had been to engineer a schism between the two Ukrainian republics. See Aleksy Deruga, “Początek rokowań o sojusz między Piłsudskim a Petlurą (styczeń–lipiec 1919),” Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich: Studia i materiały, no. 6 (1972): 49.
the Royal Romanian armies in Pokuttia have been treating the Ukrainian population very humanely,... the Plenipotentiary Dictator requests ... that the Supreme Command of the Royal Romanian Armies in Pokuttia decide to keep its armies in the parts of Galicia it has occupied until the final resolution of Eastern Galicia’s political fate.™

The Polish political and military authorities reacted quickly to the Supreme Council’s decision of 25 June 1919 allowing Poland to occupy Eastern Galicia as far east as the Zbruch River. Piłsudski himself arrived at the Galician front to head the campaign. By the middle of July the Polish forces had advanced to the Zbruch, and the UHA and ZUNR government were forced to retreat to the small part of Podilia still controlled by the UNR government.

By that time the fate of Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic had been sealed, even though the Eastern Galician question remained on the daily agenda of European politics at least until March 1923. Warsaw had successfully implemented a fait accompli in the east. In practice Dmowski’s more concrete and clearer conception had prevailed, but the differences of opinion between the KNP and Piłsudski with regard to Eastern Galicia were not essential.

A Polish-Ukrainian accord in Galicia in the years 1918–19 was, in this author’s opinion, an impossibility. Neither side was ready for it. They were spurred to negotiate only by the situation at the front, which constantly changed, and their positions changed along with it. The draft armistice convention proposed by Berthélemy’s mission, which scholars have considered as the basis for a compromise, was no more acceptable than the proposals of Johnson and Wade or the Botha Commission. The Galician Ukrainians showed that they were more willing to engage in a dialogue than the Poles, but they relied too much on the Entente’s sense of justice and were not willing to sacrifice their regional interests in favor of the all-Ukrainian cause. Meanwhile the Poles, especially those who lived in Galicia, did not consider the Ukrainians to be equal partners. No political force in Poland could imagine Lviv as a Ukrainian city. Neither Poland’s ruling circles nor the Polish public would have accepted the loss of Eastern Galicia. It was unrealistic to expect that historical traditions and mutual prejudices could be forgotten so quickly. For decades to come, both nations endured many more ordeals before they realized how interdependent they were and embarked on what has become their current reconciliation and mutually beneficial partnership.

97. Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorichnyi arkhib Lvova [Central State Historical Archive of the City of Lviv], fond 361, op. 1, spr. 148, fols. 3-4; TsDAVO Ukrainy, fond 2192, op. 1, spr. 3, fol. 167.
Iulian Bachynsky (Polish passport photo)
The Tragic Fate of Iuliian Bachynsky

Iurii Shapoval

On 18 December 1934, Soviet newspapers announced that the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, presided over by Vasilii V. Ulrikh, had been in session in Kyiv from 13 to 15 December to examine the cases of thirty-seven individuals, and that it had "established that most of the accused had arrived in the USSR via Poland, and the others via Romania, with the task of committing terrorist acts on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR."

The exposing and trials of the members of this "terrorist" group, as those of the members of the Leningrad and Moscow groups after the assassination of Sergei M. Kirov on 1 December 1934, supposedly confirmed that a wide-scale anti-Soviet underground existed.

Hryhorii Kostiuk recalls having read this announcement: "of the thirty-seven defendants, twenty-eight were condemned to death by shooting and the sentences were carried out, while nine [remaining] individuals ... were singled out for additional investigation. This meant that they would be shot later or sent to concentration camps, which, however, they would never leave alive. Thus there was little joy in this [news]. Nonetheless—how strange the human psyche is—somewhere deep in [my] soul there was some hope: yet perhaps someone will survive."

Among the nine "spared" individuals was Iuliian Bachynsky, a prominent Galician Ukrainian political figure and publicist, and the author of *Ukraine irradienta* (Lviv, 1895 and 1899; Berlin, 1924) and *Ukrainska immigratsiia v Z'edynenykh Derzhavakh Ameryky* (Lviv, 1914). Until recently almost nothing

3. Regarding the latter work, Lubomyr Wynar writes that "Bachynsky should be
was known about Bachynsky in Ukraine, and his life after 1933 was a “blank spot” even for Western scholars. After previously closed Soviet archives became available to researchers, it became possible to fill in this lacuna and to correct erroneous information about his earlier years.

Bachynsky was born on 28 March 1870 in the village of Novosilka in Galicia. His father, Oleksander, was a Greek Catholic priest and a counsellor to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. Bachynsky studied law at the universities of Lviv and Berlin. He became involved in revolutionary politics as a young man, and from 1890 to 1907 he was a member of the central leadership of the Ukrainian Radical Party. Later Bachynsky was also a founding member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), and he remained in its leadership until 1914. In 1905 he travelled to the United States and Canada to study the Ukrainian immigrant communities there. He returned to Lviv in December 1906, and throughout the next year he prepared for publication his two-volume study about the Ukrainian immigrants in those countries. Only the first volume was published, just before the outbreak of World War One.

From 1915 to 1918 Bachynsky served in the Austrian army, at the rear. In 1919 the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) appointed him a counsellor of its diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C. Bachynsky recalled that

I was informed about that [the appointment] in Stanislav [now Ivano-Frankivsk]. I did not travel [to Washington] with the mission because I wanted to visit Kyiv to become familiar personally with events there. Because Kyiv was occupied by the Bolsheviks at the time, [however,] I travelled [instead] from Stanislav to Vienna, where the mission [to Washington], headed by Halysynsky [Ivhen Holitsynsky], was sojourning. After we [the mission’s members] reached Copenhagen, we received notification from the UNR government about Halysynsky’s removal from the position of head of the mission and my

considered the pioneer of the scholarly study of Ukrainian emigration. From the perspective of time [that has passed since he wrote his book], one can only be amazed at the great erudition of the author, who was able to provide a brilliantly coloured, broad picture of the religious, socio-economic, political, and cultural life of the Ukrainian emigrants [in the United States] in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (Liubomyr Vynar, Iurii Bachynsky—vydatnyi doslidnyk ukrainskoï emigratsii [Munich and Toronto: “Logos,” 1971], 16). Bachynsky’s book was republished recently as Ukrainska immihratsiia v Spoluchenyh Shtatakh Ameryky, ed. with a preface by Vasyl Markus (Kyiv: INTEL, 1994).

4. The authors of Western sources on Bachynsky had no information about the place and year of his death. See, for example, Vynar, 3; and the article on Bachynsky in the Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 1, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 156.

5. See n. 3.
appointment instead of him. In Washington I was not successful in achieving [American] recognition of the UNR, and I left with the mission for Vienna, where I distanced myself from working with the UNR [government-in-exile].

On the way from Washington to Vienna, Bachynsky stopped in Berlin, where he surrendered his mandate as head of the mission to the inspector of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UNR, Mykola Vasylko. From the summer of 1921 to the autumn of 1923 Bachynsky lived in Vienna. Though he was not involved in politics there, he had a wide circle of Ukrainian friends who were, and he was most sympathetic towards the USDP. In 1923 Bachynsky moved to Berlin and bought a building there. He lived there until 1933, except for a period in 1931–32 when he visited Lviv and was imprisoned by the Poles.

We shall return to Bachynsky’s political views and political contacts as an émigré. But let us examine now the period of his life about which next to nothing was hitherto known—the period after he emigrated to Soviet Ukraine. Wynar writes that “Bachynsky emigrated [vyikhav] to [Soviet] Ukraine in 1932 together with his daughter. He worked [there] as an editor of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia in Kharkiv. Soon after Bachynsky was arrested, and all traces of him disappeared.”

Bachynsky truly did emigrate to Soviet Ukraine together with his daughter Olena. At the time he was divorced. He did not emigrate there in 1932, however, but in 1933, crossing the border on 26 November. By 28 November he was in Kharkiv. On 19 May 1934 the foreign-visitors’ department of the Kharkiv Oblast Executive Committee issued to Bachynsky, who was a Polish citizen, “Certificate for the Stay of Foreigners” number 500556. This document, which was in Russian, granted Bachynsky a temporary residence permit for six months, until 19 November 1934. The document’s section indicating the “Purpose of arrival” states that Bachynsky had come “to work.”

Bachynsky truly did want to work. He found employment at the publishing house of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia in Kharkiv. He also signed a contract with the Ukrainskii Rabochii publishing house to write a book called “16 rokov Radianskoi Ukrainy,” and he began researching it and collecting various materials. Considering Bachynsky’s extensive journalistic experience, he should have been able to write that book quite quickly; and his Sovietophile leanings give us grounds to state that the book would have served to create a positive image of Soviet rule. Bachynsky explains his own views thus:

I recognized that for Ukraine the Soviet system is the most acceptable. I believed that Ukraine is now [nynt] a province of the Russian Soviet republic and not a

6. Arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy (hereafter ASBU), file 44987 FP, fol. 86 (verso).
7. Vynar, 10.
8. ASBU, file 44987, fol. 85.
repUBLIC that has equal rights with it; that it is imperative to conduct work for the
greater independence of Ukraine and so that the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of
Ukraine is not part of the All-Union Communist party (of Bolsheviks), but
enters into the independent section of the Third International under the same
conditions that other republics (the Polish, Czech, German, and others) would
enter if Soviet rule arises there.9

Bachynsky made this statement during one of his interrogations after his
arrest by the Soviet police. Because he wanted to explain his actions honestly
and did not change the ideas and beliefs he had expressed earlier, unlike many
others who were arrested, I feel we can believe his words. Although he was
generally and sincerely a Sovietophile, his views on the need for Ukrainian
independence could only have raised the Soviet regime’s suspicions about him.

Bachynsky was arrested on 6 November 1934 at apartment 92 on 7 Radiialna
Street in Kharkiv, where he resided with his daughter. The report of the arrest
by the officer in charge, Zamkov of the Kharkiv Oblast Administration of the
NKVD, reads as follows:

On the basis of order no. 788 dated 5 November 1934, I conducted the search and
arrest of Iulian Oleksandrovy ch Bachynsky (a foreign national).

During the search [the following items] were found and confiscated: a passport
issued in Berlin, number 161489, three notebooks with notes and addresses,
various correspondence on 69 sheets (part of correspondence with [people] abroad
and the address).

During the search and arrest, Iu. A. Bachynsky tried to maintain an outer calm,
and several times he expressed interest in [having] us explain the reasons for his
arrest.

Bachynsky, together with the necessary items, was delivered to Special Block
No. 1.10

On 9 November an investigator of the Second Department of the Secret
Political Division (SPV) of the Administration of State Security (UDB) of the
NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkiv Oblast, [Georgii M.] Bordon,11 signed
a resolution stating that “Bachynsky is a member of a terrorist organization [who
has been] arrested in accordance with a proposal by the SPV,” and because the
investigation of his case is concentrated in Kyiv, “Bachynsky is to be sent under
special escort, maintaining the strictest isolation, to the city of Kyiv [and placed]
at the disposal of the SPV [there].”12

9. Ibid., fols. 73–4.
10. Ibid., fol. 15.
11. The NKVD considered Bordon “a great expert [fakhivets] in Ukrainian affairs.” See
Ivan Maistrenko, Istoriiia moho pokolinnia: Spohady uchasnyka revoliutsiinykh podii v
Ukraini (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985), 279.
12. ASBU, case 44987 FP, fol. 17.
On 13 November another SPV agent, Goldman, signed a document stating the grounds for keeping Bachynsky in the special block of the NKVD prison. Bachynsky was accused of involvement in “the newly organized All-Ukrainian Centre of a counter-revolutionary, nationalist organization, the OUN-UVO, whose set goal was the overthrow of Soviet rule in Ukraine”; moreover he was accused of being one of the leaders of the “organization’s terrorist work in the Ukrainian SSR.”

The worst thing for Bachynsky was the fact that eyewitness testimony against him had been given to the NKVD by people he had known for a long time. One of them was Antin Krushelnytsky, a prominent Galician writer who, ironically, had been imprisoned, like Bachynsky and other left-wing Galician editors, for his pro-Soviet activities by the Poles in 1932. Krushelnytsky had also emigrated to Soviet Ukraine, together with his sons Taras, Ostap, and Bohdan, arriving in Kharkiv in the spring of 1933. (A fourth son, Ivan, had emigrated there in 1932.)

It is hard to say why Krushelnytsky began giving the NKVD the “information” it required soon after he was arrested on 6 November 1934. Possibly he did so in the hope that he could thus save the lives of his sons. Krushelnytsky “worked” with the SPV investigator Mykola D. Hrushevsky, who, on 28 November 1934, coerced him into giving “penitent” depositions and stating that he, Bachynsky, and another Galician literary figure, Roman Skazynsky, were leaders of the fictional OUN. At an interrogation held on 7 December 1934, the following dialogue took place:

**Question:** Accused Krushelnytsky, you headed the organization OUN in Soviet Ukraine. What do you know about the composition [sklad] of this organization?

**Reply:** In my previous depositions, on 28/XI, 29/XI, 2/XII, and 5/XII, I named a number of persons who are known to me through [our] mutual involvement in the ranks of [this] organization. I confirm these depositions.

[In reply] to the question put to me, I can briefly inform you [povidomyty] of the following:


As individuals [who were] close to the leadership of [this] organization, [and] its active members [aktyv], I know of Antin [Bilenky-]Berezynsky, Mykola Kulish, Hryhorii Epik, and the two Vozny brothers.

These people fulfilled the organization’s work entrusted [za doruchenniam] [to them] by the centre, but with whom they, in turn, were connected down the line of [this] organization is unknown to me.

In one of my previous depositions, I indicated that practical counter-revolutionary activity was entrusted to individual members of the centre—acts of sabotage

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13. Ibid., fol. 21.

to Iuliian Bachynsky, and terror to Roman Skazynsky—[and] in their practical activity they should have been closer to the organization’s rank-and-file participants, while my contacts in matters of the organization were limited to that circle of persons whom I named as participants in the centre. The only exceptions in the given case were Kulish and Epik, with whom I was personally connected.15

At an interrogation held two days earlier, on 5 December, Krushelnytsky stated that

After the formation, under my leadership, of the guiding centre of the organization, concrete measures were taken to renew the links between local nationalists and those who had arrived from abroad and to incorporate them into the organization’s ranks.

In this way the two Vozny brothers, Antin Berezynsky, Hryhorii Epik, and Mykola Kulish were added [pryiednani] to the organization.

The addition of these persons to our organization was a very important [velmy serioznym] factor from the perspective of the successful expansion [rozhortaninia] of the organization’s activity, inasmuch as they (particularly, of course, Kulish, Epik, and Berezynsky), having broad links with local nationalist circles, were the first rung in the creation of a mass, multifaceted [shyrokorozhaluzhenoi], counter-revolutionary organization, which the “OUN” was supposed to become in Soviet Ukraine...

In pursuit of the practical realization of these plans, the organization’s guiding centre entrusted the organizing of sabotage acts to a member of the leadership, Iuliian Bachynsky, who was supposed to expand this work by using the help of Berezynsky, who had broad links in the local nationalist circles.16

Krushelnytsky was interrogated in detail about the participation of his sons Taras and Ivan in the clandestine émigré-nationalist Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). Taras had, in fact, been an UVO member from 1928 to 1932. Krushelnytsky openly admitted that, but denied that his son Ivan had also been a member.17 He was also grilled about actual active members and leaders of the UVO and its successor, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, with whom he had previous contact. At an interrogation held on 2 December 1934, he declared that before emigrating to Soviet Ukraine he had met with the nationalist ideologist Dmytro Dontsov, who supposedly told him that “for work in Soviet Ukraine, together with me Iuliian Bachynsky and Roman Skazynsky would be planted [budut znakhodytys].”18

Such testimony greatly benefitted the NKVD’s contrivance of an anti-Soviet conspiracy by the UVO and the fictitious Alliance of Ukrainian Nationalists. The

15. Ibid., fols. 56-7.
17. Ibid., fols. 29-30.
18. Ibid., fol. 44.
case against Krushelnytsky was bolstered on 7 November 1934 by testimonies extracted from such detained “active members of the counter-revolutionary ‘Ukrainian Military Organization’” as Serhii P. Vikul, Hryhori I. Kossak, Mykhailo M. Tesliuk, Stepan L. Rudnytsky, and Ivan H. Shakh. As a result, Krushelnytsky, who was initially only implicated in the NKVD-fabricated case against an “UVO” conspiracy, was declared to be the leader of the OUN by the head of the SPV in Ukraine, Borys V. Kozelsky.

The NKVD’s desire to embellish its case against an OUN conspiracy explains why Krushelnytsky, Bachynsky, and certain other persons were not victimized immediately after Kirov’s assassination, when Skazynsky and Krushelnytsky’s sons Ivan and Taras were, in fact, executed. That is why the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR decided at its closed session in Kyiv on 14 December to submit Krushelnytsky’s and Bachynsky’s cases for further investigation.¹⁹

Because he did not yet know that the execution of his sons Ivan and Taras had already been decided, on 15 December 1934 Krushelnytsky wrote a memorandum to the “Court attached to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR,” in which he stated:

Having been raised in a petit-bourgeois environment, I have already lived beyond the span of one human life—35 years of literary, pedagogical, and community work in petit-bourgeois surroundings, which consequently led me to commit nationalist crimes against the fatherland of the workers of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR.

Having disarmed myself during the investigation and at [my] trial once and for all [ostatochno], and having liberated myself from all relicts of criminal nationalism and fascism, I ask the court and the entire Soviet public [hromadskiss] to allow me and give me the opportunity, together with my sons, to reconstruct myself on the foundations of Soviet ideology and return to work among the Soviet citizenry as a sincere Soviet toiler, and to devote what remains of my life’s powers, and the full-blown powers of my sons, to aiding the construction of socialism and a classless society.²⁰

Bachynsky behaved completely differently from Krushelnytsky. Documents show that from the moment he was arrested he did not waver and rejected all accusations made against him despite the enormous pressures he had to endure from the NKVD (e.g. the above-mentioned interrogator Hrushevsky and the latter’s colleague, Sokolov). Things must have been much more difficult for Bachynsky than they were for Krushelnytsky. Depositions against him had been extracted from repressed fellow emigrants from Western Ukraine such as Vasyl I. Atamaniuk, Oleksander I. Badan-Iavorenko, Osyp I. Bukshovany, Mykola A.

¹⁹. Ibid., fol. 22a.
²⁰. Ibid., fols. 71–2.
Kham, Serhii I. Kopach-Kholodny, Mykola H. Levytsky, Mykhailo M. Lozynsky, Khoma M. Prystupa, Stepan L. Rudnytsky, Serhii P. Vikul, and Semen H. Vityk. Most of them had been made before Bachynsky arrived in Soviet Ukraine, and the NKVD had earmarked him for arrest as a “national fascist” even before he had entered the country.

One document reveals that on 25 November 1934 Ivan Kulyk (the head of the All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers and a member of the Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party [of Bolsheviks] of Ukraine [KP(b)U]), and Nikolai Popov (the CC secretary in charge of propaganda and the press) had protested against Krushelnysky’s arrival in Soviet Ukraine. But no one protested against Bachynsky’s arrival. It seems that the NKVD was counting on Bachynsky’s arrival in Soviet Ukraine so that they could use him to uncover new participants in the “nationalist underground” there. For example, in a deposition dated 13 May 1933, Badan-lavorenko states:

I was at the meeting at [Mykhai]lo Lozynsky’s [home] in January 1931. Present there were [Karlo] Maksymovych [Savrych], [Antin Bilenky-]Berezynsky, [Osyp] Vasylykiv [Krilyk], I, and Lozynsky. Lozynsky informed [us] about the foreign policies of [Ivhen] Petrushevych and [Ivhen] Konovalets. He said that with Poland’s help negotiations are being conducted with France and the Russian émigrés about organizing a unitary front for interventions against the Soviet Union.

To strengthen [our] work and as a direct representative of the supreme staff, Bachynsky Iuliian was supposed to arrive in Kharkiv from Berlin.

During his interrogation on 15 April 1933, Lozynsky supposedly stated: “In May 1924, a conference took place near Königsberg, at which present were I, [Volodymyr] Bandrivsky and Iuliian Bachynsky, [Ivhen] Konovalets, [Vasyl] Kuchabsky and [Riko] Jary (Konovalets’s representative in Königsberg), Lostovsky and one other Belarusian, and several representatives of the German nationalists whose names I do not remember, but I do know that some of them were from the Reichswehr and one of them had the rank of admiral.”

Another political prisoner—the former pro-Communist member of the Polish Sejm from Polissia, Mykola Kham—stated during his interrogation on 23 April

21. Ibid., fol. 60. Kulyk could not have known that his turn at being represed would also come. On 27 July 1937 he “admitted” to his NKVD interrogators that “I had grown so close [zriissia] to the Ukrainian nationalists that when ... [they] proposed to me—a Jew—to join a Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolutionary organization, I considered [rotsinyv] this as nominating me for the role of the ‘saviour’ of the Ukrainian people. This appealed to my ambitions” (O. H. Musienko, ed., Z poroha smerti: Pysmennky Ukrainy — zherty stalinskykh represii [Kyiv: radiansyki pysmennyk, 1991], 292).

22. ASBU, file 44987 FP, fol. 97.

23. Ibid., fol. 134.
1933:

Bachynsky, Iuliian, 60–62 years old, a Galician.... The author of the well-known brochure *Ukraina irridenta* (a brochure with a Menshevik orientation). The gist of the brochure [is]: “In the future Ukraine must be an independent country with its own administrative apparatus and its own bourgeoisie.”

Before the imperial [world] war Iuliian Bachynsky occupied a prominent place in the work of the Galician Social Democrats [USDP] and belonged to the right wing of this party, the so-called SDs[Social Democrats]-Separatists. He collaborated with [Dmytro] Dontsov, [Symon] Petliura, [Volodymyr] Vynnychenko, and others.

During the Petliurivshchyna Iu. Bachynsky remained in the “emigration” the entire time, lived mostly in Germany, and was close [nablyzhenyi] to “president” Petrushevych.

While living in Berlin, Iu. Bachynsky wrote the about-face [zminovikhovsku, i.e., in support of emigration to Soviet Ukraine] brochure “Ukraina i bilshovyzm.”

The brochure’s basic task was to ease the arrival in Soviet Ukraine, under the guise of a “reappraisal of values,” of various agents of the German and Polish general staffs....

From what I was told [zi sliv] by Semen Vitek [Vityk], I know that Bachynsky was close to the UVO leadership abroad; more precisely [virnishe] he belonged to its political section [chastynya]. In 1930 he travelled to the Ukrainian SSR bringing [z] Petrushevych’s and Konovalets’s personal directives regarding the rebuilding and strengthening of UVO work in Ukraine. Thus Bachynsky’s arrest by the Polish authorities and his trial for his “Bolshevism” is entirely a comedy calculated to mask him for [the purpose of] further c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] work on the territory of Soviet Ukraine in case he arrives here.

The natural question that arises from this is: did Bachynsky truly travel to Soviet Ukraine with a secret mission? An answer would be impossible without clarifying his political position and political contacts as an émigré.

When Bachynsky arrived in Vienna in the summer of 1921, he was not too familiar with the nature of the various Ukrainian émigré political groups based there, and he sought the widest possible contacts (perhaps because of his background as a political journalist) with all of the groups that generally supported the Ukrainian cause. Nonetheless he primarily established links with the Social Democrats, and developed close relations with Oleksander Oles (Kandyba), Borys Matiushenko, Volodymyr Levynsky, and particularly Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who emigrated to Soviet Ukraine in 1924. Over time he became acquainted with levhen Petrushevych and other prominent figures of the Western Ukrainian government-in-exile, such as Kost Levyttsky, Hryhorii Myketei, Roman

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24. The actual title is *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i ukraintsii* (Lviv, 1928); it is a collection of articles, not a brochure.
25. ASBU, fols. 140–1.
Perfetsky, Volodymyr Bandrivsky, and E. Radyk. Bachynsky maintained these contacts after he moved to Berlin and until he emigrated to Soviet Ukraine. Bandrivsky and Radyk introduced Bachynsky to the UVO leaders Ievhen Konovalets, Vasyl Kuchabsky, and Riko Jary in a Berlin café in 1924. What exactly interested Bachynsky in the UVO? Primarily it was the organization’s anti-Polish revolutionary politics, which, given his growing Sovietophile tendencies, he viewed as more sensible than subversive acts against Soviet Ukraine. When Konovalets and the UVO leadership adopted an openly anti-Soviet line at the end of 1924 and beginning of 1925, Bachynsky distanced himself from them because he considered such a line to be harmful to the Ukrainian cause.

Before that time, however, in 1924, Bachynsky had taken part in a conference in Königsberg, which Lozynsky had mentioned during his interrogation on 15 April 1933. Knowing full well that the NKVD knew the details of his life as an émigré, Bachynsky frankly and calmly spoke about his meetings with many nationalist activists. The record of his interrogation on 23 November 1934 states that he said the following:

One time, in the summer of 1924, during a conversation with Bandrivsky, Konovalets, [and] Kuchabsky I found out that they were preparing [to go] to Königsberg for a conference with some Germans. Having become interested in this and having received a proposition to take part in this conference, I gave [my] consent and, after a day or two, together with Bandrivsky and M. M. Lozynsky (I forgot to mention that the evening when I found out in the café about the next conference, he, Lozynsky, was also [present]), I left Berlin for Königsberg.

Some three kilometres from Königsberg, on the estate of a German landowner, we held the conference, at which present were (1) Konovalets, (2) Kuchabsky, (3) Lozynsky, (4) Bandrivsky, (5) Jary, (6) I—Bachynsky, and several Germans ([from the] Deutsch Nationale Partei). I recall that also [present] was a serviceman with the rank of admiral. At the conference the subject was the question about preparing military actions against Poland. All of us agreed that at the moment when the Germans begin their offensive against the Danzig Corridor, the UVO would have to begin an insurgent action in the ear of the Polish army, primarily in Eastern Galicia.26

Bachynsky was so frank because he was not involved in any group or organization, he knew his information would be corroborated by previously extracted confessions, and he had nothing to hide. He spoke openly about his contacts with Petrushevych after breaking with Konovalets—contacts that lasted until his emigration to Soviet Ukraine—even though he was not a member of the

26. Ibid., fols. 90–1.
group around the "dictator of Galicia." He also spoke about how certain émigré representatives in Prague had boycotted him before he emigrated.

Bachynsky's testimony completely ruined the NKVD's scheme about his "emissary" functions in Ukraine. It made absolutely clear that he had not belonged to any émigré political, and an unbiased analysis of his publications and actions confirmed his Sovietophile convictions.

The NKVD carefully studied Bachynsky's notebooks containing the addresses of various activists and organizations abroad, his citations from the foreign press about the 1932-33 famine, and other notes. Nevertheless, they could not find anything truly compromising, because he had disclosed information about all of his acquaintances abroad, stressing that "With all these people I was acquainted in one way or another and met with [them] in various years, but not as people who implemented anti-Soviet work. I met with them as personal acquaintances from years ago [davnikh rokiv]. As for the quotations from the foreign press, he explained that he had compiled them "for an article in the next issue of Vilna trybuna with the aim of refuting [them]."

Nonetheless, by an order signed on 19 November 1934 by Kozelsky, two of Bachynsky's notebooks containing the addresses and quotations about the famine were included in the NKVD's case against him as evidence characterizing him "as a Ukrainian nationalist" and having "a direct relation to his fascist activity."

Bachynsky's behaviour did not change even when he was forced to confront the witnesses against him. On 7 December 1934 the NKVD organized such an encounter with Roman Skazynsky. Here is an excerpt from the official record:

Question: Tell us, accused Skazynsky, do you confirm your testimony that Iuliian Bachynsky, who is sitting across from you, is an emissary of the OUN leadership abroad and, assigned the task by [za doruchenniam] this leadership, having arrived in Soviet Ukraine, became a member [uviishov do skladu] here of the guiding centre of the counter-revolutionary OUN underground?
Reply: Yes. I confirm my testimony. I assert [zaiavliaiu] that Iuliian Bachynsky, having arrived in Soviet Ukraine as an emissary, became a member here of the guiding centre of the organization OUN.
Question: Tell us, accused Bachynsky, do you confirm Skazynsky's assertion?
Reply: No. I deny my membership in the organization OUN.

27. Ibid., fols. 92, 100.
28. Ibid., fol. 114.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., fol. 117.
32. Ibid., fols. 125–6.
On 10 January 1935 a similar confrontation was organized between Bachynsky and O. A. Polotsky, the head of the All-Ukrainian Society for Cultural Ties Abroad, with whom Bachynsky had become acquainted at the Soviet consulate in Prague in February 1933. Polotsky also declared that "Bachynsky, as a representative of the OUN, was a member of the guiding centre of the counter-revolutionary bloc." At the end Bachynsky was asked: "do you acknowledge [vyznaiete] your membership in the leadership of the counter-revolutionary nationalist bloc and [your] participation in the terrorist activity of this organization?" He replied: "No. I deny [my] membership in the counter-revolutionary organization. I have no relation to the terrorist activity of [this] organization."

Skazynsky’s and Polotsky’s depositions were also added to case no. 1255 as ones that establish Bachynsky’s and Krushelnitsky’s membership in the OUN. In his deposition of 7 December 1934, Skazynsky also mentions Antin Bilenky-Berezynsky: "One of the members [uchasnykov] of the guiding centre—Berezynsky—placed before me the task of landing a job [pronyknuty na robotu] in Ukrainian state publishing houses in order to organize, having created our opposition [oporniu] group there, propaganda through skilful [vmilu] and discreet [oberezhnoho] exploitation of the Soviet press. Through Berezynsky I was also supposed to enter into writers’ circles in order to expand work among them." The case file also contains depositions by Bilenky-Berezynsky himself, who is referred to there as an active “UVO” member. But, as other testimonies cited above make clear, he also played an active role in the “OUN.” On 25 November and 7 and 8 December, if we are to believe the record of his interrogations, he described in detail Krushelnitsky’s and Bachynsky’s missions in Ukraine, particularly their key role in the creation of three terrorist groups—two in Kharkiv and one in Kyiv. He also spoke about his personal contacts with both of them and stressed that he had found out from Krushelnitsky that he had been included in the organization’s guiding centre. He states:

Approximately a week later I was visited at home by the second primary [osnovnyi] participant in the counter-revolutionary centre—Iuliiian Bachynsky.

Iuliiian Bachynsky, whom I knew well [blyzko] since the years 1912–13, basically [v osnovnykh rysakh] confirmed everything that Krushelnitsky had told me, and [prychomu] added that while [iakshcho] Krushelnitsky had been connected with the OUN leadership through its Lviv representatives—[Volodymyr] Starosolsky, [Stepan] Volynets, [Mykhailo] Matchak, [Stepan] Rudyk, and others—he, [that is,] Bachynsky, had managed before his departure, in Berlin, to

33. Ibid., fol. 153
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., fols. 168–9.
36. Ibid., fols. 176–7.
have discussions [besidy] with Bandrivsky, Prots, Perfetsky, and others, and that [prychomu] the Berlin leadership of the organization particularly insists [napoliahie] on the swiftest-possible expansion [iaknaiskoroishomu rozhortanni] of terrorist action here, in Soviet Ukraine.

This aspect [storonu] of the work, according to [zi slihv] Bachynsky (and Krushelnytsky, about which I had spoken earlier), was entrusted to Ivan Krushelnytsky and Roman Skazynsky.37

Bilenky-Berezynsky’s testimony unequivocally indicates that Bachynsky had arrived in Soviet Ukraine on a “clandestine” “nationalist” mission. It would have been hard to disbelieve, given that Bilenky-Berezynsky had known Bachynsky for many years and was both the head of the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia and the director of the Rukh publishing house, where Bachynsky had found employment.

But was Bachynsky in Ukraine on a secret mission? Bilenky-Berezynsky himself provides the answer. This writer (born in Lviv in 1897) and former active member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) resided in Kharkiv from 1928. The wide-scale Soviet campaign against yet another “national deviation” (personified by Mykola Skrypnyk) that began early in 1933 resulted in the witch hunt and repression of many Galicians (most of them connected with the KPZU) who had come to work in Soviet Ukraine.38 A large number of them were implicated and tried in the NKVD-fabricated case against the “Ukrainian Military Organization.” It is no accident that the secret instruction of 13 February 1933 signed by the head of the GPU of Soviet Ukraine, Vsevolod A. Balytsky, stressed: “Particular attention is to be paid to the members of the ‘UVO,’ who have penetrated into the Party and arrived from abroad bearing fictitious party tickets of the fraternal Communist parties, [and] who, as [our] investigation has determined, are the most active organizers of the underground, espionage, and diversion.”39

It was during this campaign that Bilenky-Berezynsky, who had been arrested on 31 December 1932, was accused of belonging to the “UVO” and sentenced by a GPU troika on 23 September 1933 to ten years’ imprisonment. Soon after, his wife (surname Stein) agreed to collaborate with the GPU if her husband was released, and in May 1934 his release was ordered by Balytsky under the pretext that he was seriously ill. But the price for granting Bilenky-Berezynsky his freedom were great: the SPV began exploiting him as a provocateur and false witness, and he was forced to write reports about and denunciations against

37. Ibid., fol. 175.
38. For a history of this repression, with biographical details about various individuals, see Oleksandr S. Rublov and Iurii A. Cherchenko, Stalinshchyna i doliia zakhidnoukrainskoi intellentsii (20–50-ti roky XX st.) (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994). Ed.
supposedly real counter-revolutionary and terrorist organizations, to provide
“testimony” fabricated by the GPU, and to provoke representatives of the
Ukrainian intelligentsia.⁴⁰

Another secret NKVD collaborator who also played a role in the destruction
of Bachynsky and many other persons was the philosopher and full member
of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Volodymyr O. Iurynets.⁴¹ On 12
October 1934 he sent to the NKVD a report detailing planned terrorist acts
against Soviet officials, first and foremost the second secretary of the KP(b)U
Pavel Postyshev. One of the “terrorists” he named was Bachynsky. After he
was also arrested in 1937, Iurynets admitted that his report had been “completely
fictitious.”⁴²

That this was so was corroborated by SPU agents who were arrested during
the Ezhov terror’s “rotation” of Chekist cadres and forced to confess their
crimes. One such agent was the afore-mentioned Mykola D. Hrushevsky. At his
interrogation on 12 August 1937, the following dialogue took place:

Question: You conducted the investigation of the case against the Krushelnytskys
and Bachynsky. On [the basis of] whose materials were they arrested?
Reply: They were arrested on [the basis of] materials [supplied] by Iurynets and
Karbonenko.
Question: What did the materials of these agents state?
Reply: That Krushelnytsky and Bachynsky [were] members of a counter-
revolutionary, terrorist organization.
Question: [Did] the materials correspond to reality?
Reply: No.
Question: How [jakym chynom] were they sentenced?
Reply: I was not at the trial and don’t know the details. No one was allowed [to
attend] the trial. Kozelsky was occupied with this case. I do know that put up
[vystavlenyi] as a witness … [was] a traitor [and] provocateur from [among] the
agents [agentury] recruited from the milieu of the [people] arrested, Bilenky-
Berezynsky, who was later released from [his] sentence [zvilnyly vid pokaran-
nia].⁴₃

Bilenky-Berezynsky’s role as a provocateur in many “cases,” particularly in
Bachynsky’s, was uncovered in detail in 1959, during the Khrushchev thaw.
Bilenky-Berezynsky’s NKVD controllers apparently trusted him so much that

⁴⁰. Despite his collaboration, Bilenky-Berezynsky was sent to a concentration camp in
November 1934 and exiled to Omsk oblast in October 1935. There the NKVD rearrested
him in February 1937 and sentenced him to death by firing squad on 27 June 1938. See
Rublov and Cherchenko, 294–5. Ed.
⁴¹. On Iurynets, see my book Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv: Storinki nenapysanoi istorii
⁴². Arkhiv Upravlinnia SBU Kharkivskoi oblasti, file 0-20269, fol. 153.
they allowed him to appear as a witness during the pseudo-judicial examination of Bachynsky’s and Krushelnytsky’s case. But while “appearing at the court in session in the case [against] Krushelnytsky, Bachynsky, and others as a false witness [pseudosvidok], Bilenky-Berezynsky became confused [zaplutavsia] during his testimony and was removed [vidvedenyi] by the court.”

In the years 1934–5, however, false testimony did produce the desired results. On 19 February 1935 Bachynsky was presented with the record of the investigation against him. He responded: “I recounted [rozpoviv] everything during [v protesi] the investigation. I have nothing to add. I do not acknowledge my guilt [vynnym sebe ne vyznaiu].” Later that month Kozelsky confirmed the court’s verdict in the case against Krushelnytsky and Bachynsky. The words “He did not acknowledge his guilt [Vynnym sebe ne vyznay]” appear at the end of the list of charges against Bachynsky.

The case was handed over for assessment to the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. On 28 March 1935 this organ of Stalinist “justice” sentenced both Krushelnytsky and Bachynsky to ten years’ deprivation of freedom, accompanied by the confiscation of their property. Krushelnytsky was sent to a concentration camp on the Solovets Islands, where the NKVD troika in Leningrad oblast ordered him to be executed on 9 October 1937.

Details about Bachynsky’s life after he was sentenced have not been located. The only thing that available documents tell us is that he died in a concentration camp on 6 June 1940. He left this world without bowing to the system that, from an émigré’s distant perspective, seemed to be “acceptable.” We will never know what Bachynsky thought before he died, but we do know that he did nothing that justified depriving him of his freedom. This was officially recognized in October 1957, when Bachynsky was rehabilitated “in accordance with newly discovered circumstances.” But his rehabilitation came much too late, and there was no need to discover any new “circumstances.” Bachynsky himself discovered them when he refused to be broken and did not acknowledge his “offense.”

44. Arkhiv Upravlinnia SBU Kharkivskoi oblasti, file 0-20269, fol. 147.
45. ASBU, file 44987 FP, fol. 187.
46. Ibid., fol. 214.
47. Ibid., fol. 217.
48. Ibid., fol. 218.
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At the Crossroads of Socialism, Nationalism, and Christianity: The Intriguing Biography/Autobiography of Pavlo Krat*

Walter Smyrniw

At the turn of the century, Ukrainians immigrated to Canada for a number of reasons. Some left their homeland because they were attracted by “free homesteads” available to farmers, or else to escape from economic misery; others were lured to Canada by employment opportunities in the mines, industries, and construction projects. Among the newcomers was also a handful of people who immigrated for ideological reasons: they believed that Canada would provide an ideal opportunity for the implementation of socialist doctrines. Ukrainian political refugees were a rare phenomenon at that time, but they did exist. One of them was Pavlo Krat, who came to Canada in 1907 under the assumed name of Pavlo Ternenko in order to escape from political persecution for participating in the revolutionary movements of 1905 in Russian-ruled Ukraine.

As a political immigrant and a dedicated socialist, Krat earned his livelihood in Canada in many ways. Changing occupations frequently during the first seven years, he maintained a steadfast devotion to the promulgation of socialist ideology among Ukrainians in Canada. Endowed with a fiery temperament, Krat frequently quarrelled not only with fellow socialists, but also with many other Ukrainians, including the leaders of the Catholic and Orthodox churches. But neither his friends nor foes were able to anticipate Krat’s radical change in allegiance. When Krat became an ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church,

* I would like to express my appreciation to Rev. Bruce Harrod for the assistance he rendered me by researching in the Archives of the Presbyterian Church of Canada.
not only the socialists, but Ukrainians of various political and religious persuasions, spared no efforts in castigating him. Although the denunciations and hostilities continued for several years, neither his detractors nor Krat himself deemed it necessary to explain why he abandoned the socialist ideology and became a clergymen. The biographical information about him published to date does not duly elucidate the above question, but it does provide the basic facts about his life and controversial activities.¹

Krat was born in 1882 in the village of Krasni Luky near the town of Hadiach in Poltava gubernia. During his student days he became a devoted socialist and an active member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, which in 1905 became the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers’ Party. Because of his political activity, Krat could not continue his studies at Kyiv University after the Revolution of 1905, so he switched over to Lviv University in Austrian-ruled Galicia, where he played an active role in the student movement of 1906–7. For this Krat was imprisoned by the Austro-Hungarian regime.

After his release from jail in 1907, Krat immigrated to Canada. In the autumn of that year he became the editor of the first Ukrainian socialist newspaper in Canada, Chervonyi prapor, and later he took part in organizing the Ukrainian branches of the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC).² Krat began writing revolutionary poetry in Ukraine and continued doing so in Canada. By 1915 several collections of his revolutionary verses and short stories had been published. With the outbreak of the First World War, Krat’s ideological orientation began to change. In the summer of 1914 he organized the Samostiina Ukraina (Independent Ukraine) association in Canada and began establishing branches of it at Ukrainian-Canadian socialist centres and promoting the new

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² In Canada, Ukrainian socialists identified themselves under various names. When their first organization was established in 1907, it was known as the Ukrainian branch of the SPC. Dissatisfied with their treatment by the SPC’s Anglo-Saxon leaders, in 1909 the Ukrainian socialists formed an “autonomous” organization called the Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats in Canada. In 1914 this organization was renamed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Canada. The party was banned by the Canadian government in 1918. See Peter Krawchuk, Our History: The Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907–1991 (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 1996), 5–7, 18, 34.
society in *Robochyi narod*, the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP) in Canada. Krat’s involvement in this association, as well as his studies of Presbyterian theology, which he began in the fall of 1914, infuriated other USDP members, and in 1916 he was expelled from the party.\(^3\)

During the years of the First World War Krat continued his theological studies. In 1917 he was ordained a minister of the Presbyterian Church. At this time Krat still contributed articles to *Robochyi narod*; evidently he did not believe that this was incompatible with the duties of a Presbyterian pastor. In the 1920s Krat embarked on missionary work in Western Ukraine. Upon returning to Canada in the late 1930s, he left the Presbyterian Church and became a pastor of the United Church of Canada. He continued serving in that capacity until his death in 1952.

The brief published biographical sketches of Krat do not shed much light on the intriguing aspects of his life, such as his involvement in the Revolution of 1905 in Ukraine and his role in the Ukrainian socialist movement in Canada. Much more revealing in this regard are the unpublished materials that surfaced in the 1970s in the National Archives of Canada: the Papers of the Chief Press Censor, and the John Robert Kovalevitch Papers, which contain the manuscript of Krat’s autobiography. These sources provide many new details about Krat’s activities in both Ukraine and Canada. This was readily confirmed by the interesting studies of Orest Martynowych and Nadia Kazymyra, who utilized some of the above-mentioned archival materials. These authors augmented the previous biographical information on Krat; more importantly, they elucidated many puzzling and fascinating aspects of his involvement in the Ukrainian socialist movement both in his native land and in Canada.\(^4\)

Martynowych and Kazymyra have confirmed that Krat’s autobiography is a valuable source of historical information. But it is more than that. It is also a literary work that provides us with important insights into the ideological and psychological problems Krat experienced when he tried to reconcile his commitment to socialist ideology with Christian faith and the duties of a Presbyterian pastor. This paper shall examine the diverse motivational factors that governed Krat’s public activities in both the secular and the religious spheres.

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In addition to Krat’s autobiography, there are two other biographical sketches of Krat in the National Archives of Canada. The first is a denunciation of Krat written anonymously in April 1916. Entitled “Biography of Paul Crath,” it describes Krat as being “a son of a German colonist from Southern Russia” and accuses him of being “in the service of [the] Russian ‘Okhrana’” and an “agent provocateur” during the student riot at Lviv University. Further, it denounces Krat for resorting in Canada to “political blackmail under [the] guise of humorous papers,” for spreading socialist propaganda, for organizing “the famous ‘Independent Ukraine Society in Winnipeg’ with a program of collecting funds for armed rebellions in Southern Russia” and then embezzling these funds, and for writing articles “of [a] slanderous, immoral character” and publishing “books of [a] seditious, atheistic, revolutionary kind of the vilest description.”

This biographical sketch and other allegedly incriminating materials were sent to the chief constable of Winnipeg, who forwarded them to Lt.Col. Ernest J. Chambers, the chief press censor for Canada.

The second biographical sketch, also designated “Biography of Paul Crath,” was written by Fred Livesay, the press censor for western Canada, who had engaged Krat during the First World War as a reader and translator of ethnic publications in Canada and the United States. Livesay composed the sketch to demonstrate to the chief censor in Ottawa that the numerous charges brought against Krat by the zealous supporters of Bishop Nykyta Budka were without substance. While acknowledging Krat’s participation in the Revolution of 1905 in Ukraine and the student clashes in 1906 at Lviv University, Livesay asserted that the insinuations about Krat’s involvement in the assassination of Count Andrzej Potocki, the viceroy of Galicia, were “manifestly and absurdly false” because the count was killed in 1910, whereas Krat had been living in Canada since 1907. Moreover, Livesay asserted that whereas Krat’s enemies have “freely and publicly accused him of being the paid spy in Canada of Russia … he is accused by anonymous agents of the same faction in Canada of being anti-Russian. Proof of this is claimed to lie in certain anti-Russian pamphlets written by Crath several years ago.” Although Livesay’s outline of Krat’s activities in Ukraine and Canada is factual and certainly more accurate than the biographical sketch written by Krat’s anonymous detractor(s), it presents only a brief account


6. Nykyta Budka was the first Ukrainian Catholic bishop in Canada, appointed in response to repeated requests from Ukrainians in Canada for a Ukrainian bishop. His tenure in Canada (1912–27) gave rise to several controversies and harsh criticism from both Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian socialists in Canada.

7. Actually, this is not quite accurate, for Potocki was assassinated in 1908.

8. “Biography of Paul Crath.”
of his life. For obvious reasons, Livesay devoted the most space to repudiating the charges against Krat and justifying his decision to employ him.

In contrast to both of the above biographical sketches, Krat’s autobiography is a large manuscript, which he wrote in English.\(^9\) It is not clear when he began writing it and why it ends abruptly with the years 1921–22. A further mystery is why the manuscript was found among the John Robert Kovalevitch Papers.\(^10\) In spite of being incomplete, the autobiography reveals much more than was hitherto known about Krat’s activities in Ukraine and Canada.

In addition to the many new facts about his life, the autobiography brings to light a number of experiences and ideological tenets that had motivated Krat in his youth. Thus it tells us that he became a socialist not only because his fellow students and some teachers at the Gymnasium he attended persuaded him to subscribe to a socialist ideology, but also because he had the opportunity to visit the home of a poor worker and to observe first-hand the wretched conditions and impoverished existence that were prevalent among the toiling classes. Further, it becomes evident that Krat’s commitment to socialist ideology and political parties took precedence over his university studies and even over his amorous pursuits. Significantly, Krat admits that his strict adherence to Marxist socialism soon led to an ideological conflict: “When I found that the Marxian teachings were opposed to my love for Ukraine[,] I was torn with inward strife, as this theory proclaimed that only the labouring classes of the world are heirs of the future and that he only is my neighbour who is associated with the ‘International’, and that towards other men I should have no mercy; also that religion is a fake and that Christianity should be swept away from the path of the victorious Proletariat, and that the red flag, not the blue, should be my standard. Though it was more heartbreaking to me than the loss of Vera[,] I tore from my heart my goddess, Ukraine, and worshipped the ‘International’.”\(^11\)

This conflict manifested itself vividly in 1907 while Krat was taking part in the student revolt at Lviv University. In the autobiography he states that after the Ukrainian students had occupied the university building, “a blue and yellow banner of Ukraine was hoisted from a window of the university, but to some extent it jarred on my international feeling[,] and seeing the Polish President of the University running along the hall in red toga and cap[,] I tore them from him[,] making an international red flag out of his toga[,] and hoisted it beside the


\(^10\) Rev. Kovalevitch (1886–1978) was a Protestant minister and an active member of the Ukrainian community in Canada.

Ukrainian.”^12 Later Krat’s inner struggle, or more precisely his ideological discord, manifested itself again with the outbreak of the world war around the questions of socialism, nationalism, and Christianity. This inner strife and clash of value systems continued to plague Krat for some time, even after his ordination as a Presbyterian minister.

Krat’s autobiography contains a detailed account of his revolutionary activities. He frequently neglected his studies at Lviv University in order to smuggle in illegal publications and firearms into Russian-ruled Ukraine, to spread socialist propaganda among the peasants there, and, in 1905, to instigate peasant rebellions. Krat’s renditions of the revolutionary developments and his involvement in them are quite colourful but not always credible. His depictions of certain events seem far-fetched or exaggerated. It is difficult to believe, for example, that ten thousand peasants had gathered near a mill and that after hearing Krat’s revolutionary speech, “the peasants lifted up red flags and[,] singing revolutionary songs[,] demonstrated along the streets of the hamlet, paying no attention to the mounted police who were powerless to disperse them.”^13 Quite incredible are also Krat’s descriptions of his numerous escapes from the police and soldiers. For example: “One night when I slept in the barn of a fisherman[,] it was surrounded by cossacks. I dashed out, and shooting to right and left made my escape through a garden of sunflowers[,] receiving a wound in my foot[,] and only was saved from being captured by the darkness of the night[,] in which the cossacks could not see me swimming across the swiftly running [Dnieper] river.”^14 It is difficult to accept the notion that a person with a wounded foot would be able to swim across such a wide body of water as the Dnieper. Even more incredible is the “role of an Austrian noble” who, Krat would have us believe, rented a villa near Kaniv from where he was able to launch frequent propaganda campaigns among the peasants.

Many of the revolutionary events are likely overstated by Krat. But on the whole the manuscript presents a detailed and interesting account of his participation in the clandestine socialist movements in both Russian- and Austrian-ruled Ukraine. The details provide vital clues for a further investigation of Krat’s involvement in the 1905 uprisings, for which he was “condemned by the Kiev court to be hanged as a leader of the peasant revolution.”^15 Although they are very subjective, the autobiographical accounts point the way to other data, especially such documents as the reports of the so-called Third Section, the tsarist secret police, which would likely yield more comprehensive and more

12. Ibid., 1: 111–12.
13. Ibid., 1: 87.
15. Ibid., 2: 51.
objective evidence about Krat’s involvement in radical political events. This applies, of course, to his revolutionary activities in Russian-ruled Ukraine and to his participation in the student rebellion at Lviv University, for eventually he became an émigré in Canada because of his involvement in both places.

The manuscript makes apparent that Krat intended to continue his dedication to socialist causes in Canada. But soon after he arrived in Winnipeg it became clear that certain deviations would be inevitable. Because he had very little money left, Krat realized that for the first time in his life he would have to get a job. Since he could not speak English, he could only find employment as a common labourer. His first job in Winnipeg was with a crew paving streets with cement. Many of Krat’s Ukrainian acquaintances were surprised to see “an intellectual” engaged in manual labour; and during his first day at work “about two hundred Ukrainians assembled on the sidewalk to see me at work, for they could not believe that a leader of their students in Lemberg [Lviv] would do manual work.” When he showed up at the hall in the evening, Krat “received an ovation from Ukrainian labourers.” Krat was very pleased with himself: “Believing in a socialistic state in which everybody should work manually for their bread[,] I was proud of my attainment and thought that every labourer should see in me his hero.” A few weeks later Krat gave up manual labour when he became the editor of Chervonyi prapor.

The autobiography tells us that Krat was engaged in a surprising number of jobs and business ventures in Canada. He worked on the railroad, in a mine, and on a farm, and for a time he was a photographer, an editor, a printer and publisher, a fur trapper, and even a gardener tending the landscape of Wesley College, where he would be studying theology a few years later. Furthermore, he owned a farm near Gimli, Manitoba, took a homestead in Alberta, owned a profitable lumber business in Manitoba, and was a major shareholder in a co-operative farm in British Columbia. Some of these undertakings were profitable; his lumber business, for example, received lucrative contracts from the city of Winnipeg and the Canadian Pacific Railway. From several ventures he could have realized substantial profits. As Krat puts it, “I pictured myself a millionaire before long.... If I had stuck to the work without dreaming my dreams that year ... we could have profited very well.” Most frequently he dreamt not about financial profits, but about the coming of international socialism on a global scale. Driven by a restless spirit, Krat relentlessly pursued this vision, and on more than one occasion he not only sacrificed his previous profits and material gains, but also left his wife and children without any means of support in order

16. Ibid., 2: 8.
17. Ibid., 2: 9.
18. Ibid., 2: 40, 77.
to proselytize socialist ideology among Ukrainian workers in Canada. The autobiography contains a detailed chronicle of Krat’s activities and difficulties in disseminating the socialist creed.

Because he was fanatically dedicated to international socialism, Krat often found himself at odds with those socialists who advocated the implementation of socialism solely within the sphere of the Ukrainian nation. This discord began in Ukraine and continued in Canada, where, in addition to diverse socialist goals, there emerged personal rivalries, jealousies, and intrigues that brought much grief to Ukrainian socialists. Krat was by no means a passive target of various machinations. From his recurring allusions to the persons he loathed, with whom he quarrelled, or with whom he had a standing feud, it is obvious that he contributed more than his fair share to the conflicts he had with his comrades. In view of the prevailing intrigues and dissatisfactions, departures from the ranks of the USDP were quite common.

Although he was frequently troubled by the hostilities, Krat was not prepared to resign from the USDP because of them. Instead, he gradually developed a critical attitude towards the party’s policies, its membership, and his own role. In time he began questioning and re-evaluating many of the things he had formerly taken for granted or simply ignored. Krat was troubled more and more by the lack of an ethical code among the socialists. He notes that he was perturbed by seeing his comrades living common-law, misappropriating party funds, and indulging themselves at the party’s expense, and by the perpetual bickering and denunciations. But all of this did not prepare him for the moral decadence he encountered among Ukrainian socialists during his sojourn in Vancouver in the winter of 1913–14: “This envy and lack of brotherliness which I had experienced and seen among the socialists—drunkenness and adultery among all the Ukrainians in Vancouver; gambling of Ukrainians in the Chinese dens[,] where Ukrainian girls were present—burdened my soul[,] and I began to find that my nice ideals of socialism yielded rotten mushrooms instead of flowers. I began to wonder what to do about it. Ukrainian labourers became so undisciplined that they did not recognize any authorities[,] and in the books which they read they only looked for proofs of the non-existence of God in order to be sure that they should not be punished for their evil conduct.”

Kropilo writes that his “thoughts unconsciously turned to the Protestant churches in Vancouver” when he became aware of such ethical problems. It is worth noting that in 1913 and 1914, when Krat was experiencing serious concerns about the lack of ethical standards among his comrades, he began publishing a magazine of humour and satire called Kr Rooflo and then Kadylo,

19. Ibid., 2: 83.
20. Ibid., 2: 83.
where he printed bitter lampoons of Bishop Budka and other Ukrainian Catholic clergy. He was no less critical towards the Russian Orthodox priests who ministered to Ukrainians in Canada, for he perceived these clerics as mere servants of the tsar. His repudiation of the above churches and his inclination towards the Protestant churches may not have been as coincidental or as “unconscious” as Krat would have us believe. Orest Martynowych has ascertained that “in Canada, the movement which finally resulted in the conversion of a number of Ukrainian congregations to Presbyterianism was initially led by men who identified themselves as ‘Radicals,’ and who attracted men of similar outlook.” Krat was likely aware of this. Moreover, it is plain from Krat’s autobiography that although he was a well-known socialist radical, he was contacted on many occasions by Ukrainian Protestants, who strove to recruit him into their ranks.

Evidently such contacts started shortly after Krat’s arrival in Canada. He was visited by Zygmunt Bychynsky, a Presbyterian theology student at Manitoba College, who “suggested that [Krat] should study theology.” At that time Krat had no obvious interest in religion, but during the course of the next several years he no doubt became aware of the fact that in Canada both the Ukrainian socialists and Protestants were “concerned with social problems, with the alleviation of basic everyday human needs.” For these and other reasons Krat stayed in touch with the Ukrainian Protestants in Winnipeg, perhaps primarily through Rev. Illia Glowa. These contacts proved quite valuable in 1913, when Krat faced hostilities from the Ukrainian Catholics who wanted the postmaster general to close down Kadylo. At that time Krat concluded that he could count on the “support ... [of the] Ukrainian Presbyterian Missionaries ... since in those days [his] paper was always written in such a way that Ukrainian Presbyterian ministers indirectly supported [the] paper.” Therefore it is not surprising that by the autumn of 1914 Krat was willing to enroll as a student of theology at a Presbyterian college. Evidently this was not his first choice of action, for prior to that he decided to launch “a purely Ukrainian national movement.”

24. According to Krat’s wife, she and Krat were married in 1911 in a Presbyterian church by Glowa (“Korotki vidomosti pro perebih zhyttia Pavla Krata,” 21). Krat does not mention the year when he got married, but states that he and his wife first “wa[i]ved the marriage ceremony and acquired a license; a few years later we were married by a Presbyterian minister” (“Autobiography,” 2: 50).
Although his plan turned out to be temporary, it nevertheless signalled an unexpected, major shift in Krat’s ideological orientation.

In July 1914 Krat came to Edmonton and began organizing an association that became known as Samostiina Ukraina. His new national program “was heartily greeted by the majority of Edmonton Ukrainians[,] and we held meetings several times a week for two months.” In view of this support, within a short time an official name for this organization had been selected, an executive committee had been elected, and a constitution had been drawn up, stipulating that all Ukrainians, regardless of their religious or political affiliation, were eligible to join the association. This organization was received favourably not only in Edmonton, but also in other Ukrainian-Canadian centres. In a matter of weeks branches of the association were established in Vegreville, Cardiff, and Calgary, Alberta and in Winnipeg. It is plausible that the stimulus for the phenomenally rapid growth of this organization was the favourable reception of its main objectives: “to promote the establishment of an Independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic within the boundaries of historical Ukraine.... To provide moral and material assistance in the liberation movement in Ukraine and to develop amongst other nations a favourable attitude to the idea of a rebirth of Ukraine as an independent republic through an influence on American and European press and activities.... [and] To provide the Ukrainians in Canada with economic and educational services in order to raise their cultural and material level.”

The association also grew rapidly because Krat promoted its ideology in the Ukrainian-Canadian press, particularly in Robochyi narod.

Krat provides interesting details about the factors that prompted him to launch the new association and why it did not last in spite of its initial success. While spending the winter of 1913–14 in Vancouver, he reached the conclusion


28. The association “was headed by O[ley] Boyanivsky, M[ykola] Syroidiv, and H[ryhorii] Skchar. [The] Chief organizer ... was P. Krat” (Michael H. Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians: A History, 2d rev. ed. [Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1982], 329). Martynowych states that “after lengthy discussions with Revs. [Avraam] Zalizniak and Glowa, Paul Rudyk and other prominent Ukrainian Presbyterians in Edmonton, Crath established the Society for an Independent Ukraine” (Ukrainians in Canada, 319). There is no evidence in Krat’s autobiography that such talks took place before the formation of the association, or that the Ukrainian Presbyterians encouraged him in this venture. Krat acknowledges that Zalizniak, Glowa, and Rudyk convinced him to study theology at a Presbyterian college. But in respect to the formation of the association, Krat states it was “my new idea” and notes only that “Mr. Rudik [Rudyk] liked my lectures so much that he allowed me to use the Hall free of charge and contributed generously in the collections” (“Autobiography,” 2: 88).

that a war between Russia and Austria would break out soon and that it would be "a struggle between those two empires for supremacy over the Slavs, and a hope awakened in [his] soul that through that war the revolution would come and Ukraine would be freed from the Czar."30 Krat decided to move from Vancouver to Edmonton, where he anticipated better conditions for the creation of the new association. Moreover, during his sojourn in Vancouver Krat’s work in British Columbia on behalf of the USDP was severely criticized by the Winnipeg-based executive committee of the party. He felt that this was “unjust persecution,” and it brought him “to the decision of abandoning this socialist party and starting a purely Ukrainian National movement.”31 Although Krat later encountered growing hostility in Winnipeg from Ukrainian Catholics, nationalists, and socialists who had no confidence in him or the new association, this was not a major factor in the dissolution of Samostiina Ukraina. Of much greater significance were Britain’s entry into the war and its military alliance with Russia. Under such political circumstances, Samostiina Ukraina was soon denounced by the “Edmonton Moscophiles” as a “pro-German movement,” and Krat and his colleagues had to abandon the new organization promptly to prove that they “were loyal to the British cause.”32

During Krat’s involvement with Samostiina Ukraina, three men convinced him to become a divinity student at Manitoba College: the Presbyterian pastors Avraam Zalizniak and Illia Glowa, and Pavlo Rudyk, a rich Ukrainian businessman and influential member of the Presbyterian congregation in Edmonton. Glowa promised to assist Krat in registering at the college, and Rudyk agreed to finance moving his family from British Columbia to Winnipeg. Allegedly this took place after the funeral of Joseph Cherniawsky, a missionary of the Independent Greek Church, a Byzantine-rite church within the Ukrainian community in western Canada that had close ties with the Presbyterian Church. Krat asserts that thereafter “we [Krat, Zalizniak, Glowa, and Rudyk] returned to Edmonton[,] and I tarried there organizing a Ukrainian National Organization called ‘Free Ukraine’ [Samostiina Ukraina].”33 This is not an accurate account of events. Krat could not have attended Cherniawsky’s funeral in the summer of 1914, just before his involvement in Samostiina Ukraina, because Cherniawsky was murdered in March 1912.34 It is much more likely that Krat was approached by the above men in 1912, but declined their offer at that time and accepted it only after the dissolution of Samostiina Ukraina. Indeed, in the fall

31. Ibid., 2: 88.
32. Ibid., 2: 91.
33. Ibid., 2: 90.
34. Martynowych, Ukrainians in Canada, 219, 234.
of 1914 Krat had no other options, inasmuch as he had been censured by the executive of the USDP and had neither a job nor a source of income, and his wife was ill and alone in British Columbia.

While studying at Manitoba College, Krat did not confine his interests and activities to theology. He had to supplement his income in order to support his family, and hence he "began editing both the socialist Robochyi narod and the Presbyterian Ranok."35 During the war he also worked as a translator for Fred Livesay and assisted his wife, Florence Randall Livesay, with her translation of Ukrainian folk songs. In spite of the time all these jobs took up, Krat was a relatively successful student and won two scholarships for "general proficiency."36

Krat was a very unusual student of theology: he did not believe in God. As he puts it, "Although I was not converted to believe in God, I was led to the College by a desire to learn a way to help me in making my people moral, and then go back to Vancouver and save those whom I left perishing because of their immoral lives."37 Krat relates in detail how his inability to believe in God, to preach, and to pray, compounded by the necessity of taking part in daily prayers at the college, led to a severe and prolonged crisis of conscience. He realized that he was playing a hypocritical and an immoral role while studying the precepts he hoped to combine with socialist ideology. He strove to integrate socialist and Christian concepts and values, but found it hard to accept the precedence of one over the other: "Dr. Armstrong of Wesley College showed me the Bible in another light, and the story on the creation and fall of man and other things lost to me their accusative power against the people. Then, reading the gospels, I was attracted by the words 'The Kingdom of God' and began to feel that under this term Christ understood some ideal state on earth in this life. And then I was disturbed by the feeling that this Kingdom of God was higher than socialist internationalism: but for a long time I did not allow the Kingdom of God to replace my graven image of Social[ist] Internationalism."38

Krat's inner ethical and ideological conflicts were compounded by accusations that he was a "traitor of their cause ... of their nation ... [and] of the parent religion," which Ukrainian-Canadian socialists, nationalists, Catholics, and Orthodox levelled against him in unison. In view of all this, it is amazing that he was able to persevere and finish his studies.

35. Ibid., 259.
38. Ibid., 2: 94.
Although he had already completed the second year of a three-year program, Krat was “still an atheist” and “could not muster a prayer.” The Presbyterian Church did not know about these innermost secrets of his soul, however, and made arrangements to send Krat to Saskatoon to take charge of “the Dana Mission Field.” It was in Saskatoon where he completed his theological studies. There, on the eve of his graduation, Krat was relieved to receive a telegram inviting him to become the editor of Haidamaky, a newspaper published by a Ukrainian socialist organization in Trenton, New Jersey: “It looked to me as a deliverance from the situation in which I was, so I accepted the offer[,] and as soon as I received my diploma and my ordination was over I left for the United States.... My conscience rebuked me, telling me I was doing wrong, [by] going away after the Presbyterian Church gave me my Theological education for three years, free, but I justified my conduct [by] saying that the Church [had] neglected the mission among Ukrainians and also [that] I had no belief in the existence of God and could not be a hypocrite.”

Even after he was ordained a Presbyterian minister on 4 April 1917, Krat had no misgivings about becoming an editor of a socialist newspaper or about playing at church politics with the Presbyterian Church in Canada, an activity he had started during his last year of studies. Therefore, while travelling to his new job in the United States Krat stopped in Toronto at the Presbyterian “House Mission Office and repeated [his] request, that there be some general control over Ukrainian work.” When church officials told him that his request could not be arranged immediately, their “answer justified [his] conscience in leaving for The States.”

When he arrived at the office of Haidamaky, Krat was astonished to find that the newspaper had already hired an editor. More surprises were in store for him during his sojourn south of the border. For example, “A week after my arrival in [the] United States I saw an article in a Canadian Ukrainian Catholic paper, in which it was stated triumphantly, that I had sneaked out of the country and no one knew where, but credit was given me that I was honest enough to forsake the Church which was the enemy of Ukrainians. Now my eyes were opened to the dangerous situation in which I had left my followers in Saskatchewan, so I published in the Ranok a pastoral letter to the Ukrainians in Canada telling them that for personal reasons I left Canada but tried to urge and encourage them to continue their religious progress.”

39. Ibid., 2: 115–16.
42. Ibid., 2: 116–17.
Other trials and tribulations followed. When Ukrainian-American socialist organizations discovered that Krat had been employed as an organizer by Haidamaky, they demanded that the paper dismiss him. Among the vocal "enemies" of Krat in the United States was Myroslav Sichynsky, who denounced Krat for betraying the socialist cause by pursuing religious studies.\(^{43}\) He disregarded the fact that in 1910 Krat had been a pivotal member of the Society for the Liberation of Myroslav Sichynsky that had been founded in Edmonton, and that it was Krat's poem "Sichynsky v nevoli" that helped the society to raise "over four thousand dollars, and some of the funds were used to spring Sichynsky from prison in November 1911."\(^{44}\) In spite of Sichynsky's hostile letter, the publishers of Haidamaky did not dismiss Krat.

As an organizer for Haidamaky, Krat decided to go to Pittsburgh. There he called on his old acquaintance Zygmunt Bychynsky, who was at that time a pastor and the editor of The Union, a Ukrainian Presbyterian paper. Rev. Bychynsky became perturbed when Krat told him about his socialist activities, and he tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Krat to return to Presbyterian missionary work. Upon ascertaining that the Ukrainian workers in Pittsburgh were not receptive to socialist ideas, Krat decided to resign from Haidamaky and to assist Rev. Bychynsky in his pastoral work. He was prepared to try this for a month in order to find out whether he could "retain [his] socialistic ideas and harmonize them with Christian morality."\(^{45}\) Although he was aware that he "could still be regarded as an atheist," Krat had no misgivings about establishing the Ukrainian Evangelical Society together with Rev. Bychynsky, inasmuch as it was based not on religious but on nationalistic aspirations. Current events, particularly the "strong national movement towards independence" in Ukraine, led Krat to the belief that Protestantism, rather than the more traditional churches, would provide a better guarantee for prosperity and freedom in his native land.\(^{46}\)

Meanwhile, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada was wondering what had happened to one of its newly ordained ministers. After finding Krat's new address, church officials sent him a letter requesting that he come to Toronto to explain his actions. When he was questioned about his disappearance, Krat resorted once again to a political ploy, stressing the need to

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43. Sichynsky had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Austrian emperor for assassinating Count Andrzej Potocki, the viceroy of Galicia, in 1908. He escaped from prison in 1911, and in 1915 he was granted political asylum in the United States. By 1917 he had become the leader of the Ukrainian Federation of the Socialist Party there.
44. Martynowych, Ukrainians in Canada, 257.
46. Ibid., 2: 120.
regulate Ukrainian mission work and to provide an “equalization of Ukrainian Missionaries and the enlarging of the Ranok.” The officials replied that Krat would have to wait until the forthcoming Presbyterian Assembly to resolve these issues. But Krat could not avoid or delay holding some services in Canada. They were met with great hostility. “At one of my services in Toronto,” states Krat, “I was attacked by a group of Socialists. They surrounded my pulpit, shouting and accusing the Priesthood…. They were so furious that they were ready to tear me to pieces.”47 Given this hostility, it is not surprising that Krat chose to return to the United States and to await the assembly’s decision there.

After returning to Pittsburgh, Krat was also asked why he had left his pulpit and gone to Canada without permission. Resenting such rigid control over his work, he decided to quit his ministry and to try his luck once again with Haidamaky in Trenton. He was well received there and appointed the new editor of the paper. Two weeks into his new job, Krat attended a meeting of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in Newark, New Jersey. There he was confronted by Myroslav Sichynsky, who accused him of “betraying the labour cause by being a priest.” Krat was dismayed by “seeing the man [he had] saved from death in prison trying now to denounce [him] in every way,”48 and he realized that owing to such opposition and animosity toward him he had no alternative but to resign as the editor of Haidamaky.

In the meantime the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada approved Krat’s proposal regarding the equalization of the work of Ukrainian missionaries and summoned Krat to start “survey work in Saskatchewan.” Although he had won a partial victory through his political manoeuvre within the Presbyterian Church, Krat was not happy with the findings of the survey he undertook. While conducting it, he became “suspicious that Presbyterian leaders did not care to see organized Ukrainian congregations” and “that they were using Ukrainian missionaries to spoil the influence of the Catholic Church.”49 Krat became even more displeased when he discovered that the Presbyterian Church had dismissed Rev. Glowa as the editor of Ranok and “sent [him] to Edmonton against his will.”

In view of these and similar developments, Krat started thinking about leaving the Presbyterian Church. But other important events also influenced his thinking: “Kerensky was in power and there was a movement for the Independence of Ukraine[,] and all my friends and college mates were becoming ministers of state and high officials. There was a prospect for me to do something worth while for my people[,] and here in Canada I was only to sit in

47. Ibid., 2: 121.
48. Ibid., 2: 122.
49. Ibid., 2: 126.
a corner and spend time for nothing. I wrote to the Kerensky Government asking
them to send me $700 for my return home.\textsuperscript{50}

Krat hoped he would to be able to combine his nationalist and socialist
aspirations in Ukraine. But there was a major obstacle: “in Ukraine[,] leaders of
the National movement were mostly Socialists,” and they would immediately
want to know why Krat had been expelled from the USDP. Krat realized that
there would be an opportunity to rectify this problem during the Second
Convention of the USDP, which was to be held in Winnipeg from 16 to 21
August 1917. Therefore he made an unexpected appearance at the convention to
demand a formal justification for his expulsion on the basis of the party’s
constitution. This produced the results he desired: the convention not only
acquitted Krat, but reinstated his membership in the USDP.

In spite of this success, Krat postponed his return to Ukraine after receiving
a lucrative offer during the convention to teach at Ukrainian schools in Toronto
and Hamilton. Pleased with this turn of events, he accepted the position of
instructor at the Mykhailo Pavlyk School of Higher Education. Although Krat
refers to it as a “private school” in his autobiography, this school was in fact
affiliated with the Toronto branch of the USDP. Evidently it was very successful,
for during the 1918–19 school year it had over a hundred students.\textsuperscript{51} Later Krat
acknowledged that his position at that school “was probably the best work in my
life.” There he was at first able to combine his socialist and nationalistic
aspirations. But, regrettably, such opportunities did not last. Krat soon discovered
that both his socialist colleagues and the school’s students wholeheartedly
supported the Bolshevik Revolution, whereas he beheld it as “the most bloody
revolution ever known.”

Moreover, Krat soon realized that by 1918 “Ukrainian laborers all over
America were falling into the clutches” of Bolshevik propaganda. In order to
dispel the influence of this propaganda, Krat wrote “a novel on the line of
Utopia, called ‘When the sun arose.’” In it he strove to demonstrate that violence
is not necessary in the evolution of a global socialist society, and that such a
society should be “based on love and high education and other virtues.”\textsuperscript{52}
Although Krat was an ordained minister when he wrote his utopian novel, he did
not believe that religion would play a significant role in the future. Consequently,

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 2: 128.

\textsuperscript{51} Mykhailo H. Marunchak, \textit{Istoriia ukraiintsiv Kanady}, vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Ukrainska

\textsuperscript{52} “Autobiography,” 2: 133. The Ukrainian title of the book was \textit{Koly ziishlo sontse:
Opovidanie z 2000 roku} (Toronto: “Robitnyche slovo,” 1918). For more information, see
my article “The First Utopia in Ukrainian Belles Lettres: Pavlo Krat’s \textit{Koly ziishlo
in his utopia all major religions wither away, leaving a completely secular world. Houses of worship become philosophical discussion clubs, and the bare notion of loving one’s neighbour as one does oneself is all that survives from the Christian creed.\textsuperscript{53} Although Krat’s book was well received and four thousand copies of it sold out quickly, it did not persuade the Ukrainian socialists in Canada and the United States to change their pro-Bolshevik opinion. This troubled Krat deeply and led him to his final rift not only with the students at the Pavlyk School, but also with the USDP.

The brief sense of joy and satisfaction Krat felt while teaching at Ukrainian schools in Toronto and Hamilton notwithstanding, he realized that his conscience still bothered him. Hence he went to see the Presbyterian Church officials Dr. John G. Shearer and Rev. Edmison to explain why he had quit his mission work in the western Canada. While rebuking Krat, Rev. Edmison requested that he take “charge of the local mission,” but Krat declined. By 1918 Krat was at an impasse with both the Presbyterian Church and the Ukrainian socialists. His dispute with the latter pertained to their recognition of the Bolsheviks. Although the majority of Ukrainian socialists in Canada and many of his students at the Pavlyk School accepted and even praised the tactics of the Bolsheviks, Krat was steadfast in his rejection of the Bolshevik regime, condemning its “wholesale slaughter” not only of “captured enemies,” but also of many innocent civilians, students, and even children.

In May 1918 Krat felt “alone in the world,” denounced by his countrymen “as a traitor and their worst enemy.” It seemed to him that the Presbyterians were his only friends. Throughout the previous winter the Presbyterian Home Mission Board had repeatedly urged Krat to start a Ukrainian mission in Toronto. But he did not accede to its requests until Ukrainian Presbyterians asked him to preach and arranged with the board for his resumption of mission work. Inasmuch as Krat was still an atheist, depressed, and held in disgrace by his fellow Ukrainians, this was a daunting task: “Although I avoided the question of the existence of God, I taught my audience morals from the Gospels, preaching the fruits of the Gospel rather than the Gospel itself. When my enemies learned that I was preaching[,] they raised an uproar all over America in the Ukrainian press[,] and more calumnies were thrown against me. Toronto socialists many times raided my church[,] and often I felt like Daniel in the den of lions.”\textsuperscript{54}

Depressed and desperate, Krat bought a gun and “one evening [in May] went to Scarborough Beach with the thought of death.” He decided against suicide,

\textsuperscript{53} Two years after his novel was published, Krat changed his mind about the role of religion. As he translated his novel into English, he “added chapters and put Christianity in it as a soul and a warning spirit” ("Autobiography," 2: 133). Krat does not mention why the translation was not published or what happened to the manuscript.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 2: 135.
however, after reading the copy of Leo Tolstoy’s essay *What I Believe*, which he had left by chance in his coat pocket. In it he found not only badly needed consolation, but also a convincing justification for believing in God.55 While Krat’s relief that he could now pray and believe in God is understandable, it seems very odd that he had no thoughts about his involvement in the Presbyterian Church at this important juncture in his life. His foremost desire at that time was to “return to Ukraine and worship God there.”56 This is an important admission, for it reveals that, after a considerable struggle, Krat was able to forsake the ideals of international socialism and its inherent atheistic precepts, but he could not give up his Ukrainian national sentiment and Weltanschauung. Therefore it is not surprising that nationalism continued as a significant value in Krat’s life and as the focal point of his subsequent Presbyterian missionary work in Canada and Ukraine.

Despite this turning point in Krat’s drawn-out ideological struggle, his transition to the new perspectives was by no means instantaneous. As Krat put it, “I started gradually to kill in me the materialistic conceptions [and] replacing them with Christ’s in religion.” In spite of many handicaps and obstacles, in the end Krat was able to persevere and cope with his difficult pastoral duties at the Ukrainian Presbyterian mission in Toronto, which he managed from 1918 to 1925. Moreover, in 1923 he embarked on his first mission to Ukraine. In subsequent years his missions to Volhynia and Galicia became frequent and prolonged, inasmuch as he played a key role in the formation of the Ukrainian Reformed Evangelical Church in those regions. In 1925, when a German Lutheran bishop tried to place the Ukrainian Evangelical Church in Galicia under the jurisdiction of the German church, Krat proved a staunch defender of the independence of the Ukrainian church.57 By 1931 he had succeeded in establishing “29 congregations and mission stations” in Western Ukraine, and his missionary endeavours were duly acknowledged and lauded by Ukrainian Presbyterians in Canada.58 Krat continued his mission in Western Ukraine until 1938, when he gave it up owing to poor health. Although both the Second World War and the Soviet regime obliterated all of Krat’s accomplishments, he was nevertheless able to achieve, at least in part, what he and Zygmunt Bychynsky had planned in 1917, namely, the founding of an Evangelical movement in Ukraine.

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55. In his autobiography Krat does not specify what he found consoling and persuasive in Tolstoy’s work.
Krat’s autobiography not only provides a testimony about the ideological shifts experienced by some Ukrainians in Canada in the wake of the First World War and the ensuing revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe, but also reveals the emotional impact these changes had on those who were deeply committed to socialist ideology. Moreover, the manuscript yields many new details about Krat’s life and offers us an insight into the motives and ideals that were the driving force behind his radical and frequently paradoxical behaviour. Above all, however, it provides us with a biographical paradigm of a person experiencing psychological and spiritual crises after discovering serious shortcomings in socialist ideology and trying to replace this ideology with Christian precepts. This paradigm obviously has a direct bearing on developments in Ukraine today, where many people became aware during the course of the perestroika and glasnost period of the numerous flaws in socialist doctrine. In newly independent Ukraine, these people are also trying to change quickly to new social, religious, and economic ideologies. Krat’s biographical paradigm shows us that such changes are difficult, fraught with pain, and not instantly realizable.
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Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies
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Ottoman Documents

Harvard Ukrainian Studies. Vol. 18 (3/4), vol. 19, and vol. 20 all have appeared in the eighteen months. Vol. 18 (3/4) contains articles that range from Kyivan Rus issues to documentary evidence of Ukrainian resistance in eastern Ukraine during WWII. Vol. 19 is a festschrift in honor of Professor Edward Keenan, with articles concentrating on medieval and early-modern East Slavic studies. Vol. 20 is a special volume entitled “Ukraine in the World,” which contains thirteen articles on Ukrainian foreign relations and geo-political and geo-strategic issues.


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Ukrainian Literature in Poland, 1956–1993

Olena Duć-Fajfer

Organizational Aspects

After the international border between Poland and the USSR had been defined (16 August 1945) and the 9 September 1944 treaty between these two states regarding the exchange of the Ukrainian and Polish populations in both postwar states had been partly accomplished, some 220,000 Ukrainians remained within Poland. Between 150,000 and 160,000 of them lived on Ukrainian and mixed (Polish-Ukrainian) ethnic territory. Over 50,000 others lived in ethnic Polish regions.

The historical turning point for these Ukrainians was the so-called Akcja (Operation) Wisła—their deportation from their indigenous regions and dispersal among the Polish population of the lands in eastern and northern Poland “recovered” from Germany after the war. The operation’s obvious intent of assimilating the resettled Ukrainians was not completely successful. Already in the early 1950s certain Ukrainian student milieus in Poland began organizing

1. This treaty foresaw the resettlement of 650,000 persons from Poland to Soviet Ukraine between 15 October 1944 and 1 February 1945. Although the resettlement was formally voluntary, to a great extent it occurred under coercion by official Polish agencies and in a climate of increasing anti-Ukrainian sentiments within the Polish population. The action was conducted under extremely difficult circumstances owing to the opposition of the indigenous Ukrainian population. Nearly 482,000 persons were resettled. See Eugeniusz Misio [Ievhen Misylo], Akcja “Wisła”: Dokumenty (Warsaw: Archiwum Ukraińska, 1993), 17.

2. Fedir D. Zastavny, Ukrainska diaspora: Rozseleznia ukraintsiv u zarubiznych krainakh (Lviv: Svit, 1991), 55. Zastavny’s data are basically the same as those found in other sources.

themselves and openly declared their existence. Under strong pressure from Poland's Ukrainians, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PORP) decided to incorporate all Ukrainian activities in Poland within the organizational framework of the Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Society (Ukrainske suspilno-kulturne tovarystvo, or USKT), which was officially constituted at a convention held in Warsaw on 16 and 17 June 1956. The USKT’s goals and tasks included: “6. Disseminating Ukrainian culture that is national in form and socialist in content. 7. Organizing and supporting Ukrainian artistic and scholarly activity. [and] 8. Preserving Ukrainian folklore.”

To implement its programmatic theses, the USKT established the newspaper Nashe slovo in Warsaw. The paper became not only the new organization’s chief propaganda forum, but also an important agent in the development, reinforcement, and propagation of Ukrainian literary creativity in postwar Poland. As early as in its fourth issue, the paper published poetry by Ostap Lapsky, Ivan Sheliuk, and Stepan Baryla. From that time on nearly every issue contained examples of the poetry and short prose written by Ukrainians in Poland. From issue 14 (18 November 1956) on, a separate monthly literary page in the paper published poetry, prose, and didactic criticism of the “Let’s learn to write verses” type.

A few years later the USKT began publishing new periodicals in Warsaw aimed at more ambitious and talented authors. In May 1958 the first issue of Nasha kultura, a monthly literary and educational supplement to Nashe slovo, appeared. From 1959 until 1988 Ukrainskyi kalendar, an annual miscellany that served the function of a literary and scholarly compendium for Poland’s Ukrainians, was published. Much of what Poland’s Ukrainian writers produced appeared in the pages of these publications. In time the editors began demanding better-quality writing, and writers’ works were attentively evaluated, becoming, at times, the subjects of serious critical debate.

On 19 April 1959 the chief executive of the USKT founded a writers’ association, Literaturne ob’iednannia or LOB. LOB did not fulfill its purpose, however; as one of its members wrote, “The Literary Federation exists only in name; in reality its activity waned in the first days of its existence.” One of the activities LOB undertook was to organize writers’ conferences (in September 1963 and March 1964), at which discussions revolved around the quality of the

5. See the USKT statute in Poland’s only Ukrainian weekly newspaper, Nashe slovo (hereafter NS), 1956, no. 2.
members’ writing and their future form.

After several years of USKT activity, the need for an evaluation of the works that had been published in the various periodicals became apparent. Considering the exigencies of the time, this task was admirably fulfilled by the literary anthology *Homin*, edited by Kost Kuzyk and published by the USKT in Warsaw in 1964. This first and, unfortunately, thus far the only anthology of Ukrainian literature written in postwar Poland is a record of the period in question. It contains works by forty-three poets and prose writers, and poems by Polish authors that two of them (Ievhen Samokhvalenko and Ostap Lapsky) had translated. The artistic quality of the contents was not very high; as the editor himself remarked,

In it [the anthology], alongside authors with an already crystallized countenance or at least with artistic aspirations, can also be found beginners and people who took to the pen only by chance, under the influence of the impulse of the heart or social obligation, and semi-folkloric verses by Lemko folk bards. Of course, from the perspective of artistic demands, on the whole our anthology can only conditionally be called literary, but if we take into account those tasks that it will have to fulfil in our cultural life, it fully deserves this name.7

During the next ten years, the Ukrainian writers in Poland published their works in the three periodicals mentioned above. Only in 1974 did the first new publications appear—small collections within the series *Biblioteka “Ukrainskoho kalendaria”* (Warsaw). In the twelve years that this series existed, seventeen collections of poetry and stories appeared.8 This tradition has been continued since 1990 by the USKT’s successor, the Alliance of Ukrainians in Poland (Ob’iednannia ukraitstiv Polshchi or OUP).9

The early 1980s were a watershed for Poland’s Ukrainian community. It was connected to the political changes that occurred at the time as a result of the last

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“thaw” that began with a number of long-lasting and decisive transformations in the Communist system and culminated in its total collapse in the late 1980s. A primary indicator of these changes was the loss of the monopoly on activity that officially sanctioned and controlled institutions had had until that time. For Poland’s Ukrainian community this meant the rise of other social, cultural, and religious organizations besides the USKT. Many of these organizations established their own periodicals, which often devoted space to new literary works. It also meant the establishment and growth of local Ukrainian centres, particularly in the Lemko region and Podlachia, resulting in a significant flourishing of original literature written in the native dialect. Finally it meant the beginning of a new phase in Ukrainian-Polish relations. The Solidarity movement had unmasked the Communist regime’s inhumane and repressive policies and activities vis-à-vis Poland’s Ukrainian minority, and that regime’s support of negative stereotypes of the Ukrainians. The written word was one of the ways of doing battle with these stereotypes, and certain Polish publishers began printing works by Ukrainian authors in Polish translation and in bilingual editions.

Of the dozens of new Ukrainian organizations, federations, societies, and brotherhoods that have been active in Poland since the 1980s, this article will mention only those that have some connection to literature.

Both Ukrainian Eastern-rite churches in Poland—the Orthodox and Greek Catholic—have published literary works in their annual almanacs for some time.

In 1980 the Brotherhood of Orthodox Youth (Bratstvo pravoslavnoi molodi) was established. It publishes the bimonthly Wiadomości Bratstwa (Białystok), the Informatsiinyi biuletyn of theology students (Warsaw), the irregular monthly Lyst informacyjny (Białystok), the children’s monthly Lampada (Bielsk Podlaski), Parafianyn (Wrocław), and, in Belarusian, Fos (Białystok).

Ukrainian students in Poland began actively organizing themselves in the early 1980s. As soon as their association was registered with the General Polish Cultural Council of National-Minority Students of the Union of Polish Students (19 October 1984), they began publishing their own irregular periodical, Zustrichi/Spotkania, containing literary works written primarily by students and young members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Poland.

In 1989 the Union of Ukrainian Independent Youth (Soiuz ukrainskoi nezalezhnoi molodi, or SUNM) was founded. It has active branches in Gdańsk, Wrocław, Bialy Bór, and Górowo Ilawieckie. The Wrocław branch published in Polish the irregular journal Dialog.

In 1989 the first and, until now, only full-fledged centre of Ukrainian culture, scholarship, and art in Poland, the Foundation of Saint Volodymyr, was founded in Cracow. The foundation publishes an annual miscellany, *Mizh susidamy*.

Since December 1990 the Plast Ukrainian scouting organization has been active in Poland. It publishes the periodical *Plastovyi visnyk*.

Since the early 1980s especially much literary activity has occurred in three regions that have managed to preserve a local identity—the Kholm (Chelm) region, Podlachia, and the Lemko region. In northern Podlachia the indigenous Ukrainian population was not subjected to Operation Wisła. Because it has lived there compactly for centuries, it has been able to preserve its native dialect and ethnic identity. In the early 1980s a growth in national consciousness began there, particularly among the intelligentsia. A Belarusian national consciousness has crystallized primarily north of the Narew, while a Ukrainian consciousness has evolved to the south of the clearly Belarusian dialects. Simultaneously a unique explosion of literary activity and regional publishing initiatives has occurred. Since 1983 the Pidliaashshia writers’ society has been active there. Owing to the co-operation of the Voivodeship House of Culture in Lublin, over six annual editions of *Nash holos*, a literary miscellany edited by Ivan Kyryziuk and Ivan Ihnatiuk, appeared; and an irregular monthly compilation presenting the Ukrainian writing of that region in Polish translation, *Krag* (1989, ed. Hryhorii Kupriianovych) was published in 1989. In 1986, in Bielsk Podlaski, the Ukrainian writers of Podlachia established the Dumka publishing house, which has issued small runs of their poetry collections; starting in 1987, they also published *Osnovy*, an irregular journal edited by Iurii Havryliuk. In 1990 *Modlitewnik Podlaski*, a small anthology of Ukrainian poetry translated into Polish by Tadei Karabowych, was published in Białystok as a supplement to *Dyskusje*, a Polish-language book about Ukrainians in Podlachia.

Polish publishing houses have also shown interest in the writers of the Kholm region and Podlachia. They have issued several Polish-language poetry collections by Tadei Karabowych (Tadeusz Karabowicz); in 1988 Wydawnictwo Lubelskie (Lublin) released *Pod sokoryng, pod jesionami*, a Polish-language collection of poetry by Stepan Sydoruk; and in that same year the Słask publishing house (Katowice) released Iryna Borovyk’s poem *Dzień powszedni*.


12. For example, Iurii Havryliuk’s *V nepromynaiuchomu pokhodi* (Bielsk Podlaski: Dumka, 1986) and *Neherbovi heneahohii* (Bielsk Podlaski: Ukrainskie pudlische vydavnytstvo, 1990), and Zhenia Zhabinska’s *Mamo, kim my ie ...* (Bielsk Podlaski: Ukrainskie pudlische vydavnytstvo, 1989).

In 1992 the Union of Ukrainians of Podlachia (Soiuз ukraïntsv Pidliaшshia) was registered in Bielsk Podlaski. It publishes the bimonthly periodical Nad Buhom i Narvoiu.

The Lemko region has been no less interesting. Although the Lemkos had been forcibly resettled after the Second World War, they managed to preserve a regional identity because of their strong feeling of ethnic exclusivity.14 The early 1980s were also a period of rebirth in the Lemko region. Although the USKT had established a Lemko section several years earlier and a Lemko page (“Lemkivska storinka”) in Nashe slovo that published works written in the Lemko dialect, it stringently controlled the contents and was not well disposed toward “separatism.” The first manifestations of independent activity by the Lemkos, a part of whom had returned from exile in northern and western Poland and resettled in the core areas of the historical Lemko region, have been the annual Lemko Bonfires (Lemkivski vatry) organized from 1983 on. On the occasion of these mass gatherings, a commemorative periodical titled Holos Vatry was published; each issue contained a regular poetry section. At the “Bonfires” themselves, poetry competitions introduced new poems to the public. In the early 1980s the regional publishing house in Nowy Sącz, Sądecka Oficyna Wydawnicza, began taking an interest in Lemko literature. It published five bilingual (Lemko-Polish) poetry collections, a collection of fables, and a collection of stories by contemporary Lemko authors.15 Lemkowie piszą: Wiersze z lasów i gór, an anthology of Lemko poetry in Polish translation edited by Petro Trokhanovsky, was published by the Cracow publishing house Miniatura in 1989. In subsequent years other poetry collections appeared.16

An important achievement for the Lemko movement was the registration, in 1989, of the Association of Lemkos (Stovaryshynie lemkiw). In that same year it began publishing a quarterly organ, Besida (Krynica). A year and a half later a second organization, the Alliance of Lemkos (Ob’iednannia lemkiw) was

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14. Sociologists consider this feeling to be characteristic of the transition from being a people to being a nationality. See Andrzej Kwilecki, Lemkowie: Zagadnienie migracji i asybilacji (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1974), 104–10.


founded. In 1992 this affiliate of the OUP began publishing an annual newspaper, Vatra. In 1991 a third organization was created—the Hospodar Rusyn Democratic Circle of Lemkos (Rusynskyi demokratychnyi kruh lemkiv “Hospodar”). In 1993 it began publishing the irregular Biuletyn “Lemko” (Bilianka).

An exclusively literary initiative was the Lemko Autumn (Lemkivska osin) international festival of Lemko poetry first held on 16 and 17 October 1993.

A momentous event for Ukrainian literature in Poland was the organization, in 1983, of the First Competition of Young Creators of Ukrainian Culture in Poland by the Cracow branch of the USKT. The competition saw the debut of several authors who have subsequently left their mark in Ukrainian literature. It also spawned future gatherings at which new works were launched, and the circle of young authors grew considerably. Unfortunately, projected plans to publish a collection of these works did not reach fruition. In 1989 the Cracow branch held a second competition. Its results, however, were less significant. There were also many other literary initiatives, particularly in the 1990s. The more significant ones include the open-air poetry and theatre evenings organized by Greek Catholic youth (the so-called sarepty) or during the rallies of young Ukrainians in Biały Bór and at the Ukrainian fairs (larmarky) in Gdańsk.

All of these initiatives were necessary, because until the 1980s the Ukrainian literary process in Poland, particularly during its first stage, essentially evolved in response to the Ukrainian community’s demands and to the need to organize that community. This does not mean that writers did not create because of a personal need to do so, but only that their writing was subordinated to the need to prove their existence. Because they represented an ethnic minority and functioned within its organizational framework, they attested to the existence of its culture and created literature according to the allowable parameters and the reality in which they lived. The impact this had on the intellectual and artistic aspects of their writing can be seen through closer examination.

**A Proposed Periodization**

The beginning of Ukrainian literature in postwar Poland occurred in 1956, the year that the USKT and its organ Nashe slovo were founded. This literature can basically be divided into two periods. The first, which lasted from 1956 to 1982, could be called the USKT period. The second began in 1982 and could be called the period of literary renewal. In that year the debuts of Tadei Karabovych, the most prominent representative of the younger generation of Ukrainian poets in Poland (he debuted as a Polish-language poet in 1980), and another talented young poet, Iaroslava Khrunyk, occurred. In 1983 the First Competition of Young Creators of Ukrainian Culture in Poland, held in Cracow, introduced other new poets to the reading public. Thus the years 1982–83 can be considered a turning point for contemporary Ukrainian literature in Poland.
There were no obvious formal or thematic changes in the literature of the first, long, twenty-six-year period to allow us to allow us to subdivide it chronologically. Nonetheless, the late 1950s and early 1960s were a time when a unique “literary fair” occurred, in which dozens of new authors appeared and then disappeared. Thereafter only a small number of writers remained, and it is they who shaped the mature profile of USKT literature during the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s.

My proposed periodization is based only on the poetry that was published. The prose and, even more so, the drama that appeared in this period has many fewer representatives than the poetry, and it does not reveal a distinct evolution. Therefore only my examination of the poetry is divided into periods and discusses regional particularities.

The USKT Poetry (1956–82)

The earliest Ukrainian literature in the Polish People’s Republic was published during the wave of enthusiasm that followed the creation of the USKT. Its origins were humble: “In the first unregulated attempts called forth by the general uplift, there were more tears and joy than literary images, more editorial intrusion than author’s text, of which sometimes only the name remained unchanged…. The fact of the matter is that most correspondents wrote in their local vernacular, and editors tried at all costs to clothe their [the correspondents’] language in literary attire, and in this way they filled up the ‘Literary Page’ [of Nashe slovo].”


Much of what was published consisted of examples of common graphomania, literature written to order, and poetastery. This is indicated by the fact that poetry by about fifty authors appeared in Nashe slovo between August 1956 and May 1958, and that during the 1958 USKT prose competition, in which fourteen authors took part, the first and second prizes were not awarded. Among the materials published, exhortations in verse, reports about the activity of regional USKT branches, and didactic proverbs and fables prevailed. They included an overly long cycle, “V lemkivskim dzerkali,” which was printed for several years, and “Pryhody Petra Leleky,” humourous verses that appeared in Nashe slovo for almost fifteen years.

Even those works that deserve to be called poetry were predominantly examples of engagé literature that agitates, speechifies, instructs, and moralizes. There are several reasons why that was so. First, the USKT needed precisely such verses because they explained the organization’s program to the reader and,
in a simple, direct form, promoted involvement in community activities: “Ne stii zhe otstoron zhytia ty, / Ne bud baiduzhym hliadachem, / Hurtom zaspivai pisniu, brate, / Vona zh do podvyhiv kliuchem.”19 Secondly, most authors were involved in the USKT and enthusiastically accepted its establishment. In their poetry they expressed their honest reaction to the joys, successes, and troubles of that organization. Thirdly, the newspaper format of Nashe slovo, which was directed at a fairly concrete readership, facilitated the publication of exhortative and agitational poetry. Finally, engagé literature was the officially dominant literary tendency in the Communist countries. As Władysław Gomułka, the PORP’s first secretary, stated at the Fourteenth Congress of Polish Writers, “Living literature ... cannot hide its head in the sand, [or] flee from the ideological problems of our days, because they pertain today to every person. Life itself always decisively replies to those who try to defend the rotten foundations of the past. The only thing that matters is that everything new be the best. In [the pursuit of] this purpose the writer can help a great deal with his gentle and, if necessary, his critical, combative word.”20

Consequently, the USKT poetry brimmed with typical socialist-realist “manufactured creativity” that passionately glorified various Communist celebrations, figures, and values (e.g., poems with titles such as “Pershotraven, “Lenin,” “Velykyi Zhovten,” “Kosmichni zalysiannia”). Parallel to these shrill, rhetorical, exhortative verses, a reflective variety of patriotic lyric poetry also developed and, at times, even prevailed. Poets sang praises to Ukraine’s beauty and to their native regions from which they had been banished. Sometimes they wrote about a third fatherland—the place where they now lived: “Shchytom volynske sontse vysne,— / De pryozerna storona. / U moho sertsia dvi vitchyzny, / Ale liubov do nykh – odna.”21

Lyric poems about native landscapes were also published, from the very beginning. This fact was noted during a 1963 writers’ conference, “at which it was authoritatively observed that in the Ukrainian poetry of this time there is more singing ‘about orchards and flowers’ than about people’s experiences.”22

In time more lyric poetry on philosophical themes and love appeared, and attempts at experimenting with form were begun. Throughout the USKT period, however, traditional forms dominated: syllabotonic verses with a regular stanza structure and strong rhythms imitating folk-song melodies. Authors could not always handle the precise, classical form; consequently flaws in their versification arose. Although lyric poetry became the dominant subgenre, epic works

in which various lyric motifs were interwoven were often published. Descriptiveness prevailed over brevity; most often, long, overly verbose, multiple-stanza forms were used. Metaphors were used infrequently and were not always original.

Among the many contributions to the USKT’s publications, the works of a few dozen writers withstood the test of time and editorial selection and defined the artistic profile of the USKT literature.

The first author who deserves our attention is the poet and translator Ostap Lapsky, who did not completely fit into the parameters of that literature. His poems display a conscious search for individual expression. Lapsky actively contributed to Nashe slovo and other USKT publications from their outset. His work as a translator and his philological training made it possible for him to immerse himself in the structure, nuances, and transformation of the Ukrainian language and use them as the raw material for his works. From the classical forms (particularly the sonnet) of his earliest compositions through his experimentation with language in the 1960s to the mature, contemporary form of his later poetry, Lapsky developed his own style characterized by a sophisticated knowledge of language, sincerity, and an intuitive ability to use linguistic devices. He was not afraid of using neologisms, dialectal words, jargon, or archaisms. In one poem he relates working with language to making love: “hovirka / ta aliteratsiia / posyluiut / liubovniy akt / fakt.”

Lapsky’s creativity is based primarily on his experiences, both physical and psychological. In accordance with his belief that “works are the components of psychic order,” he sketches poetic images of his native Polissia, his family, his close friends, and his life’s road using direct lyricism. Personal motifs are the foundation for his philosophical and introspective musings. His patriotic motifs are clearly observational and subtly integrated into his musings: “Batkivshchynou / moieu / ie / Polissia, / de / ia spiznav / rosu, chebrets, tuman, / a Ukraina — / dodacha / do rosy / chebretsju / tumanu.”

Because Lapsky’s works did not fit within the parameters of the USKT literature, they were not always positively received by the critics of that milieu. Consequently Lapsky withdrew from the Ukrainian literary process in Poland. He returned only after its second, post-USKT stage began, publishing retrospective, judgmental poems full of irony and the grotesque. These works fully exhibit the most essential traits of his mature creativity. In them the author operates with condensed, intellectual images and uses literary devices as sparingly as possible.

Two exemplary USKT poets are Iakiv Hudemchuk (Mushynsky) and Ievhen Samokhvalenko (Siromakha). Both of them had two poetry collections published as part of Biblioteka “Ukrainskoho kalandriu,” and hundreds of poems in the USKT periodicals. Their works most clearly reflect the characteristic elements of the USKT literature. Both poets’ civic engagement and tendency toward reflective lyricism engendered the development of parallel poetic worlds: one created by the powerful chords of lively exhortations and praises of the “radiant present,” the other dreamy and filled with longing for the land of their childhood. Their second worlds yielded much better results in terms of artistry and poetic originality: “I ia svoiu sviatyniu maiu — / V dushi svoiei hlybini / Ne raz u nei zabihau, / Shchob pomolytys v tyshyni, / Pobuty sam na sam z soboiu / Z dalia vid vsikh suiet, turbot, / Pirnut v dytynstvo z holovoiu, / U svit fantasyky, pryod, / I staty znov zapanibrata / Iz otchym kraiem khoch na myh …”

Hudemchuk’s social lyricism betrays his tendency to report, register, and describe everything that is going on around him. Samokhvalenko searches for more ideologically correct, grand themes. The personal lyricism of both poets is primarily patriotic or about landscapes or love, with autobiographical references and philosophical musings. Both of them are constant devotees of traditional verse forms. Hudemchuk’s poetry frequently suffers from excessive narration and description, while Samokhvalenko readily exploits folk-song melodies. Their poetry is not innovative, but it does withstand literary criticism and evaluation.

Another prominent representative of the USKT literature is Ivan Zlatokudr. Both social and personal, lyrical motifs are found in his works; this is reflected in the titles of his two collections, Narodni Polshchi and Peizazhi. Zlatokudr also functions creatively in the past and present. But his poetic vision is expressed through formally experimental free verse rather than through thematic originality. His writing does not always yield good results. At times the internal structure of his verse is fractured and unsteady. Nonetheless, when compared to the traditionalist tendencies of most of the USKT poets, Zlatokudr’s search for his own voice can be evaluated positively.

Iryna Reit, Adelia Bilous, Milia Luchak, and Halyna Hasiuk have contributed distinctive poetic representations of their surrounding world and a female specificity to the psychological construction of the lyrical “I.” Reit interweaves tender, maternal feelings with generalized philosophical musings and expresses them in a metaphorical, rhythmically free form. Bilous writes about the unhappiness of love and her great passion for life. Luchak draws parallels between human emotions and natural phenomena. Hasiuk expresses her worries about the fluidity of life and determinism in general. Characteristic of all four poets are their sensitivity, impressionistic images, and light poetic constructions.

Two other poets deserve mention: Ievhen Bednarchuk for his loneliness-imbued free verse, and Oleksandr Zhabsky for his lyric poems of romantic longing.

Poets who debuted in the 1970s but whose works were mostly published in the 1980s will be discussed below.

The Poetry of the Literary Revival (1982–93)

The second stage of Ukrainian literature in postwar Poland began with the debut of a group of young authors (most of them students) at a time “when the need for new creative forces that would confirm the interminability of the literary process on Ukrainian soil in Poland had begun to be painfully felt.”27 To this process they have contributed a new sense of autonomy in the esthetic enrichment of language and a different understanding of what their presence is in the Ukrainian literary arena. The first of these changes has meant a broadening of the “capacity” of the creative loom, an openness, and an intensive search for artistic forms. The second has been connected to the younger generation’s reconceptualization of Ukrainian ethnic identity in Poland. In both cases the logical dominant has become individualism and a concomitant inclination toward self-presentation. In poetry this has been manifested by an extraordinary concentration of thought around the lyrical hero. Every carefully weighed word has been aimed at reflecting upon “Kim byly / Kim ie / Kim byti nam.”28

These are classical questions in the search for an ethnic identity. But they are part of the greater issue that every young person confronts: What is my “I”? The truly young writers were the first to speak out on this matter, and from there arose a determined search for answers, primarily through in-depth, nearly exhibitionistic self-analysis. It has occurred on all levels of the personality, including the most intimate: “Khochu vyity / v samu sebe / bosymy nohamy / peremiriaty / kutochky dushi / prohnaty / horde zlo / pidiniaty z bolota / chyius viru / zruinuvaty / mur tryvohy piznannia / vyity / z chystymy dumkamy / znaiuchy / iak pochaty novyi den.”29

Their poems are distinguished by the boldness of their “external revelation,” the filling of the external space with their being. This self-presentation is a way out from isolation.

The dimensions of ethnic self-definition have expanded from that of the individual to that of the group; the individual lyric hero has often been replaced by a collective one. This hero can be a rebel. Liberated from feelings of his own inferiority, he demands his own place on this earth: “oddaite mi / krasu /

lemkivskoi pisni / pid nebom / Velykoho / Volodymyra / nych vetse / ia ne khochu / lem khliba / y soly zemli ridnoi / vziaty bez dozvolu / y byty/ y zhyty/ iak rivnyi / sered rivnykh.”^30

Reality being what it is, at times such aspirations ring tragically in the poetry, but this ringing forces one to consider even more how great these aspirations and the struggle for one’s “presence” are: “shche tvii nespokii / kshtaltuvannia obrysv / vykonuvannia khrebeta / shchob ne zdatys / teper i tut zasvidchyty / shcho ne pereryvaietsia / a vse roste.”^31

Searching and “transcending limits” are also characteristic of the form that the new wave of poets has contributed to Ukrainian literature in Poland. Modern free verse has made it necessary for them to be constantly inventive and to have a refined sensitivity for figurative language. Typical of most of the poets are condensed images, economically expressed thoughts, and the autonomy of each phrase, which can be at times very sharp and abrupt. This is a form that allows for interpretation that is open and for images with sensory and intellectual depth. It is a form that gives each poem maximal expressivity and defines it as an individual work.

The most mature, artistically defined, and prolific younger author is Tadei Karabovych. He has gone far beyond the limits of his native milieu (he is a member of the Union of Polish Writers and the author of several Polish-language collections, many of them published abroad), but his creative fantasy is fed by what the word “fatherland” connotes. For Karabovych this is first and foremost the Kholm region: “De baba smorodynu zbyraie u hlek, / a brat smolysti haluzky v bahattia kyda. / Na kluni klekit znaiomyi lelek,— / Tut krai ridnyi, / tut hlukhoman moia.”^32 But he is not a regional poet. All of Poland’s Ukrainian ethnic territories, which he regards as another lost Atlantis, and Ukraine in general are dominant themes in his poetry. Karabovych’s verse is deeply rooted in his native soil. His images and metaphors stem from his closeness with nature, from his sensitivity to its laws. Simultaneously he aspires to loftier heights, searching for the essence of existence and aspirations. Prayer merges with the desire for love; real dimensions merge with abstract ones. Clusters of fresh ideas, semantically distant words combined in innovative metaphors, and intersecting images strongly awaken the reader’s imagination and have an emotional impact. He creates an impression of current absence in the place of former presence as an architectural construction consisting of abstract and concrete concepts:

30. Stefanivsky, “... y slezym vyter,” in his Ikona, 5.
“kropyva / kropyva / vyshche kropyvy roste spomyn / vyshche spomynu slozy / vyshche sliz viter / vyshche vitru / bliakha ozera.”

Karabovych deems his works “poetic wanderings to the oikumene of Atlantis.” They represent a search for a way of overcoming the great void of the Ukrainians’ absence in their former territories in Poland.

Another gifted poet is Iaroslava Khrunyk. Because of her intuitive poetic sensibility and the freedom and naturalness of her lyricism, her debut was considered an important literary event. Unfortunately, Khrunyk has not developed her poetic talents consistently. After making her presence felt for a brief time in the early 1980s, she was inactive as a poet for nearly a decade. Her poetry reappeared in Nashe slovo in 1992. It is difficult to define the direction in which she is evolving as a poet. Nevertheless her every poem demonstrates her genuine respect for the word, for all language structures, and her ability to capture the deepest essence of a language’s internal dependencies and the deepest essence of life—fluidity: “Doroha / chas / Doroha / chas / i kozhne derevo / kotre mynau / tse myt nepovtoryma / i kozhna ptashka / shcho pisniu vidspivala / tse moho zhyttia krykhitka.”

Myroslav Chekh’s poetry is completely opposite to this natural poetry emanating from the “depths of the soul.” His works constitute intellectual labour with the word and attempts at diverse semantico-stylistic transformations directed at reaching a non-banal artistic structure. Therefore it would be difficult to speak of this poet as having a defined artistic profile. At times Chekh’s poems remind us of a surrealistic stream of disparate associations: “Bozhe verny shche myt / narodzhenyi pom / Stoiat koni na prypioni / viter povivaie / zahubyvsia zaklubyvsia / ponad temnym haim.” At other times he truly moves us with his emotion-laden, intimate lyricism, such as his cycle “Moia maty i ...”

Roman Drozd has contributed original poetry replete with sacred Christian references. It is a “profound” poetry filled with a sense of internal dualism and unfulfillment. Drozd’s formal crystallization as a poet has yet to come, but he has shown great promise.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, two older poets who had debuted in the second half of the 1970s—Petro Lvovych and Olha Petyk-Khylia—became more active. Their poetry is not marked by as much innovation and unsettled searchings as the poetry of the younger generation. Deeply rooted in tradition, it is more narrative, less conceptually condensed, and often more epic in tone. This is not surprising in Petyk’s case, for she is also a prose writer.

33. Karabovych, in his Atlantyda, 32.
The rise of a new wave of poets in the early 1980s did not mean that theretofore productive authors disappeared from the literary scene. On the contrary, the literary renewal inspired authors who had fallen silent in the 1970s—Ostap Lapsky, Mila Luchak, Iryna Reit, Oleksandr Zhabsky—to become active again. Others, such as Iakiv Hudemchuk and Ivan Zlatokudr, never stopped writing and publishing.

Although the USKT stage of Ukrainian literature has come to an end, the subsequent stage is still evolving, and it is difficult to foresee all of the directions it might take. In the last several years, however, the greatest literary activity has occurred in Podlachia and the Kholm and Lemko regions.

The Poetry of the Kholm Region and Podlachia

In the Kholm region and Podlachia, literature written in Belarusian, Ukrainian, Polish, and the “local” vernacular have all developed intensively. The most prominent writer in the Kholm region, Tadei Karabovych, who has already been discussed, writes in standard Ukrainian and Polish. Most of the other poets in these two regions write in standard Ukrainian or in their native dialect. Some of them have evolved from writing in the dialect to writing in standard Ukrainian. The literature these writers have produced can be viewed as a concerted effort at ethnic self-definition and entering a great tradition while preserving an autonomous regional identity and existence.

One of the more prominent authors is the older folk poet Stepan Sydoruk. A member of the Polish Society of Folk Authors, he has written several collections in Polish and one in the local dialect. In the latter he uses the vernacular spoken in his native village to affirm that “Ne skazhesh matinko, shcho syn tvii ne vdav sia, / shcho v ridnim iazytsi spivaty ne vmiv.”36 This gifted artist also writes prose and paints landscapes. His poetry attracts readers with its natural, unforced lyrical reflectiveness. It revolves around local folk myths and legends and the customs of his native village, but it also confronts broader, universal, human problems from the perspective of the author’s philosophy of life. Sydoruk’s manner of writing has been greatly influenced by folk-song rhythms and images.

Besides one other author of the older generation—Ivan Ihnatiuk, who is better known as a folklorist and community figure than a writer—all of the remaining poets of Podlachia are truly young, “searching” people with a great reserve of creative energy and a drive for self-realization. Among them is Ivan Kyryziuk, who has the rare ability to work in both stylized folk forms and in modern verse. Of all his peers, Kyryziuk is perhaps the most immersed in his native soil and influenced by its folk rhythms: “I write poems in the language of my ancestors,

which my own mother taught me. In this language, and only in it, am I able to express love for my native Podlachia from the depth of my heart.”

Iurii Havryliuk’s poetry deals with the complex historical, cultural, and religious questions pertaining primarily to his native region. One of the most active figures in the Ukrainian movement in Podlachia, he has switched from writing in his original, archaic dialect to writing in standard Ukrainian. His poetry reflects the task he has given himself and his friends: “Liudy iak krapli / Slovamy iak krapli / Rozbyvaiut / porohy stolit.”

Similar patriotic and philosophical questions, quests, and musings can be found in the lyric poetry of Iurii Baiena, Ivan Khvashchevsky, Stepan Trots, and Iurii Trachuk. All of them write mostly in their dialect.

Podlachia also has talented young female poets. They include Sofiia Sachko, who expresses life’s deep truths in her personal lyricism; Ievhenia Ovsianiuk-Martyniuk, the author of intimate and patriotic lyric poetry; Iryna Borovyk, whose horizons have expanded beyond her native home in her quest for the answers to general truths; the passionately patriotic Halyna Pasichnyk and Olha Podliashanka; and Zhenia Zhabinska, the youngest poet but one with an extraordinarily mature poetic vision, fresh ideas, and a sensitivity for detail and the concrete.

**Lemko Poetry**

The literature of the Lemko region has evolved differently from that of Podlachia. The principal distinction between them is that in Podlachia the process has been “centripetal,” while in the Lemko region it has been “centrifugal.” This is also a general phenomenon, but it has been most evident in the literature. Because the tradition of writing in the native dialect has existed in the Lemko region since the nineteenth century, very soon after *Nashe slovo* was founded a Lemko page was introduced in that paper. It fostered many authors.

Postwar Lemko poetry has developed in three basic directions: (1) as folk poetry, primarily during the late 1950s and the 1960s, by authors such as Ivan Rusenko, Iakiv Dudra, Mykola Buriak, Ivan Horoshchak, Seman Madzelian, Shtefan Verkholiak, and Stefania Romaniak; (2) as poetry of longing for what was lost, which prevailed throughout the 1970s in the deeply patriotic lyricism of Melaniia Sobyn, Ivan Holovchak, and Ivan Zhelem; and (3) as poetry of Lemko self-presentation, during the new, post-USKT period. The third direction defines what is now considered Lemko literature. Its authors are active, mostly

young people engaged in a struggle to ensure that Lemko culture does not become a museum curio, but remains a living entity. Having overcome their inferiority complex, they have transcended their isolation and issued an artistic manifesto on what it means to be a Lemko. Their poetry is filled with expressions of desire (“to the point of pain,” as one poet writes) to have not only their own past and present, but also a future. The tragic experience of the Lemko struggle for self-preservation and equality is a dominant theme.

The most notable and most representative poet of this current is Petro Murianka (Trokhanovskyy). He is gifted with an extraordinary sense of artistic form, which he infuses with the concrete and symbols to create images of the Lemkos’ difficult reality. Unbounded emotion and the power of Murianka’s desire for realizing his dreams emanate from his poems: “Nych zaidesh sonechko za horu daleku / Vyplekai kvitia / na zemly ridnii / rid mii / svobidnym vyhryi / i azh tak zaid.”

Pavlo Stefanivsky—the only representative of the older generation in this current—has clearly and distinctly articulated the Lemko experience. His openly declarative poetry is based primarily on the semantic devices of literary expression. He was the first postwar poet to demand equal rights for the Lemkos, expressing a deep belief that justice would prevail: “Byla y ie / Lemkovyna / byv pra-pra / iest niano y ia / y bude nash krai / vse zhyviy / sprav nashykhy / tiah dalshiyi / byty musyt / tak khotiat / rusnaky / rusky sviaty / ia / y sertsia vashy / z ykonomastu / vyidut heroi nashy.”

Volodyslav Hraban initially wrote haikulike miniature poems on Lemko landscapes. With time he began interweaving into them images of brutal reality: “Bozha matir yde / z zastyhlym zorom / za nom tserkov / Rozderta / Vystrilom gontiv.”

A different type of poetic imagination, in which disquietude over the mystery of existence is apparent, has been expressed by Stefania Trokhanovska. In the last while she has begun writing short, philosophical verses.

Interesting verse has also been written by Ianko Shkyrpan and Iaroslav Barna.

Prose and Drama

Ukrainian prose in postwar Poland has developed much more meagrely than the poetry, because writing prose requires of its practitioners greater experience as a writer, consistency of thought, and compositional proficiency. The conditions for publishing prose have also been less conducive than they have been for publishing poetry. Consequently the prose that has appeared has been restricted

41. Stefanivsky, “Iak povstav mii versh,” in his Ikona, 29.
42. Hraban, “Eksodus, in his Na kolpak hir, 8.
primarily to short works suitable for newspapers (feuilletons, stories, sketches, *Novellen*, humorous anecdotes). The few short novels that have appeared have been published in excerpted or serialized form. Most of the published prose has been substandard—a motley mosaic of miniatures, sketches, and compositionally unfinished stories—and its authors have been modest in their use of the expressive and stylistic possibilities of the genre. At times one may find a secondary narrator (usually one of the characters), lyrical digressions (primarily in the form of nature descriptions), and stylized language (to add local colour or characterization).

The prose has consisted of four thematic groups: (1) ideological, agitational works on current issues; (2) works on contemporary life; (3) historical memoirs; and (4) stories about the trials and tribulations of the Second World War.

During the initial stage of the development of this prose, the most functional and most popular form was the feuilleton. “These small literary-publicistic works attracted [readers] with their light form and current *zlobodenni* themes. Among them prevailed the behaviour of backward *zaturkani* Ukrainians, whom the feuilletonist … ably ridiculed for their ‘trousers full of fear,’ ‘straw fire,’ and indifferent attitude toward everything that is native [*ridnel*].”

The most productive and talented feuilletonists have been Iurko Kucherivay (Myroslav Trukhan), Panko Shchypavka (Vasyl Hirny), Vasyl Perchenko (Iaroslav Hrytskov’ian), and Iaroslav Dibrova (Iaroslav Zarichny). Other authors who have frequently written feuilletons include Antin Bilchuk (Šerednytsky), Ostap Lapsky, and Andron (Roman Andrukhovych).

Literary experience and a well-defined authorial profile are evident in the stories and *Novellen* of the senior Ukrainian prose writer during the Polish People’s Republic, Ivan Hrebinchyshyn (Markiv). His works are deeply rooted in the turn-of-the-century Boiko village and focus on colourful, extraordinary poor peasants, beggars, and dimwitted youths. Hrebinchyshyn masterfully depicts the psychology of his heroes and the village community’s reactions to them.

Another prose writer whose works are based on remembrances of the interwar years Mykola Tarasenko (Shchyryba). In his story cycles and his short novel “Za gratamy,” he depicts the Communist underground in the Polish Republic.  


Authors who debuted in the postwar period have written mostly miniature sketches. The most active and productive among them has been Antin Serednytsky, who writes under the pen names Antin Verba and Antin Bilchuk. Some of his stories are based on his reminiscences of the interwar years and the Second World War, but most of them deal with contemporary life and issues. Many of them have an obvious pro-USKT, pro-Communist agitational purpose.

Ivan Sheliuk also wrote ideologically engaged, programmatic stories, many of them on the social and moral effects of the war.


The prose of Petro Halysky (Koval) has been popular among Poland’s Ukrainians. His works are predominantly on moral and social issues, such as aging parents, abandoned children, and the need to work for “moral authority.” Halysky introduced some narrative innovations.48

Only one writer, Stepan Pavlyshche, has written in a more modern, expressive vein. His Novellen are characterized by their psychological and philosophical focus and absurd situations.49

Other prose writers who merit mention include the USKT authors Iurii Krylach (Myroslav Trukhan), Maksym Zaporozhets (Stepan Demchuk), and Hryhorii Boichuk (Iaroslav Hrytskov’ian), and the Lemko authors Seman Mandzelian, Nestor Chepiha (Fedir Kuziak), and Ivan Zhelem.50 Roman Kryk


and Ihor Marushechko are two younger writers who have tried their hand at prose.

Surprisingly, the USKT writers produced very few dramas. Nothing of lasting value was written, except perhaps Antin Verba’s agitational one-act play “Iuviileiniy kontsert,” several other similar one-act plays written for amateur USKT drama troupes, Pavlo Stefanivsky’s very traditional Lemko play “Liubov nevoliu lamle,” and the more modern Lemko plays “Mlynsky kameni,” by Petro Murianka, and “Odtiahty koreni” and “Ostatnia hodyna,” by Andryi Kopcha.

Conclusions

The development of Ukrainian literature in postwar Poland has been closely linked to the unique conditions of Ukrainian community and cultural life in that country. Its first stage evolved under the strict control of the USKT, which itself was under the constant surveillance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This dual censorship had a negative impact on the literature. It must be said, however, that it was because of the USKT’s cultural and publishing initiatives that writers were able to publish at all, and this encouraged them to continue writing. The second stage of Ukrainian literature in postwar Poland has been marked by writers searching for their own voice, for a place for Ukrainian culture in Polish society, and for a way to transcend the bounds of their isolation. On the whole, Ukrainian literature in Poland has developed without the possibility of influences. Most of the works have been published in non-literary periodicals, and very few people are able to name one or two Ukrainian writers who have lived in postwar Poland. An anthology of poetry by Ukrainian authors living in Poland (edited by Antin Serednytsky) was prepared for publication in Kyiv, but it never appeared. The average Polish reader knows next to nothing about the Ukrainian literature written in his country. Nonetheless, as one critic has written, “Seeing ... Ukrainian literature [exist] in Poland is not only worthwhile [hodytsia], but simply imperative. It, [be it] less or more worthy, exists, and every honest literary scholar must come to terms [pohodytysia] with this.”

The place of Ukrainian literature in Poland should be viewed in the intercultural context in which the Ukrainian minority in that country has had to function. Almost all of the authors mentioned above have translated Ukrainian literature into Polish and vice versa. They have combined their conscious quest for a cultural legacy, which has led them to their native roots, with their knowledge, acquired through education, of Polish culture and European culture in general. Therefore it must be said that “they are not growing upon a literary wasteland. They are gazing into [Ivan] Drach’s and [Dmytro] Pavlychko’s wells.

They are searching for [Vasyl] Symonenko’s powers in space. They dream about [Vasyl] Holoborodko’s associativity and know simultaneously that they cannot flee from [Zbigniew] Herbert’s wide-ranging self-analysis, [Tadeusz] Różewicz’s synthesis, or [Maria] Pawlikowska-Jasnorzewska’s lyric self-irony.”52 It is this blend of cultures that has given Ukrainian literature in Poland its own specificity and originality.

This literature has many flaws and inadequacies. Nonetheless, a large part of it should appeal to the esthetic tastes of even demanding readers, and they should be able to find masterpieces there.

The Jewish Massacres in the Historiography of the Khmelnytsky Uprising: A Review Article

Frank E. Sysyn

Joel Raba. *Between Remembrance and Denial: The Fate of the Jews in the Wars of the Polish Commonwealth during the Mid-Seventeenth Century as Shown in Contemporary Writings and Historical Research*. Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1995. 519 pp. Distributed by Columbia University Press. U.S.$47.00 / £32.00 cloth.

Joel Raba’s study appeared earlier in Hebrew, but with its English translation it becomes available to wider circles of historians of Ukraine and Eastern Europe. In his introduction, Raba mentions my comment, in reference to John Basarab’s *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), on the difficulty of writing on the treatment of a historical event in sources and historical works written over centuries. Regrettably, despite the immense number of sources examined, the valuable information assembled in the work, and the useful comparisons to events such as the Thirty Years War, Raba has been unable to produce a work on the narrative or scholarly level of Basarab’s book.

Raba’s introduction consists primarily of a fascinating discussion of seventeenth-century broadsheets and the veracity of reporting on violence and wars. Some of the discussion—such as that the notion of combatant and non-combatant came about only at the end of the eighteenth century—is of great importance for understanding the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Raba limits himself to a general discussion of war and violence, however, and does not deal specially with depictions of internal social wars and uprisings against rulers. An analysis of such depictions would have been particularly fruitful for comparisons with the Khmelnytsky Uprising.
Raba’s introduction also contains a discussion of attitudes toward Jews in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It concludes with a five-page account of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Deluge. Although he points out that his goal is not to discuss the events of the mid-seventeenth century, Raba does not, in practice, provide his audience with sufficient background information. For example, a reader who does not know the history of the period will have no way of knowing how the Cossacks turned up supporting George Rákóczy’s campaign against Poland in 1657, because the Truce of Vilnius of 1656 is left out of Raba’s account. Raba also fails to provide a multi-faceted discussion of the economic, social, religious, political, international, and cultural significance of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Such a discussion would have permitted the reader to understand why so many Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian historians have seen positive consequences in the revolt, and it would have provided a much-needed context for understanding the views and focuses that influenced later historians’ comments on the Jewish massacres.

Chapter One, a monograph of 129 pages dealing with contemporary commentary on the Jewish massacres, is the most valuable and scholarly part of Raba’s book. It contains sections on the Jewish witnesses and chronicles, the Polish image, and foreign discussions. The section on accounts from outside the Commonwealth, above all on western European newspapers and broadsheets, adds considerably to our knowledge of how the massacres were perceived in mid-seventeenth-century Europe. It may seem pedantic to mention works left out amidst such a wealth of literature, but the omission of Pawel Ruszel’s Fawor niebieski (Lublin, 1649) should be noted.1

It is in Chapter Two, dealing with later seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century accounts, that one begins to see how the failure to place the discussion of works in a broader context and the author’s agenda and emotional editorializing devalue often otherwise valuable material. In general, Raba shows that western European works came to focus less on the Jewish massacres and came instead to include broader discussions of the causes and consequences of the revolt. No longer reporting current events and no longer fearful that the social revolt might spread, those works, as might be expected, came to discuss in a more detached manner an uprising that had shifted the balance of power in eastern Europe.

By having initially failed to provide a wider perspective, Raba reacts emotionally against this expected change. He also fails to explore fascinating

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problems that he alludes to, such as the generally pro-rebel and anti-Polish stance of *Theatrum Europaeum* that he describes. This would have entailed a deeper discussion of the international politics and social origins of the writers and editors of *Theatrum Europaeum*. We see Raba’s emotionalism in a statement that he makes after citing a passage by Hermann Conring describing Jewish leaseholding and rights to distill and purvey liquor in anti-Jewish tones (“The Cossacks have risen because of the insufferable Jewish robbery”): “This was written only a quarter of a century after the holocaust of the Ukrainian Jewry by a man who at that time was already an adult” (p. 193). It is Raba’s decision to use his work as a moral court, which increases in zeal as the book goes on, that diverts him from giving a fuller analysis of many of the interesting phenomena that he touches upon.

The baneful impact of this approach can best be seen in the third part of Chapter Two, which deals with the Cossack chronicles. Raba quite correctly demonstrates the chronicles’ considerable emphasis on Jewish economic activities as a cause of the revolt and their mention of massacres of Jews without expressions of sympathy. He does this without placing the issue in the context of the political ideology of the texts. Consequently Raba does not seem to notice that the Eyewitness Chronicle, which, unlike later Cossack chronicles, did not create a cult of Khmelnytsky and the uprising, was relatively conservative in its social attitudes and negative toward the uprising’s violence. Therefore he quotes part of a passage in that chronicle on the bloodshed without placing it in the full context of this negative attitude (p. 207) and cites the chronicle’s statement that “All those who were alive joined the Cossacks” without dealing with the statement a few lines later in the chronicle that asserts, in a tone negative to the uprising, that the burghers were humiliated and had to shave their beards and that this was a period in which the devil made mirth of people of substance.2

One does not expect Raba to make a full analysis of the sources that he uses, but he should have provided a proper context for their discussion of the Jewish–massacres and Jewish issues in general. This would have helped him when he shifted to the works of Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samiilo Velychko—the major castings of Khmelnytsky and the uprising in positive terms and in ways acceptable to the conservative and pro-autonomy Cossack officer elite of the early eighteenth century as the foundation of the Cossack Hetmanate. Such attention to the sources would have saved Raba from the strange coupling of Velychko’s famous passage about devastation in Right-Bank Ukraine (not on the Left Bank, where the uprising had produced an enduring new Cossack social order) with a statement supposedly conveying the Cossack chronicles’ views: “The land of milk and honey which was turned into a lifeless desert as a result

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of a desperate rebellion caused by the infamous acts of the nobility and the machinations of their Jewish helpers [sic].... This was the image of the recent Ukrainian past for a generation born after the wars of the mid-seventeenth century” (p. 213). This is hardly an adequate reading of the views of Velychko, who did not see the uprising, but the later attacks by the Poles, as the cause of the Right Bank’s devastation and who saw Khmelnytsky as launching a revolt that freed much of Ukraine and established the prosperous early eighteenth-century Cossack Hetmanate. Rather, this is an early example of how Raba reads his interpretations, and later his explanations of underlying motives for statements, into texts.

Chapter Three is entitled “Folk Memory and the Romantic World Vision.” It deals with both Ukrainian folk songs and Ukrainian historiography of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the works of Volodymyr Antonovych and even the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historian Dmytro lavornytsky. In keeping with his negative view of the Cossacks and the Khmelnytsky Uprising, Raba praises Panteleimon Kulish, who, he says, “fought against the harmful fiction and falsehood” (p. 237) of the general Ukrainian image. He also deals with Polish Romantic historiography, which, he says, took a negative view of the old Polish elite and a favourable view of the rebels, even though some of the historians he presents in this section did not do so.

Chapter Four deals with late nineteenth-century Jewish, Polish, and Russian historiography. Chapter Five, with the curious title “In the Tempests of State Nationalism,” treats late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Ukrainian historiography and early twentieth-century Polish and Jewish historiography. Chapter Six takes all the historiographies from the post-World War Two period to the 1980s, though here the increasing body of literature in North America makes the categories more difficult to define. (I emerge both as an “American scholar of Ukrainian origin” [p. 419] and a “Canadian of Ukrainian origin” [p. 434] without any mention of my mother’s Dutch and Irish roots). In a section entitled “Concealment,” Raba properly criticizes the silence on Jewish issues in Soviet historiography, but he unjustifiably places post-World War Two Polish historiography in the same category.

Raba offers a wealth of material, but his commentary puts one on guard as to whether to accept his coverage of a given author as complete and his assessments as valid. A few examples should illustrate the degree of biased selectivity that Raba uses in presenting his material. In his discussion of three works by Aleksandra Efimenko published between 1890 and 1906 (pp. 283–5), Raba presents her account as a series of stereotypes of cunning Jews as economic exploiters and, as he sums up a passage from her history of the Ukrainian people, an image of the alienness and culpability of the Jews. Yet, a few pages after his discussion of Efimenko, in his section on V’iacheslav Lypynsky, Raba, combining two separate fragments (consider the scholarly merit
of cobb ling them together), quotes Lypynsky as stating that "The great Ukrainian uprising of 1648 was caused by the terrible national exasperation and[.] from the point of view of Ukrainians of these days, by national oppression. In this national oppression the Jews played only an auxiliary role, [i.e.,] they were used by the Polish magnate to further humiliate the Cossacks, free people of knightly standing" (p. 292). Then, in a break in his narrative, Raba asserts that "Two years before these works were published, in 1918, during the revolutionary chaos and struggle for the future of Ukraine, seventy-year-old Alexandra Efimenko was murdered, at the same time and perhaps by the same murderers who massacred countless numbers of Jews born and living in the Ukraine. The world of the words created by the proponents of Ukrainian nationalism of the late nineteenth–early twentieth century became the world of bloody and terrible deeds." He then returns to the second part of a ten-page article by Efimenko discussed earlier, as well as other of her works, to come to a conclusion about her writing: "Thus the victims were to blame for the atrocities" (p. 294).

Only the reader who takes the time to go back and read the original works Raba discusses will realize how skewed his presentation is. In her review of the translation of a work by the German Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz, which Raba cites so frequently, Efimenko begins with a paean to the spiritual and intellectual wealth of the Jewish nation. It is true that she presents the Talmudic and mystical elements of Polish Jewry as negative, but in this she is merely reflecting the views of Graetz. Efimenko’s viewing Jews as a nation (natsiia) may have denoted that she saw them as alien to the Ukrainians, and it certainly diverged from those European trends of the period that saw Jews as only a religious group. It did, however, reflect a view common among eastern Europe’s stateless, dominated peoples, who saw nationhood as distinct from loyalty to the state, and Jewish assimilation into the dominant nations as not in their interest. It was also a view that soon after found a considerable following among Jews.

The greatest disservice that Raba does to Efimenko is to omit that most of her review article entitled "The Miseries of the Jews of Southern Rus' in the Seventeenth Century" 3 is a sympathetic account of the sufferings of the Jews during the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In it Efimenko states: "It is not for nothing that the Jews have a day of the year dedicated to sorrowful memories of 1648. The calamity that befell them is, in both dimensions and character, one of those that are inscribed in large letters and live for centuries in the memory of the people" (p. 403). She sees the economic role of the Jews in Ukraine, which was reconstituted in many areas as creating a structural antagonism between

Ukrainians and Jews, and ends her article with a comment on recent events: “We have seen the Jewish pogroms—an excessively belated return to the old traditions. Have they not taught the Little Russian people that liberation is not to be sought along that path?” (p. 408). To use Raba’s commentary style, does she really deserve the treatment he gives her?

The section on Efimenko is also an example of Raba’s strange concepts of causality. How did the world of words of the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement relate to the peasant revolts during the revolutionary events and Jewish pogroms of 1919? Raba seems to give them precedence of causality, which seems far from accurate. His imputation that Efimenko got what she deserved for somehow causing the peasant risings is even a more difficult logical course to follow. It is also tasteless.

In succeeding sections of his book, Raba’s interpretations of causal links and the real meaning of texts become increasingly bizarre. The strange logic that he employs may be seen in his description of Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s account of the first months of the Khmelnytsky Uprising in volume eight, part one of Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy. Raba asserts:

In Hrushevs’kyi’s book there is no condemnation of these murderers and atrocities, neither is there a justification for them. The reader may see a picture of a spontaneous popular uprising, whose wave washes away everything alien and hostile, everything which was guilty of the slavery of the Ukrainian people from which they wanted to be liberated. These chapters, written during the First World War, reached the reader when the fires of the bloody turmoil, the civil war which came in its wake of the two revolutions of 1917, were already extinguished. Were then the detailed descriptions of the events of 1648 an acknowledgement that mass struggle must be accompanied by terror and murder?

I am baffled as to whether Raba is asserting that Hrushevsky foresaw the events after 1917 when he was writing the book in 1916, or whether Raba is giving us his presumption of the Ukrainian readers’ reaction to the book when it was reprinted in 1922, after the first edition had been destroyed. Whatever he means seems to be based more on his desire to read certain interpretations into texts, people, and events than on any study of historical works and their reception. One can find similar treatment of Ivan Franko, Ivan Kryp’iakevych, and many other Ukrainian authors in his book.

Raba applies this method to non-Ukrainian historians as well. In questioning the views of Zenon Guldon on the demography of the Jews of the Sandomierz region, which Guldon bases on Ignacy Schiper’s data found in an article by Kazimierz Dobrowolski, Raba opines: “Thus on the basis of a study devoted to the history of one village composed in a period of growing anti-Semitism in interwar Poland and published in a Festschrift for an otherwise distinguished historian [Franciszek Bujak] known for his anti-Semitic views, the existing
estimate of population losses for the Jewish community in the mid-seventeenth
century was put in doubt” (p. 41–6). Janusz Kaczmarczyk’s biography of
Khmelnitsky is described as “formally well balanced in its evaluations” but “also
not free of hidden allusions” (pp. 415–16). As for Zbigniew Wójcik, we find that
his “conclusions, although unspoken, are: the Jews were not only guilty of what
they did, but because of their achievements they themselves are guilty of death
by the hands of the insurgents” (pp. 371–2). Raba’s evaluations of historians are
based on their being published in the wrong Festschrift and made on the basis
of hidden allusions and unspoken conclusions.

Raba’s thesis is summed up in his conclusion that “With the passage of time,
the accent shifted from the Jewish tragedy to its causes and from the causes to
the demonstration of Jewish culpability in a tragedy whose victims they became.
In the end came the denial of the tragedy as such. All this was done in the name
of objective research aimed at the increased understanding among nations. For
the sake of the future let us not allow people to forget the past” (p. 436). He has
drawn his net wide to prove his thesis, mixing serious historical and popular
works, at the same time that he has been narrow in avoiding data that would
complicate his argument. In essence, he has a moral interpretation of the Jewish
massacres and the Khmelnitsky Uprising, and he cannot abide historical research
or attempts at discussing these events in various contexts.

Despite the deeply flawed nature of Raba’s book and the need to check all
of his sources and interpretations, Between Remembrance and Denial will be
used by many scholars because of its extensive coverage of sources and historical
literature. Many of the issues and topics he discusses are of great importance,
and even his description of the evolving attitudes toward the Jewish massacres
has useful elements. The book should stimulate thinking and research on these
massacres and their place in the Khmelnitsky Uprising. Obviously, their
depiction changed in various historical periods and reflected the Zeitgeist of each
period. Interpretations varied because some works were specifically on the
massacres, while others were about the Khmelnitsky Uprising and the formation
of the Cossack Hetmanate. National origins, national and religious antagonisms,
including anti-Semitism, and national historiographic traditions affected the
presentation of events in works by serious historians and in popular tracts.
Raba’s book contains useful material for those historians who will undertake
studies of these questions in the future, and it is a handbook of how not to do
them.
Canadian Association of Slavists
Association canadienne des Slavistes
Toward a "Normal" Ukrainian History: A Review Article

Olga Andriewsky


For the better part of the twentieth century, the study of modern Ukrainian history has remained relatively underdeveloped both in Ukraine and in the West. Ideological restrictions and censorship in Ukraine both before and after 1917; the profound social, intellectual, and institutional dislocations of war, revolution, repression, and emigration; the inaccessibility of archival sources; the lack of official recognition and support for the study of Ukrainian history in universities in the West—all these factors significantly impeded the development of Ukrainian studies in general, and the development of modern Ukrainian historiography in particular.

The result, as Oleksander Ohloblyn observed in 1970 ("Problema skhemy istorii Ukrainy 19–20 stolittia [do 1917 roku]," Ukrainskyi istoryk, 1971, no. 1–2 [29–30]: 5–16), was that even in the West the interpretative narrative of modern Ukrainian history—and especially the study of the nineteenth century—had not advanced much beyond the narrow scheme of history formulated by Mykhailo Hrushevsky some three-quarters of a century earlier, that is, modern Ukrainian history as the story of cultural-national revival. Indeed, the one and only serious attempt to replace Hrushevsky’s scheme with a new and much more comprehensive synthesis of Ukrainian history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the effort of Ukrainian historians in the 1920s—was cut short by the pogrom of Soviet Ukrainian scholarship in the 1930s.

Modern Ukrainian history, Ohloblyn believed, had to be reconceived as a series of processes—processes that, moreover, took place within the larger framework of east European history. In keeping with this view, Ohloblyn identified a number of basic historical problems that he felt researchers had to address: (1) the formation of Ukrainian territory; (2) the process of capitalist
development and the consolidation of Ukrainian lands into one national-economic market; (3) political processes in Ukraine, including the development of imperial policy towards Ukraine and the politics of the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; (4) the formation and transformation of Ukrainian elites; (5) the evolution of the social structure; (6) cultural processes in Ukraine; (7) and, finally, the fundamental issue—the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation. "Without this issue," wrote Ohloblyn, "the formulation and the solution of all other problems would have, at best, limited and relative meaning.... If this issue is not resolved, it is impossible to understand the modern history of Ukraine, contemporary history, or the proper course that Ukrainian historiography should take in the future."

Since 1970, when Ohloblyn first set this agenda, the entire context of Ukrainian historical scholarship has dramatically changed. The establishment of the first permanent positions and chairs of Ukrainian history at a number of universities in the West (Harvard University, the University of Alberta, the University of Toronto) finally gave Ukrainian historical studies an official status in the Western academic world and substantially raised its prestige (Ohloblyn himself taught at Harvard in the late 1960s and 1970s.) No less important was the appearance in the 1970s and 1980s of a new generation of Western-born and/or Western-trained Ukrainian scholars, whose work focussed on various aspects of the nation-building process. (This group included Yury Boshyk, John-Paul Himka, Zenon Kohut, Bohdan Krawchenko, Paul Robert Magocsi, Orest Subtelny, Frank Sysyn, Roman Szporluk, and others.) While addressing many of the themes suggested by Ohloblyn, they consciously attempted to integrate new approaches, research, insights, and theories developed by other historians and social scientists in the West, especially those who concentrated on eastern Europe and/or problems of national identity, national movements, and nation-building.

Most importantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state has led to the reanimation of Ukrainian historical scholarship both in the West and in Ukraine itself. Archival documents and publications that had been inaccessible for many years have suddenly become accessible. Contacts and communication between historians in Ukraine and the West have significantly increased. The last ideological restrictions on the study of Ukrainian history have been removed, and previously proscribed books on Ukrainian history, including Hrushevsky’s own work, are now being republished. Indeed—the present economic difficulties in Ukraine notwithstanding—the study of Ukrainian history, both in Ukraine and in the West, has now taken on a relevance and vitality that it has not enjoyed in nearly seventy years.

In many respects, Iaroslav Hrytsak’s Narys istorii Ukrainy epitomizes the dramatic changes that have taken place in Ukrainian historical scholarship in recent years. At the same time, it represents a new and important stage in the
evolution of Ukrainian historiography—it is the first serious attempt, arguably since the 1920s, by a historian in Ukraine to present an original synthesis of the history of Ukraine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As the author himself explains in the introduction, the book is not intended as a recounting of main dates and events, or—one might add—as a simple retelling and summary of contemporary secondary literature, though this in itself would have been very useful. Rather, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* was conceived, much as Ohloblyn had envisioned this kind of project, as a summary interpretation of a whole series of historical processes—social, economic, political, cultural, and intellectual—that took place within the larger framework of eastern Europe and, ultimately, have led to the making of the contemporary Ukrainian nation. The aim of the book was three-fold: to familiarize the reader with recent historical scholarship, to provide a comparative analysis of the Ukrainian nation-building process, and, in the end, to convince the reader of the principal “normalcy” of Ukrainian history—that is, to demonstrate that, in relative terms, the process of the formation of the Ukrainian nation was neither belated nor remarkably unusual.

Hrytsak set for himself a notably ambitious and nearly impossible task—not only to master the more recent secondary literature, both Ukrainian and Western, on Ukrainian history, but also, more broadly, to master the relevant empirical and theoretical works on nationalism and national movements. In this regard, he has acquitted himself remarkably well. The quality and range of secondary sources covered in *Narys istorii Ukrainy* is impressive. Few, if any, major works on modern Ukrainian history and the theory of nationalism published in the West in recent years have been left out of this account. Moreover, Hrytsak has not simply focussed on published sources, but has included some of the freshest, most innovative—and least accessible—work done by Western scholars in recent years: dissertations, conference papers, and seminar presentations.

In this respect, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* will be of considerable interest and value not only to readers in Ukraine—for many of whom, I venture to guess, this book will come as a great revelation—but also to scholars in the West who are interested in Ukrainian and eastern European history. In fact, the only significant way in which the author could have improved the source base of this work—though at the risk of delaying the completion of this project by many years—would have been with a wider reading of Western secondary literature on eastern Europe and the Russian Empire. Many of the historical problems he addresses—such as, for example, the intellectual and political impact of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the relationship between emancipation and industrialization, the rise of second serfdom in eastern Europe, Stalinism and “modernization”—have a long and rich historiographical tradition in the West that certainly merits the attention of Ukrainian historians. A closer investigation of this
literature will, I believe, serve to reconfirm and strengthen Hrytsak’s thesis about the principal “normalcy” of modern Ukrainian history.

*Narys istorii Ukrainy* does have shortcomings. Most of them, however, are the result of shortcomings in the secondary literature itself, in which there are, unfortunately, still many. Despite a number of recent advances in research, we still, for example, do not have a full picture of the economic development of Ukraine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its place in the world economy, and conversely, the effects of international economic trends on developments in Ukraine and especially on the formation of the Ukrainian nation. (It is no mere coincidence, I would argue, that Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia deteriorated significantly after 1929 with the cataclysmic drop in international grain prices that marked the beginning of the Great Depression in Europe, or that the famine of 1932–33 in Soviet Ukraine occurred at the height of this world economic depression.)

Similarly, we still know comparatively little about the milieu of the traditional Ukrainian elites—the nobility and clergy—or their fate, particularly on the territory of the former Hetmanate after 1861. The fact that a not insignificant number of political activists in 1917 came from priestly families or, like Symon Petliura and Oleksander Lototsky, studied at seminaries suggests that these institutions probably continued to sustain, even if inadvertently, some sort of Ukrainian environment. (The fact that fifty percent of the clergy in Russian-rulled Ukraine were listed as Ukrainian-language speakers in 1897 census is especially revealing.) One can only imagine, for example, how different the history of the Ukrainian movement in the late nineteenth century would have been without the substantial financial support of Ielysaveta Myloradovych, the Poltava noblewoman and aunt of the future hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. Was the relative decline in importance of the nobility in the Ukrainian movement in the second half of the nineteenth century connected to some sort of fundamental shift in their concept of “Ukrainianness” (or perhaps their declining economic and political fortunes), or was it rather the Ukrainian movement, with its new emphasis on populism, that abandoned the nobility? Without further research, it is still premature, in my view, to simply dismiss, as Hrytsak does, these elements of Ukrainian society as “Russified” and “assimilated.” New research in this area (and many others) will undoubtedly yield some rather complex and perhaps surprising results.

There is, as well, little consensus among Western scholars concerning the dynamic of national movements. Do nations create states or do states create nations? Is “modernization” a necessary prerequisite for “nationhood”? Why do some national movements “succeed” and others “fail”? As Hrytsak quite correctly points out, most historians have moved away from the positivist models that Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner proposed in the 1950s and 1960s. (There are still, however, many historians, particularly those who study Africa and Latin
America, who, like the British historian Eric Hobsbawm, remain convinced that nations and states are rather arbitrary constructs invented by and large by politicians and intellectuals. In fact, I would argue that the fundamental divide among historians of nationalism is not between East Europeanists and West Europeanists—who, Eugene Weber notwithstanding, have until recently shown little interest in the subject—but rather between Europeanists and non-Europeanists.

Similarly, the modernization theory—the idea that modern national identity is a consequence of urbanization, industrialization, and literacy—has found its share of critics; and the newest wave of studies of nationalism (Benedict Anderson, John Armstrong, Leah Greenfield, Roman Szporluk) has not produced a single, unified theory or offered conclusive answers as to why some national movements have succeeded and others have faltered. (Why, for example, did the nineteenth-century efforts of Russian intellectuals to “re-imagine the Russian community” in a way that firmly encompassed Ukrainians fail?) But that was never their primary intention. Indeed, the works of these authors have, for the most part, deliberately shied away from simple universal formulations, aspiring instead to provide more limited insights and observations about nationalism as a historical phenomenon.

The Ukrainian case—which has been largely overlooked by theorists of nationalism—suggests that there is no easy way to predict the “success” or “failure” of national movements. Indeed, Ukraine is an excellent “laboratory” for testing theories of nationalism. (This is a point that, I believe, Ukrainian historians ought to bring more aggressively to the attention of historians and theorists of nationalism.)

As *Narys istorii Ukrainy* illustrates, the differing rate and tempo of the development of the Ukrainian movement in different regions of Ukraine (Russian-ruled Ukraine, Austrian- and Polish-ruled Galicia, Austrian- and Romanian-ruled Bukovyna, Hungarian-ruled Transcarpathia) had less to do with “modernization” per se—that is, urbanization, industrialization, and literacy—than it did with the particular constellation of political, social, and intellectual influences at work within and between regions. (One can speculate, for example, how developments in Galicia might have been affected by a Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century that was officially tolerated.)

The example of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia—a movement that succeeded by mobilizing peasants(!)—is particularly instructive and important for understanding the variety of ways in which modern nations can be “made.”

Most of my reservations regarding *Narys istorii Ukrainy* have to do with the way in which Hrytsak defines his terms. What exactly constitutes a “modern nation”? At what point is it possible to say that a modern nation has been “formed”? Is statehood ultimately the measure of “success”? Unfortunately, these questions were not addressed in the book, and the reader is left to guess what the
author has in mind. Certainly any discriminating reader will be able to discern from the narrative what Hrytsak means by the terms he uses. (For example, on p. 116, “The inhabitants of rural France ... became [nationally conscious] only after French society was transformed from a largely rural, agrarian, and illiterate [society] into a primarily urbanized, industrialized, and literate [society]—in short, into a modern nation.”) A clear definition of terms at the outset would have been very useful, especially since, I suspect, for many readers in Ukraine the concept of a “modern Ukrainian nation” will be new and unfamiliar. Without the benefit of some sort of clarification, some readers may also misunderstand Hrytsak’s assertion that Ukrainians became a nation only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

My only other reservation has to do with the definition of a modern nation. For Hrytsak it turns by and large on the issue of the national consciousness of the mass of the population, a process that he sees as part of the larger course of modernization. But as the case of Galicia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demonstrates, it is possible for agrarian, non-industrialized, and not fully literate societies to become nationally conscious. (The second chapter of the book, which ends with 1914, is, in fact, titled “From Peasants into a Nation.”) In other words, the growth of national consciousness and the process of modernization have to be treated as two distinct processes. Urbanization, industrialization, and literacy make nations “modern,” but do not necessarily make nations. (Miroslav Hroch illustrated this point in Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe on the basis of the Flemish example.) Rather, I would argue, it is mass mobilization under the banner of national sovereignty that makes an “ethnos” into a nation. This is a process that modernization can certainly make easier, but does not in and of itself induce.

The great merit and value of Narys istorii Ukrainy is precisely that it poses this and many other important questions for Ukrainian historians. Was Ukrainian history “normal”? What was the level of national consciousness among Ukrainians in the nineteenth century? When did Ukrainians become “modern”? When did they become a “nation”? Moreover, Hrytsak provides a remarkably deep and rich narrative of Ukrainian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Steeped in contemporary scholarship as well as the author’s own research, it will stimulate readers to think about these questions on their own. Indeed, the significance of this work has less to do with the individual points that Hrytsak makes—though the importance of his thesis regarding the “normalcy” of Ukrainian history should not be underestimated—than it does with the way that he thinks and writes about history. This book is, in terms of approach and method, virtually the first “modern” modern history of Ukraine—one that treats the study of history not simply as a retelling of events, but rather as discourse, that is, as a series of interpretative issues, questions, and problems that have engaged the interests of many historians, Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian alike.
Indeed, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* integrates Ukrainian history into themes of contemporary historiography and lays bare for readers the skeleton of modern historical scholarship and thought. At the same time, the author’s lively, engaging, and often provocative style assures that this book will find a wide (and appreciative) audience for many years to come.

In many ways, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* symbolizes the transfer of Ukrainian historical studies back to Ukraine. Historians in Ukraine have finally returned to the problem that Ohloblyn saw as the key to understanding the modern history of Ukraine. At the same time, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* marks the re-entry of historiography in Ukraine into the world discourse of historians and paves the way for historians of modern Ukraine to begin making a serious impact on the way that the rest of the world thinks about the history of nationalism and national movements.
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Ukraine in a Grand Narrative of European History: A Review Article

John-Paul Himka


This is an imaginative book, in structure and content.

The form has clearly been influenced by the internet: the main text is accompanied by many “capsules” on special topics, and the references to them look like links on the web—[BUCZACZ], [CHERNOBYL], [CHERSONESOS], [HARVEST], [KHAZARIA], [LYCZAKÓW], [POTEMKIN], [RUS'], [TSCHERNOWITZ], [UKRAINIA]. One cannot, of course, click on a button and hear music, but for the musically literate there’s the next best thing: notation scattered throughout the book.

There are plates, carefully chosen to offer a parallel narrative of their own, and numerous historical maps. The maps include several of direct relevance to Ukrainian history: Khazaria at its greatest extent, ca. AD 900 (p. 1240), the partitions of Kyivan Rus' (p. 1249), the Crimea, with Russian colonization of the Black Sea coastland (late eighteenth century; p. 1290), and the republic of Ukraine, 1918–91 (p. 1315). Other, more general maps also make a point of indicating Ukraine; for example, the map of Europe, 1713, demarcates the territory of the Hetmanate and labels it “Ukraine: Hetman State (1654–1783)” (p. 576). Numerous charts, as well as maps, fill the “Historical Compendium” at the back of the book (pp. 1213–1335). Here information on Ukraine is also integrated, and the reader can compare, for example, Ukraine’s GDP in U.S. dollars per capita in 1992 ($2,340) with those of Switzerland ($34,830), Albania ($229) and other European countries (pp. 1332–33).

The book has a primary narrative, divided into a dozen chapters, covering the history of the European peninsula from prehistoric times through the early 1990s. At the end of each chapter there is an essay focussing on a single moment from the time period covered in the preceding pages. For example, chapter 11,
“Tenebrae: Europe in Eclipse, 1914–1945,” leaves the reader with a fascinating snapshot of “Friday, 19 October 1945, Nuremberg.”

As is the case with works by Norman Davies generally, this book is a good read. For me the most convincing confirmation of the sheer attractiveness of Davies’ Europe came from my son, thirteen years old at the time: “Tato,” he asked, “why don’t you write a book like this?”

The cornucopia in form is matched by the boldness and innovation of the content. Many long histories of Europe have been written, but, I dare say, none such as this. Davies set himself the goal of writing an inclusive history of Europe, one that gave their due to the peoples of Eastern Europe and did not just flit between London, Paris, and Vienna or Berlin, with side trips to Rome, Madrid, and Moscow. From the preface: “At every stage, an attempt has been made to counteract the bias of ‘Eurocentrism’ and ‘Western civilization’.... East European affairs are given their proper prominence.... The space given to the Slavs can be attributed to the fact that they form the largest of Europe’s ethnic families. National histories are regularly summarized; but attention has been paid to the stateless nations, not just to the nation-states. Minority communities, from heretics and lepers to Jews, Romanies, and Muslims, have not been forgotten” (p. viii). It is therefore not as strange as it might otherwise seem that part of this survey of European history was written at Harvard with a fellowship from the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and that Davies travelled to Belarus and Ukraine while working on it (p. ix).

As a result, in this particular history of Europe one can find in outline the entire history of Ukraine from the time of the Greek colonies and Iranian steppe through to the referendum on independence at the end of 1991. Davies’ roots as a historian of Poland often show, but he certainly endeavours to be fair, as in this summary of the great mid-seventeenth-century uprising: “In 1648–54 the rebellion of the Dnieper Cossacks under Bogdan [Bohdan] Chmielnicki (Khmelnitsky), which brought a murderous army of Cossacks and Tartars right up to the Vistula, left a swathe of butchered Catholics and Jews across Ukraine. It linked peasant fury to the very real political, social, and religious grievances of the eastern provinces. It was virtually suppressed by the time a despairing Chmielnicki turned to the Tsar for aid” (p. 555).

Ukrainian national historians will have less ambivalence about how Davies treats the Ukrainian-Russian connection. On the heritage of Kyivan Rus’: “It was in this period [the fourteenth century] that the Muscovites began to call their state by the Greek name for Rus’, Rossiya (Russia), and to call themselves Russians. These Muscovite-Russians had never ruled over Kiev; but the disability did not prevent them from regarding Moscow as the sole legitimate heir of the Kievian succession.... Their tendentious version of history, which persisted in confusing Muscovy-Russia with the whole of Rus’, was not accepted by those other east Slavs who remained beyond Moscow’s rule for centuries to come” (p.
392). On Russian imperialism (just preceding two paragraphs on the Hetmanate): “Russian historians have rationalized their country’s expansion in terms of ‘national tasks’ and ‘the gathering of the lands’. In reality, Russia and its rulers were addicted to territorial conquest. Their land-hunger was the symptom of a pathological condition born of gross inefficiency and traditional militarism… Here, if ever, was an extreme case of bulimia politica, of the so-called ‘canine hunger’, of gross territorial obesity in an organism which could only survive by consuming more and more of its neighbours’ flesh and blood” (p. 655). (Readers respond: Amen.)

With regard to the dramatic events of the middle of the twentieth century, Davies has a particular axe to grind against what he calls the “Allied scheme of history.” As in other of his recent writings (see his important essay “The Misunderstood Victory in Europe” in the New York Review of Books, 25 May 1995), Davies speaks out against the widespread but simplistic and erroneous view of the Second World War as a straightforward contest between the good guys and the bad guys, with the Soviet Union a member in good standing of the good guys’ team. He excoriates the historiographical consequences of this view, which he feels has led historians to be far too soft on Bolshevik Russia. For Davies the Soviet leadership, from Lenin through Stalin to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, were simply hardened criminals, and he has little patience with those who would see things otherwise. (Sometimes he certainly pushes his polemic too far, as on p. 1090, where he states that the overwhelming majority of “Western Sovietologists … spent most of those forty years [between World War II and the collapse of the USSR] admiring the Soviet Union as a paragon of health and progress.”) He demands an understanding of the last world war in Europe that would account for the ambivalences and desperation of the peoples caught between the Nazis and the Soviets, such as the Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. Consistently in his book Davies morally equates Nazism and Communism.

Thus he says many things that Ukrainian historians will be gratified to see in print in such a major, assuredly influential book. The Ukrainians’ suffering during the war is acknowledged: “Through wilful stupidity, the Nazis spurned all the chances to win the population to their side. Through sheer arrogance, they turned their largest asset into an unbearable burden. Their savagery knew no bounds. They gave their new subjects no option but to resist…. Villages were routinely razed, and their inhabitants murdered. Nazi officials felt free to massacre people at will…. In three years, the population of Ukraine dropped by 9 million” (p. 1015). Exposed are the rhetorical devices and wartime stereotypes through which Ukrainians have been denigrated: “For many years, they were usually presented to the outside world as ‘Russians’ or ‘Soviets’ whenever they were to be praised, and as ‘Ukrainians’ only when they did evil” (p. 54). “Although they probably suffered absolutely the largest number of civilian
casualties of any European nation, their main political aim was to escape from Soviet and Russian domination. The best thing to do with such an embarrassing nation was to pretend that it didn’t exist” (p. 41). (Again, though, some Ukrainian historians may be less comfortable with some of the things Davies has to say about the Polish-Ukrainian aspects of the war, notably the account of Ukrainian atrocities against the Polish civilian population on pp. 1034–35.)

All in all, then, this work is a tremendous achievement in recasting the narrative of European history, and at the same time a validation of the Ukrainian historiographical perspective.

In a book this long there are bound to be errors, and many reviewers, who seem to be discomfited by the overall thrust of the work, have trotted out their lists of blunders in order to discredit the author and weaken the work’s authority. For our purposes, it will suffice to note that there are also mistakes in the Ukrainian sections of the book, and the prudent reader would be advised to double-check individual facts in more specialized historical studies.

Davies’ revisionist narration is so important, in my estimation, that it warrants a frank analysis of how successfully he accomplished his aims. In the critical remarks that follow, my intention is not to diminish Davies’ achievement, but to explore further the possibilities to which he himself points.

In Davies’ capsule on Tschernowitz (Chernivtsi) there is a citation from Michael Ignatieff mentioning “stolid, cabbage-eating Ukrainians.” Why this citation is demeaning and totally inappropriate I have explained elsewhere in detail (“The Snows of Yesteryear,” Cross Currents, 1991, no. 10) and here limit myself to a compact (and different) formulation. The citation comes from Ignatieff’s review of a memoir by the recently deceased Gregor von Rezzori, a memoir brimming over with negative Ukrainian stereotypes. Von Rezzori’s unflattering image of the Ukrainians did not bother Ignatieff in the least when he praised the memoir in the New York Review of Books, probably because von Rezzori and Ignatieff have something in common. Von Rezzori was born the son of a German official in Austrian-ruled Bukovyna; Ignatieff comes from an upper-class Russian family that owned land in Ukraine before the revolution. Both knew that Ukrainians were simple people who ate cabbage, instead of the dainties served to the von Rezzoris and Ignatieffs.

I am reminded of something in Anatolii Svydnytsky’s novel Liaboratski. Masia Liaboratska, the daughter of the Orthodox pastor, is sent to finishing school. Before she went to school, she spoke Ukrainian, but she returned home speaking Polish. Before, she used to enjoy the company of the other village girls her age, but now that she has a smattering of education she has nothing but contempt for peasants and spends as much time as she can with the girls in the manor. Although Masia does her best to imitate the Polish gentry, every time she leaves the manor her hosts have a long laugh at her expense. Their jokes always
include a mimicry of Masia asking to eat some onions. Onions, cabbage, potatoes—the point is that you can tell the crude boors by their diet.

Obviously, Davies was not thinking about these things when he quoted Ignatieff on von Rezzori. But this is exactly what I am getting at. The offensive material went right past Davies; no alarm bells went off. He included the Ukrainians’ story in his narrative, but he was unable to develop for this work a Ukrainian sensitivity. What was being said probably even had a certain resonance for him, since Davies has acquired over the years a particular sympathy for Polish national myths, in their most liberal manifestation to be sure, but fraught nonetheless with their own subjectivity.

Let me develop these considerations further by turning to his treatment of World War II and the peoples whose fate at that time constitutes the great challenge to the “Allied scheme of history.” In his account, Davies conflates the positions of the Poles, Ukrainians, and Baltic peoples. All of them were indeed caught, as he says, between the Nazis and the Soviets. Yet there are many important layers of nuance that he leaves unexplored. The Ukrainians and the Poles were not in the same position. While the Poles felt caught between two hostile forces, many Ukrainians in the Polish “Kresy” (Western Ukraine) viewed the Poles themselves as a hostile third force. Also, nationally conscious Poles had no sympathies for the Germans, since the Germans had been the ones who dismembered Poland. For Ukrainians, however, the assessment of the Germans was not always so unequivocal, since in some ways, primarily religiously and culturally, the Germans actually improved their situation. Incidence of collaboration with and resistance to the German regime therefore differed among Ukrainians and Poles.

What all the above-mentioned points indicate is that Davies’ revision of the grand narrative was undertaken from the Polish point of view. He has written a history of Europe that includes the factors that explain Polish history and therefore has written a much more complex and enlightening narrative than those that preceded it. It is not, though, European history as seen from Ukraine, even though much Ukrainian material is included in it. Had he stood more firmly there, he would have seen even more complexities than he has already.

This brings us to the most substantive point: Davies’ treatment of the cultural complex of Eastern Christendom.

Davies has an unresolved ambivalence about whether Europe has one civilization or two, one Christendom or two. Generally he inclines to the hypothesis of unity. Establishing a distinction between “civilization” and the more localized “culture,” he writes: “Civilization was the sum total of ideas and traditions which had been inherited from the ancient world and from Christianity; it was grafted onto the native cultures of all the peoples of Europe from the outside, to form the common legacy” (p. 821). Chapter 6, entitled “Pestis: Christendom in Crisis,” also implies a unity, since the crisis of Christendom he
describes includes both the Avignon captivity and the fall of Constantinople. On the other hand, in that same chapter, he makes the point that "the Orthodox world avoided most of the new influences which, from the fourteenth century onwards, made some of the broad generalizations [of modern historians] less tenable" (p. 432).

There are a few points in the book that make clear Davies has not done his deep research on the Christian East, except on icons, which seem to have interested him. There is a nice capsule entitled MISSA (pp. 331–32) that discusses the mass as a liturgical service and as an object of composers’ creativity. From it, however, the reader would never know that the Orthodox (mentioned in passing) have a different mass than the one described here. And although Stravinsky is mentioned, the greatest Russian and Ukrainian liturgical composers are passed over in favour of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Liszt, Bruckner, Gounod, and Janáček.

In one of those narrative moments closing a chapter, Davies takes as his focal event "The Feast of Epiphany, 6 January 1493, the Kremlin, Moscow." Evidently assuming that the East and the West celebrate the same feast with the same content, he explains the epiphany as "a remembrance of the time when Christ made himself manifest to the Three Kings" (p. 457). Not in Orthodoxy, though. There the feast is more properly translated as Theophany (Bohoiavlennia in Ukrainian), and it refers to the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan River (hence the feast is also known in Ukrainian as Jordan). It is the "revelation of God" not because of any kings, but because the Father, as a voice from the heavens, acknowledges Jesus as His Son, and the Holy Spirit descends in the form of a dove. (Following his initial error, Davies then proceeds to quote the wrong Gospel on p. 459.)

Obviously, by basing himself as narrator in Poland, Davies brings into his narrative the politics and social history of Eastern Europe as a whole, but culturally he remains confined to Western Christendom. This not only problematizes the inclusivity of the knowledge in Davies’ Europe, but also points to questions about his evaluation of the other. "Not all of Europe’s linguistic communities produced a corpus of serious literature," he writes. "Those who lagged behind, principally in Germany, Russia, and the Balkans, were still preoccupied with religious pursuits" (p. 482).

This is surely the standard view: the march of a superior, west European modernity to victory across the continent of Europe. Perhaps it is time, though, that we recast the narrative of European history even more radically than Davies has done. Could one write a history of Europe that treated the different cultures emanating from Western and Eastern Christendom primarily in terms of difference, without judging their merits, without pronouncing one serious and the other backward, without having one eat dainties and the other eat cabbage? Can the culture of Eastern Christendom be explored simply on its own terms, for its
own riches and values, without invidious comparison? And also: although the west European modernity emerged victorious, must we be so etiological in focus that we only include in our narrative that which has led to the present? Is not the past of importance to historians, and to their readers, also in and of itself? Do not tracing the origins of the modern and leaving out of account the extinct or endangered culture reflect a complacency with a particular version of “winners’ history,” not the “Allied scheme,” but a winners’ history nonetheless? Is there not a great deal of recuperative work and mental archeology to be undertaken before we can arrive at a properly balanced grand narrative of European history?

Norman Davies has written an imaginative, revisionist, complex, and detailed history of Europe. If he is to be surpassed, then he should be overtaken on the very road he has built for us.
Recreations

by

Yuri Andrukhovych

Translated by
Marko Pavlyshyn

Recreations is a carnivalesque tale of four promising young poets who attend a fictional cultural festival that turns out to be an orgy of popular culture, civic dysfunction, national pride, and sex. Beneath this raucous text, the author offers acute social criticism and far-ranging reflections on the contradictions of post-Soviet Ukrainian society. The masterful translation by Dr. Marko Pavlyshyn of Monash University (Melbourne, Australia) is beautifully complemented by a dozen illustrations from the pen of Paris-based Ukrainian artist Volodymyr Makarenko.

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Asserting a Presence: New Translations of Recent Ukrainian Literature. A Review Article

Marko Pavlyshyn


The publication of these three handsomely presented books is a welcome event indeed, given the scarcity of English translations of Ukrainian literature in general and of recent Ukrainian literature in particular. *From Three Worlds* acquaints the reader with samples of the work of five poets and ten prose writers. Oksana Zabuzhko and Volodymyr Dibrova, the authors of the two individual collections, are also represented in *From Three Worlds*. These books, together with translations of the poetry of Ihor Kalynets, Vasyl Holoborodko, and Mykola
Vorobyov,\(^1\) will greatly lighten the task of the English speaker who seeks access
to contemporary (or, more precisely, almost contemporary) Ukrainian literature.

Almost contemporary: not only in the sense that new literary phenomena of
the mid-1990s (the young prose writer Oles Ulianenko, for example, and the
large and amorphous grouping of very young writers known as Association 500)
are not represented. The books under review showcase works by writers and
poets who became visible to the public in the mid-1980s, some—Valerii
Shevchuk and Vasyl Holoborodko—even earlier, in the 1960s. They document
the tone and concerns of a period that many now see as the immediate past: a
period encompassing glasnost and the years immediately before and after the
declaration of independence by Ukraine in 1991.

Although most of the authors represented, and their various approaches to
literary creativity, were apprehended as new against the background of the
mainstream literature of the Soviet past, in important respects the three books
reflect the twilight of the old rather than the dawn of the new. The prose pieces
are all, in one way or another, commentaries upon the decadence of the Soviet
system. They bear the stamp of their authors’ pleasure at their new liberty to
hold up a “true” (and therefore, inevitably, satirical) mirror to (Soviet) life. They
also celebrate the license to choose the aesthetic tools for this task. Thus styles
and principles of construction are varied, the grey unison of Socialist Realism
seems a million miles away, yet, at bottom, one theme dominates: coming to
terms with the greater and lesser nightmares of the past. These lesser nightmares
include the day-to-day lives of ordinary Soviet people.

Some authors choose a straight and simple narrative voice that refrains from
comment but, in allowing the “truth” to “speak” for itself,” enunciates mute
protest. Such are the works of Halyna Pahutiak, Evhenia [levheniia] Kononenko,
Volodymyr Dibrova, and Yuri [luri] Andrukhovych in From Three Worlds (al-
though elsewhere Dibrova and Andrukhovych are much more mannered,
individualistic, and attuned to the issues of the post-Soviet present).\(^2\) Kostiantyn
Moskalets offers an allegorical dystopian tale laden with literary quotation and
allusion. Valery [Valerii] Shevchuk, elder statesman of the Ukrainian novel,
engages in his accustomed whimsical, ironic, yet gentle portrayal of the (Soviet)
human condition. Yevhen [levhen] Pashkovsky brings the diction of an angry
prophet to bear upon his tale of an ordinary family’s martyrdom during the

\(^1\) Ihor Kalynets, *Crowning the Scarecrow: Appeals to Conscience in Lviv,
*Icarus with Butterfly Wings*, trans. Myrosia Stefaniuk (Toronto: Exile Editions, 1991);

\(^2\) For example, Andrukhovych in his now famous novels *Recreations, The Moscoviad,
and Perversion*, and Dibrova in his “Surzhyk Tales.”
1932–33 famine and afterwards. Oleksandr Irvanets’s supernatural story of ideal and profane love harks back to the romanticism of E. T. A. Hoffmann. The grotesque becomes an implement of social satire in the texts of Bohdan Zholdak and, more radically, Yuri [Iurii] Vynnychuk, whose narrative of a family business trading in human meat is (in Ukrainian literature, at least) an exercise in taboo-breaking black humour. Everywhere the “argument” concerns human limitation, human disillusion, the high price to be paid for small comforts, and the fleeting nature of happiness. Everywhere these melancholy circumstances are presented as the consequence not of the human condition in general, but of the Soviet condition in particular, represented by such irredeemable aspects of experience as the communal apartment, the war in Afghanistan, the ecologically poisoned environment, and the intolerable workplace. Like the Socialist Realist writing from which this prose is otherwise so different, this is, at bottom, a prose of resentment, of setting the record straight.

A similar combination of formal variety and reference, however oblique, to concerns dear to the 1980s characterizes the poetry in From Three Worlds. One of these concerns is coercion. Oleh Lysheha’s verse is abstract and presents itself initially as hermetic, though a reading of the poem “’Vin” (He) might reveal a subtle reflection upon the idea that humanity has evolved simultaneously toward both culture and violence. Similarly focussed on violence are the two poems of Viktor Neborak, including the surrealist “Flying Head.” Vasyl Holoborodko, an older poet whose works were banned in Ukraine from the 1960s until 1986, is represented by three exquisite poems. One, “Z ptakhom” (With a Bird), celebrates the paradoxical charm, even romance, of alienation and discomfort. Another, “Bez odnoho skladu” (One Syllable Missing), reflects upon the tragedy of the poet who has grasped the essential but finds it beyond expression.

The six poems of Natalka Bilotserkivets, more than the others in the collection, reflect an end-of-the epoch sensibility. Somewhat bloodless and obscure, punctuated by images of bad weather and physical discomfort, they are statements of weariness, disillusionment, and underfulfilment. The colonial pain and shame of being at the periphery is memorably formulated in her line “my pomrem ne v Paryzhi teper ia napevno tse znaiu” (we’ll not die in Paris I know now for sure). Also represented by six poems is Oksana Zabuzhko, whose vibrant verse, contrasting starkly with that of Bilotserkivets, is discussed below.

All in all, the reader of From Three Worlds who is new to the material will probably come away with a mental image of a literature that is variegated but unified; a literature in which a familiar theme, the alienation of the human being in modernity, is refracted through the prism of a particular experience—the decline and fall of Soviet socialism; and a literature with a colourful spread of styles and forms from the relatively traditional and restrained to the way-out.

The translations in From Three Worlds, mostly collaborative efforts by American writers and native speakers of Ukrainian (twenty people in all), vary
considerably in quality. The task of any translator involves mediation between two goals that are not easily reconciled: being faithful to the author, on the one hand, and rendering the work attractive in the target culture, on the other. The latter justifies, indeed requires, motivated departures from the chapter and verse of the original. The former—good faith with the author—demands that such deviations not be arbitrary. Two vices are especially to be shunned: translator’s hubris, expressed in changes that are capricious or motivated by a desire to “improve” the original, and mistranslation, the consequence of failure to understand the original at the level of vocabulary or grammar.

By these criteria, the majority of the prose translations in From Three Worlds are fairly adequate, even though there are many translators’ decisions whose motivations are difficult to grasp. For example, Valerii Shevchuk’s writing has a dreamy, somewhat incantational quality that is the product, in part, of long compound and complex sentences. The translators break these up in favour of a plainer style. Halyna Pahutiak, while writing about lowlife characters, does not seek to imitate lowlife argot in their dialogue. This form of naturalism would, indeed, be quite foreign to the somewhat idealized tone of the story “Potrapyty v sad” (To Find Yourself in a Garden). It is surprising, then, to find the perfectly standard Ukrainian exchange, “Ty shcho, zmerz? ‘Oi zmerz, bratchyku’” rendered as “‘What’s with you? You froze?’ ‘Oy, I’ve froze, brother.’” (p. 269).

In such cases the translators have exceeded the terms of their license. Elsewhere their efforts have not produced an adequate correspondence between their text and the original. In Oleksandr Irvanets’s “Zahybel Holiiiana” (The Death of Holiian; for some reason, the translators think that “The Tale of Holiian” is preferable to a more literal translation) a good deal turns on the fact that the ideal beloved, Iselina, exists only in the fantasy of one of the narrators. Yet the phrase that makes this quite clear, “Ia tebe vymriiav tak davno,” is rendered as “I created you so long ago” (p. 255). “Created” is insufficient to support the full meaning of “vymriiav” (created through the activity of the imagination), which must be presented to the reader at this point to avoid confusion: this is not the case of a god creating a person, an author creating a character, or a Frankenstein creating a monster.

Regrettably, some of the poetry in From Three Worlds is not translated very well at all. While some of the verse translations are excellent, notably those of Vasyl Holoborodko by Myrosia Stefaniuk and of Oksana Zabuzhko by Lisa Sapinkopf and Larissa Szporluk, Natalka Bilotserkivets’s poem “Pora repetytsii” (A Time of Rehearsals) is not so well served. The translators mistake the

meaning of the adjective “dostemennyi” and succeed in reversing the meaning of a key pair of lines: “o naivnyi hliadachy ty virysh tsia smert dostemenna / smert vazhdy dostemenna tebe nauchaie teatr” (o naive spectator you believe this death is real / death is always real so the theatre teaches you) is rendered as follows: “o naive spectator you believe this death is invented / it is always invented so the theatre says” (p. 153).

In another place the translators appear not to have grasped the unambiguous primary meaning. The passage in question consists of three simple sentences (for clarity’s sake, I insert periods in square brackets): “tse pora repetytsii[,] vzhe tekstom velykoi dramy / peretrudzheno huby[,] remarky horiat iz pitmy” (this is the season of rehearsals[,] lips are overworked by the text of a great drama[,] stage directions burn in the dark). This becomes quite unrecognizable in the translation: “this is the time of rehearsals the text of a great drama / the overworked lips of the prompter blaze in the dark” (p. 153).

Viktor Neborak’s poem “Ryby” (Fish), too, is mistranslated, apparently because Neborak’s straightforward syntax, lightly camouflaged by the absence of punctuation, is not understood. Toward the end of the poem Neborak reflects upon the sensations of fish in a bathtub. The fish have their own concerns, and these do not include the affairs of human beings, whom they see merely as moving shadows: “dlia nykh vazhlyva voda i izha / mozhlyvo peredchuttia smerti / dlia nykh ne vazhlyvo u iakykh rodynnykh zv’iazkakh / perebuvaiut rukhlyvi prodovhvuti pliamy” (for them water and food are important[,] / and perhaps the presentiment of death[,] / the nature of the family relationships between the moving elongated shadows / are not important for them). Thanks to the efforts of no fewer than three translators, the English text reads as follows: “water and food? Crucial / but knowing someday they’re all / going to die may not be crucial / unaware as they are of their family connection to other long slippery bodies” (p. 185). This is pleasantly mysterious, but it belongs to a new poem that bears little resemblance to Neborak’s. The discrepancy is all the more out of place, given that Neborak uses free verse that is relatively free of adornments, and the translator is under no obligation to trade closeness to the primary literal meaning of the original for imitation of formal effects.

In addition to some defective translations, From Three Worlds contains a number of other irritants. The appearance of an anthology of Ukrainian literature in a series titled Glas: New Russian Writing cannot fail to raise post-colonial eyebrows. Bibliographic information about the original publication of the texts by Moskalets (p. 67) and Pashkovsky (p. 97) is wrong,5 while in the case of

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5. Moskalets’s “Dosvid koronatsii” was published in Suchasnist in no. 10 of 1993, not 1990; Pashkovsky’s “P’iatero khliba i dvi rybi” (sic) was not published in Svito-vyd, 1994, no. 2, but in 1990, no. 4.
Dibrova’s *Pisni Bitiz* (Beatles Songs) the firm advertising on the back cover is mistaken for the publisher (p. 30). In his preface Ed Hogan writes of the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s tribulations during the “sweeping purges of 1930–32” (would that they had been so brief). Tania D’Avignon’s photographs and Mykola Kumanovsky’s bookplates, while of considerable interest, are disappointingly reproduced. Transcription of proper nouns is inconsistent (Yevhen Pashkovsky, but Evhenia Kononenko), there appears to be no certainty as to whether place names are being transliterated from Ukrainian or from Russian (e.g., on the one line, Kryzhopil and Shepetivka, but Zhmerinka and Okhtirka), and, most oddly of all, the journal *Chetver* (Thursday) appears as *Chetverh*, as if the bibliographer had intended to replace the Ukrainian word with its Russian equivalent, “chetverg,” but had modified this in line with the common Ukrainian mispronunciation of Russian g as h (p. 251).

Still, these details, while they may irk the specialist and diminish the utility of the anthology as a teaching text, will probably go unnoticed by a more general reader. The volume begins with a useful introductory essay by Solomea Pavlychko and ends with biographical notes on authors, translators, and editors.

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Oksana Zabuzhko’s novel *Polovi doslidzhenia z ukrainskoho seksu* (Field Research into Ukrainian Sex, 1996) has gained her far more notoriety than she previously had achieved fame as a poet. This asymmetry is regrettable, as Zabuzhko’s poetry is of a high order. Rich, resonant, and rhetorical, it is also confessional and intimate. It addresses themes both perennial and topical—love and identity, self and other, the entrapment of the human being in time, but also being a woman, being a resident of Kyiv, being post-totalitarian, being post-colonial. Zabuzhko’s poetry is sufficiently original to avoid banality, yet sufficiently communicative to evoke the effect of addressing an audience. It is very much a poetry of glasnost, both public and private. Symptomatic of this concern of the times for bringing into the open what previously was concealed is one of the recurrent images of Zabuzhko’s poetry: the re-emerging trace. A dark thing strains to become visible through the soft-boiled egg white, a cinema image takes shape in a dissolve (p. 45).

In his characteristically to-the-point introduction to Zabuzhko’s collection *Avtostop* (Hitchhiking), George Y. Shevelov is impressed by this poetry “half of politics, half of eroticism” and by the way in which it redefines for Ukrainian poetry “the boundary up to which the private is admitted in representations of

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6. In the translation by Michael Naydan and Askold Melnyczuk, the vague “potemnin-nia” (darkening) is rendered all-too-concrete as a “blue vein.” Compare *A Kingdom of Fallen Statues*, 6; and Oksana Zabuzhko, *Dyryhent ostannoi svichky: Poezii* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1990), 121.
human thought, perception, and behaviour in the most intimate sphere.” A Kingdom of Fallen Statues allows the English-speaking reader to share Shevelov’s enthusiasm. The collection arranges Zabuzhko’s poems into three thematic groups (intimacy and gender; public issues of the times; poetry and the aesthetic) and adds two essays by Zabuzhko, both of which reflect lucidly upon the problems of writing Ukrainian poetry in an environment that is both post-colonial and global.

On the whole, the translations in this collection keep very good faith with the author, although none really attempt to reproduce the rhythmic qualities of Zabuzhko’s verse. Unlike the majority of the poets anthologized in From Three Worlds, Zabuzhko often works with classical prosody, giving preference to the sonority of the ternary metres. But even though its sound and rhythm is muffled in translation, the poetry still comes across as richly textured and potent. On several occasions this reviewer was struck by the sympathy between original and translation. For example, “‘Tilky chom zseredny shtvkhaietsia vyhuknut: ‘Nu hovory vzhe!’— / U prorubanu v rami vikonnii vidchuzhenu spynu muzhchyny?” becomes, in Lisa Sapinkopf’s translation, “Why this urge within me to scream ‘Speak!’ / To the alien torso hewn in the window-frame?” (p. 55). Sapinkopf, translator of just over half of the thirty-three poems in the collection, is especially accomplished in her renderings of Zabuzhko’s less rhetorical, more intimate verse: “From this kind of longing / Bones turn into flutes, / From this kind of craving / Bog reeds ignite, / From this kind of knowledge / Life itself cracks open / And bundles of flame / Explode underfoot” (p. 17).^9

Seeking equivalence of effect in the target language, Sapinkopf tactfully prunes what in English might be apprehended as too baroque and bombastic. Thus, in “Clytemnestra,” a translation chosen as one of the “Best of 1994” by the Review of Literary Magazines,^10 Zabuzhko’s “nenavydzhu … rozbukhlu od vilhosti porystu tarankuvatist / ioho hlevkoho pidhorlia ponad soboiu”^11 becomes the much pithier but no less striking “I hate the doughy neck above me” (p. 3). Marco Carynnyk, the editor of the volume, contributes translations of some of the collection’s more cerebral and wordy pieces.

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10. “Contributor Notes,” in From Three Worlds, 280.
Of the three books under review, Volodymyr Dibrova’s *Peltse* and *Pentameron* offers the most sustained example of good translation. The tone of mock seriousness, the hallmark of Dibrova’s prose, is impeccably reproduced. Except where idiom or wordplay demand it, and in the case of changes in characters’ names that are unfathomable to this reviewer (why does “Zudina” become “Askolduk”?), the rendering is scrupulously accurate, yet alluringly readable. The book confidently establishes Halyna Hryn as one of the most skilful translators of Ukrainian prose into English.

Are her skills well spent on Volodymyr Dibrova? In the case of *Peltse*, the shorter of the two prose pieces in the book, certainly. A collection of anecdotes on the life, times, rise, and fall of an imaginary dictator, the work displays much wit and brings some of the psychological and behavioural lineaments of Soviet reality into razor-sharp focus.

*Pentameron* is intended as a more leisurely and less grotesque exercise in satire, but, to be frank, the work has not aged well. These minute details from the lives of employees in the editorial office of a Soviet scientific organization might have been welcomed in, say, 1988 as holding up a mirror to a formerly unrepresented and unrepresentable Soviet reality. At that time *Pentameron* would have “exposed” the tedium, triviality, meaninglessness, and petty unhappiness of society to itself, contradicting its heroic representation by official Soviet culture. But already in 1994, when the work appeared in *Suchasnist* (no. 1: 9–47; no. 2: 10–42) its satire was bound to seem dated. The absurdities and injustices of Soviet socialism were a waning memory in a society racked by the new and acute pangs of transition to capitalism.

The anachronistic quality of the text is even more palpable today. Dibrova and/or his translator signal awareness of this by altering an introductory note stylized as a stage direction. “The action takes place in one of the previous years of our times,” states the Ukrainian version of 1994. In 1996 the translation speaks, instead, of “one of the years of a bygone era” (p. 4). And if *Pentameron* does not successfully cross the barrier of a few years within the one culture, it is unlikely to survive transposition into others.

In *Peltse*, hyperbole and the grotesque create distance between the represented world and any particular reality, though the connection to the Soviet experience is transparent. The work becomes general in its address. It has something of importance to tell everyone about the nature of totalitarianism, the fears and desires that make totalitarianism possible, and the weirdness of totalitarianism’s consequences. *Pentameron*, on the other hand, is too scrupulous in its mimesis and too narrow in its focus to be about anything but a particular society in a particular place at a particular time. Lacking a mechanism for generalization, *Pentameron* is unlikely to become the *Dead Souls* of our times.

*Peltse* and *Pentameron*, then, is not an unmingled success. It is not for this reason alone, however, that Roman Koropeckyj’s claim on the back cover that
“Dibrova is the best young prose writer in Ukraine today” is regrettable. Such statements, unaccompanied by a definition of the speaker’s understanding of aesthetic quality and outside of the context of serious comparative evaluation, can lay little claim to authority. Furthermore, to assert today that one particular Ukrainian writer is the “best” in his generation is to misrepresent the fluidity and tentativeness of the Ukrainian literary scene.

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Koropeckyj’s judgment suggests the existence of a critical consensus concerning recent and contemporary Ukrainian literature—or, at least, a debate leading to such a consensus. In fact, no such crypto-consensus exists. This is the consequence not of post-structuralist doubt concerning its possibility or utility, but of far more basic facts about the plight of literary criticism in Ukraine in the wake of colonialism and totalitarianism. In the first place, parallel to the impoverishment of the thick literary journals and all other state-funded institutions of traditional literary life in Ukraine, literary criticism, no longer a handsomely remunerated activity, has dwindled to a trickle. Second, under the Soviet regime the function of literary criticism was to provide a megaphone for favourable or negative judgments that originated in other quarters.

Criticism in Ukraine has yet to acquire the habit of independence, the courage of its own opinions, and, most importantly, an array of intellectual frameworks within which to formulate them. Under the present circumstances, a few writers, Andrukhovych and Zabuzhko among them, have become targets either of shrill denunciations or of chummy back-patting. Others, like Dibrova, have remained, to all intents and purposes, invisible.

Invisibility of a more general, global variety has been one of the curses of colonialism that the three North American publications under review have tried to lift. Exposure to the world and presence in it are post-colonial goals more easily achieved, it would seem, in politics and sport than in culture. These three books, however, are three steps in the right direction.
The Peter Jacyk Centre is pleased to announce the publication of a volume of documents from Russian archives on the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Документи до історії запорозького козацтва, 1613-1620 pp. (Documents on the History of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, 1613-1620) includes many Russian documents that until recently remained largely unknown to students of the topic.

Among them are numerous records related to Cossack participation in the Polish-Muscovite wars of the early seventeenth century. This material was considered politically sensitive during the Soviet period, as Cossack attacks on Russian forces contradicted the official Soviet myth of “eternal friendship” between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

The publication is the result of a joint project undertaken by the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, the Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies (Lviv) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies (Moscow) of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Book Reviews


This well-researched and densely written study challenges widely held assumptions about the nationalities policy of the late Russian Empire. What was previously thought of as a master-plan to Russify the non-Russian nationalities of the empire was, says Weeks, hardly a "policy" at all. Rather, we should speak of "the confused, disparate, and uncoordinated actions of the Russian administration vis-à-vis its non-Russian subjects" (p. 5). Far from pursuing a consistent Russian nationalist course, the government reacted to the varying challenges of nationalism and modernity on an ad hoc basis.

Informed by theories of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, the book under review proposes a feasible explanation of the ancien regime's ultimate failure in dealing with the nationalities question. Weeks shows that the "nationalities policy" of the empire was far from modern nationalism: "its primary goal was to preserve the unwieldy, utterly non-national empire" (p. 9). Here Weeks turns to Anderson's (I would add—and Hobsbawm's) idea of the fundamentally antagonistic nature of the dynastic regime and national politics. The "official nationalisms" of old European monarchies were all uneasy compromises between the principles of the modern nation-state and the dynastic power; they were what Anderson called "stretching the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire." The multinational Russian Empire failed to meet this major challenge of modernity.

Weeks's focus is the tsarist government's treatment of non-Russians in the so-called Western Provinces and the Kingdom of Poland (by then officially known as the Vistula Land). Weeks, however, also devotes much space to an interesting, general discussion of the government's and Russian society's perceptions of nationality. Up until the collapse of the empire, no definite understanding of what constitutes a nation existed. The official documents considered only people of Orthodox faith as being Russians. However, the Catholic Ukrainians and Belarusians were still (for "ethnic" reasons) regarded as a part of the Russian tribe. This ambiguity of a simultaneously pre-modern and modern understanding of nationality reflected the very nature of the late imperial "official nationalism." Tsarism exploited Russian nationalism of the Right as a useful political tool, but never adopted it as a legitimizing principle of the essentially dynastic empire. It was even more reluctant to conceive of itself as a multinational state. In other words, the nationalities policy of the imperial government was in many respects "pre-national."
The last three chapters of the book are case studies of specific government projects concerning the Western Provinces: the introduction of zemstvos, the establishment of an elected municipal government in Congress Poland, and the creation of Kholm province. Of these, the last one will be of particular interest for historians of Ukraine. Weeks shows that the case of Catholic Ukrainians in the Kholm area (most of whom belonged to the Uniate church before it was abolished in the region in 1875) presented “official nationalism” with a dilemma it was unable to resolve. The tsarist administration found itself forced to admit that Catholics were not necessarily Poles and to embrace a confusing semi-modern concept of “real nationality.” Thus Ukrainians were considered ethnic Russians regardless of their religion. Nevertheless, keeping them within the fold of the Orthodox church was considered vital for the defence of their “Russian” national identity. Catholic Belarusians were subject to the same policies.

There are several minor points on which I tend to disagree with Weeks. On p. 67 he seems to suggest that admitting Ukrainians and Belarusian nations distinct from the Russian was impossible for the “official nationality” since this would have fatally upset the nationality calculus in the empire. Surely the reasons for this were by far more sophisticated or, if you will, muddled up than just keeping “Russians” in the majority. I was left unpersuaded by the author’s attempt in his Conclusion to answer the question: Did the Russian Empire have any chance of survival? The main topic of the book hardly provides a perspective wide enough to allow for a satisfactory answer.

Dealing with territories and the pasts claimed by different nationalities emphasizes the problem of transliteration. Weeks’s use of Russian and the Polish spelling is generally consistent, the major exception being “Kholm” instead of “Chełm.” I was pleased to see Ukrainian spelling slipping in occasionally, even though without explanation it might confuse the general reader (e.g., Prince Volodymyr [the Saint] on p. 172).

These small criticisms notwithstanding, Professor Weeks’s insightful book is a valuable contribution to the field. It adds significantly to our understanding of the nationality politics of the late Russian Empire and the identity-moulding processes in eastern Europe.

Serhy Yekelchyk
University of Alberta


This book was bound to spark an argument long before coming off the press. Professor Thurston’s article “Fear and Belief in the USSR’s ‘Great Terror’: Response to Arrest, 1935–1939” (Slavic Review 45, no. 2 [Summer 1986]) became one of the most controversial contributions to the field in the past decade. A provocatively sharpened “revisionist” manifesto, it was followed by a heated exchange between Thurston and Robert Conquest. A sequel to this debate occurred in an exchange between Jane Burbank and Thurston in Politics and Society (1991–92). As expected, the profession is widely reviewing and discussing Life and Terror. As early as in May 1996, it was reviewed in the New York Times and The Times Literary Supplement (in both cases negatively). An
avalanche of reviews in scholarly journals started in the summer of 1997, revealing a deep division and animosity between the “totalitarianist” and “revisionist” schools of Soviet history.

In this book, although in less polemically sharpened form, Thurston develops the line of argument already familiar to readers of “Fear and Belief” (reprinted here, slightly revised, as chapter 5): no “Great Terror” existed because Stalin had no master-plan to terrorize the country, and, in any case, there was no general fear because arrests were limited to the elite while the broad sections of the population approved and continued to enjoy life. It follows that the “totalitarianist” school has it all wrong: the Stalinist regime did not rule by terror and fear, but enjoyed the voluntary support of the majority of citizens. The final proof of this popular support came with World War II, the “acid test of Stalinism” when the people had a chance to free themselves from the regime, but instead defended it heroically.

A detailed discussion of this model is beyond the scope of a book review. It must be stated, however, that Thurston somewhat misrepresents the interpretations of the “totalitarianist” school. No adherent of this school has ever claimed that Stalin ruled by coercion alone, or, for that matter, that there were no popular entertainments and happy, sunny days in 1937. More importantly, Thurston fails to answer a logically inescapable question: why, then, was the Terror started at all? He goes to great pains to show that there was indeed a plot in the army, that there was “a grain of truth to the accusations of the show trials” (p. 57). Thus “Stalin’s terror of the late 1930s was a reaction, however grossly exaggerated, to information he received on threats to himself and the USSR” (p. 58). Thurston restates this at another place: “[Stalin’s] policies did help to engender real plots, lies and threats to his position. Then this fear-ridden man reacted, and over-reacted, to events” (p. 227). Yet Thurston’s hints of “real plots” remain unproven, while more and more evidence of deliberate extracting of false confessions comes to light.

The author uses examples from Soviet Ukraine throughout the book to strengthen his argument. But their value as evidence is sometimes doubtful. For example, the story about the arrest of the people’s commissar of the NKVD of Ukraine and his deputy at a Kyiv train station in July 1938 (p. 77) is clearly apocryphal. Thurston takes it verbatim from the files of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project. Yet one only has to read Khrushchev’s memoirs to learn the real (and no less dramatic) story of the arrest of the people’s commissar O. I. Uspensky.

The chapter on the popular response to World War II pays much attention to Ukraine and Ukrainians. Inasmuch as Thurston’s thesis is that the population in general was enthusiastically defending the Stalinist regime, all evidence to the contrary must somehow be interpreted otherwise. Thurston explains the incidents of the greeting of the Germans in Western Ukraine by referring to Ukrainian nationalism, friction between Poles and Ukrainians, and Soviet behaviour in the area in the years 1939–41 (p. 218). In central and eastern Ukraine, long a part of the Soviet Union, response to the Germans was presumably less favourable, which confirms the popular support for the regime (p. 220). Where collaboration did occur, as “in the mass slaughter of Jews at Babi Yar,” it resulted from Ukrainian and Russian anti-Semitism rather than disloyalty to the Stalinist regime (p. 224). Leaving the questions of Ukrainian, or, for that matter, Russian or Lithuanian, collaboration and anti-Semitism aside, welcoming or not welcoming the Germans proved very little. Nazism was not an attractive alternative. Moreover, the millions of Soviet
POWs, together with the hundreds of thousands of collaborators of all nationalities, suggest, in fact, that the Soviet population did not support the regime strenuously enough during the acid test of war. The necessity for the Soviet wartime appeal to the national sentiments of the peoples of the USSR was yet another indication of the insufficiency of “socialist patriotism.”

This book has its value as a strong statement of the extreme “revisionist” position. Although this reviewer does not share the understanding of the Stalinist Terror offered by Thurston, the book will definitely continue to stimulate debate and, I hope, will provoke further studies of the subject.

Serhy Yekelchyk
University of Alberta


This collection of articles—the ninth volume of a ten-volume series devoted to what until recently was Russian-ruled Eurasia—compares the collapse and legacy of the USSR with those of the Ottoman, Habsburg, Romanov, French, and British empires. It reflects the post-1989 trend in scholarship to treat the USSR and the Soviet bloc as an empire, but it fails to explain why so few academics or journalists used the term “empire” earlier when referring to that part of the world. Also lacking is an explanation of why the editors chose to compare the empires they did and why they omitted, for example, Japan, which, like tsarist and Soviet Russia but unlike any other modern empire, located industry in its borderlands.

Focussing on international relations and elite politics, The End of Empire? pays little attention to the role of social forces, American audio-visual products, and multinational corporations as causes of imperial collapse or as determinants of future trends. The book does not tell us whether it is significant that young people in what was the USSR prefer Coke to kvass, confuse liberty with consumerism, and know more about MTV, Michael Jackson, and Sylvester Stallone than they do about MTSs, Thomas Jefferson, or Stalin, or that young women there find Helena Rubinstein and Mary Quant more exciting than Sofiia Perovskaia or Praskovia Angelina. Anyone wondering about what to expect of workers more interested in John Lennon and Marks and Spencer than in Lenin and Marx and Engels will be disappointed by this collection. Its authors neither mention these variables nor explain why they don’t, thereby leaving readers to determine for themselves how such neglect might affect the comprehensiveness and validity of the arguments and relationships they present. Finally, not all issues are evenly covered. Consideration of the impact of anti-colonial public opinion in the ruling nations on the demise of the European empires, for instance, is not matched by discussion of whether or not the absence of such a tradition in Russian thought was significant in Russian-ruled Eurasia.

Some of the contributions are abstract, speculative, and abstruse. David Lake and Hendryk Spruyt use political-science models to discern future trends in the former USSR. Like Karen Dawisha, who also examines the prospects for a reassertion of Russian power
in Eurasia, they fail to note that historical examples of restorations (Ottonian, Stuart, Bourbon) reveal that the re-establishment of socio-political systems is unlikely unless they are done within the life span of a political generation by people who were active in an old system and are able to take effective part in a restored system. Yet, most readers possibly will find the articles by these three contributors more informative than the “victimological” discussion of North-South relations from a perspective of Muslim-Christian rivalry by Ali Mazrui, who employs terms such as “imperial reincarnation,” “transmigration,” and “soul of empire.”

Among the empirically based studies is Roman Szporluk’s discussion of Russian national identity. He claims that tsarism was replaced by Bolshevism as quickly as it was because the tsars failed to create a modern Russian nation. What if the resources devoted to Russifying non-Russians, asks Szporluk, had been devoted to Russifying Russian peasants? In turn, the Communists, he continues, also failed to create a modern Russian nation and, like the tsars, ultimately lost power because they paid too little attention to Russian nation-building and too much to the creation of an imperial supra-national identity. Had the Bolshevik program succeeded, the USSR would have fallen apart along republican borders. Szporluk argues that if the post-1991 Russian government does not repeat this particular mistake, it will facilitate the emergence of democracy and a market economy in the new Russia.

Dankwart Rustow makes a similar argument, noting that only thanks to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire did Anatolian Muslims and Ottoman clerks become Turks. Solomon Wank compares the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, arguing that both of them had to fall because democracy and empire are incompatible. He considers economic, political, and diplomatic factors, but does not specify whether national movements found their roots in local reaction to centrally promoted political reforms or socio-economic modernization.

Michael Fry draws attention to how postwar British and French elites acquiesced to losing colonies not only because a majority of the educated had come to believe that native rulers, even if dictators, must be better than foreign ones. Governments also realized that they could control foreign territories more easily, less controversially, and more cheaply via banks, interest rates, and terms of trade than through armies, police, and bureaucrats. Postwar Britain and France waged war not to keep overseas territories under imperial rule, but to keep communist insurgents from taking power and allying their countries with the USSR, an option that Fry equates with “chaos” in the context of the Cold War (p. 133). The Algerian and Indo-Chinese wars, he reminds us, were exceptional and forced upon reluctant governments by well-organized, unrepresentative, white colonial elites.

Among the essays devoted to legacies, those by Mark Beissinger and Robert Rotberg provide balance discussions of the good, bad, and ugly aspects of foreign rule and of the problems that values and mentalities generated by centralized, authoritarian rule create for the establishment of democracy and mixed economies. They remind us that habits, skills, and attitudes developed in order to live and get ahead within Soviet-style systems, such as cynicism, avoidance, “fixing,” and bribery, undermine market-based representative democracy. How many of us who were initially amazed at how willingly people “there” made promises were equally amazed to discover later that the people who made them did
not intend to do anything unless it was advantageous to them? Unconscionable behaviour in a free “civil society” is an adaptive strategy for an unfree person in a dictatorship.

Frederick Starr’s succinct comparison of the collapse of tsarist and, later, Soviet rule in Eurasia will probably become standard reading in undergraduate courses. Carol Fink, in her examination of the rise and fall of imperial rule in Germany between 1871 and 1945, attempts to go beyond her subject of expertise and deal specifically and systematically with Russia and the USSR. So does Miles Kahler, who, in light of French and British influences on their former colonies, speculates that Russian neo-imperialism is improbable outside of Central Asia. Thanks to these two authors, readers will spend less time flipping back and forth between articles to look for the comparative perspective advertised in the book’s title.

The USSR, like the Roman Empire, had its share of decadence, corruption, enervation, and servility. But, unlike the caesars, the CPSU’s first secretaries gave their people little bread and circuses, and the USSR hardly represented a great civilization. Mosfilm was no Hollywood, and the Exhibition of the USSR’s Economic Achievements in Moscow was no Disneyland. What other government, imperial or otherwise, it could be added, imprisoned and killed as many of its people in peacetime as did the Soviet government between 1921 and 1941? The CPSU did have accomplishments, but do we remember the Nazis because they provided full employment and built the Autobahn?

Although this collection does not deal with Ukraine specifically, Ukrainian specialists, including historians, should consult it and other comparative studies on empires that have recently appeared, and become familiar with the issues and approaches with which they deal. For readers today, it is no longer sufficient to explain people such as Ivan Mazepa, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and Mykola Skrypnyk only. Historians must also account for someone like Pavel Sudoplatov, who, in his Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster (1994), claimed: “I still think of myself as a Ukrainian who contributed to the buildup of this [favourable] partnership with the union [USSR]. The Ukraine’s strength within the union was the prelude to its ability to become an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”

Stephen Velychenko
University of Toronto


This collection of documents—the first publication of Pam’iatky istorii Ukrainy, serii V: Dzerela novitnoi istorii—was prepared by a group of scholars at the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences and at the Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration (TsDAVO) in Kyiv.

This volume is the fullest documentary chronicle of events in Kyiv during the first year of the Ukrainian revolution. Vladyslav Verstiu’s introduction (pp. 5–34) is both a descriptive historical account of events and a scholarly study of the Ukrainian Central Rada that presents uncommon interpretations and conclusions. The detailed notes and
commentaries to the documents have great scholarly value; they provide a great deal of additional information, particularly about the creation of political parties and civic organizations.

The volume contains the transcripts of the minutes of the meetings and sessions of the Central Rada (henceforth Rada) and its Little Rada and General Secretariat, and the written materials produced for and during the All-Ukrainian National Congress (Kyiv, 4–8 April 1917) and Congress of Peoples of Russia (Kyiv, 8–15 September 1917) convened by the Rada. Altogether there are 250 documents dated 4 March to 9 December 1917 (O.S.), including the Rada’s first three universals and various resolutions, memoranda, legislative proposals, declarations, appeals, and circulars. The documents selected are primarily those that were available in the original or as authenticated copies; documents that could not be authenticated were carefully scrutinized before being included. The latter task was very important, because scholars had expressed doubts about the authenticity of certain previously published Rada documents. (See, for example, Iakiv Zozulia, Chy IV. Universal avtentychnyi [Munich: Ukrainskyi tekhnichno-hospodarskyi instytut, 1965], a 12-page offprint from Naukovi zapysky UTHI.) The volume also includes photos of members of the Rada—most readers will see their likenesses here for the first time—and reproduces the original published versions of the Rada’s universals (pp. 102–13, 165–67, 399).

The documents are supplemented by reprints of articles that originally appeared in 1917 in the Kyiv newspapers Visty z Ukrainskoi Tsentralnoi Rady, Narodnia volia, and Nova rada. Although these articles might not always reflect accurately or fully the actual course of events or the conflicts that arose at meetings of the Rada and the General Secretariat, they do show how the contemporary reading public viewed the Rada’s activities.

Unfortunately, the volume does not contain an index of names, thereby making it harder for researchers to consult. [The index appears in volume two, which was published in late 1997. Ed.] Nonetheless, it is a unique collection because of its scope and because it contains little known and even completely unknown documents. Some of them will be of interest to researchers of Western Ukrainian history, particularly those documents that reveal the facts about the Russian military occupation of Galicia and Bukovyna, such as Dmytro Doroshenko’s report (doc. 78), and about the polemic regarding Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky’s return from exile that took place during the 26 April 1917 meeting of the Rada’s Committee (doc. 30). Several documents touch upon Ukrainian-Jewish relations (docs. 154, 157, 199, 234, 235) and reveal what measures the Ukrainian authorities introduced to combat the anti-Jewish pogroms (docs. 158, 159, 229).

The volume lists the 115 members of the Rada who took part in its first general assembly on 8 April 1917 (doc. 20), the members who were elected after 8 April (doc. 21) and re-elected in May (doc. 45), and all 640 members in early August 1917 (doc. 94). These lists could serve as a source for a prosopographic study of the Rada’s social and ethnic composition, regional representation, and its members’ educational and occupational characteristics. (During the years 1993–5, members of the Institute of Historical Research at Lviv University undertook a prosopographic analysis of the Ukrainian National Rada of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic on the basis of lists compiled by Mykola Chubaty.)
A valuable document published in the volume is the Law on Elections to the Constituent Assembly of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (doc. 197, pp. 413–32), according to which the first democratic elections on the territory of the former Russian Empire were to be held. Only the fundamental part of the law appears here, however; the instructions on applying the law’s first section, which contain valuable information about the Rada’s policy on Ukraine’s ethnic minorities and its position on civic rights, have been omitted. (See Zakon pro vybory do Ustanovchykh zboryv Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky [Kyiv, 1917], 32–4.)

The Bolshevik coup in Russia forced the Ukrainian government to adopt an independent foreign policy. The minutes of the 22–23 November 1917 meeting of the General Secretariat that deliberated the armistice at the Western front show that the Ukrainian leadership rejected the idea of a separate dialogue and that it desired an all-European peace and an accord with the Allied Powers. At the peace negotiations with representatives of the Central Powers that began in Brest-Litovsk in early December 1917, the General Secretariat’s position was based on its non-recognition of the mandate of the Council of People’s Commissars to negotiate in the name of all the peoples of “Russia” (docs. 246–48). This non-recognition resulted in tense relations between the Ukrainian and Bolshevik delegations (doc. 248).

Unfortunately, the volume’s compilers included only documents found in the TsDAVO. As a result, certain aspects of the Rada’s activity are not reflected in the volume. In this regard, it would have bethitted the compilers to search for archival materials pertaining to the Rada’s foreign policy located in Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg.

In order to understand fully the Rada’s role in 1917, it is necessary to have information about the socio-political situation in the various regions of Ukraine and particularly about the extent to which the central authorities had support on the local level. The volume’s documents and other materials pertain only to the central institutions and congresses, however, and therefore mostly reflect only events that took place in Kyiv. (In comparison, the first nine issues of Visti z Ukrainskoi Tsentralnoi Rady reprinted in Ukrainskyi istoryk [1978–9, 1981, 1984, 1986], contain a great deal of regional information.)

For decades Soviet historiography, literature, and film imposed an exclusively negative and often greatly distorted picture of the activities of the Rada and its leaders. At the same time, certain émigré authors of memoirs and historical accounts also committed the sin of non-objectivity. Despite the volume’s limitations, the documents it contains should help to destroy the stereotypes that Soviet and émigré sources fostered, to present a truer picture of historical events, and to corroborate certain facts and conclusions, which may not always be positive from the perspective of the supporters of the Ukrainian national-liberation struggle. These documents will also serve as the foundation for more concrete scholarly discussions, studies, and interpretations.

As a rule, in Ukraine interest in particular historical events and processes increases on the eve of their anniversary dates. It is the hope of this reviewer, however, that the publication of this volume on the eve of the independent Ukrainian state’s official commemoration of the eightieth anniversary of the creation of the Central Rada and the beginning of the Ukrainian revolution is not only a sign of respect for, and recognition of, the unique role of the Rada in modern Ukrainian state-building, but also an indication
A new stage in the study of the history of the Ukrainian revolution, based on an analysis that is free of bias, ideology, and dogmas, has begun.


The military history of the Ukrainian struggle for independence has not received much attention from Ukraine’s scholars. Some believe that everything that can be said about it has already been said; others refuse to risk doubting the authoritative works on the subject or to sift through a mountain of literature in order to examine well-known and little-known subjects from a new perspective. This accusation cannot be levelled against Iaroslav Tynchenko. In his book about the first Ukrainian-Soviet War (December 1917–March 1918)—a subject little known by historians—he convincingly shows that it was quite a unique war between the Ukrainian movement and the Soviet government in Moscow, and not simply a conflict. Tynchenko does not state openly who won, but he does indicate the opportunities for outright victory that the Ukrainian side forfeited.

Tynchenko blames the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Rada for losing the initiative and for the defeats in battle. In particular he blames Volodymyr Vynnychenko for plotting to have Symon Petliura removed as the general secretary of military affairs. Petliura’s successor, Mykola Porsh, proved to be an incompetent minister of defense.

The political and economic situation in Ukraine and Russia before the war began significantly complicated matters. The First World War still raged, and both the Soviet Russian and the Ukrainian governments were drawn into it in one way or another. At the same time, they were at odds over the Don Cossacks and Gen. Aleksei Kaledin’s government in the Don region. There were also disagreements over military affairs within the Central Rada. Meanwhile, the Council of People’s Commissars (CPR) in Moscow was unable to reach an accord with the Bolsheviks in Kharkiv, who, in turn, refused to recognize the “independence” of the Bolsheviks in Kyiv. All of these problems could only have been resolved together, but neither the Soviet nor the Ukrainian government dared deal with all of them. In the end, however, the Bolsheviks took the initiative. Volodymyr Antonov-Ovsiienko, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in southern Russia, sent part of his army into Ukraine while waging war with Kaledin. The bridgehead for his offensive in Ukraine was the so-called Donets-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic in the Donbas. Its government in Kharkiv, which had been created later than the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), did not change the constellation of forces, because it had little influence, support, or, more importantly, an army.

Thus, an undeclared war began. The Soviet forces slowly but determinedly took control of more and more railway hubs and large industrial centres, including Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kryvyi Rih, Chuhuiv, and Lozova. The Ukrainian government did not react, even though this was already an actual war. Moreover, the Central Rada long delayed responding to the ultimatum it received from the CPR (p. 98). Meanwhile, the Ukrainians
were in conflict with the Bolsheviks not only in Left-Bank Ukraine, but also in southern and Right-Bank Ukraine, though almost always in isolation and independently from one another. Only in southern Ukraine did the local Bolsheviks relatively swiftly seize power. In other places their successes were more modest.

The main events took place in Left-Bank Ukraine. There, after war was formally declared on 17 January 1918, the forces of the CPR remained the UNR's principal opponent. Tynchenko stresses that only 12.5 percent of those forces were comprised of Ukrainians or immigrants from Ukraine (p. 148), and that even only a third of the Red Guards in Kharkiv were Ukrainian. The rest of the Soviet forces consisted of Red Guards from Moscow and Petrograd and non-Ukrainian formations from the former Russian imperial army. Victory depended to a significant extent on who would first succeed in gaining the support of other units in the Russian army. Before the military hostilities began, there were fewer Ukrainianized units than Bolshevized ones. Except for certain volunteer detachments, however, the combat-readiness of all of them was unreliable.

Tynchenko destroys the myth that the Ukrainian forces had great power and opportunities before the war began. In addition, the Ukrainian government was unable to consolidate even those nascent forces that could have been organized as military units and deployed during the war. The absence of Ukrainian military administrations and intelligence units resulted in the relatively swift occupation of Left-Bank Ukraine by the Bolsheviks and the rapid advance of the Red Army toward Kyiv. The latter, however, accelerated the declaration of Ukrainian independence.

Tynchenko devotes more than half of his book to the above issues. In it he also devotes much attention to describing the exact deployment of forces of both belligerents and the measures they undertook, thereby transforming the book into somewhat of a guidebook on military strategy and tactics.

Tynchenko devotes his third chapter to the most important events of the war, which took place in and around Kyiv. In it he examines in detail the Kyiv Bolsheviks' attempted insurrection against the Central Rada and refutes the widespread belief that the workers of the Arsenal plant played the major role in that insurrection. In fact, the Red Guards of Kyiv's Podil district had a significant influence in the struggle for power in Kyiv, and they nearly took over the Central Rada. Tynchenko gives the insurgents their due, as he does the successfully conducted operations of both sides throughout the war. The Ukrainian government was in a tenuous situation (p. 254), but in the end it managed to defeat the insurgents in the capital. The price of the struggle was great, however. It did not afford the Ukrainians the opportunity to attain superiority in Right-Bank Ukraine (p. 227) and hampered their defense of the Dnieper's left bank. The Ukrainian army was exhausted and weak even before Muravev's main force reached Kyiv.

Tynchenko devotes a chapter to the 29 January–8 February 1918 defense of Kyiv during the Bolshevik offensive. The Soviet enemy's superiority was obvious, and after ten days of battle the Ukrainian government and the Central Rada were forced to abandon Kyiv. The Ukrainian military leaders did succeed, however, in evacuating their troops from Kyiv to Zhytomyr in an orderly manner.

After the Central Rada concluded its peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk and hostilities between the Allies and the Central Powers ceased at the Western front, the Ukrainians were successful in competing for the loyalties of many soldiers of the Russian imperial army during their mass demobilization and return home, including
those on whom the Bolsheviks relied. Consequently the Ukrainian army gradually began winning back Right-Bank Ukraine and advanced toward Kyiv. Tynchenko believes that the existing Ukrainian forces could have liberated Right-Bank Ukraine independently and disarmed the units of the imperial army. Then the Ukrainian-Soviet war would have become a war of liberation (p. 341). But this did not happen. Instead, the Central Rada invited the German army into Ukraine and thereby alienated large parts of the population. Whether it would have been possible then to resolve the issue of Ukrainian independence once and for all, as Tynchenko believes, remains debatable. But the battles for Kyiv and the demoralization of part of the Red Army did leave room for optimism.

The war, as Tynchenko describes it, was a somewhat odd conflict by the standards of warfare, even those at the beginning of this century. The forces of both sides did not exceed 5,000 to 10,000 men, and usually they numbered about 2,000. The soldiers had not been mobilized, but were volunteers—Tynchenko calls them idealists—who, in the chaos of wartime and the rise of new states and socio-political systems, were fighting for a brighter future. Of course, each side viewed the war in its own way. With these clashes between idealists began the battles involving millions during the civil and national-liberation wars in Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Central Asia.

Even though this book is generally a well-researched work, in this reviewer’s opinion its author has devoted too much attention to the purely military aspects of the war and the deployment of forces at the expense of neglecting the day-to-day experiences and actions of the war departments of Ukraine and Russia and the general political situation and morale in the country. The book would also have benefitted if Tynchenko had consulted materials found in archives outside Ukraine. Despite these inadequacies, however, the author has made a valuable contribution to the military history of twentieth-century Ukraine.

Anatolii Rusnachenko
Kyiv


The history of the Ukrainian anti-Nazi, anti-Soviet national resistance has been little studied to this day. Only a few books on this subject have appeared in the Western languages, among them John Armstrong’s Ukrainian Nationalism (1955, 1963, 1980, 1990) and Wolodymyr Kosyk’s Third Reich and Ukraine (1993). Slowly this subject has begun to be examined in post-independence Ukraine. Until recently, however, there was no collection of documents on this subject based on Soviet sources. To some extent the collection under review prepared by the Kyiv historian Volodymyr Serhiichuk fills this gap.

This selection of over five hundred documents is grouped in three chapters. The first chapter contains Soviet documents; the second, German documents; and the third, documents issued by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Each chapter begins with a short introduction. The Soviet documents will attract the greatest interest. They are almost exclusively documents that
the Ukrainian staff of the Soviet partisans, the staffs of the larger Soviet partisan coalitions, and their intelligence agencies sent to Moscow from the beginning of 1943 to the autumn of 1944. These documents prove that in early 1943 the command of the Soviet partisans in Ukraine, and their Party overseers, had a fairly complete picture of the Ukrainian movement operating in the German rear. A good example of this is the note of the head of Soviet Ukrainian State Security, Savchenko, “On the activity of the nationalists in Ukraine’s eastern oblasts.” It provides information about the state of the Ukrainian nationalist underground in various cities in eastern and central Ukraine and about the propaganda that the OUN disseminated among the many thousands of Ukrainians who were transported as slave labourers to Germany.

Many of the documents deal with the beginnings of the armed resistance against the Nazi occupation, especially in Volhynia. Doc. 17, for example, informs us about the locations of several armed nationalist formations in Rivne and Volhynia oblasts, and that the entire Ukrainian police in the towns of Kamin-Koshyrsyi, Liubeshiv, Kovel, Rivne, and Dubno had joined the nationalist underground. The authors of the documents transmitted in the summer of 1943 were already able to distinguish well among the three OUN-UPA factions, led, respectively, by Taras Bulba (Borovets), Stepan Bandera, and Andrii Melnyk. Doc. 21 describes the OUN-UPA’s armed clashes with the Germans and the increase in such activity. Doc. 13 indicates that the creation of armed formations of the Bandera faction had forced the Germans to increase substantially the size of their garrisons and units defending the railways and bridges. Doc. 28 informs us about the pressure the Bandera faction was exerting on the Germans in Ternopil oblast. Doc. 42 describes the Germans’ battles with the Bulba faction. Almost all of the documents also inform us about the Soviet partisans’ relationship toward the OUN-UPA, including mutual negotiations and armed clashes. For example, doc. 26—an excerpt from the journal of a commissar in Kovpak’s Soviet partisan coalition, Semen Rudnev—states: “The nationalists are our enemies, but they are fighting the Germans.”

Many of the documents in this chapter describe the relations between the Ukrainian and Polish populations of Western Ukraine: bloody clashes, mutual suspicions, and the Poles’ sympathy for the Soviet partisans. In his introduction, Serhiichuk expresses his point of view on the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. Doc. 59 informs us about the change in the Soviet partisans’ basically pragmatic attitude toward the UPA during the Nazi occupation and the Soviet state’s intention to destroy this armed resistance after it had reoccupied Ukraine. Khrushchev himself sent Stalin a proposal to employ a wide range of measures in battling the UPA, including bringing in five additional NKVD brigades, reinforced by tanks and armoured cars, and conscripting all suitable adult males in Western Ukraine into the Red Army and sending them to the front.

Twenty of the German documents are reports sent to Berlin by the Nazi police and security forces in the occupied eastern territories from May 1942 to September 1944. Of particular interest are the documents that allow us to analyze the condition of the Ukrainian underground in eastern Ukraine alongside the parallel Soviet documents in this collection (docs. 4, 14). Doc. 18 reports on the arrests of Bandera-faction members who had been active in Germany proper, including Berlin.

The OUN-UPA documents constitute the largest group in this collection. They include reports, leaflets, appeals issued by the Supreme Command of the UPA, and territorial leaders’ directives from June 1941 (the declaration of the renewal of an
independence of the Ukrainian state) to August 1946. (Similar documents may be found in vol. 1 of Litopys UPA [1976].) In my opinion, the most valuable documents in this group are the reports of the leaders of the OUN expeditionary groups sent into central and eastern Ukraine. Doc. 52 proves the OUN-UPA's pan-Ukrainian character. Also of interest is the OUN's appeal to Ukraine's citizens dated January 1944, which elucidates the essence of the organization's policies and calls upon the inhabitants to join the UPA.

This collection undeniably has scholarly value. It would have been an even better book, however, if Serhiichuk had done certain things. The documents from the various sources should have been synchronized: some of them deal with one period of time and others with another, thereby making them difficult to compare. Serhiichuk does not explain why all of the German documents appear in Russian translation only while all the other documents and his introductions are in Ukrainian. (Most likely the German documents had been translated years ago for use by Soviet intelligence, security, and Party agencies.) Serhiichuk does not indicate whether the originals exist or to what extent other materials have been preserved. Chapter 3 does not represent all the OUN-UPA currents, but contains only documents issued by the Bandera faction. There Serhiichuk has titled doc. 56 "The Programmatic Principles of the OUN" and has dated it August 1946. In fact it is Perspektivy nashoi borotby by Osyp Hornovy (Diakiv) and was written later than August 1946.

Since Serhiichuk is not the author of the documents, the inclusion of his name on the cover is superfluous. Finally, it is unfortunate that the collection contains only documents found in two Kyiv archives. After all, there many other documents in other archives, including ones outside Ukraine. Despite these criticisms, however, I have no doubt that historians of the Second World War, specialists on national-liberation movements, and anyone interested in modern Ukrainian history will find OUN-UPA v roky viiny a useful source of information.

Anatolii Rusnachenko
Kyiv


Finally Iurii Badzo's major contribution to the socio-political thought of the Soviet Ukrainian opposition has been published. The author, a former philologist who was a well-known human-rights activist and Soviet Ukrainian political prisoner and became a politician in post-Soviet times, began writing Pravo zhyty in 1972 and completed it in 1978, despite persecution by the KGB. The second manuscript of this work, which he wrote after the first manuscript was stolen in 1977, was confiscated in February 1979 during a KGB search of his apartment. Badzo was arrested in April 1979 and spent over nine years in prisons, Mordovian labour camps, and internal exile in Yakutia before being released and allowed to return to Kyiv in December 1988. The extant chapters of Pravo zhyty were returned to him by the Security Service of Ukraine in 1991. They are a major contribution to Ukrainian intellectual history.
In *Pravo zhyty*, Badzo undertook an all-encompassing analysis of the status and prospects of the Ukrainian nation. His examination of Ukraine’s past, present, and future was based on a painstaking, and I would say scrupulous, study of the classic works of Marxist-Leninism that became the foundation of the history and policies of the CPSU and of the Soviet way of life. This made Badzo’s work doubly dangerous to the Soviet authorities. Badzo’s use of Marxism is understandable in the conditions of the closed and totalitarian society that was the USSR. But Badzo approached Marxist teachings without piety, reviewing and revising many of their conclusions as well as the conclusions that official Soviet ideology had reached on the basis of these teachings. Badzo’s approach to Marxism was, as far as I know, unknown in the uncensored socio-political thought not only of Ukraine, but also of the entire Soviet and contemporary communist world. Unfortunately, only chapters one, two, and five of *Pravo zhyty* survived in the restricted KGB archives and were returned to Badzo in 1991.

The works’ central question is: does the Ukrainian people have a right and an opportunity to live? The CPSU’s program for the “fusion of nations under communism” condemned the peoples of the USSR to extinction. Badzo rejected and refuted this theoretical premise. He shows that its author was Lenin, who exaggerated the power and influence of assimilative processes under capitalism and subordinated the national to the social in both theory and practice. Lenin and the Bolsheviks easily accepted this premise because their party supported great-power chauvinism (*velykoderzhavnystvo*). Therefore their response to the national aspirations of the peoples of the Russian Empire was one of distrust.

The Bolsheviks’ declared right of nations to self-determination remained only words and a falsehood, at least until the captive nations forced the Soviet Russian government to grant them either real independence or republican status within the USSR. But, as Badzo shows by citing various documents, both Lenin and Stalin, and their successors, did everything possible to transform this union of republics into a renewed Russian state. What difference is there between one, indivisible Russia and one, indivisible union of republics? The difference is only one of formulation (p. 69).

With the post-Thaw intensification of the Soviet Party’s dictatorship in the mid-1960s, the theory of the fusion of nations, now disguised as the theory of the “flourishing and rapprochement of nations,” became the foundation for asserting that a single Soviet people with a common territory, culture, way of life, and the Russian language as the means of inter-national association had arisen. In this way, the creation of a single nation and people was shifted from the communist future to the time of its construction, that is, the past and present of Soviet socialism. Badzo asserts that “the idea of the fusion of nations, of a nationless humanity with one culture and one world language, arose in Russian communism exclusively as a political thesis that reflected the psychology of great-power chauvinism, the spirit and tradition of centralism” (p. 114). He shows that because of this theory and the way it was implemented, great damage and evil befell the Ukrainian people: the persecution and destruction of its culture starting in the 1920s and 1930s and continuing up to the present, the oppression of its language and its speakers, assimilation, and the reduction of everything Ukrainian to the ethnographic level. One should not, however, overestimate the theory’s successes in the USSR. As well, it received negligible support abroad.
The reflection of the above theory in the historiography of the captive peoples of the USSR, particularly the Slavic peoples, is a series of historical theories that completely falsified history. The most popular and most frequently used concept in Soviet historiography was that of an “ancient Rus’ nationality.” For Soviet Russian scholars, this nationality and its land—Kyivan Rus’—was the where the history of the Russian people and the Russian state originated, while Ukrainian and Belarusian history did not begin any earlier than the fourteenth century. These postulates, Badzo stresses, were also adopted by all official Soviet Ukrainian historians. Nonetheless, as Badzo reveals through meticulous analysis, these postulates had no scholarly foundation and remain an allegation. He shows that archeological, anthropological, and even reliable historical works by certain Soviet scholars prove that all three peoples—the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians—were separate ethnic communities before the rise of Kyivan Rus’.

Another concept beloved by official Soviet Russian historians was the concept of the unification of Ukraine and Russia. Badzo shows that in Soviet historiography, particularly from the 1950s on, it appears that nearly all of Ukraine’s history was nothing more than the desire and struggle for this unification. It is no surprise that both of the above concepts, which are very similar, are almost identical to the allegations made in pre-revolutionary Russian historiography, which also viewed the Ukrainians and Belarusians simply as etnographic branches of a single “Great Russian” people.

Another tool that the Soviet great-power chauvinists used to battle the independence-minded non-Russian peoples in the USSR was the theory of “bourgeois nationalism.” According to that theory, all national-liberation movements in the Russian Empire were reactionary, the bourgeoisie that headed them was treasonous, and therefore the inclusion of these peoples in the empire was a progressive phenomenon. Badzo points out that the first two beliefs were repudiated by what really occurred in world history, even from a Marxist perspective. The sole purpose of this theory was to justify Russian imperialism and colonialism.

Badzo shows that if one examines the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” thesis, which was disseminated in Soviet publications as widely as possible, it is evident that all it was was a means of vanquishing manifestations of Ukrainian national consciousness in the socio-political and cultural spheres. If one scrutinizes the present-day “internationalists,” they turn out to be nothing but Russian great-power chauvinists, while Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, and Pavlo Hrabovsky become Ukrainian independentists.

The most interesting and most debatable part of Badzo’s book is the final chapter, where he ponders the prospects for the Ukrainian people’s development and searches for a solid theoretical underpinning for his views. Here again he turns to Marxism, first and foremost the early works of Marx and Engels. Although he begins with Marx’s theory of private property, Badzo reaches an interpretation of communism and socialism that is entirely different from the one that the Soviet authorities imposed after the Russian Revolution of 1917. As a result of that revolution, capitalist private property was rejected, but Russia did not have the conditions for the positive accumulation of private property and all that it implied; Russia had not gone through a period of bourgeois democracy. To a significant extent, the country’s population still retained vestiges of feudalism and despotism in its consciousness and culture. Therefore a new order arose in the USSR—bourgeois socialism or, as Badzo calls it, class-antagonistic socialism. The ruling class
became the CPSU—the only structure that had a monopoly on political activity as a unique form of labour—and it controlled all property. All other classes were subordinated to it, and the intelligentsia served it. As Badzo writes, “From the CPSU’s total understanding of everything [Dlia totalnoi svidomosti KPRS], the life of the Soviet person in society is only a means of existence, a tool of progression toward a positive whole—the building of communism. The person loses his unconditional self-worth [bezumovnu samotsinnist]. The logical continuation and consummation of such an ideology is the physical annihilation of people for political reasons.” (p. 267).

What were the reasons for the state of Soviet socialism? Badzo names a number of external reasons from Russian history, the Marxist revisionism of the CPSU ideologues, and, what is particularly interesting, the flaws and utopian nature of certain Marxist tenets, including underestimating the biological-psychological origin of human beings, absolutizing the role of socio-political factors in the development of humankind, and the very idea of the proletariat. According to Badzo, the latter is based on Marx and Engels’s underestimation of the political egoism of party bureaucrats and their overestimation of the proletariat’s messianic role.

The main problem with Marx and Engels’s teachings is, according to Badzo, that their “social ideal created a closed ideological system that did not foresee and essentially denied the possibility of a critical attitude toward its own project of history, toward itself” (p. 288). It became a myth, not a science.

Badzo believes that during every concrete stage of humankind’s development the solution to social contradictions must be constantly sought, aiming toward an ideal that is impossible to attain. At the time that he wrote Pravo zhyty, Badzo saw democratization and the end of the CPSU’s monopoly on power as the only way of resolving the historical contradictions of socialism in the USSR. For Ukraine the only solution was an independent democratic-socialist state. He expressed solidarity with Eurocommunism.

Unfortunately, Badzo was unable to avoid one of the essential flaws of similar books written in various times: although his critique of the existing society, its ideology, and Marxist theoretical currents is very well done, his vision of the ideal future is much less developed. Badzo had no doubts that Ukraine had such a future. Because he had no time, or perhaps for some other reason, however, he described this ideal only in very general terms. In addition, he erred to a significant degree on the side of utopianism.

Pravo zhyty should be considered the pinnacle of the Marxist (or rather neo-Marxist) current in Ukrainian intellectual thought after Ivan Dziuba wrote Internationalism or Russification? In this published version, Badzo has modified some of his original prognoses for Ukraine’s future, which indicate that his ideas have evolved. On the whole, his work shows his familiarity with Marxism and is an important and original critique of existing socialism and of its philosophical and ideological foundations. Therefore it will be of interest and of use to historians, philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists studying not only Ukraine, but also twentieth-century European social movements and ideas. Badzo’s treatise is a reprimand directed at the Ukrainian historians and philosophers who grovelled before the Soviet regime. To a significant degree, its critique remains relevant and is applicable to the situation in Ukraine even today.

Pravo zhyty also includes an appendix containing the open letters Badzo addressed in the years 1977 and 1979 to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, foreign Communist parties, and the world’s democratic public (pp. 312–19), to the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (320–63), and to Russian and Ukrainian historians (364–390), as well as excerpts from his wife’s diaries detailing Badzo’s persecution (391–98). [The second of Badzo’s open letters—a synopsis of Pravo zhyty that he wrote after the KGB confiscated its manuscript in February 1979, appeared in English translation in the Journal of Ukrainian Studies 9 (1984), nos. 1: 74–94 and 2: 47–70. Ed.]

Anatolii Rusnachenko

Kyiv


This book consists of a monograph and a selection of over thirty documents and tables. In it Volodymyr Baran, who hails from Volhynia, examines the totalitarian system in Ukraine during the 1950s and 1960s as a phenomenon in all its aspects—social, political, economic, and spiritual. He rejects the traditional division of post-Stalin history into periods based on the rule of one or another general secretary or first secretary of the CPSU. Baran’s theoretical starting point is the concept of evolutionary totalitarianism. He defines it quite succinctly as a theory that treats the internal dynamics of the Soviet system and views totalitarianism as a process and a complete system. That is why Baran also examines the economic and spiritual elements of this system. He deems such of its traits as single-party dictates, state control of all public life, state terror and coercion, and domination by a single ideology as having already been elucidated sufficiently in the scholarly literature.

In writing his study, Baran relied on a large body of materials found in the former all-Union archives in Moscow and the Ukrainian republican archives. His analysis of these sources is more than modest; one could say, in fact, that the book is more descriptive than analytical. The general conception of monograph seems very attractive: after all, such a complex approach to Ukrainian history, particularly during the last few decades, is a rarity in Ukraine. But what is the result?

In accordance with the logic of his conception, in the first of the book’s four chapters Baran examines the “Nature and Origins of Totalitarianism.” There he provides a brief exposition and a partial analysis of various concepts of totalitarianism from the 1920s to the present. Unfortunately this pertinent chapter, with the first exposition of its kind in a historical monograph published in Ukraine, does not discuss the views of Ukrainian sociologists, political scientists, and journalists such as, for example, Mykola Stsiborsky. Baran also seems unaware of the appraisal and critique of the totalitarian system propounded in the Ukrainian underground literature of the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in Iaroslav Starukh’s brilliant booklet Upyr fashyzmu. In the first chapter, Baran also provides a brief exposition of the development of Soviet totalitarianism from 1917 to Stalin’s death. He states that it had the ability to evolve, albeit in a limited way (pp. 65–66). Although this statement is entirely believable, it is not reflected in any way in the text.
In the second chapter, "Socio-Political Processes," Baran examines in detail the crisis of the ruling Soviet elite, focussing his attention on events in Moscow. He tries to look impartially at the two principal opponents—Lavrentii Beria and Nikita Khrushchev—in the belief that Beria was not the only one responsible for the crimes of Stalin's regime. In Baran's opinion, Beria was also not the radical reformer that some have tried to paint him as today, but sooner a sober pragmatist who understood the necessity of certain changes and adaptations that the system needed to undergo in response to new conditions and situations. The principal new political condition that Baran sees is Stalin's death and the ensuing necessity of dividing the spheres of power and influence and transforming the mechanism of rule. The crisis after Stalin's death also affected political institutions, legal norms, and political culture. Still, how the crisis was manifested in the USSR, particularly in Soviet Ukraine, is nearly absent in the monograph. Baran justifiably calls the changes that were initiated a co-ordinated policy of a narrow oligarchy (p. 70).

Turning to Ukrainian problems, Baran devotes much attention to the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), defining it as an institution. The designation appears somehow dear to him when he speaks several times of the filling of the Presidium of the CPU's Central Committee and the republican Party itself with ethnic Ukrainians. One gets the impression that Baran wants to say that the composition of the CPU made it Ukrainian in terms of its political interests. In my opinion, the issue was not that. At the time, Ukraine was Russified and communized enough for most CPU members, and practically all its leaders, not to imagine themselves outside the parameters of the CPSU and the USSR. (How deep this process went in their consciousnesses is another matter.) That is why Moscow could entrust the highest posts in the republic to CPU members who were ethnic Ukrainians. Baran, however, is in no hurry to label Petro Shelest a national-communist; instead he limits himself to calling him a "nationally oriented communist" (p. 85).

Baran believes that the changes of the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the creation of a national elite in the republic and that one can clearly trace two currents within it: one autonomist but marginal, the other centrist, which dominated and determined the political line (p. 86). Although I agree with this view, which had already been voiced in publications of the 1960s, I would like to clarify one thing: during the time in question, one should speak of a regional elite running an administrative unit called the Ukrainian SSR, but never of a national elite.

In Baran's opinion, other political institutions besides the CPSU—the trade unions, soviets, and sports, scientific, and other civic organizations—were not only "decorations" in the system of Soviet democracy, but served specific aims, including preparing cadres and controlling society. Baran's exposition of the question of de-Stalinization in this chapter fits quite well with his conception. He examines de-Stalinization not only in its narrow sense as everything connected with the critique of Stalin, but also as a retreat from extreme manifestations of classic totalitarianism in all spheres of life, "a retreat from the model of so-called full totalitarianism and a certain decrease in the level of the totalitarianism of Soviet society" (p. 116).

It is fitting that Baran includes an analysis of the movement opposed to the system at the time that it was evolving. But his explication of that movement is unsuccessful. He refers to it on the whole as a dissident movement. Analyzing the Ukrainian movement from that perspective, he sees it as tending toward being national-democratic (p. 143). In
his description he makes many factual errors and exaggerations, stating, for example, that the Ukrainian National Front of the 1960s had 150 members and that Ivan Dziuba’s *Internationalism of Russification?* became the principal document of the national-democratic movement. Baran refrains from taking even a cursory look at the other forms and manifestations of opposition to the regime, such as workers’ protests, strikes, religious dissent, and the Crimean Tatar and Jewish movements. Perhaps he does not know about them. Only in passing does he mention the armed national resistance in western Ukraine that still existed in the 1950s.

In chapter three, Baran’s presentation of socio-economic relations in the 1950s and 1960s is productive vis-à-vis his theory of evolutionary totalitarianism. But he avoids defining what these relations were in totalitarian societies like the USSR. Nonetheless, the data he has amassed and certain of his partial observations are interesting. For example, he discerns two conflicting tendencies in Soviet agricultural policy after Stalin’s death—one pragmatic, the other ideological. The pragmatic tendency reflected the long overdue need to reform this backward branch of the economy, while the ideological tendency reflected the traditional view on such transformations not from the perspective of their economic usefulness, but in accordance with official ideological norms (p. 155) in a desire to make collective-farm property more like state property. Baran points out the periods of certain agricultural advancement, particularly up to and including 1958, the gradual growth in crop cultivation, and an obvious decline in animal husbandry. His analysis would only have benefitted if he had refrained from analyzing and citing contemporary rural studies and the resolutions adopted by Party plenums, which he mentions much too frequently.

Baran describes quite well the decentralization of industry and the attempts to reform it economically. He emphasizes that until the mid-1950s all administration and planning for Soviet Ukrainian industry occurred in Moscow. In the 1950s an increasingly larger percentage of industrial enterprises was transferred over to the authority of republican structures until, with the creation of the regional economic councils and the transfer of a number of local industrial enterprises over to the authority of local agencies, the all-Union agencies directly controlled no more than 2.9 to 3.8 percent of all enterprises (p. 182). The objectives for creating the regional economic councils were not only economic, such as bringing management and production closer together and avoiding industrial duplication and inter-enterprise barter, but also to weaken thereby the resistance of the Stalinist bureaucracy, particularly in the centre. In Baran’s view, this broadening of the rights and responsibilities of the national republics ensured Ukraine’s brief economic autonomy. This is debatable: after all, in that same chapter Baran speaks of the expansion of planning by Moscow, and how the CPSU, the military, and other all-Union structures remained unchanged.

Baran analyzes in detail how part of the Soviet leadership, together with leading Soviet economists, wanted to draw the USSR closer to a market economy, taking as their basis the effectiveness of this or that plant or factory and the goods they produced. Even so, Baran rightly remarks, the requirements of the economic plan still had to be fulfilled by the experimental enterprises. Gradually the all-Union bodies and agencies reasserted their control over planning, management, and industry. Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s the rate of Ukraine’s industrial development remained sufficiently high (p. 213).
In Baran’s detailed examination of Soviet social policy, which one can truly say existed from the late 1960s on as proof of the system’s evolution, this reviewer’s attention was drawn to his thesis regarding the growth of the higher nomenklatura’s privileges while the principal mass of the citizenry experienced a downward equalization in their wages. (This tendency has remained to this day.) Unfortunately, however, Baran does not elaborate this plausible thesis, even though it could substantially elucidate the evolution of this nomenklatura up until perestroika.

Baran’s fourth, and final, chapter is titled “National-Cultural Problems.” It is not very original. His exposition of Soviet nationality policy is essentially limited to a survey of Russification; and his overview of literature and art deals only with their official organizational forms without devoting any attention to their development, including their non-official variants. It appears that in general works on Ukrainian history of the Soviet period one need not write about the intensification of Party and state control over literature and art or analyze its forms, manifestations, and impact on intellectual life under the Soviet regime.

Baran does devote a much better paragraph to the role of censorship in the Soviet system of ideological control. Everything was subject to censorship, even posters about the leading collective farmers. Baran’s account of how censorship in Soviet Ukraine functioned is most likely the first of its kind. I do not agree, however, that censorship became the principal tool of Party-state control over the mass media and cultural and intellectual life (p. 262). After all, Baran indicates that there were other direct channels of influence, such as the Party itself, civic organizations, and special services. What is worse, nearly every author who wrote something for official publication had his or her own self-“censor.” As proof of this, one can add up the figures that Baran provides about censorship for political or ideological reasons of texts published from 1957 to 1960. Such censorship amounted to only 0.8 percent of all interference by censors (p. 256). What operated sooner was knowledge that such censorship existed.

Baran’s survey of the state’s attitude toward religion and the church generally confirms what he states at the beginning of it: that the secular nature of Soviet rule was embodied in a militant atheism whose stated purpose was the destruction of all religion. Baran also discusses the high level of religiousness within the population, at least outwardly, the attempts at reviving the Greek Catholic Church in western Ukraine (pp. 271, 287), and the almost complete submissiveness of the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church in their dealings with the secular authorities (p. 279).

Did Baran prove that the totalitarian system underwent an evolution in Ukraine in the 1950s and 1960s? On the whole, he was on the way to proving it. His analysis of the traditional traits of totalitarianism is successful, and he presents a good analysis of economic relations. Baran’s study would have benefitted, however, if he had gone beyond discussing only the official, superficial changes in the republic’s socio-political and economic life and in the development of literature and art, and had explored why they occurred the way they did and not differently—i.e., if he had more carefully examined the unofficial sphere of activity. Then the reader might see what Ukraine was really like during the evolution of the system.

One of the greatest flaws of Baran’s book, if not the greatest, is, in my opinion, the fact that nowhere does he directly delineate Ukraine’s place in the Soviet system: whether it was an internal colony, an indivisible part of the USSR, or something else. From
Baran’s logic, or sooner his narrative, it seems to me that Ukraine was an internal colony, but the monograph does not allow one to say so categorically. Baran’s vague approach to this principled question explains his attitude to the national movements of the 1950s and 1960s and, less so, the elite. This partly explains, and is explained by, his greater attention to elucidating Ukrainian issues using data from the former all-Union archives in Moscow. There is no doubt that Ukraine’s history is intertwined with the history of the USSR. But there are valuable documents pertaining to this history in Ukraine’s archives that would have merited inclusion in the documentary appendix to this volume. Surprisingly, the monograph has no conclusion. Instead Baran presents a projection of events in the USSR and Ukraine from the 1970s to the mid-1990s.

Baran’s book is more empirical than analytical. Still, despite the criticisms, at times significant ones, that can be levelled against it, it is worth reading. It bears the marks of an evolution away from the scholarly works written in Ukraine’s recent totalitarian and colonial past.

Anatolii Rusnachenko
Kyiv


These two books reflect an ongoing, twofold debate within the political camp of President Leonid Kuchma over Ukrainian national identity and “Ukrainianness.” First, the debate is a reaction to the perceived western Ukrainian bias of Leonid Kravchuk’s presidency. Secondly, it is related to the entry of the “Little Russian,” Russophone elites from eastern Ukraine into the state- and nation-building processes after Kuchma’s victory in the July 1994 presidential elections. Both books show a marked evolution away from the romantic Eurasianism of two works (one of them co-authored by Tabachnyk) published a year earlier (see my review article in Journal of Ukrainian Studies 22 [1997], nos. 1–2: 145–64). This reflects the speed of Ukraine’s post-Soviet transformation process.

The three volumes of Nahorody Ukrainy is devoted to a history of Ukrainian commemorative medals, which are an important part of the symbolism of Ukraine’s state- and nation-building processes. Volume one deals with the medals issued before the twentieth century, during the political and military struggle to establish an independent Ukrainian state (1917–21), and in the Ukrainian diaspora during the years 1921–93. Volume two covers Soviet commemorative medals that were issued from 1921 to 1991. Volume three deals with the medals issued since 1991 in independent Ukraine. The number of medals has expanded under Kuchma far beyond the number issued under Kravchuk; they serve to link Ukraine’s newly revived national historiography with that of the emerging nation-state. Volume three also contains a large statistical section about
the people who have received commemorative medals, an excellent bibliography, and an index of names. In all three volumes, a large number of primary documents supplements the analysis and commentary, and the text is augmented by colour reproductions of the medals.

*Nahorody Ukrainy* serves to show that there has been a continuity throughout various periods of Ukrainian history. Unlike during the period of Kravchuk’s presidency, when Ukrainian military publications ignored Soviet military traditions and experience, under Kuchma the Ukrainian state has sought to forge a more all-embracing national idea built upon both of Ukraine’s legacies—the national and the Soviet. When dealing with World War II, for example, new, officially approved Ukrainian history textbooks portray all Ukrainians who fought in the war as patriots, regardless of the military formations (Soviet, nationalist) in which they served. Volume one of *Nahorody Ukrainy* does the same, and it includes photographs and commentary on commemorative medals issued by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and even the Waffen SS Galizien Division.

*Ukraina: Alternatyvy postupu* is a curious survey of Ukrainian history written by three prominent figures associated with the Kuchma administration. It critically reviews Ukrainian history from the viewpoint of Ukraine’s attempts at “self-affirmation” as a “state nation” (*derzhavna natsiia*). The authors deliberately use the latter phrase (rather than “nation-state”); it appears that they prefer Paul R. Magocsi’s territorial approach to Ukrainian history to the ethnic variant espoused by Mykhailo Hrushevsky or Orest Subtelny. The volume’s meandering and often waffling text is divided into fifteen chapters, twelve of which focus on the twentieth century.

In my opinion, the authors do not deal adequately with the 1932–33 man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine, Soviet nationality policies, the UPA and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or the Soviet Ukrainian dissident movement. They seem confident that there is no going back to the Soviet era, but what lies ahead and how Ukraine will look in the future is less certain to them. Building an independent state and “internal consolidation” (i.e., nation-building) will, they believe, take decades.

The authors do not doubt that Ukraine was and is a European country. Unlike their predecessors under Kravchuk, however, they recognize that the centuries that Ukraine was part of the tsarist and Soviet empires have left a “Eurasian” imprint upon Ukraine and given rise to differing regional political cultures. Therefore support for independence varies throughout Ukraine, and this lack of uniformity is “negatively impacting upon the unification of the Ukrainian nation” (p. 632). The authors do not agree with Hrushevsky’s view that Kyivian Rus’ was a proto-Ukrainian state. Instead they support the theory that all three Eastern Slavic nations emerged as separate entities in the twelfth century. By the time of the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, the Ukrainians and the Muscovites/Russians had drifted very far apart. During the Khmelnytsky period, the Ukrainians understood who they were not; in other words, they distinguished between themselves and the “others”—the Poles, Tatars, and Russians. Tsarist and Soviet rule served to blur the distinction between the Ukrainians and the Russians. Presumably this distinction will once again become clear now that the USSR no longer exists.

Thankfully, the authors do not subscribe to the tsarist and Soviet interpretation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav as the culmination of the “age-old desire for reunification of the two fraternal peoples.” Instead they argue that the Poles pushed Ukraine into an alliance with Muscovy, which was reinforced by the Orthodox Christian culture that Ukraine and
Russia shared (pp. 192–93). The authors support V’iacheslav Lypynsky’s view that, despite over three centuries of tsarist and Soviet rule, the difference between the political cultures of Ukraine and Russia remains distinct.

The authors, like all members of the Kuchma administration, criticize the tsarist and Soviet states’ policies of Russification and denationalization without blaming the ethnic Russians. (In this regard they go farther than the British scholar Andrew Wilson, who refused to use the term “Russification” in his *Ukrainian Nationalism: A Minority Faith* [Cambridge University Press, 1997].) They state that the “unique Cossack republic” evolved into a “typical Russian gubernia inhabited by landowners and serfs” (p. 181). Because Ukrainian national activities were suppressed in the Russian Empire, the only course available to most Ukrainians was assimilation or, at best, becoming “Little Russians.” This had a disastrous effect upon Ukraine’s chances of success in its drive toward independence in the years 1917–21, because at that time Ukraine had “not yet matured internally” (p. 258).

The central question posed in this book is how Ukraine can overcome the legacy of denationalization inflicted upon it by the tsarist and Soviet regimes. For the authors, the central task for the Ukrainian nation in the twentieth century has been “its transformation from an ethnos into a conscious political and cultural community” (p. 198). This nation-building (“consolidation”), they argue, has to incorporate all of Ukraine’s ethnic groups and regions “with their [specific] interests, traditions, values, cultures, and languages” (p. 546). The authors support the construction of a “national type of statehood” and the search for a “national state idea,” without which the Ukrainians “cannot overcome ... the[ir] ‘plebeian’ or ‘non-historical’ people complex” (pp. 672 and 684).

While accepting Ukraine as a multiethnic state that provides political, social, economic, and cultural rights to all of its citizens, the authors signal their support for the June 1996 Ukrainian constitutional view of the Ukrainians as the sole titular nation and of Ukraine’s Russians as one of its many ethnic minorities. This view was also upheld during Kravchuk’s presidency, but some authors in Russia and the West (e.g., Dominique Arel) condemned it at the time as promoting Ukraine as a “nationalizing state.” (The latter opinion is still held in Ukraine by Vladimir Grinev’s Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms party, which is probably why Kuchma has not chosen it as his “party of power.”) The independent Ukrainian state’s policies, the three authors believe, should facilitate the “ethno-cultural revival” of the ethnic Ukrainians as the “state-supporting titular nation that is the demographic and ethnic basis of Ukrainian society.” This, in turn, will help facilitate the gradual expansion of the Ukrainian language “into all spheres of life with the aim of ensuring that the language situation is brought into line with the ethno-cultural structure of society” (pp. 756–77).

While supporting Ukraine’s independence, the authors criticize its alleged “absolutization” under Kravchuk. Instead of the latter, they support a strategy that rejects both this absolutization and Belarusian-style dependency on Russia. They view Kuchma’s domestic and foreign policies as aiming to strike a difficult balance between these two extremes. In addition, they reject the view held by the Kravchuk administration—that Ukraine only has national interests in the West—in favour of a more all-embracing security policy that also recognizes Ukraine’s interests in the CIS. This policy will ensure that the interests of all of Ukraine’s regions are taken into account. Still, co-operation
with the West is crucial, because it “will provide the possibility of solidifying [utverdeny] the Ukrainian independent state” (p. 712).

Both works under review give us reason to doubt Kuchma’s lack of commitment to state- and nation-building. Such a charge was levelled against him when he was elected in July 1994. The continuity in policies between the Kravchuk and Kuchma administrations reflects an emerging consensus within Ukraine’s non-communist elites to support political and economic reforms and state- and nation-building.

Taras Kuzio
Honorary Research Fellow
Ukraine Centre
University of North London

Vasyl Boiechko, Oksana Hanzha, and Borys Zakharchuk. 
Kordony Ukrainy: Istorychna retrospektyva ta suchasnyi stan. 

The unanticipated collapse of the Soviet Union and the spontaneous emergence of the former Soviet republics as independent states in 1991 raised concerns about the prospects of instability in the region and the legitimacy, acceptability, and durability of their borders. After the various republics declared sovereignty in 1990, their leaders had begun addressing these issues by signing bilateral agreements affirming the status quo of the republics’ borders. The elevated significance of these borders resulted in increased interest in the history of their formation. In Ukraine’s case, however, no academic works dealing specifically with the history of its borders had theretofore been written.

After the declaration of Ukraine’s sovereignty in 1990, three members of the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences in Kyiv, Vasyl Boiechko, Oksana Hanzha, and Borys Zakharchuk, wrote a 31-page monograph entitled Formuvannia derzhavnykh kordoniv Ukrainy, 1917–1940 rr. After Ukraine’s declaration of independence, concerns about the potential instability of Ukraine’s borders with Romania and Russia and about the question of Crimea increased. Consequently the three authors expanded their study into the book under the review. It was published with the assistance of Ukraine’s Institute of Public Administration and Local Government and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, and partially financed by Canada’s Department of External Affairs. The book discusses the history of the formation of Ukraine’s borders from the time of the Central Rada (1917) to the transfer of Crimea (1954) to the Ukrainian SSR, describing chronologically unfolding events per border issue.

The current border of Ukraine has two origins: (1) the internationally recognized external border of the former USSR; and (2) the inter-republican borders between the former Soviet republics. Using historical data and ethnic-population settlement statistics, the authors argue in support of the legitimacy of the formation and demarcation of Ukraine’s existing borders and therefore their acceptability to Ukraine, even though they were determined and imposed upon Ukraine by Moscow, usually by Stalin. For the authors, Ukraine’s commitment to the existing borders, even though millions of
Ukrainians live in ethnic Ukrainian territory located beyond these borders, demonstrates the state’s sincere co-operation in maintaining a stable, albeit territorially disadvantageous, border.

The authors examine how the USSR government officially delineated Ukraine’s border with the Belorussian SSR and the Russian SFSR on the basis of the recommendations made by the border commission established by Moscow in 1924. The commission considered ethnic and economic criteria when it relegated the nine ethnic Ukrainian former gubernias of the Russian Empire to Soviet Ukraine, excluding Crimea and some minor adjustments. In 1954, however, Crimea, with its preponderance of Russians and severe economic needs, was officially transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR with the approval of the CPSU and the Russian and Ukrainian Supreme Soviets. The authors effectively argue that both the Russian SFSR and Crimea consented to the present-day Ukrainian-Russian border and to the inclusion of Crimea in Ukraine. Moscow, not Kyiv, had the final say.

It must be emphasized that Kordony Ukrainy does not focus on the history of the formation of Ukraine’s territorial and ethnic boundaries before 1917 or on their possible impact upon Ukraine’s present-day borders. The authors provide no analysis of the formation of the borders between Muscovy/Russia and the Hetmanate and Slobidska Ukraine, or of the border formed by the former imperial gubernias of Chernihiv (excluding its northern portion), Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, and Tavria. The authors also fail to mention, let alone analyze, the legal and de facto demarcation of maritime borders in the Black Sea and Azov Sea or the Ukrainian-Romanian border at the mouth of the Danube River, despite the importance of military security, the potential results of underwater oil and mineral exploration, fishing rights, and Romania’s territorial claims to a small Ukrainian-held island in the Black Sea. Strategic and military considerations in the formation of Ukraine’s borders are omitted. Yet they determined Stalin’s inclusion of ethnic Ukrainian lands west of the Carpathian Mountains within the Ukrainian SSR; Ukraine’s sharing the mouth of the Danube with Romania; Russia’s retention of the mouth of the Don River at the Sea of Azov; and the importance of Crimea to both Ukraine and Russia. There is also no comparison of border issues in Ukraine with those in the other former Soviet republics or in the east European countries.

Kordony Ukrainy has a 22-item, 59-page appendix. None of the items are dated after 1940; specifically, there are no documents from the years 1945–46, when the current Polish-Ukrainian border was delineated; from 1954, when Crimea was transferred to Ukraine; or from 1990, when the various Soviet republics signed treaties confirming the status quo of their existing common borders. Nevertheless, the authors’ extensive use of primary-source materials obtained from government and former Party archives has resulted in an informative and well-argued presentation. As the first book focussing primarily on the formation and legitimacy of Ukraine’s current borders, it is highly recommended.

Andrew Beniuk
University of Alberta

The re-evaluation of Ukrainian literary history has begun. The results, so far, are refreshing, even exciting. The cobwebs of Serhiy Iefremov, Oleksander Doroshkevych, Dmytro Chyzhevsky, and other luminaries in the field of literary history are being swept away and replaced by fine spider webs of new postmodern literary structures borrowed mostly from the West. One can only speculate how long they will last before yet another new wave of perceptions of literature will overtake them. Yet there is something exhilarating in the change of attitudes. It is a long overdue innovation.

One of the first studies of twentieth-century Ukrainian literature written in this new vein is Solomiia Pavlychko’s study. Its appearance caused a minor storm in the Ukrainian press and the literary milieu in Kyiv. In reality, her book is an example of thorough and dedicated scholarly analysis that, while offering completely new vistas of Ukrainian literature, does not contain any “outrageous” new concepts. A traditionalist can read it with real pleasure.

Dividing her book into four main chapters, Pavlychko proceeds from “The Crisis of Populism at the Turn of the Century and the Appearance of a Modernist Discourse” to “Modernism as Aestheticism,” “The ‘Hidden’ Modernism of the 1920s: Between the Avant-Garde and Neoclassicism,” and, finally, “Modernism in the Context of the Artistic Ukrainian Movement [MUR].” This last chapter concludes with what, perhaps, are the most original essays in the volume—“The Philosopher of Crisis and Instability: [Viktor] Petrov-Domontovych-Ber” and “The Nihilistic Modernism of [Ihor] Kostetsky.” A puzzling omission is any discussion of the self-proclaimed “modernist” New York Group of Ukrainian émigré poets.

In her examination of modernism not as a “a selection of stylistic, formal, or genre principles, but as a certain artistic philosophy, a certain model of literary development in our century” (pp. 12–13), Pavlychko carefully notes considerable differences between several Ukrainian modernisms. Their desire to be “modern,” to draw closer to reality, showed itself in very different circumstances and with very different results. It is in distinguishing the various “modernisms” in the works of different Ukrainian writers that Pavlychko excels. While showing the weakness of “modernist theories” among Ukrainian critics, she tends to concentrate on those theoreticians who have been neglected (for example, Mykola Ievshan, on pp. 127–61). Equally penetrating is her treatment of the “modernism” of the 1920s. For the first time, the writers Mykola Khvylov, Valerian Pidmohylny, and Viktor Petrov are discussed as modernists, and even the Neoclassicists (pp. 191–99) represent for her “a philosophy of conservative modernization.” The general impression of that period of literature as quite stunted, although still vigorous, is acceptable to most discriminating readers.

No great Ukrainian modernist literary work was possible. Nagging populism was far from dead, and it was successfully resuscitated in the official Soviet doctrine and practice of “socialist realism” in the 1930s. Pavlychko, however, rescues even the slightest glimmer of modernity before the onset of Stalinism, and is inclined to see a modernist revival in some works of the 1970s (e.g., the poetry of Ihor Kalynets). There is no doubt
that the postmodernism of the most recent Ukrainian poetry and prose shows a resurgence of modernity.

Pavlychko’s postmodernist discourse is refreshing and almost completely free of jargon. It makes stimulating reading—so stimulating that one deputy in today’s Ukrainian parliament reacted with a furious condemnation of it, alleging that it slandered Ukrainian national culture. This, surely, indicates that modernity is still a far cry for most Ukrainians, who are unable to welcome an open society. Yet theirs is a hopeless rear-guard fight against not only postmodernism, but also post-colonialism. The changing spectrum of appreciating one’s own culture as part of the European heritage has been eloquently depicted by Solomiia Pavlychko. She has done so without resorting to a pure analysis of texts, as so often happens, but within the framework of cultural and intellectual history. For her gesture towards a more traditional critical analysis, this reviewer is especially grateful.

George S. N. Luckyj
University of Toronto


Historical philology has long been a fruitful method for analyzing medieval written sources, and it has provided many good insights into the history of early Rus’. The most recent work in this tradition is the late Bohdan Strumiński’s study of the foreign loanwords found in Old East Slavic. After an initial chapter discussing the distinctive features that developed in the East Slavic languages during the ninth through eleventh centuries, the next three chapters examine Old Nordic as reflected in the Old East Slavic languages and vice versa, and the interrelations between Old Nordic and Old East Slavic onomastics. Chapters five and six cover Old Nordic and Old East Slavic mutual lexical borrowings and Finnic borrowings in Old East Slavic. Finally, Strumiński provides a lengthy index, organized by language group, encompassing all the words found in his study. In sum, this is a particularly useful handbook for anyone interested in the possible non-Slavic origins of a given word found in a text relating to early Rus’ history.

At a time when scholars have increasingly utilized a multidisciplinary approach in the study of early medieval European Russia, Strumiński steadfastly pursued a highly traditional but very narrow philological method with an underlying assumption that etymology can explain many of the mysteries of early Rus’ history. In his very first chapter, the author asks why there was such great linguistic unity among the East Slavic tribes that had settled over a huge territory of some one thousand km. His answer is that the Northmen (Vikings) united the various East Slavic tribes and imposed Nordic political authority and Byzantine religion upon them between the early ninth and mid-eleventh centuries. He then asserts that to demonstrate that this answer is plausible, it is necessary
to show that the basic features of the East Slavic linguistic area developed during this “Nordic” period (p. 11).

Strumiński’s claim that there was an extraordinary linguistic unity among the early East Slavic tribes is a supposition that cannot be proven owing to the lack of written sources from this period. The single most important source, the Rus’ Primary Chronicle, was composed in Kyiv, and perhaps other places, by a number of authors writing after the mid-eleventh century. The language they employed was strongly influenced by Church Slavonic. The best pre-1050 source, De Administrando Imperio (ca. 950) by Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, is problematic, because its Rus’/Norse and Slavic names were ostensibly recorded by a Greek author who never came near the Rus’ lands himself. The only way to demonstrate an “amazing linguistic unity” among the East Slavic tribes would be to compare documents written in Old East Slavic by members of the various tribes before 1050. Given the absence of such written sources, archaeology provides the best evidence regarding the degree of homogeneity within East Slavic society during the Viking Age. And, while archaeologists note many common East Slavic features in the material culture, they also emphasize the distinctive characteristics of each East Slavic tribe. In short, there are good reasons to question the basic premise of the book.

The book’s structure also presents problems. It seems to be more a series of collected essays on a variety of linguistic themes than a systematic, well-organized analysis. Chapter four, for example, discusses the origins of the word Rus’ (from Baltic Finnish *ruotsi ‘Swede’), the etymology of the word Ladoga, the East European river and place names in Old Nordic, the gods of the Rus’, the Old Ukrainian, Old Nordic, and Khazar names for Kyiv, the Old Ukrainian and Old Nordic names for the Dnieper Rapids, the origins of the name Igor’, the term urmane in the Primary Chronicle, the ethnic composition of the early Rus’ elite as reflected in personal names, and the original form of the personal names found in the Rus’-Byzantine treaties of the tenth century. Each of these subjects is interesting, and Strumiński makes a number of important points. But he fails to show how all these individual sections relate to a larger theme. The absence of a conclusion also emphasizes the lack of a well-developed connection between individual sections. In short, the reader is left to guess how all the parts of this work are supposed to fit together.

In addition to Church Slavonic, Strumiński constantly refers to a variety of languages spoken by the East Slavs during this time—East Slavic, Old Russian, Old Belarusian, Old Ukrainian, Old East Slavic, and Rus’. He never explains what he means by each of these terms, nor does he discuss their interrelationship. The very use of all these terms points to significant linguistic disunity among the East Slavs. It is very difficult to accept the idea that Old Russian, Old Belarusian, and Old Ukrainian already existed in the Viking Age. It seems more plausible to argue that regional dialects of Old Rus’/Old East Slavic had begun to appear already at this time. But such a development would run counter to the author’s basic premise about linguistic unity.

Strumiński’s highly traditional approach also leads him to omit a number of important written sources. Over the past twenty years, linguists such as Andrei A. Zalizniak have published important studies on the Old Novgorodian dialect as reflected in the almost 800 birchbark texts found in Novgorod and other Rus’ towns. The fifty or so texts dating from the eleventh to early twelfth century provide the “purest” linguistic evidence of the language spoken by the people of the northern Rus’ lands. It is thus
regrettably that Strumiński does not consider them. Furthermore, he did not examine the birchbarks and graffiti that contain the earliest references to such words as berkovets, poromon', kapi, kolbiag, lar', sorochok, tiun, and iabitnik. He also omits the Norse name Azgut, found in birchbark no. 526 from Novgorod and dating from the second third of the eleventh century. The earliest reference to the word meta is found on elasp-lock no.5 from a Novgorod stratum dating from 973–1051. These early Rus' “written” sources are especially pertinent for this type of historical-philological study. A number of specific points also need emendation.

While Strumiński provides us with a valuable reference work on the lexical borrowings in Old East Slavic, he does not elaborate any general thesis that explains what these individual borrowings tell us about early Rus' history.

Thomas S. Noonan and
Roman K. Kovalev
University of Minnesota


Alexander Schenker’s Dawn of Slavic is a valuable contribution to the field of Slavic studies. A brief review can only touch upon his wide-ranging treatment of various complex, often controversial topics in Slavic philology. The book is intended to be an introductory handbook for the beginning student of the earliest period of Slavic culture and “a guide to further reading, an invitation to a deeper and broader study of subjects” (p. xv) in the history of Slavic. It is arranged and written in such a way that it can also be used by specialists in non-Slavic studies and by non-philologists, for it provides glosses, translations, and explanations of linguistic terminology. The book offers maps, tables, copious notes, a cross-reference index, a full bibliography, and attractive plates reproducing samples of early manuscripts and inscriptions. The work is divided into three long chapters (“Historical Setting,” “Language,” “Early Writing”) and four appendices.

Chapter one comprises “a historical sketch of Slavic settlement in Europe and the integration of the Slavs into medieval European cultural commonwealth” (p. xv). This chapter outlines a number of theories about the Slavic ancestral home (the autochthonous, the Danubian, and the mid-Dnieper theories), and both supporting evidence and inconsistencies are provided for each theory. In addition, the author sketches a broad general picture of the early Slavs, their history, culture, and religious beliefs, and the way in which the Slavs fitted in among the Indo-European peoples. Extensive examples describing the early Slavs as seen by their neighbours in non-Slavic primary sources are provided. Chapter one also presents a detailed account of the Moravian mission and considerable information about the Cyrillic-Methodian tradition, including the role and legacy of Constantine and Methodius and their disciples in the development of Slavic letters. Again, this information is based on Slavic (Vita Constantini, Vita Methodii, Bulgarian Legend, Primary Chronicle) and non-Slavic (Italian Legend, Papal Correspondence, and Conversio) primary sources. The portrayal of the Moravian and Bohemian periods is also drawn from primary sources
(Annals of Fulda, Frankish Chronicle, Royal Frankish Annals, Thietmari Merseburgensis episcopi chronicon). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the long-standing question of the origin of the term “Rus’.” Schenker presents the views of the “Normanists” and the “anti-Normanists”; most of the evidence supports the Normanist view.

Chapter two, dealing with the language of the Early Slavs, starts with a short general presentation of the main concepts of historical linguistics, such as the idea of a proto-language, linguistic reconstruction, and phonetic laws. The information is especially helpful for a reader with little or no background in linguistics. This is followed by a survey of the Indo-European languages, their basic classification, and the relevance of some of them to the Slavic world. The survey concludes with a thorough presentation of the Slavic linguistic family. To ground his presentation of Proto-Slavic, Schenker provides a concise description of the reconstructed phonemic inventory of Proto Indo-European (PIE), as well as the set of sound changes leading to the dissolution of PIE linguistic unity. The description provides only the messy cursory information on the rise of Slavic phonemic pitch. The chapter then proceeds to an analysis of Early Proto-Slavic (EPS), its phonemic inventory, and changes that EPS underwent on its way to Late Proto-Slavic (LPS). This portion of the chapter is presented clearly except for some terminological inconsistencies. When illustrating some dialectal differences already present in EPS (the fate of *sk and *zg clusters in particular (p. 84), the author compares their reflexes in eastern South Slavic and Czech/Slovak with Russian. His use of the term “Russian” contradicts the author’s earlier statement (p. 60) that he will use the term “Early East Slavic” as the cover term for the pre-Petrine variety of Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Russian. Similarly, in the examples of intra-syllabic harmony (p. 88) the term “Old Russian” is used. Such inconsistencies may lead the reader to misplace a particular reflex chronologically.

Velar palatalizations and their relative chronology, one of the central and most controversial issues in Slavic historical phonology, are discussed in some detail. Schenker doubts the third-before-first hypothesis and argues against it at some length. In fairness, more evidence in support of that hypothesis could have been provided, including facts related to *x not participating in the progressive palatalization, as well as the failure of Novgorod dialects to undergo the progressive palatalization. The section on phonology concludes with a summary of data on LPS phonemes and their distribution in tables.

Chapter two continues with the discussion of Proto-Slavic grammatical categories and their correspondences in the system of PIE. The discussion of nominal declensions is solid, although in places the description is too laconic and confusing. For instance, the illustration of the substantival declensions is organized into two tables: the endings of PIE (p. 124: table 6) and the corresponding endings of LPS (p. 124: table 7). The commentaries contained in notes to both tables point to the development of various endings from PIE to LPS. However, these entries have no reference to a specific declension type. To illustrate, consider note 3a on p. 123: “In -Vn(t)š, n was lost and the preceding vowel, if short, underwent compensatory lengthening. The low back vowels were, as a rule, raised to ĭ,...” A reader who is not familiar with the PIE and LPS systems will have difficulty with this section and probably will not be able to relate -Vn(t)š to the label “Consonantal” given in tables 6 and 7 (p. 124). Table 7 (p. 124) is incomplete; it omits neuter endings in the plural paradigm of the ð-stems (nominative and accusative neuter plural ending -a is not included) and ascribes the feminine/neuter ending -č₂ to the nominative/accusative dual of -stems, even though no feminine nouns belong to this declension type.
The presentation of adjectives is wanting in detail. What is needed is a table illustrating all case/number endings, not merely a description of the fairly idiosyncratic rules governing their composition. Although Schenker claims (p. 129) that the plural definite adjectival link y (i) comes from the instrumental plural masculine/neuter stary + jimi > staryjimi, the source can be sought just as easily, if not better, in the genitive plural of all genders: star-Ь + jixь > staryjixь (with regular lengthening of Ь to y in the vicinity of j).

The description of the verb and verbal categories is succinct and informative. One could quibble with the statement (p. 138) that the two conjugations differ in the third person plural. The ending in both instances is underlying -ntь, in one conjugation preceded by o, in the other by i (with o + ntь > qть, i + ntь > -еть). In other words, the two "conjugations" have exactly the same endings. Nowhere, either here or in the discussion of syntax, are future auxiliary constructions (with имать, хотеть, and нaчать) mentioned. Chapter two also addresses questions of syntactic reconstruction and problems related to it; it includes a cursory examination of the uses of cases and word order in LPS. A valuable sample of LPS vocabulary is included in this chapter. The lexical entries are conveniently grouped according to semantic classes (substantives and adjectives) or stems (verbs). A list of prepositions and lexical borrowings is also appended. This portion of the chapter is presented systematically, aside from minor slips (the verb ‘каза’ is translated as ‘to show’ on p. 158, but as ‘to explain’ on p. 139). The discussion of the language of the early Slavs ends with a detailed list of LPS dialect isoglosses.

Chapter three, by far the most valuable in this reviewer’s opinion, discusses a set of important issues related to the beginnings of Slavic writing. The information provided here, much of it for the first time in English, at least in such detail and in one place, will serve as an important tool for those preparing to read early Slavic manuscripts. The chapter begins with a note on paleography and proceeds with a detailed account of Slavic alphabets and the history behind them: both the Glagolitic and the Cyrillic alphabets are organized in a table of correspondences including comments about each graph and its sources. The beginning reader will be grateful to find here an explanation and illustration of digraphs, ligatures, and superscript letters, as well as a list of common abbreviations found in early Slavic texts. This chapter also explains how to interpret dates and numbers. Another helpful set of data, rarely found in introductory works on early Slavic, includes a note on punctuation and diacritics, a discussion of various styles of handwriting with reference to specific manuscripts, and commentary on the physical description of manuscripts, including the layout of the page, format, writing materials, binding, decorative elements, and terminology.

This chapter also includes a section on the formation of Old Church Slavonic, its relation to Proto-Slavic, and its role as the first Slavic literary language. The discussion incorporates Church Slavonic and common terminology regarding its local recensions. The author outlines the distinguishing features of each recension, supported by a list of specific manuscripts. The beginning reader may be a bit puzzled here, since a list of specific manuscripts is presented for the Bulgarian and Macedonian, Serbian and Croatian, and Czech (West Slavic) recensions, but under the so-called Russian recension Schenker only notes that this variant “is known from a very large number of manuscripts and inscriptions” (p. 192); there is no reference to specific manuscripts, nor is there a clear statement of which period is being discussed.
At the end of chapter three, the author presents a considerable amount of information regarding the classification of the oldest Slavic texts. He discusses in varying depth and detail various genres, including inscriptions and graffiti, and outlines clearly the textual characteristics and peculiarities of each.

The appendices are an excellent addition to the book. Appendix A presents concisely the history of Slavic philology from its formative period to the present day, listing the most influential works and activities of the illustrious Slavic philologists from the eighteenth century through the present. This appendix also includes information about publications of Slavic manuscripts and the locations of various manuscript collections. Appendix B is a chronological table of dates, events, and personalities in the history of the Slavs. The Orthodox Church calendar is outlined in appendix C. Appendix D is an admirable centerpiece of this work, for it handsomely exhibits excerpts from a great number of early Slavic texts in three alphabets (Glagolitic, Cyrillic, and Roman) and in three forms (high quality photo-reproduction, transliteration, and translation). Each text is followed by handy relevant information, including the text’s peculiarities and distinguishing features. Students of Slavic studies will find a superb and extensive bibliography at the end of the book, which is an excellent reference guide to further study and research.

To sum up, the book is an essential contribution to Slavic studies in the English-speaking world. Alexander M. Schenker has provided a knowledgeable and sophisticated introduction to Slavic philology and textology. This makes the work very suitable as the main text for courses in textology, paleography, advanced reading in Old Church Slavonic, or, most appropriately, for a general, introductory Slavic philology course such as the one out of which this book seems to have developed. Despite this reviewer’s wish that the author had added additional tables to improve clarity, and despite his few minor omissions and occasionally too laconic narrative, this is a stimulating work that belongs in every Slavist’s library.

Alla Nedashkivska Adams  
University of Toronto


During his long and prolific life, the late Peter Krawchuk (1911–97) served as the leading chronicler of the history of the Ukrainian-Canadian pro-Communist Left. In the 1950s the author penned Na novii zemli, a general overview of the “progressive movement” among Ukrainians in Canada, and from that time on he routinely produced detailed works dealing with various aspects of that movement’s past.

Krawchuk’s oeuvre predictably reflected the givens of the movement. In the late 1980s, however, the earth moved: the notion of glasnost finally reached the true believers in Canada. In 1989 the National Committee of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC) passed a resolution calling for “an honest, frank and objective
reappraisal of some particular periods and practices in our history.” Krawchuk ended up writing two of his last and most significant works, Bez nedomovok and Our History, in this spirit. The results are mixed: both works are notably more open-minded than his earlier writings, but they can hardly be regarded as forthright.

Our History is a departure of sorts for the author. Topics that he and his comrades had previously ignored or denied now come to the surface. In the book, Krawchuk finally admits that Danylo Lobay was justified in his criticisms that led to his break with the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA, the AUUC’s ideological successor) in 1935 (pp. 198–201). He admits that the purge of Ukrainian intellectuals under Stalin, starting with the show trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in 1929, is historical fact, as is the man-made Soviet Ukrainian famine of 1932–33. There is also a change in attitude. Krawchuk cites non-“movement” Ukrainian-Canadian organizations as having “ideological differences” with the ULFTA/AUUC, instead of lambasting them (as he once would have done) as circles of bourgeois toadies and nationalist vipers. The Communist Party of Canada (CPC) is roundly criticized for its obtrusive interference in the internal affairs of the movement; this criticism is one of most valuable aspects of the book.

In making a break with the past, Krawchuk goes so far as to admit that errors were made and to assume his own share of responsibility in this regard (p. 201). Such candidness is a significant change from the wholly orthodox tone of Krawchuk’s earlier works. Yet, it is short of being earth-moving. Many of the topical matters that Krawchuk broaches were established as fact in other historical writing long ago. Moreover, while he does acknowledge sensitive matters (e.g., Lobay) as “shortcomings,” he does not analyze or pursue them in order to establish how or why they occurred. In fact, Krawchuk seems to be avoiding investigating in favour of apologia when he stresses that such deeds were done by people acting “in good faith” (p. 201 and esp. 264–66) who were victims of “a terrible criminal deception” on the part of callous Communist hierarchs.

Ultimately, Our History is not fundamentally different than Krawchuk’s earlier writings. It might well be described as a digest of his earlier works, with single chapters distilling the essence of individual monographs. Even the attitude has not really changed. This is not a discerning examination of the Ukrainian-Canadian progressive movement (as the pro-Communist Left prefers to call itself). Rather, it is a largely uncritical celebration of that movement, a call to arms for future generations to pick up the banner of the cause. “Our” in the book’s title refers to the history of the movement, not to the history of Ukrainians in Canada as a whole. Krawchuk’s inability to shake off certain presumptions adds to the sense of continuity with his earlier writings. He consistently and unquestioningly portrays the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine as a positive development, those who opposed Soviet power (Petliura in particular) as evil, Ukrainian nationalists as lowly thugs, and those who had any dealings with the Germans during the Second World War as undoubtedly war criminals of some sort.

Such limitations notwithstanding, Our History is a useful work. It is by far the most accessible overview of the Ukrainian pro-Communist Left in Canada, even if it is largely an uncritical organizational history. It also reads quite well—an important consideration, given that it was originally written, but never published, in Ukrainian—and does not dwell on minutiae.

Krawchuk’s memoirs, Bez nedomovok (commonly rendered in English as “Without Hesitation”) are much in line with the tentative nature of Our History. They tell us some
things we might have not known before, but they do not constitute a tell-all work. Again, Krawchuk acknowledges that Lobay was “correct,” but he does not deal with the implications of this recognition. He notes that Khrushchev’s revelations at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU were shocking, but he does not mention how they were dealt with—or buried—by the Ukrainian-Canadian Left. The list could go on.

The memoirs are at their best when dealing with personalities—members of the pro-Communist Left in Canada, Soviet officials in Canada (or the United States), Soviet Ukrainian officials, and the like. They provide the reader with the sort of accounts and opinions that cannot be obtained from a conventional historical narrative. This is particularly significant insofar as Krawchuk, as a prominent Ukrainian-Canadian Communist, had dealings with a host of significant Soviet Ukrainian political and cultural figures (from the Soviet Ukrainian Party leaders Dmytro Manuilsky and Petro Shelest to the former political prisoner Nadiia Surovtsova).

The centerpiece of the memoirs is Krawchuk’s account of his participation in a CPC delegation sent to Ukraine in 1967 to investigate Soviet nationalities policy there, particularly as it related to Russification. The group’s report was highly critical of Soviet practices and caused an absolute furor upon its release. Ultimately, after intense Soviet pressure, the report lost its official status, although it maintained the face-saving status of a Party internal-discussion paper. Krawchuk’s rendition of his role as point man in the mission and the fights that followed it makes fascinating reading.

One wishes that Krawchuk had at least attempted to deal with certain aspects of the historical record that do not render him in such a favourable light, specifically “Marko Terlytsia,” the 1932–33 famine, and the late John Kolasky. Krawchuk wrote several vitriolic, anti-nationalist tracts under the pseudonym Marko Terlytsia. Did he do this out of conviction, or was he pressured to do so? His memoirs would have been a proper forum for some revelation. Regarding the famine, Krawchuk mentions his dismay that people in Ukraine were reluctant to discuss the matter. He recalls that the AUUC withstood pressure to print Douglas Tottle’s absolutely dreadful diatribe, Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (1987). Yet his memoirs are completely quiet about the pro-Soviet stance of the AUUC (while he was its president) during the Ukrainian diaspora’s 1982–83 commemoration of the famine. Finally, Krawchuk is seemingly pleased to reveal that the AUUC was under pressure to denounce Kolasky’s writings about the Russification of Ukraine’s education system, but he is never willing to deal directly with Kolasky’s analysis (or actions) and summary expulsion from the official Communist fold in which he played an active role.

This lack of candour is not surprising. Krawchuk was a Party man, although within his own definition—a national-communist (of sorts) within a Ukrainian-Canadian parameter. He was willing to fight for the proverbial Ukrainian cause, but in the end he bowed to Party discipline. In his later works he was quite willing—even pleased—to present a slightly more rounded picture of the movement’s history, but he was never willing to question it fundamentally. Although Krawchuk may have been disillusioned by certain aspects of the past, his faith was never shattered.

Andrij Makuch
University of Toronto
Guide to Research:
The Peter Krawchuk Fonds at the National Archives of Canada

Myron Momryk

The acquisition of the Peter Krawchuk Fonds by the National Archives of Canada (NAC) in 1996 filled a large gap in the available archival resources on the history of the organized Ukrainian community in Canada. In the past, attempts by researchers and scholars to write a balanced history of this community were hindered by the lack of a wide selection of archival resources. The NAC holds extensive records on the community from various federal government departments and agencies—Immigration, External Affairs, Citizenship, Labour, Royal Canadian Mounted Police—but its record of the Ukrainian Canadians' experience as documented by their own leaders and organizations has been incomplete. A modern scholarly presentation of Ukrainian-Canadian history can be produced only after the historical records of all segments of the community, including the Left, have been studied. These records, combined with federal government sources, will give historians a better and fuller picture of the evolution of Ukrainian-Canadian history.

It was with this goal in mind that in 1983 I approached Peter Krawchuk about donating his archival collection to the NAC. Mr. Krawchuk, an established journalist and author with a national reputation in the Ukrainian-Canadian pro-Communist Left, knew the value of archives. (The acquisition of his papers was certainly within the NAC’s mandate, which is to acquire and preserve records of national significance.) But he replied that he was in the middle of various writing projects and that he needed to keep his archival materials for an indeterminate period. I maintained contact with Mr. Krawchuk on a regular basis over the following years. He was persuaded to visit the NAC during one of his trips to Ottawa, during which he had an opportunity to view the reference and reading rooms, finding aids, and storage facilities and to meet with the staff.

Peter Krawchuk was in many ways an exemplar of the second wave of Ukrainian immigration to Canada. He was born on 8 July 1911 in Stoianiv in Austrian-ruled Galicia. In the post-World War I period, his native village came under Polish rule. Mr. Krawchuk was educated in the local village school and attended the Gymnasium in nearby Radekhiv until it was closed by Polish authorities in 1926. He became active in various local
political and cultural organizations, most notably the Prosvita society and the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Peasants’ and Workers’ Socialist Alliance (Sel-Rob), eventually becoming a member of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). His political activities as an organizer and public speaker attracted the attention of the Polish police. With his father’s permission, he emigrated to Canada in April 1930 to join a brother who had emigrated earlier.

Mr. Krawchuk arrived in Winnipeg at the beginning of the Depression. During the 1930s he witnessed its devastating effects on the hopes and dreams of many Ukrainian immigrants and their families, both in rural and urban areas. Soon after his arrival in Canada, he joined the pro-Communist Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), and in 1931 he became a member of the Central Committee of its Youth Section. During this period he also joined the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). In 1936 he attended the ULFTA’s Higher Education Course, whose graduates became notable leaders in the Ukrainian-Canadian pro-Communist movement. After he completed that course, Mr. Krawchuk began his nearly lifelong career as a journalist, at the newspaper Ukraïnski robitynchy visti in Winnipeg.

In May and June 1940, the unexpected defeat of France by Nazi Germany created an international crisis. Canada’s federal government, fearful of the apparent influence of international political movements and their contribution to political instability, reacted by interning “the usual suspects.” The CPC and related organizations were outlawed, and the government interned Mr. Krawchuk and other leaders of the CPC. He was held in internment camps and prisons located in Kananiskis, Alberta, Petawawa, Ontario, and Hull, Quebec. During his internment, he had long discussions on political and historical subjects with the veterans of the Ukrainian-Canadian labour movement, who encouraged him to document the experiences of its early years for the benefit of later generations. He wrote about the internment experience in his book Interned without Cause (1985).

Mr. Krawchuk was released by the Canadian authorities in February 1942. Thereafter he continued his work in the Ukrainian-Canadian pro-Communist Left. After the war he moved with his family to Toronto and became a leading member of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), the successor of the ULFTA. In 1947 he was a member of a delegation that brought a large contribution of Ukrainian-Canadian humanitarian aid to Ukraine. There he witnessed the results of the wartime devastation of Ukraine, which permanently embittered him against the enemies of Soviet Ukraine, including those in Canada. He remained in Ukraine for two years, serving as a special correspondent for several Ukrainian pro-Communist newspapers in Canada and the United States. His experiences are chronicled in his book Shistsot dniiv na Ukraini: Zapysky korespondenta (1950).

In the 1950s and 1960s Mr. Krawchuk held many positions on the national executive of the AUUC. He also visited Ukraine many times to attend various conferences and meetings. During these visits he established lasting friendships with Ukrainian poets, artists, and writers, became aware of the successes and failures of the Soviet system, and was profoundly disturbed by the Russification trends in Ukraine. In 1967 he was a member of the CPC delegation that visited Ukraine to study the Russification problem. The delegation issued a report about its findings that was critical of Soviet nationality policy. This document, known as the Kiev Report, caused much controversy within the CPC, and in October 1967 it was withdrawn as an official party document.
Mr. Krawchuk continued his press and organizational activities, however. He also began writing on the history and culture of Ukrainians in Canada with the aim of promoting the preservation of the Ukrainian language and literature in Canada and informing Ukrainian Canadians about the achievements of their ancestors in the early years of the Canadian labour movement. During his career, Mr. Krawchuk published numerous articles and over forty books and booklets, several of which were translated into English. He retired as a journalist in 1991.

Mr. Krawchuk supported the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1991. His memoirs, Bez nedomovok, were published in Ukraine in 1996. In August 1996 he donated his archival collection to the NAC, but he retained some material to complete a book project. Mr. Krawchuk died on 3 February 1998 in Toronto.

Peter Krawchuk was, without a doubt, the leading publicist of the Ukrainian left-wing movement in Canada for nearly a half-century. His writings represent almost the entire production of the "progressive" school in Ukrainian-Canadian historiography. Researchers interested in the history of the Cold War in Canada, the Ukrainian-Canadian community, and relations between Ukrainian Canadians and Ukraine will find the Peter Krawchuk Fonds at the NAC an invaluable archival resource.

* * *

The thirty-six volumes of the Peter Krawchuk Fonds are divided into two series. The first series contains Mr. Krawchuk's personal documentation, correspondence, diaries, memoirs, draft articles, and manuscripts. The second series includes his documentation on various Ukrainian left-wing organizations and research material on Ukrainian literary and historical subjects. Most of the material is in Ukrainian, the language in which Mr. Krawchuk wrote. His papers document his love of the Ukrainian language and literature. From 1960 on he kept a diary of his activities, including his travels. He maintained a large correspondence with friends in Canada and Ukraine and kept copies of his outgoing letters. During his career on the national executive of the AUUC, Mr. Krawchuk visited AUUC branches across Canada and acquired some dormant records of local AUUC branches, which are included in the funds. A finding aid to the collection is available. Researchers should note that access to the the Peter Krawchuk Fonds is restricted.

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Myron Momryk
Manuscript Division
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Letter to the Editor

27 May 1998

Book reviews are always an interesting arena in which to undertake a number of possible tasks. Some reviewers do not bother to read their designated books but prefer to use the review to announce what should have been included by the author. Others use it to press home points and settle old scores. Meanwhile, others use the occasion to critically review the work. In reviewing my work I am not sure Roman Solchanyk was successful in any of these three possibilities.

I, of course, welcome all attention and critical remarks; even when these reviews are directed at books written five and published three years ago in Roman Solchanyk’s review of my Ukrainian Security Policy (Journal of Ukrainian Studies 22, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1997), pp. 187–89). Dr. Solchanyk’s personal views as to his ‘dissatisfaction’, ‘less than thoughtful and in-depth discussion’ presented in ‘a dry and vapid style’ are, of course, his right to hold. Readers though may not be aware that the book was published by a Think Tank and therefore intended not for an academic but a wider public audience.

Dr. Solchanyk’s criticism of my ‘heavy dose of minutiae’ seem strange when he precisely resorts to minutiae himself in his critical review. Unfortunately though, his presentation of these ‘minutiae’ are factually wrong and resort to misquotations. For example, contrary to what Dr. Solchanyk states there is no mention of any declining growth rate by myself on p. 41. Why therefore bring it up except to try and score a point in an invisible battle? On p. 9 Western Ukraine is correctly described as ‘stateless’ after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire—which it was. Again, what is the point being made by the reviewer? Again, on p. 35 Dr. Solchanyk points out that the Crimean vote for Ukrainian independence was 54.2 percent. If he had read the text carefully he would have seen that I gave the figure of 36.5 percent as that of Crimeans who were eligible to vote who voted for independence. This was followed in brackets by ‘54 percent of those who voted’. 54.2 or 54 per cent? Is this not splitting hairs a little too much?

On a final note, Dr. Solchanyk may not be in agreement with my 1993 conclusion that the CIS was evolving in the direction of a confederation but there are other views on this matter. One has only to look at the Belarusian-Russian union, the customs union of five CIS states and the Russian-Armenian military alliance. In addition, Russian troops remain ensconced in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia against these countries will, much as they were at the time the book was written.

On all other points raised by Dr. Solchanyk I am very grateful for his shrewd comments. I only wish he had read the book far earlier and far more carefully which would have avoided the misrepresentation of the facts which have clearly occurred.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Taras Kuzio

Editor, Ukraine: Country Forecast (Economist Intelligence Unit)
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*Journal of Ukrainian Studies,*
Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures,
University of Toronto,
Toronto, Ont., M5S 1A1,
Canada

telephone: (416) 978-8669/978-6934
fax: (416) 978-2672
e-mail: r.senkus@utoronto.ca